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This thesis explores the inter-Asian operations of Taiwanese “idol drama” – star-centred TV 
drama set in the twenty-first-century Taiwan, targeting female audiences. It examines how the 
industry has developed international, multilateral co-operation relationships after the neo-liberal 
deregulation in its domestic market. Theoretically, it accounts for the cultural politics (of regional 
and Taiwanese representation) in the production aspect by examining different regional 
production strategies in the industry.  
I propose to view idol drama as a medium subject to three dominant, pedagogical and 
oppressive value systems (post-colonial nationalist, patriarchal, and capitalist/commercial) in 
Taiwan and other East Asian countries. The scattered dominant value systems, which resemble, 
yet contradict each other in different aspects, form the context where idol drama operates. To 
analyse these operations and their imaginations, I modify Stuart Hall’s concept of (mediated) 
articulation into the Taiwanese context. I contextualise idol drama from the perspective of 
Taiwan’s political economy and its TV market, especially political democratisation, yet with 
polemic contestation of Sino-centrism and Taiwan-centrism, media deregulation within a 
fragmented domestic market in a time of globalisation.  Regionalised viewing of TV drama in East 
Asian markets will also be assessed. 
The initial section looks into how different Taiwanese idol drama producers “package” 
different East Asian elements to appeal to both domestic and international markets. The second 
part analyses four inter-Asian packaging strategies in terms of their struggles for legitimacy and 
contestations surrounding the productions. The last part examines the mediated articulations of 
Taiwanese subjectivity with the patriarchal nationalist forces of its stronger neighbours in East 
Asia. Different articulations about Taiwanese identity, with social and gender values in the 
forefront and national relations in the background, have been mediated in this inter-Asian 
packaging to form a multi-faceted system of images that together represent the Taiwanese 
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Note on Romanisation 
East Asian researchers are referred to using the Western convention: first names come before 
family names. Names of East Asian figures, mainly politicians, media celebrities, stars, TV drama 
workers and drama characters, are presented according to the East Asian naming convention 
with their family names coming before their first names. Where these names have an established 
conventional spelling in English, I have retained the spelling. When the East Asian figures have 
adopted English names that have been commonly referred to in English-speaking world, I will use 
their English names. Otherwise, I have adopted standardised forms of Romanisation for all East 
Asian languages that do not normally use Roman script. 
As Taiwanese people usually romanise their names with Wade-Giles Romanisation system 
while people of People’s Republic of China romanise their names with Hanyu Pinyin 
Romanisation system, it is more natural, respectful and politically correct to transliterate names 
in the thesis in their own conventions. Names of drama characters will be romanised mainly 
according to their Mandarin pronunciation with the same principle, which also applies to the 
transliteration of names of authors of non-English sources from Taiwan and PRC. 
For Japanese and South Korean characters in the dramas, I will identify their names in their 
languages. If I cannot identify the Japanese and Korean names, I will use and romanise their 
Mandarin names with Wade-Giles Romanisation System. The original terms of all these East 
Asian names will be provided in Appendix A: Glossary. 
The transliteration system for Chinese words, such as 偶像劇 (ouxiangju) used in this thesis 
is Hanyu Pinyin. Hanyu Pinyin is also used to transliterate headings and titles of non-English 





New Taiwan Dollar Converted to British Pound 
Figures in the New Taiwan Dollar, such as drama production fees, are converted to British Pounds 
at the exchange rate of 1 New Taiwan Dollar to 0.02 British Pounds, as in 2015. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Research Questions 
Since the end of the Cold War and the beginning of neo-liberal global/regional media flow in the 
early 1990s, East Asia has witnessed the popularity of TV dramas made in the region among 
female audiences, such as Japanese and South Korean TV dramas (Iwabuchi, 2004a; Chua and 
Iwabuchi, 2008). This popularity seems to have reduced the influence of American media within 
the region (Iwabuchi, 2004b, pp.4-5). After decades of importation and consumption of foreign 
media culture (especially from America and Japan), since the early 2000s, the Taiwanese TV 
drama industry has created its own star-centred commercial urban dramas, locally coined as 
“ouxiangju”, which literally translates as “idol drama”. The idol drama from Taiwan has attracted 
regional female audiences and has grown rapidly in the twenty-first-century Taiwanese TV 
production industry (Ida, 2008; Zhu, 2008, pp.90-91; Deppman, 2009; Heryanto, 2010; F.-c. I. 
Yang, 2013). It generally runs 13 to 20 episodes of 70 minutes each, excluding commercial time, 
and specialises in romantic love stories. It is circulated in the East Asian drama markets, targeting 
the region’s female audiences (initially teens and early twenties, then teens to forties) (Kao, 2004, 
p.164, p.185; Feng, 2006 cited in M.-J. Lin, 2006b, p.41; Wu and Jiang, 2010a, p.9; Wang, 2016). 
The dramas have not only catered for Chinese-speaking audiences but also reached non-
Chinese-speaking East Asian audiences. Thus, this drama can be broadly understood as a 
commercial female genre operating at regional level.  
Inasmuch as the consumption of idol drama is regionalised in this laissez-faire manner, so 
is its production. As I will analyse in the thesis, the success of idol drama Meteor Garden (2001) 
created a regional network of resources so that Taiwanese TV production companies have tried 
to take advantage of this, experimenting with “production regionalisation”. Taking a flexible and 
even opportunistic approach of regional, or more precisely, “inter-Asian” operation, different 
Taiwanese idol drama producers “package” different East Asian elements to produce TV dramas. 
For example, Meteor Garden’s producer Angie Chai has integrated East Asian markets and sold 
dramas to the dealers or TV stations in East Asia (2004 cited in Liang, 2004, p.208; Liang, 2010). 
Virginia Liu, another idol drama producer, identifies her company as a show-business brand with 
“bases in Taiwan, aiming at all entertainment-related business in (East) Asia, to ultimately 
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worldwide”.1 Liu says that since she runs an independent company, her work is quite borderless 
and she must go out to make contacts with business in many countries (personal communication, 
March 26, 2013). Meanwhile, the producer Tsai Yueh-Hsun, who announced “New Asian projects 
of Chinese-language film and television” (Wang, 2012; C.-W. Wu, 2012), suggested that 
Taiwanese TV dramas should produce more inclusive imaginations that do not “speak from a 
particular social historical position” (Tsai, 2012). Similarly, Gala TV, a Taiwanese satellite TV 
company that has produced TV dramas adapting Japanese manga (Japanese comics), believes 
that its regionally-oriented products would act as an open container housing different regionally 
popular elements (Hsiao, 2012). The aforementioned producers have formed a variety of 
international production relations with non-Taiwanese media companies from the PRC (People’s 
Republic of China), Japan and South Korea. 
TV is usually considered a national medium. Its production and content are conventionally 
national, having a national setting, presuming a national audience, and circulating mainly in a 
country (Caughie, 2000). TV programmes from strong media production systems would enjoy 
international circulation, such as the US, Japan, Hong Kong and Egypt, but their contents are 
predominantly domestic productions (Fiske, 1987; MacDonald, 1990; Ma, 1999; Tsai, 2002; Abu-
Lughod, 2004; Lukacs, 2010). For post-colonial nation-states, TV programmes are an important 
tool for social development and the production of modern national citizens (Abu-Lughod, 2004). 
Considering the prevailing presumption of TV as a national medium, the international operation 
or, more precisely, inter-Asian packaging of the Taiwanese TV drama industry mentioned above 
is problematic. Taiwan is a relatively small country that has a population of around 23 million 
people. But it has opened up its domestic TV market for foreign imports in a neo-liberal 
deregulation since 1993 disregarding the fact that it has not had a strong media industry, and has 
situated near far more influential countries such as the PRC, Japan and South Korea, which have 
had more established media systems (Feng, 1995, pp.31-65). By neo-liberal media deregulation, 
I refer to the Taiwanese government’s opening of TV business to foreign media and free import 
of foreign content under pressure from US media enterprises and government who were 
advocates of neo-liberal global free flow of goods, according to David Harvey (2005), and the 
Taiwanese taking of the neo-liberalism discourse concerning potential benefits of free market 
                                                     
1
 Available at: http://www.pgestar.com/about.php [Accessed 6 October 2015]. 
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media system to its media and society (Chang, 1994; Feng, 1995; 2007). Under such 
circumstance, the inter-Asian packaged idol dramas have created multilateral transnational 
production linkages, as I will introduce in the thesis. In terms of drama content, a number of them 
have non-Taiwanese elements (such as settings, actors, characters), while producing stories 
depicting contemporary urban lives in Taiwan, the region and beyond.  
The above phenomenon triggered my research questions that can be summarised as follows: 
1. Where are idol drama’s markets in East Asia and how has the industry competed in the markets? 
2. What kinds of regional creative strategies have idol dramas implemented? What are their 
advantages and limitations? How have the strategies been considered in Taiwan and in the 
industry? Which strategies have worked successfully, in commercial or cultural senses? 
3. How have the idol dramas imagined Taiwan in relation to different East Asian countries, such 
as the PRC, Japan and South Korea? How should we assess the imaginations? What kinds of 
inter-Asian articulations concerning shared values and national relations have been mediated in 
these idol dramas?  
These questions focus on the practices of drama workers as signifying agents and outcomes 
of their mediations that are situated in highly laissez-faire contexts/conditions. Briefly mentioning 
here, I will answer them by taking on the study of media in cultural studies that has focused on 
questions of context and mediation. I will contextualise inter-Asian packaging of Taiwanese idol 
drama from the perspective of the political economy of Taiwan and its TV market, in particular 
political democratisation, yet with polemic contestation of Sino-centrism and Taiwan-centrism, 
and media deregulation with market fragmentation and multiple channels full of legally circulated 
foreign imports in a time of neo-liberal globalisation. I will then examine how Taiwanese idol drama 
producers co-operate with non-Taiwanese media industries, “package” different East Asian 
elements, and articulate Taiwanese value systems and those of their foreign co-operators in their 
works, since neo-liberal global and regional media flow became an irreversible trend.  
 
1.2 Significance of the Research 
This contextually informed analysis of idol drama’s inter-Asian packaging and articulation would 
contribute to academia in media studies. Empirically, the thesis explores how idol drama as a 
female-oriented TV industry has developed a variety of international co-operation relationships, 
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in the neo-liberal deregulated environment. It asks question about how the female-oriented 
industry from a comparatively small yet politically contested Taiwan has sustained itself regionally 
after the deregulation in its domestic TV market. Regionally-made audio-visual products and 
narratives are not new in East Asia. For instance, since the mid-twentieth century, Hong Kong 
film industry has been producing export-oriented films and has developed its own unique inter-
Asian film-making as well as cross-cultural style of storytelling (Yeh and Davis, 2002). But such 
strategy has been considered difficult for its time-consuming negotiations and scripting for 
different national talents by Peter Ho-Sun Chan, a Hong Kong film-maker who actively conducted 
the strategy during the early 2000s and later seemed to have given it up (Yeh, 2010b). He even 
commented that inter-Asian audio-visual productions hardly operate on a long-term basis and 
thus are relatively rare (Lo, 2005, p.142). In this light, inter-Asian packaging at regional-scale 
operation is a contingent yet controversial strategy, in opposition to the production strategy that 
mainly focuses on the Taiwanese domestic TV drama market which I call “commercial localism”. 
How Taiwanese idol drama has been doing in their inter-Asian packaging and operating at 
regional scale is an interesting question to both industrial and academic experts. 
Theoretically, the thesis offers an account of the cultural politics (of the regional and 
Taiwanese representation) in the production aspect of idol drama in an era of neo-liberal 
globalisation. It does so by examining different regional production strategies in the industry, 
arguments surrounding them and their efforts to obtain legitimacy. As I will discuss later in the 
thesis, Taiwanese society in the 1990s experienced the decline of Sino-centric KMT (Kuomintang, 
also known as Chinese Nationalist Party) authoritarian rule that was replaced with political 
contestation between Sino-centric nationalism and Taiwan-centric nationalism. After the end of 
the KMT authoritarian rule, Taiwanese TV business was no longer oligopolised by TV stations 
controlled by the KMT government. New TV stations and the free trade of foreign TV dramas have 
created a fragmented market of TV consumption since 1993 (Feng, 1995, pp.31-65; Curtin, 2007, 
pp.151-175).  
Fragmentation has also appeared in TV drama production, as will be illustrated later. In order 
to compete in the domestic market, several Taiwanese production companies, who have their 
own strategies and production preferences, have actively sought and articulated specific foreign 
partners in their inter-Asian operations, such as Taiwanese-PRC, Taiwanese-Japanese, 
Taiwanese-Korean co-operations, etc. The Taiwanese production companies compete in the 
21 
 
market for audiences with their own production strategies and the foreign partners. The foreign 
partners are “allies” in the sense that they share similar ideas on drama discourse and values so 
that they can co-operate with specific Taiwanese idol drama production companies. By 
accommodating the foreign allying partners – a practice that is not without friction and constraint 
– the Taiwanese producers attempt to survive in and contribute to the heterogeneity and 
contestation in this field. Their inter-Asian dramas articulate the value systems of the countries 
where their allies are from, and actively bring these values into the field of Taiwanese idol drama 
making. Consequently, these inter-Asian dramas (alongside their foreign allies) have competed 
with each other, providing different social values and political ideas in their competition for 
audiences. 
The topic of cultural politics constitutes an important theme for critical media and cultural 
studies. In the thesis, a scene will be analysed in which the cultural politics in the inter-Asian idol 
drama industry are not only domestic, but also international and multilateral. The cultural politics 
surrounding idol drama’s packaging take place in the competition between Taiwanese TV drama 
production companies in the neo-liberal yet fragmented Taiwanese TV industry. As the 
companies are linked to various co-operators in East Asia, their cultural politics is international. It 
is also multilateral as the inter-Asian packaging of Taiwanese idol drama engages many countries; 
one idol drama would engage one or two foreign co-operator(s). Previous researches on the co-
operation of either film or TV tended to specifically focus on the latter, e.g. a specific Taiwanese 
film/TV drama that has a bilateral dimension between Taiwan and mainland China or between 
Taiwan and Japan (Shih, 1995; 1998; Curtin, 2007, pp.133-150; Feng, 2007; S. C. Wang, 2009; 
Chang, 2010; Yeh, 2010a). They have failed to provide a broader account of the 
multilaterality/multilateralism of Taiwanese international engagements in a multi-polar world. 
Furthermore, this thesis will examine the representations of Taiwanese and the region in idol 
drama that targets female audiences and it does so with an awareness of the 
multilaterality/multilateralism mentioned above. The idol dramas have included nationally different 
East Asian characters that interact with the Taiwanese on screen. The interactions are multilateral: 
for example, mainland Chinese residents whose houses are being knocked down by the company 
of a Taiwanese businessman; a young mainland Chinese man marrying a Taiwanese woman; a 
Japanese girl coming to Taiwan to find her Taiwanese mother; a top Japanese star who interacts 
with stars of Taiwanese idol drama; a South Korean woman and a young Hong Kong man who 
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make a living in Taiwan; a female South Korean film-maker being in a love relationship with a 
Taiwanese man; a South Korean film director making a film in Taiwan, etc. Such imaginations of 
Taiwan in relation to particular neighbours become “inter-Asian”, constructing different symbolic 
discourses on Taiwanese identity within this dynamic region, in an era of globalisation.  
In the discipline of media and cultural studies, media representation is a key theme. 
Analysing the depiction of Taiwanese and East Asian individuals in idol dramas is important for 
studies on Taiwanese national and cultural identities, since Taiwanese national and cultural 
identification is under much contestation between three nationalist political groups in mainland 
China and Taiwan, which will be introduced in the following section of the current chapter. Mark 
Harrison (2009, p.52) notes that “the Taiwanese write their history with geo-politics”. 
Representation of inter-Asian interactions is not a new concept for contemporary Taiwanese 
writers and film-makers, as its history has been related to the movements of its stronger 
neighbours and conquering outsiders, especially mainland Chinese, Japanese, and, more 
historically distant, the Dutch and Spanish. As the contemporary world is characterised by the 
central position of image products, especially film and TV, in the formation of cultural identities 
(Hall, 1991a, p.27), the dramas’ depictions of both contemporary Taiwanese and East Asian 
characters may shape and affirm the identities and values of their audiences in a certain way. But 
different audio-visual medium platforms have their own narrative traditions and political, economic 
and ideologically value-laden creative conditions. For example, Taiwan New Cinema constructed 
the geo-political history in a realistic fashion (Yip, 2004; Berry and Lu, 2005; Yeh and Davis, 2005; 
Davis and Chen, 2007; Lin and Sang, 2012; Tweedie, 2013; Lupke, 2016). Its film-makers 
struggled to express themselves in an authoritarian, Sino-centric regime before, during and after 
the 1990s.  Because of their loyalty to personal authorship, they have survived mainly in the minor 
art houses as well as international film festivals and have had a limited audience base that 
respects and appreciates their say (Berry and Lu, 2005, p.5).2 The US-based Taiwanese feminist 
                                                     
2
 These films, which circulate in minor non-commercial international filmic networks such as festivals and art houses, are 
different from idol dramas because of, firstly, their commitment to self-expression and, secondly, their observational 
realism based on directors’ personal memories. The directors drew on their own personal memories and ethnic 
backgrounds for film-making and together they established a signature historically realistic film style that indirectly echoed 
and encouraged the larger Taiwanese cultural localisation movement. The cinemas centred on the subalterns in the 
ethnically heterogeneous Taiwanese society, and mainly on the three largest ethnic groups, Mainlanders (waishengren), 
Hoklo people and Hakka people. Although the Taiwan New Cinemas achieved critical success in the 1980s and 1990s, 
the directors mainly made films that addressed their own personal memories and socio-ethnic backgrounds and visioned 
Taiwan through their eyes. Their films nonetheless overlooked more subalterns, such as homosexuality and indigenous 
people (Chiu, 2007, p.18). These film directors, who had strong commitment to their own expression concerning subjects’ 
micro experiences impacted by the macro historical transition in Taiwan, cared less about the market return of their films. 
23 
 
scholar Shu-mei Shih (2003, p.146) once commented that, in an age of globalisation, the 
multicultural Taiwanese individuals can take advantage of the global network for their own 
purposes. If the Taiwan New Cinema has raised funds internationally, another cultural production 
system may also make use of overseas circulation, such as the idol dramas that target the East 
Asian female audience.  
In contrast to the Taiwan New Cinema, idol dramas address a mainly female audience in 
Taiwan and East Asia, using a commercial logic (Deppman, 2009; F.-c. I. Yang, 2013, pp.1073-
1075). Their constructions of the geo-political and cultural realities of contemporary Taiwanese 
society deserve attention and critical analysis from both cultural and gender viewpoints because 
they would have an invisible influence on the targeted East Asian female audience who can 
associate with and relate to the constructions and may affect the regional socio-cultural 
identifications of the audience. In this thesis, I will argue that the idol drama industrial workers 
articulate the mainstream ideas and value systems of the countries where their allies are from 
and those of Taiwan in the inter-Asian representations of the idol drama.  
 
1.3 A Brief History of Taiwan and Taiwanese TV 
1.3.1 Taiwanese Political Economic History 
A brief detour to the complex histories of Taiwanese politics of identities and neo-liberal 
deregulation of its TV industry is necessary here since they constitute the political, economic and 
social cultural contexts and production conditions of idol drama. Taiwan has been “on civilisation’s 
edge” but significant in the maritime exploration of much stronger global and regional powers 
(mainland China, Japan and US), as an island located on the Pacific Ocean south east of the 
Chinese mainland (Yeh and Davis, 2005, p.4; M.-C. Tsai, 2010). Its numerous ethnic inhabitants 
consequently have been influenced by the much stronger neighbouring and foreign forces (Roy, 
2003; M.-C. Tsai, 2010; Wakabayashi, 2014). These inhabitants have also formed complex 
ethnically dominating relations with each other: indigenous people have been dominated by Hoklo 
                                                     
In the 1980s, the smaller-budget films were supported by state-owned film studios that tolerated/encouraged diversity in 
film-making. This is not to say that they never had domestic commercial success. The Taiwan New Cinemas came at the 
time of the political democratisation in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The broadly defined political and male-oriented 
films created a few commercial successes. In the late 1980s, their works received international acclaim from European 
film festivals, and their target audiences shifted to global critical audiences cultivated in the international art-house and 
film festivals. But throughout the 1990s these political expressions had little commercial success in the Taiwanese 
domestic film market. The directors were also criticised for failing to attract the general audience. Commercial failure of 
the cinemas in Taiwanese box office was paradoxical in view of its international acclaim (Davis, 2007, p.8). 
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and Hakka people who arrived in Taiwan from south eastern Chinese prefectures hundred years; 
all together, they experienced Imperial Japanese colonial domination during 1895 and 1945 and 
later were ruled by the authoritarian Sino-centric KMT (Chinese Nationalist Party) during 1945 
and 2000 (Chun, 1996; 2000; 2002; Kuo, 2003; Wang, 2004; Ngo and Wang, 2011; Wakabayashi, 
2014, pp.388-402). 
Since 1945, Taiwan was governed by the KMT that founded the Republic of China (ROC), 
the official name for Taiwan, when the KMT was still based on mainland China. The KMT was 
politically competing against the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) that founded the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC). The KMT lost in the Chinese Civil War and moved its base to Taiwan 
in 1949. After the outbreak of Korean War, the KMT has been protected by US and it has been 
pro-American and ideologically opposed to the CCP’s PRC (Roy, 2003; Wakabayashi, 2014, 
pp.64-92). The KMT was Sino-centric Chinese nationalistic, maintaining it being the protector of 
Chinese traditional Confucian culture so as to claim it being the legitimate Chinese regime (Chun, 
1996; 2000). The KMT brought with it a suppressive authoritarian rule to Taiwan, controlling this 
society and regulating media forcefully with martial law during 1949 and 1987 when the world 
experienced the Cold War (1947-1991) (Lee, 2000, p.125). Culturally, the KMT re-Sinicised the 
post-colonial Taiwanese people and promoted Chinese nationalism with which it oriented 
Taiwanese national identity (Chun, 1996; 2000). It favoured “mainlanders” or “waishengren” 
(literally meaning “people from outside Taiwan Province”) to “benshengren” (literally meaning 
“people based in the Taiwan Province”, and ethnically referring to Hoklo and Hakka people who 
just experienced 50-year Japanese colonial rule) (Ngo and Wang, 2011, p.3; Wakabayashi, 2014, 
p.95).3  
However, after the ROC ruled by the KMT lost the right to represent China to the PRC in the 
United Nations in 1971 as well as US’s official diplomatic relationship in 1979, the 1980s saw not 
only the rise of cultural localisation (cultural de-Sinicisation) but also political democratisation 
movements that asked for lifting martial law in Taiwan (Chun, 2000; A.-c. Hsiao, 2000; Roy, 2003). 
Interaction with the world, especially the US-centred West, is believed to be an important factor 
                                                     
3
 Its population policy was not localised, as if it were to return to the mainland quickly. Those who moved from the mainland 
with the KMT kept their own mainland provincial identities and later were identified as “waishengren” in total. Those who 
had inhabited Taiwan were governed by the Taiwan Provincial government and gradually have been identified as 
“benshengren” (Ngo and Wang, 2011, p.3; Wakabayashi, 2014, p.95). 
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in the Taiwanese nation-building movement (H.-l. Wang, 2000; 2002; 2007; Lynch, 2002). The 
more globally the Taiwanese travel in the world that is governed by the Westphalian system of 
sovereign nation-states, the more urgently they feel the need to have a Taiwanese national status 
(Wang, 1999; 2000). The movement of Taiwanese nation-building led by non-KMT political 
activists from mainly the Hoklo benshengren ethnicity, formed the Democratic Progressive Party 
(DPP) in 1986, sought political and media rights, and asked for the end of authoritarian rule and 
even for the establishment of a new state (H.-l. Wang, 1999; 2000; 2002; 2007; Chuang, 2011; 
Wakabayashi, 2014, p.187).  
PRC has claimed that Taiwan is one of its provinces, which has been recognised widely in 
international politics. It has promoted its political unification scheme “One Country, Two Systems”, 
to which KMT and DPP have responded differently (Schubert and Braig, 2011; Wu, 2011). 4 The 
KMT has articulated to PRC’s stance by taking an ambiguous discourse made in 1992, the 1992 
Consensus, which acknowledges that “there is one Chinese state in the world, but this state is 
subject to the interpretations in Taiwan and mainland China” (Wu, 2011; Hughes, 2014). The KMT 
wishes to keep Taiwan “a part of a Chinese country, which is the ROC”, following its Sino-centric 
Chinese nationalism. KMT, who might agree with the statement that “Taiwan belongs to ‘China’”, 
does not accept PRC’s unification scheme (Wu, 2011). On the contrary, the DPP refuses PRC’s 
provision more strongly than KMT, claiming that the political future of Taiwan remains in dispute 
and should be decided by the people in Taiwan (Schubert and Braig, 2011, p.75). Building a 
Taiwanese nation and the denial of the 1992 Consensus are the uncompromised political goals 
of DPP.  
After more than a decade of political competition, the DPP won presidency and ruled Taiwan 
during 2000 and 2008. DPP oriented Taiwanese people towards a Taiwan-centric stance (Chang, 
2006; Schubert and Braig, 2011). PRC ratified Anti-Secession Law to prevent further nation-
building move of DPP administration in 2005 (Schubert and Braig, 2011). The KMT came back to 
power in 2008 and will be incumbent until early 2016 (Wakabayashi, 2014, p.iv; p.365). It tried to 
orient Taiwan back to a Sino-centric stance (Hughes, 2014).  
                                                     
4
 The principle of “One Country, Two Systems” is a political arrangement formulated by the PRC government in the early 
1980s for Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macau, which have had capitalistic political and economic systems. It promises that 
their political and economic systems will remain, even when they reunify with the PRC, as a “special administrative region”. 
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To compete for political power, the KMT and DPP have had different economic policies with 
PRC in the twenty-first century. During Cold War, the KMT-ruled Taiwan benefited in the US-
Japan-Taiwan economic connection for its economic performance (Gold, 1986; Ching, 1994, 
p.202). Nonetheless, since the late 1980s and 1990s, PRC has been Taiwanese manufacturing 
sector’s production base (Schubert, 2010, p.74). Exporting goods to the PRC market has become 
a main target since the 2000s (Chow, 2013). The PRC has arguably exerted its economic market 
power to increase the economic integration between Taiwan and the PRC so as to encourage the 
Taiwanese’s positive political attitude toward unification (Tanner, 2007). Since then Taiwanese 
economic and socio-political-cultural aspects have been in widening disjuncture, in which KMT 
and DPP holding welcoming and sceptic positions towards the economic integration with 
mainland China, represented by the Economic Co-operation Framework Agreement (ECFA), a 
bilateral trade deal between Taiwan and PRC (Amae and Damm, 2011; Schubert and Braig, 2011, 
p.83; Fuller, 2014). 
The KMT and DPP have also both articulated Taiwanese multi-ethnic reality by discoursing 
this society as a multi-ethnic community formed from four main ethnic groups; this is not to say 
that the new imagined community is harmonious. The hierarchical socio-economic differences 
have been maintained in the ethnically heterogeneous society (Chun, 2002; Kuo, 2003; Wang, 
2004; Ngo and Wang, 2011). In the hegemonic politics between KMT and DPP, Mandarin – the 
language made official by KMT – remains the official language of Taiwan. Although DPP 
administration made Hokkien, Hakka and indigenous languages compulsory in Taiwan’s national 
education, it did not replace Mandarin as an official language with Hokkien (Chang, 2006; Kloter, 
2006, p.219; Schubert and Braig, 2011, p.77; Fell, 2012, p.141).  
Overall, in the late 1990s, it was argued that Taiwan became “post-Chinese-nationalist”, 
because the society still bore some imprints of the history of KMT Chinese nationalism while no 
longer represent China in international politics (Hughes, 1997). Weiming Tu (1996, p.1121) 
argues that the new post-Sino-centric Taiwan is a good case of “glocalism”. It imports many 
cultural products from abroad but in the meantime, cultural localisation is becoming popular. Tu 
also states that cultural localism, which walks well with pro-Western globalism, has become a 
dominant discourse and Sino-centrism has been marginalised domestically. Shu-mei Shih (2003) 
praises the emergence of globalisation and localism. Shih argues that multi-ethnicities in Taiwan 
may benefit from globalisation as then every individual could at least use globalisation for his or 
27 
 
her own purposes, although not each one has equal access to global networks (Ibid, p.146). Not 
advocating “pan-Chinese economic universalism”, which is best represented by KMT’s policy and 
instrumentalises cultural Chinese-ness for economic gain (Ibid, p.148), she encourages this post-
Sino-centric Taiwanese identity to become more multicultural, embracing global cultural 
hybridisation and resisting Sino-centric nationalist cultural incorporation in order to invent new 
forms of trans-culture as the core of a unique entity called “Taiwanese identity”. In this way, the 
cultural formation of Taiwanese society is unlikely to be marked by “a specific ethnicity or 
community, but by universal qualities shared by all cultures” (Ibid, p.146).  
 
1.3.2 The History of Taiwanese TV Drama Programming 
This transition from one-party authoritarian rule to a multi-party system not only appears in the 
political field, it also relays to the field of TV culture, which changed from oligopoly of three KMT-
controlled stations to multi-channel system operating in a neo-liberal and globalised environment. 
Television was introduced in Taiwan in 1962 during the KMT’s authoritarian rule. The first 
Taiwanese TV station, TTV (Taiwan Television Company), produced its first TV drama Chong Hui 
Huai Bao (meaning “Come back to me”) in the same year (Tsai, 2004, p.165). Before the 1990s, 
there were only three terrestrial TV stations – TTV, CTV (China Television Company) and CTS 
(Chinese Television System) – that were controlled by the KMT (Lee, 1979, pp.143-171; L. Lin, 
2006, p.73; Ko, 2008). As a form of entertainment, the TV drama of these three stations was an 
important ideological tool of the KMT, which wanted it to be anti-Communist and Chinese 
nationalistic, and to deliver stories of ancient Chinese history and domestic family life to its 
domestic audiences (Lee, 1979, pp.143-171; 2000, p.128; L. Lin, 2005; 2006; F.-M. Lin, 2006, 
p.241; Ko, 2009a). 
Taiwanese political economic transition led to the liberalisation of the TV market and the 
ensuing fragmentation of TV consumption in the 1990s. The deregulation of the TV market was 
over-determined by multiple factors in a very specific historical context dating back to the early 
1990s. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, both domestic interests (localisation and pan-Chinese 
economic universalism) and foreign interests (Hollywood and Western media) pressed the ruling 
KMT for open access to all media, including TV (Feng, 1995, p.33). Externally, the US and 
Western film studios and satellite TV also wanted to enter Taiwan, the people of which was then 
satisfied by illegal underground cable TV locally called “the Fourth Channel” as opposed to “the 
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Old Three” (TTV, CTV and CTS) (Lee, 2000, p.132; Cheng, 2002, pp.329-330) for non-KMT 
information and entertainment. The Western media, especially the US enterprises backed by the 
US government, urged the KMT government to open up markets.5 Domestically, the political 
groups advocating the DPP and Taiwanese nationalism asked for the foundation of TV channels 
that favour their viewpoints (Feng, 1995, pp.33-35). Many Taiwanese home-grown TV 
entrepreneurs planned to legally run Taiwan-based satellite TV that targeted the pan-Chinese 
market in East Asia, especially the PRC (which had opened up labour and business market for 
Taiwanese business and encouraged them to come to mainland China since the 1980s), Hong 
Kong and Taiwan, as their strategies for overseas expansion (Feng, 1995, pp.24-26; 2007, 
pp.125-129; Curtin, 2007, p.161). The KMT, which was marginalised in international politics yet 
had followed American neo-liberalist ideology, on the one hand, could no longer suppress these 
domestic urges and, on the other, considered joining the World Trade Organisation (WTO) (and 
accepting its neo-liberalistic free-market principle) as an opportunity to participate in international 
economic scene (Feng, 1995, pp.31-65; 2007). It opened up the TV market, allowing the 
foundation of new terrestrial TV, cable TV and satellite TV, plus the entrance of foreign satellite 
TV in August 1993 (Feng, 1995, pp.31-65; 2007). A new terrestrial Formosa Television Inc. (FTV), 
run by a Taiwanese nation-building group politically devoted to a new Taiwanese state, started to 
air in 1997 (Chen, 2002, p.301; Curtin, 2007, pp.163-169). A channel of Public Television Service 
(PTS) started free-to-view in 1998 (Rawnsley and Rawnsley, 2001).  
The KMT, being more in agreement with the idea of pan-Chinese economic universalism, 
began encouraging Taiwanese TV productions to target the growing ethnic Chinese market in 
East Asia; the KMT government released the economic policy of “Asia-Pacific Regional 
Operations Centre”, aiming for Taiwan to replace the economic role of Hong Kong, that had been 
in the sovereignty transition, to become the centre of six regional industries (manufacturing, sea 
transport, air transport, financial service, telecommunication and media) (Feng, 2007, p.129). The 
policy – which was considered a failure in the Taiwanese public sphere in 2000s – added media 
in its plan after witnessing the trend of cross-Strait media interaction initiated by overseas-market-
                                                     
5
 The USTR (United States Trade Representative) releases a Special 301 Report annually to protect and identify trade 
barriers to US enterprises. During 1989 until 1997, Taiwan was placed on the priority watch list of the report for the 
violation of intellectual properties of US products. The violation also included the circulation of US products on the Fourth 
Channel. In 1992 and 1993, the USTR exerted more pressure on the KMT government to take action to protect the rights 
of US enterprises in the Taiwanese market. This resulted in the ratification of the Cable Radio and Television Act in Taiwan 
that legalised the Fourth Channel. For more information, see Y. Kurt Chang (1994). 
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oriented Taiwanese media enterprises themselves. According to its rationale, the Taiwanese TV 
businesses should reorient their productions for the growing ethnic Chinese market (especially 
the PRC) in East Asia (Feng, 2007, p.129). Yet the PRC never allowed these Taiwanese satellite 
TV channels to enter its territory in the 1990s, and the latter mainly relied on this Taiwanese TV 
advertisement market (Feng, 2007, pp.125-129; Curtin, 2007, p.162). The 1990s’ Taiwanese TV 
market was competed for by domestic programmes from TV stations controlled by the KMT, new 
TV stations controlled by pro-independent politicians, new Taiwanese satellite TV channels 
aiming at pan-Chinese audiences in East Asia, and satellite channels owned by transnational 
media conglomerates. The TV advertising market has been competed for by more than 100 TV 
channels, including terrestrial, cable and satellite TV channels. On average, a TV channel shares 
only 110,000 individuals (Chang, 2011, p.48). The cable TV subscriptions reached 1.5 million 
households in July 1993 (Feng, 1995, p.37) and around 5 million households (60% subscription 
rate) on official record in 2010. 6 The result was over competition in the Taiwanese TV market, 
low-cost programming and reliance on cheap foreign imports. 
The consumption of TV programmes fragmented into groups with different “tastes”, in 
Bourdieu’s terms (1984). Politically charged TV channels were engaged with the national identity 
and politics in Taiwan by catering to male and female audiences with news and dramatic 
programmes that conform to their stances (Feng, 1995, pp.31-65; Curtin, 2007, pp.156-158). FTV 
and SET, two domestic TV stations established by pro-independence politicians and 
businessmen (Chen, 2002, p.301; Curtin, 2007, pp.163-169; Sun, 2012), made TV dramas and 
competed with the Old Three’s drama programming. The Old Three’s Mandarin-speaking 
historical and martial arts dramas and the Hokkien-speaking family dramas from FTV and SET 
competed fiercely with each other over the 8-9pm time slot in the 1990s (Ko, 1999; Chen, 2001; 
F.-c. I. Yang, 2008c, pp.283-285; 2015). Since the beginning of 2000s, the Hokkien dramas have 
had a higher viewership than the Mandarin dramas in the time slot. Importantly, whilst commercial 
localism (guarding the domestic market with low-cost commercial productions) became an 
economic strategy, the Old Three gradually relied on pan-Chinese co-production with the PRC 
media companies for its demand of historical and martial arts dramas (Chen, 2001; S.-C. Cheng, 
2010; Lai, 2011). By the 1990s, the domestic TV production system had started regional 
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 Available at: http://www.ncc.gov.tw/english/files/11021/278_743_110210_1.pdf [Accessed 6 September 2015]. 
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operation. Until the 2000s, however, its regional operation mainly adhered to Chinese-speaking 
markets outside Taiwan (Feng, 1995, pp.19-27; 2007; Chen, 2001; Curtin, 2007, p.133-150; S.-
C. Cheng, 2010; Lai, 2011). 
Non-commercial domestic TV channels, PTS and the Buddhist Da-Ai TV Channel, occupied 
a small audience portion.7 The PTS has been weak because of its lack of sufficient funding since 
its launch in July 1998. This minimum funding might be because the government views the PTS 
as an alternative “supplement” to the competitive commercial TV formed of more than one 
hundred cable and satellite channels and four commercial terrestrial TV channels, several of 
which were directly controlled by the KMT and DPP (Feng, 1995, pp.67-122; Liu and Chen, 2004, 
p.54). Although its news, made-for-TV films and documentaries have gradually attracted 
educated urban citizens and cultural and media critics, it has had very limited budget for drama 
productions (Weng, 2006).8 
Foreign entertainment imports were considered better in quality than the programmes of the 
Old Three before the 1990s (Feng, 1995, pp.15-16). Yet official TV imports were controlled and 
kept to a minimum before the 1990s in the Old Three and were highly dependent on the KMT’s 
diplomatic relations with specific foreign countries (Lee, 1979, pp.143-171). Before the 1990s, 
they largely came from the US, Japan and Hong Kong, the three important trade partners to the 
KMT-ruled economy (Lee, 1979, pp.143-171; Luo, 1996; Ishii, Su and Watanabe, 1999; Curtin, 
2007). The legalised Fourth Channel took advantage of these stronger foreign imports to 
gradually win a larger share of the domestic market. Hong Kong martial arts genres, US films and 
TV dramas, Japanese variety shows and female-oriented TV dramas, became popular 
programmes on cable TV in the 1990s, attracting various audience groups. Even the contents 
from the politically antagonistic PRC (e.g. historical dramas) and the more culturally neutral South 
Korea (urban dramas) entered Taiwan in the mid-1990s (Kim, 2005; Zhu, 2008, p.107). Utilising 
the foreign imports, satellite TV attracted many of these Taiwanese audience groups and further 
contributed to the TV market fragmentation. 
                                                     
7
 Da-Ai TV station began to air on 1 January 1998, according to its website, which is available at http://www.daai.tv/daai-
web/aboutdaai/about.php [Accessed 16 August 2016]. Information about more than 180 TV dramas made by Da-Ai TV 
are available at http://www.daai.tv/daai-web/drama/ [Accessed 16 August 2016].  
8
 Its funding does not directly come from household licence fees. Instead an annual fund has been allotted from the 
governmental budget, according to the Public Television Act (ratified on 18 June 1997). The governmental funding was 
NT$1.2 billion (£24 million) during 1998 and 2001 and has remained NT$0.9 billion (£18 million) since 2002; in 2005, its 
total income was NT$1.5 billion (£30 million), including governmental funding, public donations and incomes like real 
estate rent (Weng, 2006). 
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To the Taiwanese, the US and Japan have been the main centres of modernity alongside 
Hong Kong, being a symbol of Chinese modernity (Iwabuchi, 2002, pp.121-157; Curtin, 2007, 
pp.29-67). Since WWII, the West, the US in particular, has been the most important reference for 
the Taiwanese economically, politically, militarily and culturally (Chen, 2010, pp.161-209). 
American and Japanese media culture were popular among different audience groups, partly as 
a means to reject KMT’s Sino-centric media culture and its Confucian value systems (Lii and 
Chen, 1998; Ishii, Su and Watanabe, 1999; Iwabuchi, 2002, p.150; Huang, 2008). Apart from 
economic, political and military connections, consumption of Hollywood (American) culture has 
been popular in the Taiwanese media for a long time. Yet it did not enjoy absolute domination 
during the Cold-War period as Hong Kong entertainment culture was equally popular, apart from 
the domestic production of the KMT’s media system (Lee, 1979, pp.143-171; Lii, 1998; Ishii, Su 
and Watanabe, 1999; Curtin, 2007). Hollywood has been dominating the film market since the 
liberalisation period in the 1990s when the Hong Kong film industry was weakening (Curtin, 2007, 
pp.85-108). It has also expanded into Taiwan’s cable TV market since the same time (Ishii, Su 
and Watanabe, 1999). Generally Taiwanese audiences have been receiving Hollywood values in 
action and romantic genres.  
Although the audiences have consumed Western media, many Taiwanese women still had 
ambivalent attitudes towards Western depictions of sexual freedom and gender relationships 
(Iwabuchi, 2002, p.148; Huang, 2008, p.199). This is because, firstly and morally, they have been 
tied by Confucian codes even though they have watched American shows and fantasised about 
American lifestyles (Huang, 2008, p.199). Secondly, they have sought TV dramas that subtly deal 
with similar problems in their daily lives as more feasible references. Thus, they have found 
alternatives from culturally proximate East Asian products (Iwabuchi, 2002, p.148; Hu, 2005; 2008; 
Yang, 2008a; b). 
Japanese colonisation left a huge legacy in Taiwan. Taiwanese people feel ambivalent 
towards Japan and regard Japanese modernity with nostalgia and fascination (Tsai, 2005, p.108). 
In the Cold-War/martial-law period, the KMT re-Sinicised Taiwan and suppressed Japanese 
elements to a minimum for its Chinese nationalism education (Luo, 1996, pp.14-59). Yet the two 
countries were economically inseparable in the Cold-War economy led by the US. Thus the KMT’s 
Japanese policy was “economically dependent on Japan yet culturally anti-Japanese” at that time 
(Ko, 2008, p.126). In 1972, due to the end of diplomatic relationship between ROC and Japan, 
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the KMT completely banned the already minimal Japanese media imports (Luo, 1996, p.15). Yet 
Japanese media influence has remained in the Old Three system, not in the form of imports but 
as a format reference since the early stages of Taiwanese TV.9 Taiwanese TV show workers 
have constantly adapted Japanese formats and the tendency has never stopped (Mao, 2010). 
The reference relation also existed in Taiwanese pop music and advertisement production (Ching, 
1994, pp.207-208; Tsai, 2005, p.108).  
The ban on media culture from Japan was lifted in the early 1990s, following in the wake of 
political, social and media liberalisation (Luo, 1996, pp.105-139). On the Fourth Channel, apart 
from the American content, Japanese content, which commonly appeared with a bundle of idol 
stars, TV dramas and variety shows, quickly became popular among adolescents and grown-ups 
in their twenties in the 1990s in an outbreak of “Japanophilia” – interest or love of Japanese 
(popular) culture (M.-t. Lee, 2004; Ko, 2004). Comparatively, historical and martial arts dramas 
from the Old Three or from Hong Kong and the PRC remained attractive among older male and 
female audiences (Curtin, 2007, pp.133-150). FTV and SET’s Hokkien TV dramas also attracted 
older female audiences (Chen, 2001). The Japanese content also reached the younger audience 
via underground video cassettes and VCDs (Hu, 2004). This local popularity of Japanese TV 
drama in Taiwan was part of a larger regional female phenomenon in the 1990s (Iwabuchi, 
2004a). The Japanese youth-centred urban dramas featuring young Japanese idols were 
introduced by satellite TV, especially Star TV, with the label of “Japanese Idol Drama”, to the pan-
Chinese market including Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan, the PRC etc. with Mandarin dubbing 
(Ching, 2000a, p.256).  
According to Leo Ching (2000b), Taiwanese youth’s embrace of Japanese media culture, 
including TV drama, was connected to the audiences’ desire for Japanese modernity and the 
desire to depart from the KMT Sino-centric value and ethical codes. Many academic audience-
focused researchers chose senior-high school and university students as case studies and 
reached similar conclusions to Ching’s critique (Lii and Chen, 1998; Iwabuchi, 2002, pp.121-157; 
M.-t. Lee, 2004). Japanese dramas not only offered beautiful characters in fashionable styles, but 
also individualistic resolutions and values for urban dwellers to help cope with emergent personal 
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 Retiring TV director Teng-Yi Lin (2010) recalled on a public forum that he adapted Japanese novels into TV dramas for 
TTV in early 1960s. 
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agonies and troubles in urban settings. Regarding the resolutions and values, they developed a 
highly reflexive storytelling out of the writers’ serious engagement with post-bubble-economy 
Japanese society (Tsai, 2002). These Japanese TV dramas were cathartic and thought-engaging 
to both men and women, who demanded more progressive and contemporary ways of living (Hu, 
2008; 2010). Some adult-oriented Japanese dramas critiqued Japanese modernity, revealing 
social tensions in Confucian ethos (Liew, 2011). The Japanese imports were different from Sino-
centric imaginations embedded in the Old Three’s TV dramas, the patriarchal values and 
exaggerated dramatic styles in localist TV dramas from DPP-connected FTV and SET and the 
overt sexual freedom in American TV dramas (Iwabuchi, 2002, p.148; Huang, 2008, p.199). The 
Japanese dramas, alongside their idol talent culture, later became the main reference for the local 
idol drama industry. 
In summary, in the 1990s and early 2000s, it seems that the laissez-faire TV market worked, 
and many non-KMT political cultural forces in this society entered the TV field and benefited in 
general. Sino-centric TV culture turned to co-production with the PRC whilst the commercial 
culture of Taiwanese nation-building groups was home-based as the above section argues. 
Youngsters were consuming foreign imports introduced by the new satellite and cable TV as well 
as underground video circulation. At that time there were no similar domestic programmes 
tailoring to these demographics until Meteor Garden was produced by a number of new 
generation TV workers in 2001. Situated in a deregulated environment characterised by free flow 
of popular Japanese and other foreign dramas that interested female audiences in the country, 
the new Taiwanese drama makers succeeded in adapting Japanese manga as well as emulating 
the styles of Japanese TV dramas, and then derived a contingent and opportunistic form of inter-
Asian “package” of idol drama, including inter-Asian funding, presale and co-production, to 
sustain at regional level. 
 
1.4 A Critical, Interdisciplinary Study of Media (Idol Drama) in Cultural 
Studies 
Critical media studies identify three important areas of research: text, production and reception 
(Taylor and Willis, 1999, p.239). How textual meaning is constructed is one of the studies’ 
cornerstones. However, relying solely on such textual analysis could be considered 
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problematically isolated for it overlooks both production and consumption contexts (Ibid, p.27, 
p.103). A media product is produced and disseminated under conditional factors before an 
audience gets to watch a TV drama, and every individual has his or her own context when 
watching. Today, media analyses from a cultural studies paradigm are more likely to pay attention 
to at least two of the areas bridged by textual analysis (Fiske, 1987; Ma, 1999; Tsai, 2002; Lukacs, 
2010). 
The development of the regional operation of idol drama is of prime interest and its 
articulation of Taiwanese inter-Asian relations in the regional context. It will be explained why the 
dramas “emerge at a specific time”, whose possible interests they serve and under what 
“institutional constraints” they are situated (Kaplan, 1993, p.10). Such an inquiry demands a 
research method that covers both context and symbolic articulation of idol dramas. In this light, I 
will take into consideration the production aspects – the political economy of the production 
condition (that is, the larger political environment and the mechanism of media production, the 
latter of which includes media institutions, the TV industry’s market structure and funding source, 
etc.) and production tradition and convention – and textual articulation of the idol dramas. 
Regarding signification, I will enquire into how idol drama, as a product created under increasingly 
regionalised forces, represents “the Taiwanese in East Asia” and how it mediates the complex 
geo-political and economic realities in the region, and in what type of regional political economic 
context. 
I will view culture in several related senses. As “media culture” it firstly refers to idol drama 
– a symbolic production or a specific signifying product created from the artistic and intellectual 
activities of humans (Williams, 1982, p.13). The idol drama as media culture has its ideological 
dimension connecting to larger social world that is dominated by specific forces. The ideological 
effect of the signifying practices – the connotative level of the cultural signification – in relation to 
various forms of cultural politics between the powerful and the suppressed, is the focus of critical 
media studies (Hall, 1996, p.395). Idol drama is a commodity produced with commercial rule. 
Commercial media as a system is always controversial. Earlier critical theorists dismissed it as 
an industry of “false consciousness”, because it tended to adhere to the dominant value system 
which was accepted by the mainstream society. Later researchers adopted a more complicated 
framework in the light of the Gramscian concept of hegemony (Hall, 1974; 1982; 1986a; 1989). If 
we accept the notion that the most commercially successful media must “mediate” and “address” 
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the mass demands/desires of society, we can say that the commercial media must win the 
consent of the mass and heterogeneous demands of audiences to achieve commercial success. 
The issue is connected to the hegemonic articulation of dominant and dominated value systems 
and social consent in media production. This issue demands a non-determinist theorisation on 
the hegemonic contestation between different social groups, and the examination of the 
struggle/access over meaning in the non-conflict-free media institution noted by Stuart Hall (1974, 
pp.289-290, p.296; 1982, p.81).  
Overall, Hall’s theorisation of media, in particular, his concept of (mediated) articulation 
explicitly informs my analysis of the inter-Asian operation of idol drama. Pierre Bourdieu’s 
approach to the field of cultural production also inspires my analysis of idol drama industry (1993). 
They share some ground as both of them equally stress the significance of context for cultural 
production in their cultural sociological analyses and society-media relationship, especially how 
the latter is conditioned by the former, but they are different in their approach to social relations 
between different social groups/classes. Bourdieu provides a relational account of how (cultural 
and media) practices are shaped by social structures but Hall problematises media messages in 
his neo-Gramscian analysis of the formation of cultural hegemony. I draw on their concepts that 
suit my research purposes. 
In the above section, I have contextualised idol drama against, firstly, the overall political 
transitions of Taiwan since the 1990s and the competing political forces and ideologies today, 
and, secondly, the homologous transition of Taiwanese television industry. The first analytical 
chapter of the thesis delineates idol drama’s markets in East Asia and their competitions patterns 
(Research Question 1). I will examine the emergence of idol drama and its market conditions in 
the twenty-first century by looking at the mechanism and logic of idol drama’s inter-Asian 
operations. Its initial operation of the pioneering TV drama Meteor Garden (2001) and more inter-
Asian operations afterwards will be introduced. These new operations, facing a deteriorating 
domestic market and funding conditions, have responded to the booming South Korean media 
culture, incorporated elements of funding markets in South East Asia and the PRC, and co-
produced with Japanese media enterprises. The analysis will be based on industrial reports and 
interviews. 
The second analytical chapter throws light on neo-liberal and global forms of cultural politics 
in production aspect of a cultural field by teasing out several idol drama packagers’ strategies – 
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their advantages and constraints – and their legitimacy as well as contestations (Research 
Question 2). This analysis draws on Hall’s theories on cultural politics in warfare of ideas (1974; 
1982; 1986a; 1989) and Bourdieu’s conception of competition in the production field of symbolic 
goods (1993). Bourdieu’s notion of field helps by bringing a relational pattern of the cultural 
production field. In this light of Hall and Bourdieu, Taiwanese society has fragmented politically 
and culturally, its TV market has been liberalised, and its TV drama production field has had 
multiple production groups who have had their own strategies and preferences. I suggest that 
cultural politics takes place, primarily, in competition between many production companies in 
Taiwan with their own value-laden strategies. The companies strive to enter, stay, and prosper in 
this competitive field. Secondly, these production companies can employ workers who could form 
internal friction inside the companies for not agreeing to their strategies and decisions, in which 
different values are marginalised. This struggle/access over meaning in the media institution has 
been a concern of media studies (Hall, 1974, pp.289-290, p.296; 1982, p.81; 1986a; 1989; Gitlin, 
1979). Thus a key question for us to understand such cultural politics is whether the individual 
production companies’ creative strategies obtain cultural or economic legitimacy/consent and 
remain in the cultural field, within the industry and on the market. I shall introduce five types of 
inter-Asian operations of the producers of idol drama, four of which are focused in the chapter – 
their strategies, constraints and legitimacy in the field. A unique issue concerning cultural politics 
of inter-Asian idol drama is that the inter-Asian idol drama productions have various foreign 
partners as allies. Their striving for legitimacy is related to the perceptions of their allies in Taiwan.  
The last section of the thesis considers the inter-Asian imaginations in idol drama (Research 
Question 3). Borrowing Stuart Hall’s approach to mediated articulations in signification (Hall, 
1974; 1982; 1986a; 1989; Slack, 1996, p.125), I will examine the mediated articulation of an East 
Asian “little subjectivity” (a term meaning the subjectivity of a small country) from Taiwan with the 
patriarchal nationalist forces from its stronger neighbours in East Asia, abiding by Kuan-Hsing 
Chen (1998; 2010) who modifies Hall’s concepts for critical cultural studies in Taiwan. This 
analysis focuses on regional relations instead of class relations, which was the main concern of 




1.5 Key Terms Defined 
1.5.1 Packaging and Packagers 
Two terms have been adopted in East Asian cinema studies on regional and transnational filmic 
co-operation: assemblage and packaging (Davis and Yeh, 2008; Berry, 2013). There is also some 
shared ground as they both reflect on filmic co-operation in the region, but there is difference in 
emphasis. Darrell William Davis and Emilie Yueh-yu Yeh (2008) uses the term “package” to 
conceptualise diverse types of artistic and creative combination of East Asian film co-productions 
between Japan, South Korea, PRC, Hong Kong. It describes the practice of media makers flexibly 
looking for resources and means of production from different East Asian national industries in 
their productions. Their attention is on the creating and producing practices of film-makers, their 
network relationships, work conditions and filmic contents and aesthetics (Tsai, 2011, p.243) and 
they do not make the argument against a totality presumption, as the concept of assemblage 
Chris Berry suggests does. Observing the co-operations between three Chinese-language film 
industries in forming new Chinese-language filmic culture that is led by industries’ global 
marketing, Chris Berry (2013) attempts to grapple the logic behind these industrial operations by 
adopting the concept of “assemblage” from Aihwa Ong (2005) who was inspired by Gilles Deleuze 
and Félix Guattari. His argument stresses that these practices may seem to mean “integrations”, 
but do not necessarily lead to a total and homogeneous system.  
With different emphasis, both concepts shed light on the filmic co-operation in Chinese-
language and East Asian media companies. For my attention on the practices on the creative 
dimension of the co-operations, the term “packaging” seems more relevant. I use “packaging” and 
“operation” interchangeably in the thesis, as empirical terms describing the actual practices of 
drama making in terms of assembling cast, seeking shooting locations and applying for foreign 
funding. I call the producers “(lead) packagers” for their decision-making positions when deciding 
target markets, raising investment from the markets and casting foreign actors, in contrast to other 
“packaging team members”. 
Because my thesis focuses on new forms of cultural politics over values in idol dramas, I will 
particularly focus on story development in which the producer plays a role, co-working with 
scriptwriters. The term “producer” mainly refers to a professional position locally termed zhizuoren 
(meaning “producer”), a person who runs a production company that provides TV programmes to 
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a variety of TV channels. To avoid confusion, I will use “makers” or “workers” instead to refer to 
individuals who participate in TV drama productions. Taiwanese TV making is centred on 
producers. The producers have their own production companies, initiating TV drama production 
projects, submitting the projects to TV stations for purchase and investment, and assembling and 
paying for production cast and crew. A producer would scout his or her scriptwriters to develop 
stories in pre-production before a director, who serves mainly as a professional who visualises 
scripts into audio-visual forms, is scouted. A producer oversees the completion of the whole 
process and they are responsible for the TV station and other distribution buyers. The TV 
producers and scriptwriters are more important, in my analysis, for they decide on the script – the 
centre of TV drama – in pre-production. 
At a theoretical level, I view these producers and their scriptwriters as cultural workers within 
the paradigm of critical media and cultural studies. I stress three characteristics of the packagers 
and packaging teams in their works: their mediated elaboration of ideology, how they elaborate it 
and their relationships with other packagers in their field. Firstly, I draw on critical cultural and 
literary theories of Marxists who see cultural workers in mass media as carriers of dominant 
ideology. They are where ideology functions; ideology speaks through them (Hall, 1982, p.88). In 
the perspective, the packagers have three levels of sociality – their confinement of political 
economy and literary convention as well as socially structured consciousness (Williams, 1977, 
pp.192-198). The packagers are structured in different sets of regional and social relationships 
and they are saturated with the dominant ideologies in the region. They make decisions within 
the conditions, based on their strategies. For example, the packagers and packaging teams face 
the question of whether they should apply for and accept particular funding whose provider would 
interfere in their work in some situations; they would risk being under the control of the fund 
provider. The second dimension is the textual combination of inter-Asian packager. This is related 
to the function of the packager who selects and composes different elements to form a particular 
symbolic work (Barthes, 1977). These packagers choose their ways of mediation, selecting and 
composing different elements to form a particular set of symbolic work. They select and package 
different East Asian elements at production and narrative levels in their works. Their last 
dimension is that the packagers are situated relationally in a field of idol drama competing for 
success. They have different trajectories and packaging strategies which would be identified as 
central characteristics of their brand images. They have different critical distance from ideological 
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imperatives (Williams, 1977) and different critical agencies to produce reflective minds among 
viewers (Benjamin, 1978). 
This notion of packagers reflect the elitist criticism towards mass-produced culture by Max 
Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno (1944) in order to maintain a critical stance towards the 
standardisation of the contemporary commercial production of culture and its contribution to the 
maintenance of the existing social order. Most of the production companies work in very confining 
commercial environment. A contestable and transformable field, with more agents from different 
social groups struggling to enter and stay, could provide a possibility of change. Idol drama can 
be one such case. The various TV drama production companies and agents could translate the 
ideological contestation of larger social politics into the cultural field of idol drama in different 
ways. However, it is yet to be discovered how idol drama and its production can generate 
possibilities of change (challenge to the existing patriarchal, nationalist and capitalist discourse in 
East Asia). 
1.5.2 East Asia 
In the beginning of the chapter, several Taiwanese idol drama producers mentioned “Asia” in their 
discourses. They were only referring to “East Asia”. Their original phrasings would be kept when 
they are quoted throughout the thesis. Knowing the risk of being simplifying the complexity of 
regional imagination, I use the term “East Asia” interchangeably with “Asia”, mainly when I 
mention “inter-(East) Asian packaging” to refer to idol drama’s regional assembly of production 
means. There are several meanings to the term “East Asia” in my thesis. Its first meaning refers 
to “a geographical space”, including at the very least more than 10 countries. “East Asia”, in this 
context, refers to both North East Asia (Japan, South Korea and the PRC) and South East Asia 
(Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, Philippines, etc.). Taiwan and Hong Kong are 
geographically between the two regions. Yet, the East Asia in my research is not simply based 
on geographical boundaries, but is more about a “regional (cultural) boundary” created by a 
circulation network of media culture (Chua, 2004, p.203) and then imagined by contemporary 
East Asian countries as well as public discussions in response to the traffic of media culture 
(Berry, Liscutin and Mackintosh, 2009). I mainly discuss it as a cultural space formed of markets 
and production connections between the following countries (or regions): Taiwan; the PRC; 
Japan; South Korea; Hong Kong (as a special region of the PRC); Singapore; Malaysia and 
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Thailand.10 The first five areas are more fully discussed because of their media companies’ 
production connections to the TV industry in Taiwan.  
The cultural entity of East Asia is formed of countries, people, and media enterprises. These 
countries, people and media may have been considered relatively culturally similar, due to the 
domination of Confucian philosophical value system. But they have had different national histories, 
especially their histories of westernisation and shedding of Confucian values (Chua, 2004, p.201), 
and thus are all nationally and ideologically different, and some of them are in contentious 
relationship. The cultural space of East Asia is not homogeneous. Yet the term “East Asia” can 
highlight their shared history of modernisation of being different from Western countries and the 
experience of Western (cultural) imperialism over the last two centuries (although these 
experiences were very different). Thus, we need to call them in plural terms, “East Asia(n)s”. The 
meaning also refers to mediated East Asian subjects who embody the nations in TV dramas and 
the drama-producing professionals and media companies. Both subjects on and behind the 
screen are “performative subjects” in Homi Bhabha’s (1990, pp.297-299) term, structurally 
embedded and bounded by their nationally dominant value systems. Idol drama is a product 
created by the Taiwanese media industry with increasing collaboration with its counterparts in 
East Asian countries. The media industry is an ensemble constituted by businesses, companies, 
and their projects that supply products firstly to their home market and secondly to important 
foreign markets. Here, a media company may operate on a regional scale, supplying its products 
to more than two nationally different markets: for example, a Hong Kong media production 
company may work as a supplier in the PRC’s TV market as well as its “home” market. 
With regard to Chinese-speaking societies, the PRC, Taiwan and Hong Kong (even Macau) 
are different in terms of ideology (e.g. socialism and capitalism), history (e.g. different colonial 
and imperial experiences) and culture (e.g. different modernisation experiences). Hence, it is 
meaningless to see them as one. In later analysis, I will group the Hong Kong TV market into the 
South East Asian market because the dealers of the Hong Kong market are usually also in charge 
of the circulation of idol dramas in South East Asia.11 Since Taiwanese society has its own specific 
                                                     
10
 As my thesis mentions both the Republic of Korea and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, it refers to the 
former as South Korea and the latter as North Korea. “Korean Peninsula” means the geographical space where today’s 
South and North Korea locate. “Korea” means the nation that has long inhabited the Korean Peninsula. 
11
 For instance, the Hong Kong TV market and system is separate from the PRC market and system. 
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political, economic and cultural formations, I will analyse it as a unique Chinese-speaking 
(Mandarin) country, separated from the one on mainland China. My analysis covers Taiwan’s 
interactions with South East Asia, the PRC, Japan, and South Korea via idol drama making, 
marketing and text. 
 
1.5.3 Inter-Asia 
I will use “inter-Asia(n)” to capture the Taiwanese TV industry’s increasing operation between 
East Asia and collaboration with East Asian partners. Previously, three terms have been used to 
describe the regional practices of East Asian media: pan-Asia, inter-Asia and intra-Asia. Each 
term has its own particular meaning. Firstly, “pan-Asia”, which highlights regional unity, was 
coined by East Asian film-makers who combined their know-how, means of production and market 
bases to compete with the Hollywood threat, especially in the early 2000s. “Pan-Asia” mainly 
means multiple links of at least two East Asian film-makers and contextually implies the existence 
of competition from Hollywood. Earlier analysis of these East Asian film co-productions tended to 
follow film-makers’ narratives and referred to their films as “pan-Asian cinemas” (Yeh and Davis, 
2002) or “pan-Asian productions” (Teo, 2008). Secondly, critical cultural academia in East Asia 
has chosen “inter-Asia” instead of “pan-Asia”, or another term, “intra-Asia”. The “inter-Asia” was 
inspired by the establishment of the inter-American cultural studies network that built critical 
communications between Latin and North America (Chen, 1998, p.2). The critical scholars in East 
Asia argued that “there is no unity to the imaginary entity called ‘Asia’” and hence chose the term 
“inter-Asia” (Chen and Chua, 2007, p.1). The term can “highlight the existence of a plurality of 
‘Asias’, to emphasise the links, and to problematise the lines that are drawn between the local, 
national, regional and global” (Burgess, 2004, p.131). The “Asia” of “inter-Asia” denotes an East 
Asian subject, and inter-Asia can mean the bilateral or multilateral interactions of the East Asians. 
The media researchers in the community of inter-Asia cultural studies, who are interested in both 
the industrial crossovers and cross-cultural relationships in East Asia, have employed “inter-Asia” 
to describe the diverse fusions of cultural elements in inter-Asian media connections in general 
(Iwabuchi, 2009; 2010a; b; F.-c. I. Yang, 2013). Finally, “intra-Asia” highlights the geographically-
bounded space of East Asia (and by extension, its market). C. J. W.-L. Wee (2012, p.198) used 
“intra-Asian cinematic productions” instead to examine the spatial imaginations of East Asia in 
these regionally-produced films. 
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This research examines how the idol dramas operate in the East Asian market by 
incorporating East Asian market investment, employing talents and other elements and producing 
dramas that articulate nationally different social values, and envision Taiwanese relations with 
other countries in East Asia. I will pay specific attention to their funding, production and narratives. 
The producers so far have mainly promoted and labelled their works in ways such as Taiwanese-
Korean, Taiwanese-Japanese and cross-(Taiwan) Strait co-productions (Chiang, 2003; Liu, 
2003a; Wu, 2003a; b; Chen, 2005b; P.-C. Chu, 2011a; Gala TV Station, 2011; Y.-L. Wang, 
2011a). It may be argued that, by hyphenating the media culture they interact with, they may 
appeal to the Taiwanese desire to participate and build links within the regional media 
communities. Their practices to fuse East Asian media elements seem similar to Koichi Iwabuchi 
(2009; 2010a; b) and Fang-chih Irene Yang’s (2013) descriptions of the inter-Asian media cultural 
connections within the cultural market of East Asia. Both “inter-Asia” and “intra-Asia” properly 
describe their practices in their ways. However, “inter-Asia” seems more inclusive than the “intra-
Asia” in terms of both marketing (financing), industrial interactions and on-screen relationships. 
“Inter-Asia” is designed to explain the cross-cultural relations between two East Asias, while “intra-
Asia” does not. Hence, I chose “inter-Asia” as my main term for the Taiwanese’s varying 
interactions with other East Asians, in particular, the mainland Chinese, South Korean and 
Japanese East Asians.  
Although the producers of the idol dramas have regionalised their marketing and production 
process, the term “regionalisation” does not necessarily mean the regional spread of idol drama. 
Rather it is more about drama producers’ ambitions to achieve such a goal, and their de-localised 
mind-set. 
 
1.6 Chapter Layout 
To summarise, this PhD thesis examines the inter-Asian packagings and representations in 
Taiwanese idol drama. I have explained the significances of the inter-Asian idol dramas and the 
necessity of studying them in this chapter. My approach will look at both their production context 
and textual articulations. The analytical chapters examine the dramas’ three inter-Asian 
dimensions: market competitions (chapter 4), production strategies (chapter 5) and mediated 
articulations (chapter 6). 
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To analyse the inter-Asian packagings and imaginations, a critical approach is necessary. 
Chapter 2 draws on Western and East Asian critical media theories for setting a framework and 
concepts. This chapter proposes to see the idol dramas as a female-oriented medium that is 
subject to three dominant, pedagogical and oppressive value systems (post-colonial nationalist, 
patriarchal and capitalist/commercial) in Taiwan and other East Asian countries. The scattered 
sets of dominant value systems, which resemble yet contradict the others in different aspects, 
form the context of the idol drama industry and packagers who embrace it. Their ambiguous 
resemblance is one main factor of inter-Asian co-operation, yet their contradictions form the 
difficulty. The value systems from stronger countries in East Asia, especially their ideas about 
Taiwan and social (gender) values, have been articulated by idol drama packagers and entered 
Taiwan. But such articulation is open to competition between different packagers. The inter-Asian 
packagers articulate about Taiwanese identities and social and gender values in the forefront, 
with national relations in the background. There are differing examples of mediation, depending 
on producers’ strategies and production preferences. 
Chapter 3 reflects my research methodology that adopted a study of idol drama industry and 
ideological criticism to idol drama’s inter-Asian narrations. It firstly traces my interactions with idol 
drama industry as an observant before and in my doctoral research. I reflect on why I became 
interested in the industry. I will then discuss my initial presumptions and framework, which were 
challenged in my interview with key important figures of inter-Asian idol drama making, and how 
I corrected them with new ones. The second part explains how I use semiotic and ideological 
analysis to fictional narratives in film and TV for my analysis of idol drama’s ideological 
representations. 
Chapter 4 traces the development and characteristics of idol dramas. It examines the history 
and patterns of their inter-Asian interactions and connections with other East Asian media cultures 
and industries. Initially, the Taiwanese idol dramas adapted the Japanese manga that appealed 
to a regional female audience, hybridised Japanese elements with standardised Chinese-
speaking settings and obtained not only domestic but also regional success. As regional 
competition increased and the Taiwanese TV environment worsened, three new packaging 
logics/patterns appeared at different times. The idol drama packagers, firstly, responded to South 
Korean media culture’s regional popularity by utilising its media elements, secondly, incorporated 
elements of South East Asia and the PRC whose markets funded the packagers, and, thirdly, 
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started casting Japanese actors and continued with TV adaptations of manga for the Japanese 
market.  
Chapter 5 examines four inter-Asian production strategies represented by the trajectories of 
four packagers as well as their contestations for legitimation, in contrast to commercial localism. 
Different production companies have differing strategies, preferences and schemata based on 
their leaders’ personalities, creative styles, work history, connections, future visions and the 
imagination of their audience. Their orientations determine their own particular advantages and 
constraints. The packagers actively seek resources, linkages and alliances in the region. Doing 
so, they are relatively free from the domestic TV stations’ budgetary constraints, but they still 
cannot compete with local productions in the domestic market. They mediate the dominant values 
of related countries and articulate national differences. Inter-Asian packagings help sustain them 
in the field of Taiwanese idol drama, and their sustenance has contributed to heterogeneity and 
diversification of the field. But they have to defend their legitimacies and respond to criticisms 
from other idol drama producers, usually by addressing the economic benefit which indirectly 
helps domestic cultural industries. In particular, PRC co-productions and TV adaptations of 
manga have involved such politics for legitimation. The heterogeneity of production strategies, 
characterised by multiple bilateral inter-Asian linkages in the field of idol drama, is structurally 
homologous with Taiwanese politics, the heterogeneity of which is also characterised by the 
connections of Taiwanese factions with particular foreign forces, although idol drama culture has 
a relative autonomy from politics. 
Finally, chapter 6 investigates the inter-Asian mediated articulations in idol dramas. It 
identifies the dramas’ three particular inter-Asian envisionings of Taiwanese relations with the 
PRC, Japan and South Korea and dialogues of national difference in social values with the PRC, 
Japanese and South Korean markets. The imaginations are embodied in various fictional 
Taiwanese protagonists interacting with other East Asian regions on-screen. In a multicultural and 
Western-influenced urban capitalist Taiwan, the articulations are bilateral and sometimes 
trilateral. Socio-economic and cultural reconciliation with the PRC, referencing to Japanese 
modernity and exploring Taiwan’s commonality with South Korea, are popular themes. The 
expressions, as a whole, are diverse, seemingly open-ended and even contradictory, forming a 
multi-faceted system of images that represent Taiwanese economic and cultural relations with 
other East Asian countries. The inter-Asian imaginations envision Taiwanese relations with other 
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countries, articulate national differences or tensions, and provide templates concerning values 
and identities to their target audiences in Taiwan and other East Asian countries to make sense 
of the world. Serving the economic interests of the media businesses, these dramatic templates 
articulate the dominant ideological and value systems in the PRC, Japan and South Korea and 
address the economic and cultural imperatives of interactions and co-operations. The gender and 
socio-economic expressions vary according to funding sources and target markets, but 




Chapter 2 Analysing Inter-Asian Idol Drama 
In order to analyse the inter-Asian packaging of Taiwanese idol dramas and their mediated 
articulations of Taiwan and non-Taiwanese East Asian countries, this chapter introduces key 
theoretical concepts based on Western critical media theories on media production and 
signification (Hall, 1974; 1982; 1986a; b; 1989; 1996; Williams, 1977; 1982; Bourdieu, 1993). The 
critical media theories, which make sense of media from the perspective of class politics in a 
capitalist society, are reviewed, modified and applied to the context of Taiwanese media situated 
in East Asia and characterised by multiple post-colonial, patriarchal, nationalist, capitalist forces 
competing in a time of globalisation. My understanding of the Taiwanese context is informed by 
East Asian critical cultural theorists’ ideas of regionally popular media culture, in particular, mass-
mediated female-oriented TV dramas (Fore, 1993; Iwabuchi, 2002; 2004a; b; 2009; 2010a; b; 
Chua and Iwabuchi, 2008; F.-c. I. Yang, 2008a; b; c; 2012; 2013; 2015; Zhu, 2008; Choi, 2010; 
Dasgupta, 2013). 
A basic introduction to the theoretical concepts will be given in 2.1. Then I shall lead the 
discussion to the East Asian context and idol drama’s mediated articulation between different 
Taiwanese political and cultural factions and their stronger allies in 2.2 and 2.3. To briefly mention, 
one central concept of the thesis is “(mediated) articulation”, which was mainly theorised by Stuart 
Hall, who suggested probing into the mediated articulation of social discourses and their context 
as research framework (Hall, 1986a, p.141; Grossberg, 1992, p.54; Slack, 1996, p.115). Yet, my 
use of the term articulation is different from Hall and other critical media scholars’ use of the term, 
which in their case describes how capitalists’ values are dominant in the mass-mediated 
articulation of social groups. In my case I use it to refer to how the media of Taiwan (a small 
country) articulates Taiwanese subjectivity (“little subjectivity” in Kuan-Hsing Chen’s formulation) 
with numerous sets of post-colonial, patriarchal, nationalist and capitalist forces from stronger 
countries in East Asia, negotiating with them in aspects of nationality, gender and class (Chen, 
1998, pp.18-20; 2010, pp.92-94). 
As there are multiple post-colonial, patriarchal, nationalist and capitalist societies that 
Taiwan and its idol drama can side with, it is very important to find a spatial concept that can 
tackle “homologous relations of political and cultural agents in their respective spaces” – the 
competing relations of post-colonial nation-states in East Asia, the competing relations of 
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nationalist groups in Taiwan allying with stronger countries, and the competing relations of media 
(TV drama) production companies in Taiwan. The second central concept is Pierre Bourdieu’s 
“field” (1977; 1984; 1993). It helps me to explicate how different Taiwanese idol drama producers 
compete in the Taiwanese TV market. As discussed previously, they do so by remediating the 
dominant values of foreign allies in the articulations. Therefore, the dominant values of the foreign 
countries, shared by particular audiences in Taiwan, contest with other dramas and their values. 
 
2.1 Internationalising Critical Media (Production) Theories to the East 
Asian Context 
2.1.1 The Theories of Media Production in Cultural Studies 
Mass media has been regarded as a public sphere that would mediate ideas and world views of 
a community in the study of media (Hall, 1974). Thus, consuming and interacting with the media 
is an important practice for a subject to socialise with, becoming a social member (McQuail, 1969 
cited in O’Sullivan, 1994, p.19). Objecting to the mere interest in “content and effect” of the 
observational behavioural science that prevailed in media studies in the US since WWII, critical 
scholars on media, such as theorists from the Frankfurt School, French Marxist tradition, and later 
from British Cultural Studies, have argued that mass media plays a significant role in social politics 
by reinforcing capitalist ideology and value systems and suppressing the resistant voice of the 
working class.12  
Being interested in the Marxist question of determination or over-determination (Williams, 
1977, p.82; Hartley, 1994, p.82), yet objecting to simplified economic determinism (the base 
determines the superstructure), neo-Marxist Raymond Williams (1977; 1982) and Stuart Hall 
(1974; 1982; 1989) embarked upon their theorisation of media and society. Two sets of analytical 
focus occupy their works on the ideological dimension of media and cultural production. Williams’s 
analytical framework is concerned with art work’s mediation and its conditions; Hall’s is about 
                                                     
12
 The European Marxists in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, including Karl Marx, Antonio Gramsci and Louis 
Althusser, see society as an entity formed by a dominant capitalist class and subordinate working class. The Marxists 
have built their discussions against European industrial societies and capitalist economic development over the last two 
centuries. The Marxian concept of culture is essentially centred on class in his theory that conceives society as a spatial 
metaphor of base and superstructure. In this society, the base includes economic activities, and the superstructure refers 
to the intangible forms of activities, such as school, laws, knowledge and media. In general, Marxism has a strong 
tendency towards economic determinism, which means that the base structure determines the activities at the level of 
superstructure (Hall, 1974; 1982; 1986b).  
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mediated articulation and its context. A scholar of literature and drama, Williams builds up his 
critical analysis on art works by emphasising their ideological connection with the larger 
sociological cultural environment (1982, pp.11-12). His research framework is then concerned 
with “the social process of all cultural production, including those forms of production which can 
be designated as ideologies” (Ibid, p.30). Williams (Ibid, pp.21-25) thus suggests that analysts 
should attend first to the social conditions and situations of art works and, secondly, to the works’ 
mediation of social and material relations. Importantly, we ponder the question why and how the 
social and material relations that form the conditions of the art works would be mediated by the 
works themselves (Ibid, p.29). Through probing in this way, the Marxist cultural theorist examines 
how ideology affects and communicates through symbolic production. 
Williams’ cultural sociology paves the way for cultural studies that focuses particularly on 
contemporary mass media and popular culture. Another leading theorist, Hall, is also interested 
in the ideological dimension of mass media. His theorisation of mass media follows the Gramscian 
approach to social politics whose key argument is that the dominant group’s value system 
addresses other social classes to win consent for leadership – hence its domination is hegemonic 
and unstable (1982; 1986b; 1991b).13 A mass media analyst (news in the UK, in particular), Hall 
argues that the address is mediated in mass media. Hall (1986a) calls this kind of address 
“(mediated) articulation”, drawing on Gramscian Marxists Ernesto Laclau (1977) and Laclau and 
Chantal Mouffe (1985; 2014). Briefly speaking, articulation is a common word in the UK. In the 
Oxford Dictionary, the noun “articulation” and its verb “articulate” has two main meanings. The 
first is “the action of putting into words an idea or feeling” or “express (an idea or feeling) fluently 
and coherently”; the second is “the state of being jointed” / “a specified joint” and “forming a 
joint”.14 Hall expands the second meaning to refer to “a unity of more than two different elements 
                                                     
13
 Hall draws on the theorisations of Louis Althusser and Antonio Gramsci. Althusser (1971) approaches class politics by 
analysing how the ruling capitalist class employs “state apparatus (e.g. police)” and “ideological state apparatus (e.g. 
media)”. He believes that the ruling class must employ these apparatuses to maintain its domination. Although Althusser 
insightfully shifts the focus to politics at ideological level, his theorisation does not recognise the dynamism between 
domination and resistance (Hall, 1982, p.78). The work of Gramsci fills the gap to revise, renovate and sophisticate the 
Marxist theory (Hall, 1982, p.78; 1986b, p.411). His work is non-reductionist and allows for the possibility of the 
subordinate class’s resistance. Gramsci (1971) argues that the ruling class dominates society through a contesting 
process in which its value system, alongside its resolution and horizon, wins the assent of the society and thus is 
legitimised. This is what he calls a hegemonic process. The Gramscian “hegemony” does not mean “incorporation”– 
implying the disappearance of the suppressed, and absolute assimilation. Rather, to maintain its dominance, the ruling 
force must constantly address and take account of the social conflicts. It is a unity of difference or a construction of 
collective identity through difference between two groups in which the suppressed may “lose out” but do not disappear 
(Hall, 1986b, p.423; 1991b, p.58). 
14
 Available at: http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/articulation [Accessed 11 July 2016]. 
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or structures under certain conditions” (Hall, 1986a, p.141; Slack, 1996, p.115). I mainly adopt 
the second meaning, following Hall. Articulation produces “identity on top of difference” and 
“unities out of fragments”, constructing “one set of relations out of another” (Grossberg, 1992, 
p.54). It was initially used as sociological concept by Laclau and Mouffe as a call for the socialist 
activists’ strategy of “dis-articulating” the dominant group’s discourse by “re-articulating” with 
critical ones. In other words, the term is used by them to indicate discursive practices that would 
help form social relationship/linkage between two classes in the social imagination of public 
opinion. Such practices have different methods and can come from either a dominant or a weak 
group.  
Nonetheless, Hall’s theories of mass media mainly use the term to tackle the discursive 
articulation of the dominant value system in the mass media, in the context of the prevalent 
domination of capitalist values in the media within the UK in the twentieth century (1982; 1986a). 
Hall argues that mediated articulation mainly emanates from the most powerful group: that is, 
mass media produces messages favouring the dominant class’s value system. Yet the mediated 
articulation would be a unity of complex structures in which concepts are related in terms of their 
differences and similarities in the hierarchically structured articulations (Hall, 1980 cited in Slack 
1996, p.115). In the mediated messages, the dominant group is articulated with other social 
groups which it dominates so that its value system gains consent and will seek social consent for 
leadership. It is not “dis-articulation” and “re-articulation” from the value systems of the other 
powerless social groups mentioned above. This outcome mentioned above is related to both the 
larger ideological environment and the control of means of signification. A weak group’s agent 
can access media production, however this access is limited and has to “perform with the 
established terms” (Hall, 1982, p.81).  
A critical analytical framework in studies of production and content in the media will see the 
mass mediated articulation and its context, such as the political economy of the media, production 
relations and larger social environments. Yet, media production is not determined one-
dimensionally by one particular factor. The term articulation suggests a more active and complex 
process of media production and its outcome. As an articulating practice involves many factors, 
the outcome is “over-determined” (Grossberg, 1992, p.56). Analysts must theoretically and 
historically map the context of mediated articulation and the forceful value systems that constitute 
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the context (Grossberg, 1992, p.55; Slack 1996, p.125). In light of the critical media theories, idol 
drama as a form of mass media will be analysed in terms of context and (mediated) articulation.  
 
2.1.2 Internationalising Media Theories to the East Asia Context 
Cultural politics between the dominant and the oppressed in East Asia in a time of globalisation 
appear as multiple layers and are related to multiple countries in the world. To begin with, various 
post-colonial East Asian countries formed nation-states after WWII. The male-centred nation-
states, scattered over different geographical spaces (Grewal and Kaplan, 1994, p.7), are in 
endless competition with other countries/nations for more resources. On the one hand, they are 
oppressed by more powerful Western hegemonies. On the other, imperial and colonial relations 
and power orders also appear between countries with different scales of resources within East 
Asia. Hence the post-colonial, patriarchal nation-states’ value systems have mainly three 
dimensions: nationalist, patriarchal and capitalist/commercial values.  
In the meantime, old geo-political relations seem to have re-emerged. Though experiencing 
relative demise, larger civilisations, which influenced small countries before the advent of the 
Western imperialism, are likely to continue to do so in the future (Chen, 2010, pp.12-13). The 
dominant political cultural groups in small countries are overshadowed by larger countries. 
Ironically, the patriarchal nationalists in these countries resemble and contradict each other in 
different aspects of their value systems. Many of them embrace a market economy and summon 
women in the name of nationalism and patriarchal pedagogies – which moulds women to a 
national ideal and sacrifices the benefits of the working class to the national capitalist’s interest – 
for their international competition (Bhabha, 1990, pp.299-301).  
Therefore, (mediated) articulations between the dominant and the dominated, pluralise at 
various social levels (class, gender, and ethnicity) and involve different nationalities and 
nationalist imaginations at the regional level, particularly in the age of globalisation. Consequently, 
certain values at different levels become hegemonies domestically and regionally. Which 
patriarchal nationalist capitalist value system will become hegemonic regionally? How are the 
dominant and repressed value systems articulated with each other in the world of mass media 
(e.g. idol drama)?   
An effort to answer these questions has been initiated by East Asian cultural studies and 
feminist scholarships that have reframed East Asian cultural politics that are characterised by 
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colonialism, nationalism, heterosexual patriarchy and capitalism (Chen, 1998; Yang, 1999; Shih, 
2007; L. Wang, 2011). In theorising geo-politics in East Asia, Kuan-Hsing Chen (1998, pp.18-20; 
2010, pp.92-94) uses “articulation” to refer to the formation of relations between little subjectivities 
(subjectivities of small countries, such as Taiwan) and larger civilisations (US capitalist neo-
imperial modernity, Japanese imperial colonial modernity and Chinese Confucian civilisation). 
Chen identifies two ways of articulation in the geo-political context: articulation from the 
dominant/colonial position and that from the dominated/colonised. He argues that colonial 
imperialism and its top-down interpellation – which usually comes in the name of condescending 
civilisation and is characterised by colonial assimilation – belong to the former type. Whether little 
subjectivities experience the process of colonisation or not, they are often forced to identify with 
specific larger civilisations or even to take sides between competing civilisations with internal 
splits (1998, pp.18-20). Thus, for Chen, articulation as a formation of relations between two 
elements can either come from powerful positions or weaker positions. Chen’s usage is more 
similar to Laclau and Mouffe. Hall’s main critique points to the former type – the hegemonic 
(mediated) articulation forming a structure in dominance which is an outcome of the effort from 
the dominant – and Chen’s attention is on the latter type (the articulations from the weaker 
positions). Chen distinguishes two forms of articulations from the little subjectivity: one complicit 
to status quo and one dis-articulating it. For the first one, Chen maintains that the active yet non-
reflexive identification with larger civilisations (e.g. colonial hybridisation) has been common in 
Taiwan (e.g. identification with Japanese imperialism and American neo-imperialism). Such 
identifying articulation might relieve the little subjectivity’s anxiety about marginalisation, but it 
does not touch the core of the subjectivity’s identity crisis since it would reproduce the fixed 
dominant/colonial structure. He calls for “critical syncretism” – critical forms of articulation by the 
little subjectivity to actively and reflexively mix with various minorities, e.g. the colonised, working 
class, women and the homosexual (1998, pp.24-28; 2010, pp.96-100). This critical articulation is 
opposite to those complicit to status quo. It is again similar to Laclau and Mouffe’s critical practice 
to dis-articulate the hegemonic discourse by revealing hidden truth in the re-articulation.  
In the field of media, such critical dis-articulating practice to counter dominant discourse, 
argued by Shu-mei Shih (2007, p.35), has already appeared in contemporary art-house films in 
Taiwan and other Chinese-speaking regions because the stream of art film has tried to disrupt 
dominant patriarchal, nationalist and capitalist discourses. Shih calls the signification of the 
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Chinese-language art films that reveal the linguistic dissonance or heteroglossia and break the 
myth of pan-Chinese totality and fixity in the ethnic Chinese world, as “minor (mediated) 
articulation”. It challenges the monolingual standardisation and assimilation of cultures into one 
Sino-Chinese civilisation.  
We can now apply Williams and Hall’s media theory to the idol dramas situated in a context 
pinpointed by Chen, and analyse them in contrast to arts and art-house films for women. The 
inter-Asian idol dramas can be seen as complex mediated articulations of numerous sets of forces 
in the region; they are initiated by the Taiwanese as a little subjectivity facing several larger 
civilisations. The articulations are multiplied because they can choose one among multiple 
stronger East Asian countries (such as the PRC, Japan, etc.) and the latter’s value systems. 
These stronger countries can interfere and articulate with Taiwan. Thus, simply asking whether 
and how submissive an articulation of Taiwan and its idol drama is towards one dominant country 
in East Asia is not enough. As Chen points out, the small countries would usually split into several 
factions that ally with different civilisations, we need a theory that further explains relations of 
different factions in a social space – a field that is full of different agents competing with each 
other. I found Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of “field” very useful here. 
Bourdieu’s sociology analyses the relations of individuals and agents in different social 
spaces that range from the larger field of society to the field of cultural consumption and 
production (1977; 1984; 1993). It explains how agents in the spaces contest with each other, 
winning legitimacy, although Bourdieu does not find that agents can look for foreign allies and 
articulate with the allies. Consider these questions: are Taiwanese idol dramas actively taking 
sides to co-operate with the media industries of stronger societies in East Asia? If so, which one 
are they siding with? How is one mediated articulation different from another? What is the 
articulation of this siding? Are the articulations of any sidings more of Chen’s critical syncretism, 
with more subaltern minorities than non-reflexive practices complicit to status quo and having the 
ideological effect pinpointed by Hall? Thus an analytical model combining Hall’s critical media 
analysis and Bourdieu’s theory of field is necessary as it brings plurality to the idea of articulation. 
Multiple agents exist in a particular field of a small country. With the combination of Hall and 
Bourdieu’s concepts I can comprehend how the agents seek larger countries as allies and then 
articulate the value systems of these larger countries. Are the articulations critical of or complicit 
with the values of the larger? 
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The following sections theorise the idol drama in terms of context and (mediated) articulation. 
I shall map their geographically and historically situated context, describe the historically specific 
features of the context, and see how stronger forces are articulated in the idol dramas that 
compete in Taiwan. 
 
2.2 Context 
2.2.1 Nationalist, Patriarchal and Capitalist Forces in East Asia 
European critical social and cultural theories that have been primarily concerned with class 
struggle have been applied to different types of social politics, e.g. racial, ethnic and gender 
politics in the West (McRobbie, 1981; Hall, 1986b; 1991b). Still, they need modification to fit 
Taiwanese and East Asian contexts characterised by the value systems of three hegemonic and 
intersecting forces – nationalist and patriarchal as well as capitalist (Hall, 1996, p.397). To briefly 
summarise, East Asian female-oriented mass media and its targeted audience are heavily 
influenced by scattered nationalist, patriarchal and commercial forces situated in different East 
Asian countries. In reality, these three forces usually operate in combination. Each country has 
its specific domestic ecology that is generally different from that of another country, yet similar in 
some aspects. Nonetheless, globalisation since the 1990s, has made the dominant value systems 
in these countries unable to completely control the formation of values and identities in their own 
countries. 
The region has had several structures of value systems: colonial imperialism, post-colonial 
nationalism, heterosexual patriarchy and capitalism, at least since the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries (Chen, 2010, p.96). The region is formed from several countries, which possess 
different levels of power determined by the regional realpolitik over the period. The male-centred 
nation-states are in infinite competition with other countries/nations for more resources (Foucault, 
1988 cited in Bhabha, 1990, p.301). They are situated within a global world dominated by the 
West. Western countries, especially the UK and US, have been influential in East Asia since the 
nineteenth century. China and Japan, which had a relative power rise and decline, have been the 
two strongest civilisations in the region, overshadowing smaller countries. The political-economic 
dynamism influences the cultural formations. The East Asian countries, especially the PRC versus 
Japan, and South Korea versus Japan, cannot truly reach reconciliation because of historical 
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issues and territorial disputes. Their cultural nationalism is usually strengthened by agitating the 
nationals against each other. Inferior to the global and regional hegemonies (formerly colonised 
by Japan and currently overshadowed by the PRC), the local political-economic elites from 
Taiwan, such as the KMT and the DPP politicians and other elites, are only dominant within the 
country. Here, the DPP politicians have risen to compete with the KMT for political domination, 
and this has divided the country into two nationalistic camps. 
The post-colonial patriarchal nation-states are both similar to and different from each other. 
Their value systems have mainly three dimensions: nationalist, patriarchal and 
capitalist/commercial. The nationalist rulers are also patriarchal. To compete in the world, they 
and their discourses, characterised by binarism, seek to integrate heterogeneous internal entities 
into one. Their people are educated as “object(s) of pedagogy” and also “performative subjects” 
in Homi Bhabha’s phrase (1990, p.299) to contribute to national development together. The post-
colonial patriarchal nationalists are granted ruling positions by the people as long as they are 
“loyal to their nation with conscience” (Abu-Lughod, 2004, p.91). Yet these discourses have 
internal conflict. The post-colonial patriarchal nationalists oppress other social groups in these 
countries. The nationalist elites, alongside their male-centred patriarchal ideology, be it agrarian, 
socialist or capitalist, have suppressed and inculcated women with their value systems (Fore, 
1993, p.66).  
Their pursuit of national economic development sacrifices and represses powerless social 
groups. South Korean feminist Hae-joang Cho Han (2000) criticises the South Korean male-
centred nationalist state for producing a uniform national subjectivity and suppressing the 
constitution of alternative social identities for its high-growth, capitalistic economic development. 
Japanese sociologist Sechiyama Kaku (2013) examines how the persistence of traditional 
patriarchal values and gender codes in Japan, South Korea, North Korea, Taiwan and the PRC, 
has influenced and worsened contemporary gender relations, and sustained gender inequality 
and discrimination in both the family and in the workplace. Due to the marginalisation in the power 
relations of patriarchal nation-state, women respond ambiguously to patriarchal nationalist values, 
doing and undoing these values contradictorily at different times (Bhabha, 1990, pp.299-301). 
Moreover, they do not absolutely and automatically register the patriarchal sense (Liu, 1994, 
p.58). For instance, feminist scholars from Hong Kong, Taiwan and the PRC follow Indian 
American feminist Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (1988, p.28) to ask “can the feminine speak”, as 
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Chinese-speaking women are very silenced compared to men. They note the public domination 
of masculine voices and vision and examine the struggle of the establishment of women’s public 
spheres (Yang, 1999). 
Finally, the patriarchal nationalist states embrace a capitalist market economy, prioritising 
capitalistic resolutions for the national economy. The nation-states sacrifice and suppress the 
working classes in the interests of national capitalism and international competition. East Asian 
countries have pursued economic prosperity by making their national economies integral parts of 
the global capitalist economic system that has expanded from Europe and North America to other 
parts of the world at different points in time (after WWII in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan and 
after the 1980s in the PRC). Their state-led industrial advancement and economic growth (Vogal, 
1991 cited in Lee and Lim, 2014, p.4) has corresponded with society’s embrace of a market 
economy. More recently, these countries have been under the increasing influence of neo-
liberalism that sees culture as an object of international free trade, and also as an effective tool 
for branding the nation (Ibid, p.5). 
 
2.2.2 Impacts of Globalisation 
The 1990s saw the emergence of the economic globalisation of East Asia, with the old Cold-War 
power structure falling apart, and the PRC opening up market/labour to foreign capitals and global 
economic competition. The liberalisation of the economic system and political democratisation 
(except the PRC) reached one of its peaks. Those East Asian countries that were once ruled by 
authoritarian domestic patriarchal-nationalist regimes were impacted by rapid social economic 
transition and new forms of information flow (Kim, 1999; Chen, 2010, pp.12-13).  
Twenty-first-century East Asian countries are undergoing more complex economic 
integration, increasing their mutual reliance. Yet they are still competing for political and economic 
power (Zhao, 1997). This competition has continued, leading East Asian nationalists to have 
complex feelings toward their neighbours (Lo and Pang, 2005, pp.2-3). In the meantime, old geo-
political relations between large and small countries seem to have come back. Though 
experiencing relative demise, larger civilisations seem likely to continue to influence small 
countries in the future. The political cultural groups dominant in these small countries are 
overshadowed by the larger countries, such as KMT and DPP in Taiwan opposed to PRC, 
America, and Japan, as introduced in chapter 1. Ironically, the patriarchal nationalist value 
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systems in these countries resemble and contradict each other in different aspects of their value 
systems. Thus it is not difficult to discover the contradictory and schizophrenic co-existence of 
“harmony” and “opposition”, “co-operation” and “competition” and “friendship” and “animosity” in 
East Asia. Nationalists usually condemn other countries for historical war responsibilities and 
claim their sovereignty on small islands in territorial disputes. The dynamism in East Asia is 
characterised by the whimsical shift between, on the one hand, the call for regional reconciliation 
and a peaceful future, out of economic desire, and, on the other, daunting military preparations 
and national protests against the other nations (Lo and Pang, 2005, pp.2-3; Cooney and 
Scarbrough, 2008; Ap, Kwon and Wakatsuki, 2015). 
 
Inter-Asian Media Consumption and Co-operation 
The region’s prosperous economic growth led by strong nation-states has provided material 
conditions for the development of various media systems in the national markets. The strongest 
media centres and symbols of East Asian modernity during the Cold-War period were Hong Kong 
and Japan (Yeh and Davis, 2002; Curtin, 2007, pp.29-46).15 The post-war Hong Kong-based 
Chinese-language media was characterised by flexible production (Yeh and Davis, 2002). It had 
active regional media circulations and production activities. The film (and by extension, TV) 
industry grew by targeting and treating the regional population as its basic market base and 
gradually expanding its influence from the ethnic Chinese population to non-Chinese East Asian 
countries (Chan, 1996; Yeh and Davis, 2002; Tsai, 2005, pp.110-111; Curtin, 2007). In respect 
of production, the Hong Kong film industry pre-sold screening rights to the distributors for funding 
(Lii, 1998). Its prosperity attracted many talents from Chinese-speaking countries, such as Taiwan 
(Tsai, 2005, pp.110-117); its international expansions generated many Hong Kong films casting 
foreign actors (Morris, 2012). In terms of narratives, it developed narration styles that attracted a 
wide range of regional audiences with fast-moving scenes and visual spectacles (Chiao, 1991, 
p.159).  
                                                     
15
 Chinese-language commercial film studios moved from their pre-war centre in Shanghai to Hong Kong during Cold 
War, because of Hong Kong’s proximity to the South-East-Asian film market for Chinese-language films, Chinese film-
makers’ exiling in Hong Kong during WWII and later the division of socialist mainland China and capitalist Chinese-
speaking areas (Curtin, 2007, pp.29-46). 
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In contrast to its wartime imperialistic expansion, the post-war Japanese media had been 
inward-looking, addressing its domestic market and refraining from East Asian media export 
before 1990s (Iwabuchi, 2002, pp.1-4). This is not to say that Japanese media did not have a 
competitive edge. There was illegal and limited circulation of Japanese media in East Asian 
countries, including former Japanese colonies, where their governments banned the circulation 
of Japanese media products in pursuit of the construction of their own national media systems 
and identity-building (Luo, 1996; D.-H. Lee, 2004; Ko, 2008, p.133). Only Hong Kong media 
pragmatically established deeper interactions with the Japanese in order to advance in media 
production (Yeh and Davis, 2002, pp.61-63). 
In the 1990s, Japanese media products were widely introduced to audiences in the region, 
except South Korea where they were still banned (Iwabuchi, 2002; 2004a; b; D.-H. Lee, 2004, 
p.251). They were largely circulated through both legal (the multinational satellite broadcasters) 
and illegal (underground video circulation) routes in many East Asian countries (Iwabuchi, 2002, 
pp.139-141; D.-H. Lee, 2004, p.252; Hu, 2005). The new consumers of Japanese media, who 
might have once been consumers of media products of Hong Kong as well as those of their own 
countries, were able to compare the mediated Japanese modernity and value systems with those 
of Hong Kong and their own countries (Iwabuchi, 2002, pp.135-135; MacLachlan and Chua, 2004, 
p.156; Fung, 2007). The South Korean media system was also based in its domestic market and 
this helped it develop a unique national media culture (Lee, 2008). In the late 1990s, it joined the 
regional media circulation so that East Asian media consumers had one more option (Chua and 
Iwabuchi, 2008). These East Asian media industries have their own focused genres and target 
audiences. Collectively, however, they are seen as key actors who attempt to challenge the 
domination of global media by the US (Iwabuchi, 2002; 2004b, pp.4-5; Chua, 2004). 
One arguable means for East Asian women to indirectly express their views and desires 
may lie in their media consumption. Since the late 1990s, many women in the region have been 
free to choose between Western, Hong Kong, Taiwanese, Japanese and South Korean media, 
especially TV dramas. These regional exchanges of TV dramas have particularly drawn critical 
attention, especially from feminists. Influenced by Western feminism, East Asian feminist scholars 
started to seek the public spheres of the women of the region (Yang, 1999). They have identified 
that mass media culture is one important site for contestations between patriarchal ideology and 
feminist viewpoints, since it can influence and constitute a much wider public (Sang, 1999, 
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pp.134-135). The transnational consumption of female-oriented TV dramas has been analysed 
by critical media scholars so as to understand how East Asian female audiences formulate their 
own gender and social values (Iwabuchi, 2004a; Chua and Iwabuchi, 2008; Huang, 2008; Yang, 
2008a; b). TV dramas from different countries have embodied nationally different sets of social 
values on a continuum between Western and Confucian values. Whilst some women have 
become a faithful audience of Western TV dramas (Huang, 2008), many East Asian women have 
looked for more adoptable templates from Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, etc. 
(Iwabuchi, 2002, pp.144-151; Fung, 2008; Ida, 2008; Lin and Tong, 2008; Heryanto, 2010). This 
implies the increasing significance of East Asian media products in the process of East Asian 
female audiences’ identity construction and self-expression. 
The regional circulation of East Asian media culture is believed to be attributed to the 
regional cultural proximity in the socio-gender value system shaped by the local East Asian 
patriarchal-capitalist-nationalist regimes and their business cultures. The “cultural proximity” has 
two senses (Iwabuchi, 2002, pp.134-135). The first is the essentialistic, static East Asian cultural 
root of patriarchal Confucianism. These countries all share common roots of patriarchal 
Confucianism in varying degrees, and have struggled for capitalist economic development and 
prosperity, although they have developed different contemporary cultural values. Yet even though 
East Asian media cultures have formed a cultural bloc, they are at different stages of 
modernisation and westernisation. But the media and cultural productions in more economically 
advanced countries will remodel themselves to create complicated works to engage with 
emergent yet controversial social phenomena, issues and values, and address new demands.16 
Their creative innovation and maturity lead to their regional popularity among people in other 
neighbouring countries who are not satisfied with the domestic media that is rooted in more 
traditional values. The second sense of the cultural proximity actually exists when a consumer 
positively identifies with the ideas, values and people’s lives in an imported TV drama from a 
neighbouring country. Only those who accept the product would identify the “culturally proximate” 
distance between their society (e.g. Taiwan or Singapore) and the society of the imported media 
                                                     
16
 For instance, the 1990s’ Japanese TV dramas developed a highly advanced and reflexive storytelling out of their writers’ 
serious engagement with the post-bubble-economy Japanese living context (Tsai, 2002). These Japanese TV dramas 
provided healing and reflexivity to the individuals, both men and women, who demanded more progressive contemporary 
ways of living (Hu, 2008; 2010). 
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(e.g. Japan). Others, who reject it, would not (Iwabuchi, 2002, pp.134-135; MacLachlan and Chua, 
2004, p.156). 
The same phenomenon of cultural proximity may apply to the regional female consumption 
of South Korean TV drama. Watching romantic TV dramas from South Korea might be a form of 
escape and/or a silent protest of the regional women towards their patriarchal society (Yang, 
2008a). Yet the values provided by Japanese and South Korean media have slight variations. 
Comparatively, cultural values encapsulated in South Korean TV dramas are more neo-
Confucian, whilst Japanese TV dramas convey more individualistic and post-Confucian values 
(Choi, 2010; Liew, 2011). For example, South Korean TV dramas offer the regional audience 
templates that are modern in terms of appearance yet traditional in terms of gender codes (Lin 
and Tong, 2008). In these dramas, women live out a contemporary utopian myth that is complicit 
with Confucian and capitalist patriarchy: for instance, they walk into marriages where patriarchal 
values prevail, whilst continuing to go out to work. Interestingly, this allows South Korean dramas 
to generate generational/class-specific interpretations. Watching the same drama, middle-aged 
and working-class women are likely to identify with the traditional values, whilst young middle-
class women might more actively negotiate with these conservative values (Yang, 2008b). 
To briefly summarise, individuals’ values and identities in East Asia have been influenced 
by various non-domestic media since the 1990s. Unlike the past, the dominant patriarchal 
nationalist forces of East Asia cannot completely control the choices of their female audiences or 
nationalise them in an authoritarian manner. Yet the transnational consumption of TV drama has 
mostly involved the formulation of gender and socio-economic values in the receiving audience 
because this consumption mainly concerns urban lifestyles and the emotional world. These 
dramas are “apolitical” in the sense that they are “petite narratives” that do not engage with the 
“grand narratives” of geo-politics between East Asian countries. That is why this parallel 
transnational appropriation of another country’s values and individualities can take place between 
two countries, despite the two countries being oppositional in national interests. 
As East Asian media industries compete regionally in a more free-trade environment, they 
consider more active exploitation of their competitors’ resources, including talents and other 
elements, firstly to appeal to their target audience in the domestic market and, secondly, to enter 
their competitors’ home markets. Inter-Asian media productions targeting more than two markets, 
which were relatively rare before the 1990s except for Hong Kong film, are now considered 
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common in the region.17 In the new East Asian media co-operations, the media industries cross 
over to exchange capitals, markets, stars, talents, formats and other elements both contingently 
and heterogeneously. These crossovers mean temporary industrial friendship, on the one hand.18 
On the other, they also mean that the media are reiterating regionally accepted values, 
contributing to the homogenisation of social and gender values in East Asia (Lim, 2008; Yang, 
2012). 
 
2.3 (Mediated) Articulations 
When investigating inter-Asian co-operations, we should pay attention to the issue of articulation 
and hegemony. An attempt to unite markets and conduct inter-Asian co-production might face a 
dilemma because it would not only respond to dominant social values but also potentially lead to 
cross-cultural imaginations – stories articulating at least two national cultures. The articulations 
could provoke regional debates, discussions and controversies since different national stances 
would come into play. The national differences in terms of social values, national interests and 
geo-political power relations, form unprecedented challenges for media industries that plan to 
articulate East Asian elements together in a diegesis. Not surprisingly, this practice to articulate 
“East Asian differences” has been considered risky, and demands more historically and politically 
reflexive efforts on the part of the media workers (Sun, 2000a; b; Tsai, 2005, p.123; Lo, 2005, 
p.154).  
For projects from a small-market industry in the lower level of the East Asian media 
hierarchy, casting a more established star usually incurs a higher expense. The projects must 
take advantage of the “star-as-capital” to cover this extra expense. Here there is a difference 
between the media industries based in larger economies (the PRC or Japan, etc.) and those from 
smaller economies (Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, etc.). Chinese or Japanese projects can 
recoup the expense in their domestic markets alone. On the contrary, many transnationally casted 
                                                     
17
 The Hong Kong film industry had a number of co-operations with Japanese film studios during the 1960s (Yeh and 
Davis, 2002) and with the South Korean film industry during the 1980s (Hyun, 1998). 
18
 There are two types of inter-Asian “friendship”. The first type is “employment” – the East Asian media systems compete 
for regional visibility by scouting for and employing talents and elements from other East Asian media systems (Yeh and 
Davis, 2002; Tsai, 2005; K.-C. Lo, 2005; 2014). The second type is “joint production”, teaming-up, especially in finance, 
to conquer both and even larger markets, such as pan-Asian or global markets (Wei, 2011). The first example involves 
inter-Asian flow of talents and formats. The best example of the second is Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon (2000) that 
had multinational casting and a good box office in the US. 
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projects from Taiwan and Hong Kong are export-oriented. For the latter, which lack a large-scale 
home market, multinationally casted projects are intended to address overseas market demands 
whilst balancing their own domestic necessities. They need to consider how the two markets’ 
value systems, including both similarities and differences, can be united. The similarities can be 
linked more easily while the differences are articulated in prioritisation of the more dominant side. 
Thus the end results will illustrate regionally shared values and the larger countries’ own values 
as hegemony with small entities being articulated in subordination. 
 
2.3.1 Domestic Factions, Regional Allies 
The notion of (domestic) hegemony (in Taiwan) and (inter-Asian) articulation is even more 
important when analysing regional activities of idol drama. Taiwanese idol drama is a small and 
young TV industry that is based in Taiwan, a country of internal split. The split results from the 
relative decline of the Sino-centric nationalism of the KMT, which has been replaced by the 
competition of two domestic patriarchal nationalist forces (the KMT and the DPP). Had it not been 
the relative demise of the authoritarian political discourse from the KMT and the consequential 
deregulation of domestic media market, inter-Asian co-operation beyond nationalist control would 
not be so prevalent in Taiwanese TV production. Historically, Taiwan has been an area for 
encountering multiple forces in East Asia: it is “a site and a product of relations with other entities 
and areas in terms of culture, geography, history, politics, and economy” in the long term since 
centuries ago (Shih and Liao, 2015, pp.1-2). More recently, with political democratisation, cultural 
de-Sino-nationalisation and media liberalisation, Taiwanese society and culture are no longer 
shaped by the Sino-centrism. The contemporary Taiwanese society, being young and open, is 
becoming heterogeneous, diverse, decentralised, individualised and transnationally connected 
(Shih, 2003, p.146; Shih and Liao, 2015, p.1). Although there is a tendency for the local patriarchal 
nationalist ideology of the Taiwanese nation-building movement (of the DPP) to be getting more 
currency, this force does not yet monopolise the shaping of Taiwanese culture. The country’s 
culture is again an open space of contestations. The individuals may ignore nationalist agenda 
and want to build their identities by making their own inter-Asian connections with other regional 
forces via media consumption. Or they may find ways to reconcile local and regional perspectives. 




Yet the fact that Taiwanese society is democratised, decentralised and relatively distant from 
Sino-centrism does not mean it is free from ideological forces. It is still under hegemonic 
contestation between three patriarchal nationalistic forces (the KMT, the DPP and the CCP). 
Similarly, the deregulated TV industry is still heavily influenced by domestically competing 
discourses embedded in commercialism, selectively embracing particular sets of patriarchal 
nationalistic sentiments in order to make its dramas sellable and safe, domestically and regionally. 
With the country’s social and cultural transition, its TV market, which is competed for by imports 
and domestics, has become fragmented into many sections. Domestic political-cultural forces 
might not dominate in the consumption market of TV drama. Domestic TV drama making can 
adopt globalised approaches, some of which take advantage of foreign elements such as from 
Japan and South Korea, especially those that are appealing to their target audiences. Inter-Asian 
strategies may push further the decentralisation of the formation of socio-cultural values and 
identity via TV dramas. 
To analyse how the Taiwanese politics has affected idol dramas, I need to draw on Pierre 
Bourdieu’s sociology of culture, in particular his concept of “the homology of fields” (1977; 1984; 
1993). Bourdieu is mainly concerned with the social relations in class society and a homology 
between class relations and other sub-fields, such as culture (arts). The key point of field 
homology is that all fields are structurally determined by class relations. The pattern would be 
relayed to the field of consumption via the logics of practice (habitus) of specific classes. As for 
the field of symbolic cultural production, although different social groups would struggle to enter 
the field where each group would have its orientation and strategy (Garnham and Williams, 1980, 
p.215; Jenkins, 1992, p.86; Bourdieu, 1993; Johnson, 1993, p.6), the suppressed (e.g. working 
class in France and the UK) have difficulty entering a cultural field because of its lack of cultural 
and economic capital. Although this field would have relative autonomy, it would relay class 
politics via the unequal distribution and accumulation of economic and cultural capital. It is much 
easier for dominant social groups to do so, whilst minority groups usually fail to remain in the 
cultural fields. Thus entering the field, to keep it from the monopoly of dominant groups, is an 
important contestation practice for socially repressed groups. 
Bourdieu’s analysis of the cultural field also extends to its context. That means it demands 
the study of the set of social conditions of the production, circulation and consumption of symbolic 
products. The analysis encompasses the works themselves relationally within the space of 
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available possibilities and within the historical development of such possibilities, and the creators 
of works in terms of their strategies and trajectories, based on their class-specific habitus and 
their objective position within the field (Johnson, 1993, p.9). Structure of the cultural field is 
included naturally in the analysis. 
The Bourdieu’s theory concerning the relationally patterned dynamism in a cultural 
production field is insightful, yet demands modification to fit the particular Taiwanese patriarchal 
nationalist context. To illustrate the context and multiple bilateral articulations of agents in idol 













Figure 2-1 Politics of Inter-Asian Idol Drama Production  
Double-sided arrow means a competition/contestation relation; Line is a linkage. 
 
As Kuan-Hsing Chen (1998, pp.18-20; 2010, pp.92-94) notes, East Asia has had larger 
civilisations and little subjectivities. The patriarchal nationalist forces from different East Asian 
countries of different size and power (labelled as “A”, “B”, “C”, “D”, etc. in the diagram of Figure 
2-1) are in their own “post-colonial condition”. The countries are in infinite competition. Certainly, 
in a time of globalisation, they are no longer in the old frame of the Cold War, but they still vie for 
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regional and global influence or “soft power”. Yet global competition has made the governments’ 
domestic domination become relatively weak, confronting the trend of deregulation and market 
commercialism. 
As commented in chapter 1.3, political factions in Taiwan tend to link to outside forces, and 
this arouses criticisms of their pro-American, pro-Japanese and pro-Chinese stances. Similarly, 
there is a structural homology between the politics and idol drama industry in the sense that an 
idol drama production company would have its own production orientation and strategy. The idol 
drama industry would have relative autonomy from politics, but the basic rules of Taiwanese 
politics would spread. A Taiwanese TV maker would also want to actively make inter-Asian 
linkage with, and take advantage of, a foreign market to gain more competitiveness. 
This thesis views those TV production company leaders, who implement inter-Asian 
production, as “packagers”. Inspired from the term “package” used by Darrell William Davis and 
Emilie Yueh-yu Yeh (2008) in their research on East Asian film co-productions, “packaging” refers 
to the packagers’ inter-Asian scouting and employing of resources and means of production from 
multiple East Asian countries, to produce regional cultural formations. The packagers would 
select the funders/forces whose value systems and demands are more acceptable to them. That 
is, they choose their allies – forming a set of “production relation” in one drama – and they may 
choose another ally in another drama. In the above diagram, I mark four such packagers, labelled 
as “a”, “b”, “c”, “d”. They actively select and link with the companies/market dealers from overseas 
markets. Each inter-Asian packager is an agent (e.g. “a”) and has its funder (e.g. “A”). These 
funder-packager linkages (“A-a”, “B-b”, “C-c”, “D-d”…) can be multiple. In this way, they not only 
contribute to the heterogeneity of Taiwanese idol drama but also keep their field in contestation. 
This model echoes Shih (2003, p.146), who maintains that Taiwan is becoming universally and 
transnationally connected and cannot be defined by a single national culture.  
In this way, Taiwanese idol drama is an inter-Asian textual space for external forces to be 
configured and told. But the external funders do not forcefully “invade” this field since their 
participations are initiated by the Taiwanese packagers. As this production environment is 
commercial, the packagers tend to link with dealers in larger markets for funding. Therefore the 
linkage is hierarchically structured. The unity of packager and its external co-operating funder, or 
its “ally”, is a complex, hierarchical structure of “articulation”, in Stuart Hall’s term (Hall, 1986a, 
p.141; Grossberg, 1992, p.54; Slack, 1996, p.115). In light of the ideas Kuan-Hsing Chen (1998; 
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2010) mentioned earlier, we could argue that the values of the larger market dominate and is 
taken seriously by the Taiwanese packaging in the articulation. The Taiwanese idol drama project 
would decide to tailor to the tastes of the larger markets, such as the PRC and Japan. However, 
it is important to note that the main funders/distributors may not be identical to the actual 
audiences in those overseas markets. Rather, they can be regarded as gatekeepers who are 
rooted in their national discourses and control what their domestic audience can access. 
Therefore, the dominating forces deriving from these larger markets, including their ideological 
demands, value systems, TV industrial conventions and government regulations (e.g. 
censorships), influence and shape the funded Taiwanese projects through the articulations of the 
packagers. 
As an inter-Asian packager links with an “acceptable” external force, cultural contestation is 
likely to take place outside rather than in the link between them.19 The first visible cultural politics 
appear mainly and horizontally between two Taiwanese packagers, who link with two external 
forces. As illustrated above, the idol drama industry is an ensemble formed of numerous nodes – 
individual TV workers – who have their own production strategies that oppose those of others. 
The workers form companies, which are primary units in the industry. The companies compete 
for success, strive for legitimacy and oppose others in the market. For example, packager “a”, 
who connects to the external funder “A”, would be criticised by other groups (for instance groups: 
b, c, d…) as an “agent/proxy” of A or as the “traitor” of other factions of the Taiwanese TV industry. 
As such, the competition for legitimacy between the production companies is where the first 
conflict of cultural politics occurs. The packagers differ from each other, opposing the packaging 
style, funding market and external forces behind the other packagers. Thus this contestation takes 
the form of horizontal competition. The competition between packagers is also indirectly inter-
Asian, because one packager is contesting against the influences of the foreign markets behind 
the other packagers. 
The second type of cultural politics exists vertically between the administrative and creative 
sides inside a packaging production company. Senior workers can be seen as the nodal points 
that are financially stronger and senior in terms of career capital. They are more able to found a 
production company, to run projects, because of their richer and greater working funds, 
                                                     
19
 I do not mean that the two have no difference at all. They might still have some friction but the difference is slight.  
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connections, strength, work experience, especially market sensibility, etc. These leaders recruit 
and cast project-based staff and actors, who basically agree to the central principles and 
orientation of the contracted project and the company. In the diagram, such recruitment is seen 
as a connection between the junior (e.g. β) and senior nodes (e.g. b) of TV workers in the circle 
of the Taiwanese idol drama industry. By agreeing to “the terms and conditions” of their 
employment, the members become the extension of the leader in this project. Yet these members 
could still have creative divergency. This is usually because of the conflict between commercial 
pressure and personal, artistic concerns. The higher the administrative positions of TV workers, 
the more commercial pressure they bear. The employed members would be pressurised by the 
packager leaders. As such, the field of idol drama is an open-ended and complex ensemble where 
there are different levels of collaboration and contestation.  
 
2.3.2 Articulating Self with Ally 
Since East Asia is composed of several patriarchal, nationalist and capitalist regimes that are 
shaping their nationals and competing for regional historiography, their difference indicates the 
existence of many imagined worlds. The inter-Asian packagers do not simply reproduce the 
discourses rooted in the imagined worlds they link with in their dramas. The dramas are 
characterised by “dual concerns” (Hitchcock, 2002, p.68): that is, the drama markers will identify, 
reconcile and negotiate in the actual production sites, the similar and different values and 
identities between the Taiwanese and external forces, whilst articulating shared elements among 
these differences. Yet different makers will “absorb and translate” (Ma, 1999, p.167) the 
determinate factors in their own ways and produce different outcomes. Each packager/external 
partner linkage forms a particular TV discourse in the Taiwanese TV field. The packaging team 
must successfully address these external funders’ main interests and reconcile them with their 
own Taiwan-specific preferences, even though they already share a few similarities. In addition 
to foreign funders, they articulate the taste and ideological discourses of targeted external markets 
(sometimes the funder differs from the targeted market). The articulations embodied by the 
fictional narratives and characters might draw on personal experience, perception and approach 
based on the producer’s own life context and the production resources in hand. The articulations 
only possess “relative autonomy” because they depend on powers of and are constrained by the 
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dominant value systems, so the ultimate counter-discourse could not appear in these 
elaborations. In that way, the production company is seen as the local agent of the external force 
in Taiwanese TV culture/market, articulating and disseminating the latter’s values and agendas. 
 
2.3.2.1 Juxta-political Articulations 
Concerning international and geo-political relations, idol dramas are inclined to mediate “peace” 
as their main cross-cultural theme, while art-house and male-centred genres display a sense of 
opposition and rivalry (Hitchcock, 2002; Lo, 2005; Dasgupta, 2013). The latter tends to put 
national antagonism in the narrative centre, articulating East Asian nationalist differences from 
one perspective and signifying the existence of irresolvable conflict. Regarding this, Kwai-Cheung 
Lo (2005, p.154) believes that the latter exactly captures the current relation of the East Asian 
patriarchal nationalists. 
I believe it is the basis on which the complex representation of Asia is founded. In the process of 
striving to represent Asia, there is always a signifier-without-a-signified that carries no 
determinate meaning. This empty signifier of Asia stands for the presence of meaning as such. 
The horizon of representing Asia is wide open for film-makers to engage in a hegemonic struggle 
in order to produce new contingent meanings and shifting identities for the region. 
 
Art-house and male-centred genres make it clear that the one-sided perspective and non-
consensual characters are exactly the East Asian reality. Yet commercial and female-oriented 
films and TV dramas simplify and present reconciliation juxta-politically. Firstly, they tend to set 
national politics on a secondary level, negotiating national politics with romantic love stories. 
These media products are centred on romantic discourses and, more precisely, the female 
consumers’ desires and fantasies. Why is a commercial product targeting women more inclined 
to mediate regional peace?  
To answer this, American feminist scholar Lauren Berlant’s insight is helpful. Berlant (2008) 
examines how American white female writers address American political, national, racial and 
cultural issues. She notes that women’s literature and film (and by extension, TV drama) form a 
female “intimate public (sphere)” which belongs to the larger women’s culture that is one of the 
most thriving public spheres (Ibid, p.viii). The intimate female public is structured by market forces 
and consists of cultural and media consumption and circulation, which help the members of this 
public sphere to develop a shared world view and emotional knowledge. The sphere emotionally 
mediates, recognises and expresses the lives of women and where they belong. Therefore, 
Berlant understands an female intimate public as “a porous, affective scene of identification 
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among strangers that promises a certain experience of belonging and provides a complex of 
consolation, confirmation, discipline, and discussion about how to live” (Ibid, p.viii). 
Conventionally, it has been argued that female-oriented dramas have shown a clear refusal 
to refer to social and political issues in its central themes. Also, they seem more confusing as they 
usually treat national conflicts as background in which love overcomes barriers, unlike male-
oriented political films. Berlant does not agree with the argument about the apoliticalness of 
female drama. She sees the women’s drama as “an aesthetic structure of affective expectation” 
which “locates real life in the affective capacity to bracket many kinds of structural and historical 
antagonism on behalf of finding a way to connect with the feeling of belonging to a larger world” 
(Ibid, p.4). This genre cultivates fantasies of vague belonging as an alleviation of what is hard to 
manage in the antagonism of real life, compromised intimacies and the attrition of life. Utopianism 
is its main principle and one of the main utopias is patriarchal heterosexual normativity. Therefore, 
this genre has a characteristic of being “juxta-political” (Ibid, p.3). It “flourishes in proximity to the 
political because the political is deemed an elsewhere managed by elites who are interested in 
reproducing the conditions of their objective superiority, not in the well-being of ordinary people 
or life-worlds” (Ibid). In such female worlds, politics is often seen as a “field of threat, chaos, 
degradation or re-traumatisation” rather than a good promising possibility, as “politics requires 
active antagonism” (Ibid, p.11).  
The female drama occasionally crosses over to the political or does some politics, but most 
often it acts as a critical chorus that sees “the expression of emotional response and conceptual 
recalibration as achievement enough” (Ibid, p.x). When the female genre touches politics, it often 
demonstrates compassionate liberalism. Observing how American middle-class white female 
writers write on ethno-racial issues in the US, Berlant argues that these female writers have the 
ideology of “white universalist paternalism, sometimes dressed as maternalism”, mobilising post-
racist fantasy, usually in melodramatic cultural conventions (Ibid, p.6). The romantic conventions 
are adapted to imagine “a non-hierarchical social world that is post-racist and ‘at heart’ democratic 
because good intention and love flourish in it” (Ibid). 
Berlant’s account of the expressions of American white female writers is very inspiring, 
though in need of adaptation into East Asian geo-political cultural politics. As East Asian 
patriarchal nationalists are keen to construct the ethno-national identities for their competition 
over regional influence, East Asian TV workers might wrestle with national conflict and ask for 
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regional harmony in a juxta-political fashion. In his examination of About Love (2005), a female-
oriented movie that consists of three filmlets set in Tokyo, Taipei and Shanghai and was released 
in 2005 when political relations between Japan and PRC and between PRC and Taiwan were at 
a low point, Romit Dasgupta (2013) argues that the film is a feminised/romance-inflected account 
of regional dynamics. The account is motivated by the agency, desire and fantasy for inter-Asian 
romantic encounters of female consumers in the three societies, dominantly from urban middle-
classes who have consumed popular culture from the other countries since 1990s; it counters the 
official patriarchal nationalistic discourses by staging compatible and understanding encounters 
(Dasgupta, 2013, p.119). It is hence a filmic space in which the female audiences in PRC, Taiwan 
and Japan can articulate their emotions and anxieties about worsening inter-state relations (Ibid, 
p.127). The female-oriented products in the accounts of Berlant and Dasgupta similarly portray a 
desire to transcend the opposition between political and ethno-national forces. This may be 
particularly true for East Asian female-oriented films and TV dramas, including Taiwanese idol 
drama. 
Even though inter-Asian idol dramas interact with geo-political nationalist tensions with their 
peaceful provisional resolutions, they might still be checked by the dominant forces that aspire to 
nationalise media space, noted by Lori D. Hitchcock (2002, p.68). This is due to nation-states 
having their own official discourses and imaginations, but individuals and social groups today 
have their own imagined worlds which are distancing them from nationalist officialdom. The 
different “imagined worlds” are constructed by the historically situated imaginations of persons 
and groups in the world (Appadurai, 1990, p.7). They contradict and contest each other and 
sometimes subvert official imaginations. The imagined worlds and the imagination are new social 
practices to stage collective aspirations through the images (Ibid, pp.4-5). The female imagination, 
which might be transnational or even non-national, would be marginalised by more than two 
patriarchal nationalist discourses in the home market, and in the receiving country remain a more 
minor discursive position. The contestation of the imagination determines not only the border-
crossing reception but also domestic reception of the inter-Asian dramas. This is why many inter-
Asian commercial packagings are more historically generic in the textual level, avoiding conflicts, 
because of the difficulty in overcoming the differences between the historically situated 
imaginations of East Asian nationalists. This will be discussed in chapter 5. 
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Alternatively, the articulations may neglect these irresolvable conflicts which are too difficult 
to overcome in the articulation, e.g. they only attend to social and gender articulations, neglecting 
national relationships. With regard to how these packaging teams articulate the self and ally, I got 
an insight from Robin Wood’s account of how American genre film-makers elaborate and interact 
with ideological differences between dominant and subordinate social groups (1977, pp.671-672). 
Wood says that individual film-makers would have different strategies to mediate and deal with 
ideological tensions, and provide resolutions in drama narratives from their own life experience 
and personality. What is of interest is Wood’s account that commercial films would attempt to 
produce “ideologically neutral” films (neglect of particular differences, even conflicts and 
tensions). Wood believes that although these films try to offer the simplest and most archetypal 
scenes, these efforts to produce ideologically pure films are in vain because of the unlikeness of 
neutrality. This argument is germane to my interest in the idol dramas’ interaction with East Asian 
cultural differences as the packagers work with the rule of genres and might shun some 
irresolvable conflicts. I will discuss this in detail in chapter 5. Gradually the inter-Asian media co-
operation would be less interested in communicating through engagement with historical and 
cultural issues, but would prefer elemental and generic stories in an archetypal setting. As major 
productions are usually dominated by mainstream national ideologies and narrative conventions, 
minor projects are more art-oriented and tend to counter the former. For this reason, Koichi 
Iwabuchi (2009; 2010a) and Fang-chih Irene Yang (2013) are sceptical about the commercial and 
female-oriented regional media co-operations because they are likely to ignore ethnic, gender 
and socio-economic minorities, no matter what cross-cultural images are produced. 
 
2.3.2.2 Social and Gender Values 
Steve Fore (1993) argues that the agrarian Confucian patriarchy that previously permeated the 
region has now mixed with capitalist patriarchy in East Asia. The women of East Asian countries 
may “find themselves bracketed by their society’s blend of traditional and capitalist value systems, 
both of which are founded on patriarchal ideologies” (Ibid, p.66). The street movements of 
feminists (Sang, 1999, pp.134-135) and tranquil movement of women via consumption, education 
and participation of workplace, have changed women, who now have different desires and ideas. 
As the notion of hegemony indicates, the Confucian and capitalist patriarchal value systems self-
modify when addressing female contestation, so as to gain consent. Today, East Asian women 
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go out to work to realise themselves in the workplace, but they are still expected to take care of 
family as mothers and wives, according to the updated contemporary patriarchal social 
expectations. Yet, conflict exists in the new codes for it is very difficult to manage the two tasks 
(Lin and Tong, 2008, pp.111-114). 
In media analysis, one key question would be whether the (inter-Asian) female-oriented idol 
dramas (in the meta-narrative) offer a contemporary myth that is complicit with contemporary East 
Asian capitalist patriarchy, or have they developed alternative viewpoints, e.g. revealing the 
internal contradiction? Over the last few decades, Western feminists have turned their attention 
to the display of women as sexual objects on screen and spectator’s identification (Mulvey, 1975; 
1981). Later they tackled the exploration of the masculine and feminine viewpoints and values 
delivered in female-oriented filmic works. Previous feminist film scholars deduced two types of 
filmic (and by extension, TV drama) narrations for women (Cook, 1983; Kaplan, 1993). The first 
type of narrations of female subjects in films (and by extension, TV drama) is coined by E. Ann 
Kaplan (1993, p.13) “women’s melodrama”. The narration has women in the centre but is 
patriarchal in ideology. This approach claims to be the female voice, but in fact conforms to 
patriarchal capitalist ideology and enunciates from a patriarchal position. The second type, 
“women’s films”, refers to those resisting the patriarchal framing of women by positing female 
desire and subjectivity. Nonetheless the feminist scholarship argues that the relationship between 
masculine and feminine viewpoints is not clear-cut in female genres (Cook, 1983, pp.252-253). 
“Real” feminine viewpoints do not exist. This is because these female genres soften sexual 
difference and merge masculinity and femininity. Thus both male and female viewpoints would 
coexist in the female-oriented dramas and a pure expression of the female voice is unlikely to 
exist. 
Post-colonial feminists on female-oriented films and TV also distinguish critical articulations 
with the post-colonial patriarchal nationalists and those conforming to the latter (Fore, 1993; Shih, 
2007; L. Wang, 2011). Ethnic Chinese feminists call the critical films addressing contradictions, 
“women’s cinema”. These post-colonial female-oriented films and TV also illustrate “a sense of 
feminist paternalism” (Abu-Lughod, 2004, p.91). Although this distinction between “women’s 
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melodrama” and “women’s film” or “cinema” needs more examination,20 the distinction is useful 
to guide my analysis of inter-Asian idol dramas. As argued, that the new key issue for 
contemporary East Asian women is whether the conflict around new social expectations for 
women is reflexively revealed and addressed, I would like to keep the division of “women’s 
melodrama” and “women’s film” but slightly update their definitions to my concerns. Within the 
division, I will examine whether the idol dramas “offer merely utopian myth for women from 
patriarchal discourse” (this is my meaning of women’s melodrama), or whether they “reveal 
internal conflict” (as in women’s films). 
 
2.4 Conclusion 
Inputting the Western and East Asian critical academic arguments, we can roughly estimate how 
the Taiwanese female-oriented idol dramas articulate national, class and gender discourses that 
intersect with each other. Firstly, these articulations might be symbolically reduced to dramatic 
representations of the interactions of two sexes and ethnicities in the narratives. Secondly, inter-
Asian female-oriented dramas from small countries such as Taiwan tend to ambiguously conform 
to the dominant value systems of larger and stronger countries because through funding and 
marketing, the values of dramas are shaped indirectly by the larger countries. Drama makers in 
smaller countries have also been affected by multiple value systems from powerful countries in 
the formation of their own socio-cultural values and identities, and consequently in production 
strategies. This is exactly what the globalised Taiwanese culture is becoming through inter-Asian 
linkages. Since the regional gender value systems remain heterogeneous, the more markets the 
Taiwanese packagers have, the more multiple value axes Taiwan will link with in this new global 
age. The products have their own political, economic and ideologically value-laden creative 
conditions so that critical researches should examine the different media linkages, their criticality, 
and the operation of hegemonic ideologies within, through comparative research (Tsai and Shin, 
2013, p.9).  
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 Between the two categories exists a space of mild critique that usually appears in less commercial products possessing 
light-hearted feminist sentimentalism (Zhang, 2011, p.105) whose boundary between “conformity” and “criticality” is 
subjective, depending on the contexts of interpretation. 
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Chapter 3 Methodology 
To probe into the production side of idol drama, its politics and its textual articulations, I adopted 
multiple methods including an analysis of secondary data (news reports and industry data), a 
long-term observation of the industry and a series of in-depth interviews with key industrial 
workers, as well as textual analysis of idol drama stories. The first section of this chapter reviews 
my doctoral research journey, the questions employed and the methods used. It traces my 
interactions with idol drama workers before and during my research. I reflect on why I became 
interested in this industry. I will then examine my initial opinions and framework, which were 
challenged by the findings from the interviews, and discuss how I revised these initial 
presumptions.  
The second part of the chapter reflects on the textual method used to critique idol drama’s 
ideological imaginations. I followed ideological criticism based on a semiotic and ideological 
analysis of fictional narratives in film and TV and cited previous East Asian film studies that also 
take up the criticism.  
 
3.1 Participant Observation and In-depth Interview 
3.1.1 Preparation before PhD Study 
Living in a time when TV drama became central to many women whose daily lives were saturated 
by media, I became interested in it, especially its place as a domestic industry in the society of 
which I was a part, as well being intrigued by its potential influence on the public. In 2004, I 
enrolled on a master’s degree programme in Mass Communication. I analysed the shift of the 
production of Chinese-language classical and historical TV drama from Taiwan to the PRC. 
Postgraduate study was a good reason for me to start contacting people who were working in the 
Taiwanese TV industry. I did not find many people from the generation which made Chinese-
language classical historical dramas for Taiwanese TV, since most of them had moved to the 
PRC in the 2000s. Instead, I met many people who were making idol dramas and developed two 
important links.  
My first link was with Virginia Liu, whom I interviewed in 2004 for an essay required by a 
module of my course. Producers tend to be difficult to reach for interview mainly because their 
workload is so heavy that they tend to decline interviews that do not benefit them immediately, 
74 
 
and student researchers have no useful connections. I did not know Liu and had no connection 
with her. I just called her company and requested an interview. To my surprise, she agreed to it 
because she was willing to give students like me a chance. I interviewed her again for another 
term paper in 2005. 
My second link was with a small group of idol drama scriptwriters, S1, S2 and S4, who had 
worked for Angie Chai a few years during the 2000s. These scriptwriters became the most 
accessible figures to outsiders via the Internet because they worked with computers and started 
blogging at that time, and I was an “outsider”, in the sense that I did not study TV and film 
production skills at university and had little connection to the industry. In 2006, I was particularly 
drawn to the blogs of S1 and S4, the writers of Silence, an idol drama produced by Chai. Of 
course, these blogs have ceased now due to the rapid transition of social media and I cannot 
provide links that reveal their names here due to anonymity concerns. Silence packaged 
Taiwanese, Hong Kong, PRC and South Korean cast and characters with a narration from a 
Taiwanese ideological viewpoint. Therefore it caught my attention. When the drama was aired by 
CTV in 2006, it was considered by its staff a success, as evidenced by its Taiwanese feedback, 
more than many other PRC-Taiwanese co-produced idol dramas at the time (S1 and S2, personal 
communication, Feb 4, 2013, p.20). The writers’ blogs became popular among Taiwanese fans 
of Silence. S1 was particularly active on her blog and Silence’s online forum, spending much time 
interacting with the audiences, including me. She even organised a fan meeting after Silence 
came to an end. S1 also invited her fans to walk out in political protests at that time. I attended 
some of the protests with her.  
My interview with Liu in 2004 was not successful in the sense that my questions, which 
mainly concerned the industrial relations between production companies and TV networks, could 
not elicit substantial answers from Liu. I made two mistakes in the interview that unfortunately 
diverted from the subject-matter. The first mistake was that I did not sufficiently study the political 
economic aspect of Taiwanese TV industry beforehand. The second was that I did not focus on 
the work experiences of TV drama makers in my questions. My second interview with her in 2005 
was not very successful, either, due to the same reasons. Thus, I became very cautious about 
doing interviews. Before my PhD research I hardly conducted any interviews, except one with S1 
in 2007 about her work experience in the making of Silence. Most of the time, I observed 
Taiwanese TV workers, listened to and talked to them, and took notes afterwards.  
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There have been diverse approaches to media studies and various theoretical tools for the 
study of contemporary mass media. These approaches can be very roughly grouped into two 
paradigms that centre firstly on criticism and interpretation of media texts, and secondly on the 
ownership of media institutions (Taylor and Willis, 1999). The first paradigm draws on literary and 
film studies that focus on the interpretation of works and texts (Taylor and Willis, 1999). In the 
second paradigm, scholars in critical political economy of communication analyse the institution 
of media production (Mosco, 2009).  
TV audience studies have notably been influenced by the ethnographic approach that 
stresses “thick (as opposed to thin) description” of meanings and that the meanings should be 
perceived “from the native (audience’s) point of view” (Geertz, 1973, pp.13-15; Morley, 1992, 
pp.179-180). Anthropology also crosses over to the study of media production. In the mid-
twentieth century, American anthropologists started expanding their academic interests to 
Hollywood, conducting ethnographies on the movie industry (Ortner, 2010). The work I did then 
and following my research shared much with the fundamental elements of ethnography; for 
instance, I myself was the most important research tool for my study; my personal knowledge 
very much determined my research agenda; I conducted interviews and collected press coverage 
of idol drama myself. Nevertheless, I do not claim that my research is an ethnography of idol 
drama industry as my research questions, which concern cultural and ideological contestations 
and articulations in a multi-polar world, are also beyond the remit of classical ethnographic 
concern. The research is rooted in the academic paradigm of media and cultural studies and 
attempts to move one step further by adopting an ethnographic approach to idol drama production.  
My own practice was similar to what is coined in the anthropological academia by Laura 
Nader as “studying up”, in this case in an industry that has a relatively enclosed boundary in its 
productions of images for mass audience and at the same time enjoys public influence (Nader, 
1969 cited in Ortner, 2010, p.218). The notion of “studying up” implies a hierarchical relation 
between a researcher in a relatively low position and a researched object that is above the 
researcher. The researcher would clearly sense the relationship when face to face with 
recognised and influential film-makers. Later, Sherry B. Ortner (2010, p.221) – an anthropologist 
who has studied Hollywood – suggests a new term: “studying sideways”. The term means that 
media workers are not completely in opposition to academic scholars like her and other 
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anthropology researchers/teachers. Instead, there has been interface between academia and the 
media workers.  
The idol drama industry in Taiwan is one such entity. It is a relatively secretive and enclosed 
industrial community formed of companies (TV stations and production companies), freelance 
actors, directors, writers, publicity producers and journalists, the latter being half insiders and half 
outsiders. Research scholars in Media and Communication affiliated to the university may be 
linked to the industry through their students who make their careers in the industry, but compared 
to journalists, and university-researchers such as these, who are familiar with the industry, I had 
limited access to those at the top and was badly lacking professional training. I was mostly 
“studying up” in my interaction with idol drama workers. 
What I conducted during these years was coined by Ortner as “interface ethnography”. 
Ortner (2010, p.218) argues that Hollywood movie industry provides publicity information and 
public events that are an interface between the industry and the public, and that the information 
in the interface awaits critical analysis. She suggested conducting participant observation in the 
industry’s public events (promotion expos, press conferences, etc.): this is “interface 
ethnography”. After these public events the researcher approaches informants for an in-depth 
interview. This is fundamental to investigation, a preparation for further steps which would mean 
participating as an observer. Since I was interested in Taiwanese TV industry I should acquire an 
understanding of it, or even try to participate as a worker. Meeting Taiwanese TV professionals 
at such an interface as they talked to the audience was vital since it was perhaps only at these 
moments were they ready to talk to and respond to people. 
 
3.1.2 Officially Entering the Field, More Networking 
3.1.2.1 Selecting Informants 
My previous interview with S1 was the catalyst that ignited my interest in the national and gender 
politics of idol drama. My work experience with Virginia Liu also pushed my attention towards its 
inter-Asian operation. After entering PhD research, I proposed to examine the regional 
development of idol drama with two main questions: the creative tensions in production over the 
control of the production process regarding creative and cultural aspects, informed by literature 
on politics in American and Japanese media industries (Negus, 2002; Lukacs, 2010) and on East 
Asian film co-operations and their cross-cultural representations (Hitchcock, 2002; Yeh and Davis, 
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2002; Lo, 2005; Pang, 2005; Davis and Yeh, 2008; Yeh, 2010a; b). I drafted preliminary interview 
questions centred on the initiation of specific TV dramas and particularly important issues such 
as the creative tensions and difficulties the workers encountered during the production processes. 
Based on my understanding of the idol drama industry, I identified four important production 
companies of idol drama (their producers listed in parenthesis). The four groups were the Comic 
Ritz Production Co. Ltd. (led by Angie Chai); the Comic International Production Co. Ltd. (led by 
Jerry Feng) which had been in affiliation to Gala TV Station since 2005; the Power Generation 
Entertainment Co. Ltd. (led by Virginia Liu); and the Prajna Works Entertainment Co. Ltd. (led by 
Tsai Yueh-Hsun). These companies had organised their own inter-Asian packaging strategies, 
as opposed to the localism strategies. They had at different times expanded their networks for 
their drama-making businesses in three directions (PRC, Japan and South Korea). They 
pioneered and thus could provide richer experiences than other companies that followed to adopt 
similar strategies.  
At the centre of my interview list were members of staff of the four groups that were identified 
by myself through their TV dramas’ opening and closing credits, including freelance people who 
had worked for them. In mid-November 2012, I resumed my “interface ethnography”, attending 
public talks given by the key people on my interview list or very significant events that specified 
an inter-Asian co-operation. Table 3.1 below illustrates the public events I attended during that 
time. 
Table 3-1 Events that I attended during November 2012 and July 2013 
No Event Time and Venue 
 
Key Speaker(s) 
1.  A fan meeting of S1 for her TV 
drama released in 2012 
Nov 11, 2012 
(Information is selectively 
shown) 
S1 
2.  A public forum on film and TV 
scriptwriting 
 
Nov 29, 2012 





3.  A public forum on cross-Strait 
filmic co-operation (held by 
Taiwan Original Filmmakers 
Union) 
Dec 1, 2012 
14–17pm 
Taipei Zhongshan Hall (Guangfu 
Auditorium) 
16 Taiwanese film-
makers, critics, and 
scholars, including 
Chu Yen-Ping, Li 
Hsing, etc. 
4.  A public talk by S1 and B3 Dec 7, 2012 S1 
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(Information is selectively 
shown) 
B3 
5.  Public forum of the 2012 
National Taiwan University Film 
Festival – Film digitisation and 
the film-making/viewing of mass 
audience 
Dec 12, 2012 
18.30pm 
Auditorium, B1, Second Student 
Activity Centre, National Taiwan 
University 
Chu Yu-Ning 
6.  Public forum of the 2012 
National Taiwan University Film 
Festival – The art of film 
marketing, Taiwanese film-
making trend and renaissance  
Dec 21, 2012 
18.30pm 
Auditorium, B1, Second Student 
Activity Centre, National Taiwan 
University 
Tsai Yueh-Hsun 
7.  A public talk by S1 Jul 25, 2013 




I was not able to choose “participant observation” at the production process of idol dramas 
since many of the dramas I wished to analyse had already completed their productions, and 
ongoing co-produced idol dramas were usually kept top secret by their producers. For instance, I 
knew from a film/TV director S7 there were several Taiwanese-Japanese co-operations under 
planning, but he declined to reveal them (personal communication, March 15, 2013, p.8). Besides, 
it was difficult to observe the TV drama productions that had become very mobile (involving 
multiple and even regionalised locales) and virtual (many decisions were made by telephones, 
etc.). These workers usually visited different locations and communicated through email and 
phone, as Angela McRobbie (2000) notes. I returned to in-depth interviews and retuned my 
interview questions to be oriented to working experience.   
All the individuals who have interacted with me over these years, or participated in my thesis, 
are my “informants” – an ethnographic term for “interviewee” (Ortner, 2010). I choose the term as 
being especially relevant because my interviews involved the culture of idol drama making (the 
culture of their professional world) about which they are knowledgeable. Adopting this word, I aim 
to emphasise their knowledge about the production culture of idol drama. 
Difficulties occurred even after much preparation. My first decision was whether I should 
increase the scope of my interviews and interview workers outside the four groups mentioned 
above. As previously noted, they were representative, but they were not the only ones. Taiwanese 
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TV had had diverse transnational engagements with non-Taiwanese media companies. There 
had been many companies that made mainly PRC-Taiwanese co-productions, which usually 
employed South Korean actors. Since 2011, many Japanese media enterprises had co-operated 
with Taiwanese companies at the level of funding and technical support, in addition to the already 
existing trade in programmes (Li, 2011; P2, personal communication, Feb 20, 2013, pp.11-12; B2, 
personal communication, Feb 26, 2013, p.2; Yu, 2014).  
 My second problem was that my upgrade paper did not distinguish between inter-Asian 
operations either at the production level or the narrative level. It conflated them with the term 
“regionalised/Asianised drama”. I did not group the TV dramas into different categories because 
some of them intended to be geo-politically generic might still possess evidence of cross-cultural 
traces. For instance, Tsai Yueh-Hsun’s Black and White was intended to present a generic 
Chinese-speaking society, but it still has North Korean elements in its narration and thus involves 
a Taiwanese viewpoint. 
The problems caused two main difficulties: first, I was unsure how much I should broaden 
my interview list and, second, what should be my analytical objects in my textual analysis chapter. 
Consequently, I did not select my research objects properly. I sought to examine only the dramas 
made by Taiwanese producers that cast South Korean actors and temporarily called them 
“regionalised TV dramas” in my upgrade paper. The dramas that cast South Korean stars were 
indeed important but the range excluded dramas that have Japanese and PRC actors/fundings. 
“Regionalisation” could varyingly mean “regional expansion” or “regionalised in production level” 
so the term and the scope of selection of drama cases caused confusion to me and my informants 
in my early interviews.  
Resolving the problems was a part of my research and solving them was exactly what I 
would contribute to scholarship. As the four companies mentioned above best fit in my research 
objectives, I decided to spend most of my time seeking interviews with them first, collecting news 
reports about any non-local dramas in both production and narrative levels, and interviewing other 
workers beyond the four production companies if I had such chances. Japanese companies 
Amuse Soft and SPO that started investing in Taiwanese TV dramas had made it clear that they 
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were entering Taiwanese idol drama making for regional expansion on their official websites.21 I 
did not interview the companies as it was not my priority.  
During my interviews, I used ordinary terms that my informants could understand, such as 
“operation at international or regional scale”, “international connection/co-operation”, or “pan-
Asian operation”. After finishing my fieldwork, I finally chose to use “inter-Asian packaging” to 
loosely sum them up. I finally was able to demarcate them by their packaging styles. I also was 
able to distinguish the dramas that were aimed to be generic, despite some fitfully remaining geo-
political accounts (represented by Tsai and Feng in my chapter 5) from the other dramas that 
were aimed to be cross-cultural in their diegesis (best exemplified by packagers and their 
packagings analysed in chapter 6). Following my definition of inter-Asian packaging, I decided to 
broaden the ideological analysis in chapter 6 on dramas that are inter-Asian in their diegesis. 
They broadly include the dramas that have either the PRC, Japanese or South Korean elements 
since my definition of “inter-Asian packaging” now refers to various bilateral or trilateral co-
operations of Taiwanese idol drama with overseas media industries. I will discuss that later in the 
second section of the current chapter. 
 
3.1.2.2 Engaging informant Interests and Gaining Trusts 
Engaging potential informants in my research was crucial to me in order to obtain interviews. I 
actively made diverse contacts in snowball sampling among my connections. I approached some 
of my informants through “gatekeeper” organisations. I also approached some of them through 
social media and public forums. I participated in the informants’ Facebook pages. I attended all 
public talks of people who I identified could be my informants during my fieldwork. These public 
events could to some extent answer my research questions, but they were important more for 
enabling me to make contacts in person and to request in-depth interviews. When I could not 
approach potential informants myself directly, I approached them through my personal 
connections. When I contacted the informants, I attached an interview request letter, an 
information sheet and a consent form, alongside my interview questions, which I tailored towards 
their needs. I engaged their attention by stressing this research being the first PhD thesis that 
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 Available at: http://www.spoinc.jp/company/taiwan-rerease20121206.pdf [Accessed 19 February 2013] and at: 




would concentrate on the idol drama industry in the era after Meteor Garden. I wanted them to 
know that this study was more about what happened in their moving on from the influential Meteor 
Garden.  
I attended first the promotion event of a TV drama produced by S1, who now owned a 
production company. We had kept in contact since 2007 and she knew that I had started doing a 
PhD in London. At the event, I was only able to say hi to her in the crowd, and inform her that I 
had come back to Taiwan for research.  
The second event was a public forum on film and TV scriptwriting on 29 November 2012 in 
which S1 and another scriptwriter S3 were two of the six speakers. This was the first time I had 
met S3, whom I had asked to become a “friend on Facebook” in the mid-2012 after watching her 
TV drama Alice in Wonder City in London on the Internet. Now a star producer and scriptwriter 
with a TV drama on air, S1 was very busy and had difficulty arranging a time for my interview. 
Also, she was so famous that she had to be careful about giving interviews so as not to risk 
tainting her relations with the industry by seeming to be critical. After the forum came to the end I 
mentioned to S1 about my research’s key question focusing on cultural politics in the idol drama 
industry. But she declined my request. She also asked why I could not use the material she had 
talked to me about previously. Responding to her refusal, I asked her if she could perhaps decide 
after reading my interview questions. I explained to her in person and via email about the ethical 
regulation that I could only use newly collected material. So, although initially declining my 
interview request, S1 finally agreed to be interviewed. S1 also wanted to be interviewed together 
with S2. I contacted S2 on Facebook to find that he also wanted to be interviewed with S1. 
At the end of the second event, I also approached S3 and introduced myself. She answered 
briefly my question as to why Alice in Wonder City has a Japanese daughter to a Taiwanese 
mother by explaining her feelings about Taiwanese post-colonial relations with Japan. Then her 
attention shifted to a few young women in the crowd, whom she encouraged to join the 
scriptwriting association for which she worked as vice secretary-general. As a member of the 
association, I thought that I could contact her and share with her my ideas about the association. 
These involved the association collecting and documenting information on its writers for its 
website as well as putting up interviews. This step seemingly digressed from my research but it 
helped create more interaction with her. I emailed S3 a few days later in December about the 
ideas. S3 quickly responded my email and asked to have a further discussion. We met in a coffee 
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shop in Gongguan, Taipei. She told me that the ideas about the association were far beyond its 
limit and wanted me to get PhD first. At the end of this meeting I asked her for an interview and 
she agreed to do it in the January of 2013. 
I had two routes to reach senior managers in GTV for interviews. My ideal informants were 
the previous and current heads of GTV’s drama and public relations departments. My first 
approach was the telephone; I phoned a person who worked in GTV and who had exchanged 
business cards with me in 2007 and asked for an interview. But the person told me he no longer 
worked in GTV and suggested I contact his former female colleague who was still working in GTV. 
In due course I called this woman for an interview. She agreed to my request and I sent her via 
email my interview questions and information sheet/consent form. However, I did not interview 
her in the end. 
 My second approach was different. I went to a public event on 7 December 2012. The event 
was dedicated to a TV drama which was a country-wide sensation when it was broadcast in 
Taiwan in 2011. The drama was penned by S1, produced by former GTV’s head of drama 
department, in charge of many idol dramas funded by GTV in the 2000s decade, and funded by 
GTV.  My plan was to talk to GTV’s managers and the former head. Consequently, when the 
event came to a conclusion, I introduced myself to B3 (GTV’s head of marketing and public 
relations) and the former head. I told the latter that we were Facebook friends and we shared 
some friends. A few days later, I emailed her, requesting an interview. She kindly declined my 
interview request, explaining she was not conducting regional co-productions at the moment, but 
she gave me the contact way of the vice CEO of GTV (B1). My research about the regional 
operation of idol drama might possibly help justify the strategy of GTV, so B1 agreed to my request. 
As our interview was very short, I asked if I could interview the heads of drama production and 
marketing/public relations of GTV. B1 accepted my request, asking his secretary to arrange 
interviews with B2 and B3 for me. I did not contact the lady of GTV mentioned earlier. 
I contacted Tsai Yueh-Hsun in person at the National Taiwan University Film Festival’s one 
of three public forums in December 2012. The forums featured Taiwanese film-makers, two of 
whom were also idol drama producer-directors Chu Yu-Ning and Tsai Yueh-Hsun. Tsai’s session 
on 21 December 2012 was about how to market Taiwanese films in the future. I sat in the front 
row before Tsai on the floor. When the forum ended I approached Tsai, introduced myself and 
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gave him my interview recruitment letter, interview questions and information sheet/consent form. 
He kindly asked me to arrange a time with his personal assistant. 
I tried to contact some people at Comic International through two routes, the first of which 
was through B1’s secretary who could not settle a time for my interview. I also tried to pass my 
interview recruitment letter and information sheet/consent form to the company via my writer 
friends, who worked there, and received no response. Finally, I reached S7, one of the two 
directors for Gangster’s Bakery produced by Comic International via Dr Robert Ru-shiuo Chen, 
S7’s teacher during his postgraduate study.  
Unfortunately, Comic Ritz was going through a major crisis at the end of 2012 and it 
announced that it was stopping its production of idol drama (Chao, 2012; C.-F. Yang, 2013). S4 
gave me the mobile phone number of the head of drama production at Comic Ritz but the person 
declined my interview request with the excuse that she no longer worked there and was therefore 
unable to answer my questions. She gave me the contact phone number of S5, a scriptwriter 
working for Angie Chai for many years. I told S4 that I wanted to interview Angie Chai but she 
declined to ask Chai for me. S4 told me that I should try myself because she had once successfully 
helped another researcher to interview Chai, and she could not ask another favour from Chai. 
Then I told S4 that I also wished to talk to EP2, an executive producer at Comic Ritz for many 
years. S4 agreed to contact EP2 for me and luckily, EP2 agreed to my interview request.  
I emailed Virginia Liu about an interview. She was very busy and wondered why I could not 
use her previous interviews. We finally held the interview in late March 2013. I also interviewed 
EP1, who was my work colleague previously, in July 2013. As well as interviewing individuals 
connected to the four idol drama producers mentioned above, I also contacted two individuals 
who did not work for them but produced TV dramas that employed South Korean actors and had 
PRC funding/co-operation. I told my writer friend that I also wanted to interview S6, who penned 
Love at Aegean Sea. The friend contacted S6 and gave me S6’s email and phone number. S6 
then helped me contact drama producer P3 who produced Amor de Tarapaca (2004), a TV drama 
that was co-operated by Taiwanese and PRC TV companies/stations and employed a South 
Korean actor. In total, I had fourteen interviews with fifteen TV workers who were either producers 
who owned their own production companies, or executive producers in the companies, freelance 
scriptwriters, freelance directors, or senior managers at a TV station. Five of them were male and 
ten female. They had all had inter-Asian work experiences.  
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The interviews were conducted from January to March and in July 2013. All of my informants 
were interviewed only once during this period, some of whom answered my subsequent questions 
via email. The interviews mostly lasted between 1.5 and 2 hours. Three lasted more than 3 hours 
and three were only up to 1 hour in length. 
Table 3-2 List of informants 
No Name code 
(gender: M/F) 
Position and work history Interview 
date 
1. B1(M) Vice Chief Executive of Operation of Gala TV Station 
(GTV). He is in charge of the operation of the whole TV 
company which has produced and released many inter-
Asian idol dramas since early 2000s. 
Jan 31, 2013 
2. B2(F) Head of drama programming of GTV, overseeing all 
drama productions, including idol dramas. 
Feb 26, 2013 
3. B3(F) Head of marketing and public relations of GTV, in charge 
of domestic idol drama promotions and functioning as 
company spokesperson in Taiwan. 
Feb 26, 2013 
4. P1(F) Virginia Liu, leader of her own production company 
(Power Generation Entertainment Co. Ltd.). She is also in 
charge of scriptwriting. She has produced and written 7 
idol dramas since 2001, 5 of which meet my definition of 
inter-Asian idol dramas. 
Mar 26, 2013 
5. P2(M) Tsai Yueh-Hsun, leader of his own production company 
(Prajna Works Entertainment Co. Ltd.) and is also in 
charge of directing. He has produced and directed several 
idol dramas and films since 2003, 5 of which are inter-
Asian. 
Feb 20, 2013 
6. P3(F) Production company leader. She has produced an idol 
drama that was co-operated by companies from Taiwan 
and the PRC and employed a South Korean actor who co-
starred with Taiwanese actors. Her career in the late 
1990s and 2000s based in both Taiwanese and PRC TV 
industries. 
Feb 13, 2013 
7. EP1(M) Executive producer of P1. Jul 24, 2013 
8. EP2(F) Executive producer of Angie Chai’s Comic Ritz Production 
Co. Ltd. The company has produced more than 10 inter-
Asian idol dramas since 2001. 
Feb 23, 2013 
9. S1(F) Freelance writer. She has worked in idol drama business 
since early 2000s, especially for Angie Chai/Comic Ritz 
and GTV. She was a professional theatre writer/director. 
Feb 4, 2013 
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Since the late 2000s, she has been doing theatre and idol 
dramas as producer, director and writer all at the same 
time. 
10. S2(M) Freelance writer. He has worked in idol drama business 
since early 2000s. Before that he was a professional 
theatre writer/director. Since the late 2000s, he has been 
doing theatre and idol dramas at the same time. 
Feb 4, 2013 
11. S3(F) Freelance writer. She has worked in idol drama since mid-
2000s. Before writing for idol dramas, she was a 
professional theatre writer/director and also wrote for non-
commercial TV dramas. She has been doing theatre and 
idol dramas at the same time. 
Jan 25, 2013 
12. S4(F) Freelance writer. She worked as an entertainment 
journalist and variety-show executive in the 1990s. She 
became an idol drama writer in early 2000s. 
Feb 6, 2013 
13. S5(F) Freelance writer. She worked for variety-show scripting 
around 2000s and has written idol dramas since early 
2000s. 
Feb 12, 2013 
14. S6 (F) Freelance writer. She has worked in TV drama since early 
1990s. She has written many commercial TV dramas and 
idol dramas, one of which was a Taiwanese-Chinese-
Korean production.  
Jan 23, 2013 
15. S7 (M) Freelance film/TV director. He has worked with Jerry 
Feng’s idol dramas since mid-2000s. 
Mar 15, 2013 
 
Meanwhile, I collected drama-related materials published in Taiwan, including production 
companies’ and TV workers’ promotional materials and interviews on TV and press, as well as 
drama DVDs, posters, commercials, press releases, behind-the-scenes video clips/books, etc. 
Through looking at these materials I was able to develop some ideas about their works, albeit the 
ideas awaited confirmation – or challenge. The secondary data, such as TV talk shows and 
newspaper and magazine interviews, were also used to assist in in-depth interviews in case I 
encountered problems interviewing significant informants. These TV talk shows are now put onto 
online video websites free of charge. Newspapers and magazines are stored in the National 
Central Library and Taipei Municipal Libraries in Taipei, Taiwan. I used online databases to search 
for relevant news coverage. The major newspapers in Taiwan include Apple Daily, United Daily, 
China Times, and Liberty Times, etc. The major magazines include Common Wealth, 30 
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Magazine, Wealth, Taiwan Panorama (formerly known as Sinorama), Global Views Monthly, 
Business Weekly, Eslite Reader, etc. A quarterly magazine Dramaturgist Quarterly, which lived 
for a short period during 2006 and 2007, was an important reference. They were helpful for my 
analysis of the activities of TV producers whom I did not manage to interview, such as Angie Chai 
and Jerry Feng. These Taiwanese sources covered the idol dramas either as an important 
domestic cultural industry or as information related to public figures, stars and celebrities. 
Professional industrial magazines functioning as critics of Taiwanese TV have been scant. 
However, a few online news websites such as Punchline and Tech Orange have emerged in 
recent years and offered Taiwanese TV drama reviews, in-depth reports and columns on 
Taiwanese TV industry. 22 These materials have been very helpful for my research. 
I collected industry data by interviewing industry workers and reviewing Taiwanese 
government-funded industry reports, press coverage, and academic researches on Taiwanese 
TV’s political economy. It is important to note here that although I was given some industry data 
from top managers of the Taiwanese TV companies, it remains difficult to have a clear view of 
idol drama’s overseas market because of the lack of coherent trade statistics. Also, according to 
my informants, the numbers have been exaggerated in order to serve as marketing and promotion 
tools for the companies (EP2, personal communication, Feb 23, 2013, pp.29-30; P1, personal 
communication, March 26, 2013, p.22). For instance, it has been common to read in newspapers 
about Taiwanese TV producers celebrating the number of countries they have entered and how 
high their fees have been for their drama shows. The fee a TV drama actually receives and its 
production budget have been top secrets for Taiwanese TV business whose stock is not publicly 
traded and whose financial reports are not released. Market expansion is a dimension by which 
to judge a market-oriented company’s status and success. The more countries the company has 
entered, especially benchmarking markets such as Japan and the PRC, the more success and 
career capital it seems to acquire. In this way, the revenue and overseas market expansion of the 
company functions more like a promoting tool for it to increase its commercial values. Temporarily, 
it would attract curiosity and interests from outsiders. After all, the business is full of workers 
relying on the glamour of an impressive track record to increase the future economic prospect of 
their careers.  
                                                     
22
 Available at: http://punchline.asia/ and http://buzzorange.com/techorange/ 
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In summary, although it might be difficult to have a clear picture of the idol drama industry, 
it is possible to trace its inter-Asian packaging by interviewing TV drama professionals and 
examining published materials. Their strategies, directions and foreign linkages are what I am 
interested in. Hence the above-mentioned materials remain useful references. 
 
3.1.3 Interviews, Presumptions and Modifications 
The questions of my interviews with these informants were about their previous work experience 
centred on my case study dramas, including the emergence of the dramas, production initiatives, 
funding structure, the role of foreign funding organisations, their negotiations and obstacles during 
the productions, individual work experience, perceptions and attitudes towards inter-Asian idol 
dramas, and so on. The questions were tailored for the informants. The executive producers and 
producers received questions about their companies’ strategies and inter-Asian co-operating 
partners, as well as questions related to the specific TV dramas they worked on. The interview 
questions I prepared for the freelance directors and scriptwriters were mainly about details in the 
production of the TV dramas in which they participated. The managers of TV broadcasters 
received questions related to drama programming strategies and orientations, e.g. why were they 
adopting inter-Asian packaging? I noticed that GTV had more co-operations with Japanese 
companies than others, although it also had many drama co-productions with PRC companies. 
As I had to be efficient in the interviews, my questions with GTV top managers focused particularly 
on GTV’s Japanese connection since it could enhance my understanding about Japanese co-
operations.  
I did not ask my informants any questions on the deregulation of the Taiwanese TV market 
in the 1990s and the influence of Hollywood and other foreign TV imports. I believed that it was 
my responsibility to study the political economy of Taiwanese TV drama making. My previous 
interview experiences taught me that drama professionals are not academic researchers. What 
they do best is talk with ease about their work and creative experiences. Besides, as said above, 
my interviews were in general quite short and included the time spent in my informants signing 
research consent forms. It was imperative I spent every second of the interviews on their working 
experiences and their own understanding of the industry.  
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3.1.3.1 Interacting with the Informants in Interviews 
My informants included workers from top and lower levels in the hierarchy of Taiwanese idol 
drama making. Their hierarchical positions seemingly did not much affect their engagements in 
my research, but could have constrained the amount of time they had for participation and also 
the disclosure of their work. The informants higher up in the hierarchy had been interviewed time 
and again. They often had their own fluent, formal and careful discourses. With them I had to 
induce them to reveal more details; this took a lot of time, but had the advantage of preventing 
them from taking control of my interviews.  
I interviewed Virginia Liu on 26 March 2013 in the meeting room of her company’s office. In 
the interview, she did not consider me a stranger and even bought noodles and ate her dinner 
with me. As I had closely observed her and knew her waishengren background, I understood her 
creative strategy well. I successfully collected what I needed and my interview questions were 
carefully answered by her. Regarding my interview of Liu’s staff members, at that time only EP1 
was still working for Liu. I interviewed EP1 on 24 July 2013 to gain an understanding of his 
perception of Liu’s production strategy. I had now acquired a feeling of confidence in being much 
more in control in the interviews and was able to induce Liu and EP1 to tell me important details. 
I had never met Tsai Yueh-Hsun before the public forum of the 2012 National Taiwan 
University Film Festival, and thus I was a total stranger to him. Luckily, Tsai kindly agreed to an 
interview for two hours. I strongly felt the lack of time in my interview with Tsai because I had 
many questions to ask and many points to clarify with him. This was because he seemed 
ambivalent and kept adapting to his production conditions but also because I had only known him 
and held some subjective ideas about him based on his images in the press. I will discuss this 
further later. 
The top-level workers tended to be diplomatic in my interviews compared with the staff 
members who, lower in the hierarchy in the idol drama industry, were more likely to express 
criticism. Interviewing the latter was particularly crucial as I wanted to understand how the 
storytellers at the lower level were influenced by the top-level workers. My scriptwriter informants 
could participate in my interviews relatively easily. They seemed to act more frankly and were 
happier to reveal more about themselves. My research missed the heyday of the industry that 
occurred during the first decade of the 2000s. The industry was now in a crisis, losing profits and 
reducing production fees. Many of the idol drama writers were worrying about their future careers 
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when I carried out my interviews. Although many of them were likely to be aware of the crisis, 
only a few spoke up and explicitly expressed their anxieties to me. S1 told me frankly that my 
research did not meet her needs. She commented that it would have no effect on the industry and 
suggested I research how the Taiwanese government could help the industry (personal 
communication, Feb 4, 2013, p.19). Her concern was about how the industry could be rescued. 
Yet I remained keen to delineate the cultural politics of idol dramas after the neo-liberal 
deregulation of Taiwanese TV. I was very aware of the crisis but my theoretical interest was on 
how different creative strategies of Taiwanese idol drama producers obtain legitimacy. The 
research, I felt, could still be meaningful for the industry, but it would be unable to quickly and 
directly show resolutions to the crisis. 
 
3.1.3.2 The First Presumption and Modification 
A number of my major presumptions were soon challenged early on. Just like Koichi Iwabuchi 
who optimistically expected that Japanese commercial media industry could have contributed to 
inter-Asian cultural dialogues in various ways (Iwabuchi, 2009, p.30), I held a similar expectation 
toward idol drama. To briefly explain, in the course of my research, my own problem was that I 
tried to tackle the incredible ambiguity of commercial idol drama workers whilst I over expected 
their critical agency to make changes to society. For example, I thought that my producer and 
scriptwriter informants consciously made a number of cross-cultural scenes in my case study 
dramas ideologically meaningful. The thinking was denied by a number of my informants who 
claimed that they were unaware of the deep meanings that their dramas could generate.  
My first presumption mainly related to the classical dichotomy between the inclination and 
resistance to commercialism, more specifically, between the urge to produce what bigger markets 
expected and the refusal to produce. I thought that the division would also present in idol drama 
productions. I hoped to find any critical agency that could have injected progressive ideas into the 
idol drama industry. In my interviews, I often projected such an ideal figure to the scriptwriters as 
they seemingly bore less direct financial pressure than their producers, and also as I had met a 
number of scriptwriters who struggled under commercial pressure. Moreover, I presumed that the 
division were inter-Asian, such as PRC censorship affects Taiwanese scriptwriters. I wanted to 
prove if the scriptwriters would be less commercial and less motivated to target the bigger PRC 
market while the producers would be more willing to appeal to the market. I wanted to find if the 
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division between the two roles would correspond to the division between Taiwanese and non-
Taiwanese market prioritisation.  
It turned out to be wrong to presume that producers would “always” care more about market 
success than scriptwriters and thus there would “always” be tension, resistance and negotiation 
between the writers and producers. In my interviews, these writers talked about which idol drama 
producers they chose to work for, the reasons they worked for the TV dramas I was analysing, 
strategies adopted by the producers, how the strategies determined their scripts, and how they 
wrote to serve the producers. When I asked the writers if there were any such tensions, to my 
surprise, not all of the writers thought that they encountered “tensions” very much. Instead, they 
pointed out the significance of choosing producers and production companies they get along well:  
Producer and scriptwriter need to get along well. They should be able to tolerate each other and 
complete a drama together. (S6, personal communication, Jan 23, 2013, p.3) 
 
I collaborate with familiar production companies…We know each other in terms of our insistences. 
They respect their scriptwriters. (S2, personal communication, Feb 4, 2013, p.23) 
 
To briefly explain, I underestimated the difference between members of this industry, in terms 
of their commercial and non-commercial inclinations. My initial interview questions made a 
common mistake, as discussed by John Caughie (1981, p.11), Horace Newcomb and Robert S. 
Alley (1982, p.100) and Paul Watson (2007, pp.96-98); this was to naively presume that 
scriptwriters were “self-conscious auteurs” who would do everything in their power, resist against 
barriers such as commercialism or dominating power, in order to put deep meaning into their 
dramas. I also overlooked the plurality of idol drama producers. As S1 told me “all TV dramas 
have different purposes set by their producers” (personal communication, Feb 4, 2013, p.17), in 
fact, the producers would sometimes produce highly market-oriented TV dramas and other times 
make dramas that do not enjoy high ratings. They might also surrender to commercialism as time 
goes by, gradually prioritising the significance of profit and changing their principles (S1, personal 
communication, Feb 4, 2013, pp.25-26). Nonetheless, it is wrong to argue that producers are 
always more market-oriented than scriptwriters in the industry. 
Eric Ma’s (1999) account draws on both Pierre Bourdieu’s (1993) study of cultural production 
and Newcomb and Alley’s (1983) case studies in the American TV industry, and showed me a 
means in which to explain my findings. Examining the production culture in the Hong Kong TV 
industry which consisted of one big commercial TV station and one small public TV station, Ma 
argues that the commercial and public TV stations have their own schemata and cultures which 
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determine the creative expressions in their productions. People who do not accept specific 
schemata regarding their work environment are unlikely to feel autonomy and would identify the 
difference between them and the schemata as “tension”. People who are used to the schemata 
of their workplace would feel autonomous more readily. Cultural theorists have indicated, explicitly 
or implicitly, the existence of multiple positions in cultural spaces which differ from each other in 
terms of their critical distance from ideological reproduction (Foucault, 1969; Williams, 1977; 
Benjamin, 1978; Bourdieu, 1993). Their understanding perfectly fits with my analysis of my 
informants’ relationships with other people in their field.  The real workplace of idol drama making 
has multiple situations. Numerous producers stand on a continuum poled by commercial and non-
commercial considerations and they open their companies to realise their own vision. Anyone, 
including writers, may also become producers and own their production companies. The 
producers’ vision, ideas and strategies would determine the creative schemata of their production 
companies that should be followed by their employees (both permanent staff and those employed 
on a case-by-case basis). They also would decide which funding bodies they raise funds from 
and which creative workers to share similar purposes and seek to collaborate with. They could 
have different purposes between projects, taking commercially safer decision sometimes and 
riskier ones the other times, which my initial questions did not account for. They could orient their 
productions more or less close to what they perceive markets like. They also decide if the 
productions target Taiwanese market or another market.  
Therefore, in my later interviews, I requested my informants to comment on the degree of 
commercial orientation of their producers. In general, among these inter-Asian packagers I 
analysed, only Virginia Liu is less mainstream in terms of the gender-class values and distance 
with both KMT and DPP’s nationalism in her works. In the end, I identified Angie Chai, Jerry Feng 
and Tsai Yueh-Hsun as being more willing to appeal to what mainstream audiences prefer than 
Liu, even though they are all packaging East Asian elements for their productions. The three more 
mainstream TV producers, nonetheless, have different target audiences, specialities, visions of 
their careers and production strategies, which will be detailed in chapter 5. 
Scriptwriters also have their own vision, ideas, speciality, etc. and could also be more or less 
open to commercial requests from funding bodies higher up in the industrial hierarchy although 
they ought to find the producers who share most ideas with them. Some of the scriptwriters accept 
commercial considerations from funders willingly. On the other hand, a handful care much about 
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their works’ reputation and the themes they inject in their TV dramas. The latter would reject 
producers who are too market-oriented. The writers of the second type could also separate jobs 
into different categories. Some jobs are mainly for sustenance while others may be for the 
realisation of personal vision. That means that I needed to differentiate the scriptwriters on a 
continuum. By paying attention to the initiation of the TV dramas of my scriptwriter informants, 
any changes to their initial plans, how they worked for the TV dramas and how they felt about the 
changes, I could identify where they belong on the continuum.  
It is worthy to spend a few paragraphs to describe these scriptwriters in terms of their 
positions on the continuum so as to have a clear picture of their comments on my case study TV 
drama producers in chapter 5. To understand how the continuum looks like, the difference 
between a theatre director-writer S3, who has now made a living by writing for idol drama, and 
the other writers is very useful. Among the writers I interviewed, only S3 clearly expressed that 
she does not want to be bound by considerations of what markets like. She creates stories 
according to her ideas about societies. She cares very much about the social historical 
connotations in her works: 
I do not have much an awareness of what market prefers in the sense that, I usually write a story 
according to how it should be. For instance, I wrote about a Japanese woman coming to Taiwan 
to find her mother not because I was targeting Japanese market but because…Taiwan was 
colonised by Japan. The Japanese woman coming to Taiwan to find her mother would have a 
cultural implication. For the audience, this might not be very meaningful, but it was for me. I cared 
this...As a professional TV drama scriptwriter, I naturally consider the marketability of stories in 
my mind. But I cannot write a story with it because the marketability of the story in my assessment 
would never be accurate…No matter how much I assess and understand market demands, to 
me, eventually I could write the story well only when it embodies me emotionally. (S3, personal 
communication, Jan 25, 2013, p.4) 
 
In my observation, S3 is progressive in diverse aspects, including Taiwanese ethno-national 
politics, gender and class issues. She is opinionated. S3 cares so much about the realisation of 
her ideas that she has chosen to write for a few TV producers that want to produce TV dramas 
that are grand in terms of subject-matter, rejecting work offers from producers who would ask her 
in detail to serve specific requests, such as casting and location (S3, personal communication, 
Jan 25, 2013, pp.5-6). By doing so, she minimises the circumstances that she would encounter 
tensions with and suppressions from the producers. S3’s rejection manifests her resistance. 
In contrast, the other five scriptwriters that I interviewed never expressed similarly strong 
insistence. They either showed little resistance or complaints to interferences from their top 
managers after negotiation, or worked well with the managers. The reasons they gave me were 
different, some of which were quite complicated. S1 and S2 probably stand between S3 and the 
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other scriptwriters. Also coming from theatre, S1 and S2 nonetheless have held more receptive 
attitude to and been more willing to work for more market-oriented producers. This is seemingly 
because they have distinguished their works into categories with different goals (S2, personal 
communication, Feb 4, 2013, p.28). When they write stories mainly to serve producers, they 
metaphorise their roles as “cooks” who are responsible of making good dishes with the materials 
given by the producers (S1 and S2, personal communication, Feb 4, 2013, p.21). They are agents 
of the producers, constructing stories that realistically resemble the contemporary realities of 
Taiwanese society in their perception with very few personal expressions (S1 and S2, personal 
communication, Feb 4, 2013, pp.10-17). For instance, S1 and S2 pointed out that I wrongly 
presumed they intentionally made a drama an allegory of cross-Strait relationship (personal 
communication, Feb 4, 2013, pp.12-13). They stressed that, in that drama, they were just 
accommodating their producer’s requests, such as casting and shooting location, with their story. 
In this case, S1 and S2 only responded with pity instead of anger when experiencing what can 
be considered “interfering decisions” that asked to change their initial plotting.  
Scriptwriters S4, S5, S6 had held more receptive attitude to mainstream market preference 
and been more willing to work for more market-oriented producers than S3. Similarly, the dramas 
that were penned by them embodied and realised the ideas of their producers (S6, personal 
communication, Jan 23, 2013; S4, personal communication, Feb 6, 2013; S5, personal 
communication, Feb 12, 2013, p.5). 
The point that I am making here is that these inter-Asian drama writers did not always have 
serious binary friction or contestation with their producers or funders, but a number of them indeed 
had negotiations and compromises. When the scriptwriter who is more loyal to personal vision 
comes to collaborate with a more market-oriented producer, there could be difference between 
them. Indeed, such difference took place in some of my case study dramas penned by S1, S2 
and S3 who were forced to compromise. The divide between commercialism and non-commercial 
interest, which I thought to exist within the production process, were primarily found between 
different TV dramas. The divide in the orientations towards Taiwanese market and towards 
mainland Chinese market also can be found between the dramas. Thus, I changed my focus of 
analysis to different inter-Asian packaging strategies of producers with a minor attention on 
creative negotiation, suppression and compromise of their scriptwriters (how the scriptwriters view 
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their producers and work for the latter). The information provided by my informants is used in the 
fifth chapter.  
 
3.1.3.3 Other Presumptions and Modifications  
Among all my interview informants, Tsai Yueh-Hsun was the most well-renowned figure whom I 
had known via the press. I prepared as much as I could for this interview. I collected many 
newspaper articles about him, even his Japanese press interview. I interviewed S3, which served 
as a preparation for my interview with Tsai. These preparations brought both a good and bad 
influence to my interview with him. On the one hand, I seemed quite familiar with Tsai’s work 
history, aspiration, vision and strategy. For example, I learned from S3 about Tsai’s interest in 
Hollywood action films (personal communication, Jan 25, 2013, p.10). On the other, I had made 
a naïve presumption about Tsai being “patriotic to Taiwan” as he had always claimed Taiwan was 
his priority and he had resisted moving his base to the PRC. In addition to my projection of a 
critical agency to him and my idea of him consciously placing deep ideological meanings to the 
cross-cultural scenes in my case study dramas, these ideas together made it difficult for me to 
analyse Tsai Yueh-Hsun’s strategies.  
My interview questions for him were divided into two themes. The first was about his regional 
operations, network, resources and markets. I was particularly interested in his East Asian 
production strategy and how he developed it. Tsai announced his new project, which is called in 
Chinese “Ya Zhou (Asia) Hua Yu (Chinese-language) Xin (new) Ji Hua (project)” in September 
2012 (Wang, 2012; C.-W. Wu, 2012). It is composed of four TV dramas and films, which I will 
discuss later in chapter 5. The title of the project literally says “a new Asian, Chinese-language 
project” in a word-by-word translation. It sounds ambiguous and confusing by itself because of its 
juxtaposition of two different geo-cultural categories, as in a project named, for example, “new 
European, English-language project”. What does it mean? Does it refer to cultural identities or 
just scopes of drama market? Does he mean “a new East Asian and Chinese-language project”, 
or “a new East Asian project of his Chinese-language films and TV dramas”? What is his national 
and cultural identification? The press reports did not provide a deep analysis of Tsai’s new project 




Tsai’s own office was decorated with his Golden Bell Award trophies, but I noticed a poster 
of Christopher Nolan’s Batman movie standing on the floor of a corner near my seat. He was 
seemingly very interested in the Batman movie. Our interview started from Tsai’s regional 
partners and vision of markets; the idea behind Ya Zhou Hua Yu Xin Ji Hua, which he already 
talked about numerous times in his press interviews; and then I asked about his East Asian 
partners, an aspect which had been relatively overlooked by the press. I particularly asked him 
about his interactions with managers from the PRC and Japanese companies that funded and 
marketed his works, especially Beijing Hualubaina (PRC) and Amuse Soft (Japan). Tsai called 
the managers “his partners and friends”. He said that “East Asian markets” include markets in the 
PRC, Japan, South East Asia, etc., wherever Meteor Garden (2001) was shown (P2, personal 
communication, Feb 20, 2013, pp.1-5).  
In Tsai’s promotion material for White Tower (2006) he stressed the significance of East 
Asian markets and emphasised the importance of airing it in Japan (Yangming Entertainment, 
2006, p.105), so that before our interview I presumed that Tsai did not want to interact with the 
PRC and wanted to expand into the Japanese market. In the interview, however, he explained 
that the importance of the Japanese market was relative. He emphasised the significance of the 
market as it was a benchmark at that time. However, as the PRC market had been rising more 
quickly, this market was now turning out to be very important for him, although he was not 
prepared to give up his Japanese marketing network. He would not give up his success in the 
Japanese market and would still co-operate with Japanese media companies. I then probed into 
the concept of Ya Zhou Hua Yu Xin Ji Hua, telling him how I felt the wording confusing and vague. 
By dint of my questioning, Tsai replied that he wants to unite Chinese-speaking media companies 
so as to enter non-Chinese speaking markets. The term Ya Zhou Hua Yu Xin Ji Hua means to 
him “a new East Asian project of Chinese-language films and TV dramas” (P2, personal 
communication, Feb 20, 2013, pp.3-5). I found out that he has associated himself with a pan-
Chinese culture in order to appeal to the Chinese-speaking population outside of Taiwan for his 
new project which has generic Chinese-speaking settings and targets East Asian markets.  
The second part of my interview concerned the production of Black and White (2009) and 
its prequel movie, their presentation of East Asians, and the influence of PRC censorship on the 
prequel movie, in particular the (dis)appearance of North Korean characters. During the 
production of the prequel movie, the Taiwanese press, which had tended to rummage around in 
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popular texts looking for material to ignite binary debates and attract public attention, enquired 
whether Tsai had been compromised because of PRC censorship, by removing elements of North 
Korea, which has official diplomatic relation with the PRC, when he could not obtain production 
and screening licences from the PRC government (Chu, 2010c; Chiang, 2011; Y.-L. Wang, 
2011b). I also wondered similarly: why he decided that North Korean characters should not 
appear in the movie? Was the removal caused by the request from the PRC funders? Did he have 
contestation against PRC censorship? The news mentioned above was very short and incomplete. 
Tsai’s answer to the questions was important for me, in order to understand his attitude towards 
the representation of geo-politics in relation to the mainstream world views of Taiwan and PRC. 
When I raised the issue about the representation of East Asia in Black and White and the 
removal of any North Korean representation, I unwisely repeated the discourse of the Taiwanese 
press on the issue. Tsai, who was mostly very polite, communicative and fluent, did not seem to 
be happy at the enquiry. He remained calm and asked in return why he should bother to keep the 
elements which contradicted the mainstream world view of the PRC officialdom? Taking Taiwan’s 
Buddhism Da-Ai TV station as an example, for which he worked a decade ago, as well as the 
censorship in Muslim countries and Taiwanese censorship in the Cold-War era, he explained that 
any funding bodies have their own ideologies and administer certain censorships, and he tends 
to accept most of the suggestions from his partnering distributors from the markets in East Asia.  
Taiwanese society used to have a lot of restrictions. Many movies did not pass the censorship 
and was not screened and discussed (in Taiwan). In South East Asian countries, there have 
been many constraints…Muslim countries have been like this. Da-Ai TV station does not feature 
meat dishes in it. I think that this is just the requests of every creation platform and every market. 
Now everyone wants to pick at Chinese censorship and the hardship of passing it…That is why 
I said that I want to unify. I do not want opposition. Taiwan also has a lot of restrictions…It is not 
more tolerant than the other side (PRC). They did not want to have terrorist and North Korean 
elements in the movie…for their own conditions…The censorship in Taiwan used to be like that 
of present-day China. It was as equally strict as today’s Chinese censorship…When I started 
making drama for Da-Ai, I understood why I should not struggle to change it. It is a TV station of 
Buddhists and it is vegan. If I want to enter the PRC market, I must understand what the market 
wants. Why do I struggle to oppose it? ...Creation is not to produce opposition. I don’t think it 
right. (P2, personal communication, Feb 20, 2013, p.24) 
 
They (content distributors) are directly connected to the audiences. I can learn their experiences 
and understand what are possible. I can see their principles from their responses to my projects. 
I suggest that we do not take it (the suggestion of the distributors) as a constraint and criticism. 
Take it as a support and comment in my productions. (P2, personal communication, Feb 20, 
2013, pp.17-18) 
 
My presumption contradicted Tsai’s answers and I had a strong sense of discord and was 
swamped with a feeling that Tsai had not revealed the detail of his strategy to me. I thought this 
was maybe because he did not know me at all, or maybe I simply did not have enough time to 
probe into the relationship of Tsai’s ethnic background, political viewpoint and production strategy.  
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Following our interview, within my analysis, I understood Tsai’s true meaning, even though the 
interview had certainly not touched on his personal background nor his political stance. My main 
problem was that I held a high expectation to his critical agency when I was still figuring out his 
ambiguity in relation to national politics. I was hoping that Tsai would have inclined towards 
changing society through his film and TV productions and that his East Asian packaging would 
resist dominant discourses as Taiwanese art cinema had done. In fact, his TV dramas are post-
Confucian and Westernised in terms of gender and cultural values but are indifferent to geo-
politics, including Taiwanese national politics. In terms of geo-politics, the North Korean element 
appeared in the Black and White as a stereotype in Taiwanese world view since Tsai was not 
careful and experienced enough in creating “completely apolitical” storyline at that time. For 
commercial purpose, Tsai needed to become more neutral and less attached to Taiwanese pro-
American world view when his market plan expanded internationally. Thus he was willing to 
remove it once he adapted to new production condition in the prequel. He has not intended to 
represent the heterogeneous East Asia and he is adopting the idea of integration of Chinese-
speaking media industries. The relationship between Tsai’s works, his commitment to Taiwan-
based film-making and his assuming of Chinese cultural identity may well deserve theoretical 
attention. For the time being, it might be more accurate to see Tsai as a “neo-liberal media 
entrepreneur” who originates from Taiwan and flexibly adapts to the laissez-faire market condition. 
His East Asian market discourse that follows market logic is different from intellectual discourse 
of inter-Asian connections called for by Koichi Iwabuchi (2009; 2010a; b) and Kuan-Hsing Chen 
(1998; 2010) and from that found in Taiwan New Cinema (Shih, 2007). With the findings, I 
analysed Tsai Yueh-Hsun by calling him a producer of generic global culture in chapter 5. When 
I had a clear picture of Tsai’s creation, I no longer held naïve optimism about critical agency of 
idol drama workers, and now found it easier to understand the positions of many idol drama 
producers in their field, including the other three inter-Asian packagers Virginia Liu, Jerry Feng, 
and Angie Chai. 
 
3.1.4 Transcriptions and Anonymity 
All of my interviews were conducted in Chinese Mandarin and transcribed by me into written 
Chinese. The transcriptions were paginated. When citing the interviews, I include the page 
numbers they appear on if necessary. Only quotes appearing in the final thesis were translated 
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to English. My main ethical concern was how to protect my informants who have their power 
relations in the small world of production groups. As my interviews covered both levels, how to 
protect those in the lower hierarchy was my main problem. These people have also been subject 
to larger regional power relations because of their TV dramas’ overseas marketing and fundings. 
Their critical opinions involved other national media companies and could arouse inter-Asian 
disputes if the opinions became public. 
As East Asia overall does not enjoy completely guaranteed freedom of speech, my 
informants were very careful about their public statements concerning politically sensitive issues, 
and were aware of the existence of various formal censorships, especially those who had been 
exposed to media and public attention. Yet those who had not been in the spotlight or interviewed 
talked about their criticisms more straightforwardly, which was exactly why I interviewed them. 
Vitally, all of my informants principally agreed with my use of the interviews and revelation of their 
names and organisations when they signed their consent forms. Still, providing them protection 
was important.  
The experienced informants higher up in the hierarchy were more reserved and would be 
tempted to put a polish on their careers; other informants lower in the hierarchy talked about 
conflicts in very great detail. Yet the latter were also careful and wanted me to use only some 
parts of their information, especially when they revealed negative aspects of their workplace. In 
general, the lower the hierarchy, the more hesitant the informants were about disclosing identities 
and about full revelation of interview content. I observed the ethical principles that a public 
statement about a drama and its company can obviously be revealed, whilst what is not made 
public should remain hidden. For instance, one of the informants wanted to remain anonymous 
when he or she commented about a producer. Another asked me not to reveal some parts in our 
interview that involved negative matters within a company. Yet my dilemma was that I had to 
mention the TV dramas and companies of the informants as they are at the centre of my thesis. I 
decided to reveal parts of the informants’ identities and make sure I analyse their conflicts in very 
nuanced or unbiased ways. So I only anonymise their names. To avoid any risk, I offered the 
informants an opportunity to review a draft of the thesis, and a number of them viewed where they 
are cited in the thesis.  
Two producers who own their companies are named as I have their agreements to keep 
their names public. This is because, firstly, their names are their brands and come foremost, even 
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before their companies’ name. Secondly, they are higher up in the hierarchy and as 
spokespersons they accept media interviews very often – which I also use alongside my own 
interviews – and thus are experienced and careful interviewees. In other words, anonymity is quite 
impossible in their cases. 
I did not interview those TV workers who opposed and refused inter-Asian idol dramas, e.g. 
art-house and documentary film-makers in Taiwan who have gradually worked more closely with 
the public TV sector.23 This limitation was identified when I analysed my interviews and found out 
that refusal was a form of contestation for the TV workers who were invited to participate in the 
dramas, but declined the opportunity. It was difficult for me to contact these individuals. 
Fortunately, some of my informants became sceptical over time about particular forms of inter-
Asian packaging and shared with me their participation criteria and perceptions about the works. 
Their perceptions and comments greatly cover the gaps in the scope of informants.  
 
3.2 Ideological Analysis of Narrative Inter-Asian Idol Drama 
As I analysed my interviews I realised that inter-Asian packaging can take place at both production 
level and story level. There are inter-Asian operations at the production level that are aiming to 
be generic, and others at the narrative level that are aiming to be cross-cultural. Some producers 
had avoided mentioning controversial cross-cultural representations, and some had created 
simple urban love stories in historically non-identifiable urban spaces. Only a handful of producers, 
such as Virginia Liu and Angie Chai, etc., produced cross-cultural dramas that manifest the 
multicultural reality of contemporary Taiwanese and East Asian urban cities. Accordingly, I 
reorganised my chapters, analysing these operations together in chapters 4 and 5 and the cross-
cultural dramas in chapter 6.  
The analysis of idol drama’s cross-cultural articulations of Taiwan’s interactions with three 
different East Asian countries is guided by Stuart Hall’s notion of “(mediated) articulation” (1982; 
1986a; 1989). My usage of the concept is modified to refer to the articulation of the “little 
subjectivity” of Taiwan with more powerful countries in East Asia in terms of their value systems, 
and looks at the situation whereby hegemonic discourses are scattered throughout many 
                                                     
23
 For instance, film-maker Li Chih-Chiang prefers TV drama projects for Public Television Service and Hakka TV (two 
TV stations in Taiwan’s public TV sector) to idol drama work offers (Hakka TV, 2014). 
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countries of East Asia, contesting each other in aspects of gender, class and national issues. In 
this light, inter-Asian idol dramas articulate, in their storytelling, the world views and values of their 
Taiwanese packagers and the co-operating allies which the packagers depend upon in terms of 
market demands and the provision of funding. Structuralist semiotic analysis is adopted to 
examine the ideological discourses of the dramas.  
 
3.2.1 Ideological Analysis to Fictional TV Drama Narratives 
Structuralism is concerned to investigate and reveal naturalised discursive cultural constructs in 
cultural and media products (Fiske, 1987, p.31). Following Ferdinand de Saussure, Roland 
Barthes (1973; 1977) builds on this structuralism for his semiotic cultural criticism on 
contemporary French mass media. Drawing on linguistics, Barthes argues that a cultural and 
media artefact is composed of numerous sets of ideologically meaningful signs formed, in its 
meaning structure, of a “signifier” and “signified”. The signified has literal denotation and 
connotation, which is ideologically rooted in a temporal-spatial value system. The connotative 
level of the meaning of a cultural artefact conveys either the deep ideological desires or the 
viewpoints of a specific social group, for example the patriarchal capitalist class that dominated 
the collective value system of capitalist society in France during the 1960s and 1970s (Barthes, 
1973). This process of selecting and combining signs into a meaningful textual artefact or 
statement is called signification. The signification operates along paradigmatic and syntagmatic 
axes; selecting different signs paradigmatically and syntagmatically produces very different 
meanings (Fiske, 1987, p.127).  
Structuralist linguistic and semiotic science has proved very influential in literary, cinema and 
TV criticism, providing vocabulary for a close analysis of narrative sequences (Fiske, 1987, p.142), 
but it has a disadvantage: analysts tend to neaten up their objects while overlooking the gap 
between the signifier and the signified (Seiter, 1992, p.63). The theory of structuralism also 
changed and moved to a post-structuralist position. Take Barthes’s transition between his early 
and late works as an example. His early works consider the importance of formal structure in the 
construction of meaning, implying a unity between parts of a structure. He later provides a subtler 
account in which he reveals “a process by which meaning is structured into narrative” by the writer 
and reader who engage on equal terms (Barthes, 1974; Fiske, 1987, pp.142-44). Meaning now 
is no longer determined by the formal structure of a text but structured in the process of 
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interpretation of the text, especially the interpretation of audience. In spite of this, structuralism 
can still be a useful method whereby analysts can spend some time probing systematically into 
their textual research objects before venturing out into other models of study, such as audience 
studies (Seiter, 1992, p.63). 
Semiotic structuraIist ideological criticism has been applied to small concerns such as 
sentences, magazine pages, advertisement photos, film stills and, by extension, to a complex 
artefact such as comics, film, TV news, advertisement and TV drama in different spatial-temporal 
contexts, in the US, UK and Continental Europe (Metz, 1974a; b; Eco, 1976; Fiske, 1987; Allen, 
1992; O’Donnell, 1999). Structuralism views TV drama as a cultural artefact, a story and a form 
of narrative – a seemingly natural arrangement of characters and events in temporal and spatial 
settings, these elements being logically connected over time, usually with causal relations 
(Bordwell and Thompson, 1986, p.83, Alverado, Gutch and Wollen, 1987, p.122; Stam, Burgoyne 
and Flitterman-Levis, 1992, p.69; Taylor and Willis, 1999, pp.67-68). TV drama is a naturalised 
narrative that is an ideological construct composed of numerous signs, which is what the semiotic 
ideological criticism aims to uncover (Fiske, 1987, p.130; Seiter, 1992, p.32).  
Similar to film, TV drama is composed of audio-visual signifying codes. A TV drama begins 
production with a synopsis, a work set out on paper before its subsequent audio-visualisation. 
Ultimately, audiences receive it through its verbal and non-verbal aspects that appeal to various 
senses. Its verbal expression includes mainly dialogues between characters; its non-verbal 
expression includes music, visual presentation and cinematography, etc. John Fiske understands 
TV as an audio-visual medium similar to film, arguing that its verbal codes (dialogues) and non-
verbal codes (music, cinematography and so on) should be analysed in researches, which he 
himself does by providing criticism on these two aspects (1987, p.27).  
Detailed analysis of a small, yet key segment, verbal or non-verbal, enables researchers to 
perform a detailed interpretation, but analysis of larger-scale TV drama narratives gives an overall 
picture (Fiske, 1987, p.6). As my aim was to discover the ideological discourses in inter-Asian idol 
dramas that their producers wished their audiences to receive, understanding the overall picture 
of the dramas – seeing how certain values and ideas are articulated in the dramas – mattered for 
me. Taking up the semiotic analysis of narrative that draws on Althusserian and Gramscian idea 
of ideology, French structuralism semiotics, and cultural studies’ ideological criticism, I uncovered 
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the ideology of the dramas and answered questions such as how they reinforce or reproduce 
dominant value systems (Kozloff, 1992, p.68; Taylor and Willis, 1999, p.67).  
Russian folk-tale analyst Vladimir Propp derived a structuralist syntagmatic analysis of 
character-centred narrative that has provided a reference point for analysts of film and TV drama 
synopsis (1968 cited in Fiske, 1987, p.134). Propp found out that Russian folk tales share 
common narrative structures formed by the protagonists’ transformation, or journey, that is 
shaped by their relationships with other characters. All the characters function symbolically in the 
making of meanings in the tales. This method has been widely applied to film and TV researches 
which revolve around the development of protagonists, and the characters surrounding the 
protagonists (Fiske, 1987, p.136). Examined in this way, the whole story of a TV drama can be 
summarised in written form, particular plots being highlighted for specific research goals.  
Propp is concerned to find the common structure shared by the folk tales, and the ideological 
functions that advance the folk tales. His findings help analysts of drama to look at the shared 
functions of characters that form similar story structures. According to Fiske (1987, p.143), as 
American TV drama tends to have simple, repetitious and straightforward narrative structures that 
are similar to the folk tales that have common structures and conventions connected to their social 
contexts, the narrative theory derived from Propp’s work would be a good analytical tool for the 
TV drama in general (Fiske, 1987, p.148). But Fiske points out that such structuralist analysis 
would be applicable to the American TV series that have clear endings in every episode, but 
would not be applicable to the interminable American soap operas that run for years, anchor 
themselves along social pulses and thus are ideologically open and contradictory (Fiske, 1987, 
p.143).  
Whilst Fiske’s research objects are the American TV series where each episode usually has 
an independent and complete storyline (e.g. sit-coms and series) and the soap operas whose 
storylines are never-ending, Hugh O’Donnell is interested in non-US female-oriented TV dramas 
such as the telenovela that emerged from Spanish-speaking countries and spread to Europe. 
Telenovelas tend to have an ideological closure as they would usually end after a period of time, 
whereas continuous soap operas would rarely come to such closure (1999, pp.23-24). Thus any 
analytical accounts of the soap operas’ ideology are interim (O’Donnell, 1999, p.212). O’Donnell 
(1999, p.3) suggests that the telenovelas fit well with the structuralist narrative analysis of Propp 
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because they are sequential, and their narratives move from the beginning through to the middle 
and to the end.  
O’Donnell (1999, pp.21-23) divides the synopsis of telenovela into micro, macro and meta 
narratives. The micro-narrative refers to the “basic” or “literal” relationships of fictional characters, 
such as their familial and romantic relationships, friendships, rivalries, and antagonistic 
relationships. These relationships in the micro-narrative are the base of meta-narrative and 
macro-narrative. The meta-narrative, for O’Donnell, refers to the topic and subject-matter of a TV 
drama which is indirectly informed by the drama itself and should be identified by its audience in 
return. The meta-narrative may be topically connected to a specific social environment but it may 
also be universal, such as “love” being the meta-narrative of a heterosexual urban (middle class 
or teenage) romance. The macro-narrative is related, firstly, to which societal categories, e.g. 
gender, class, generation, ethnicity and nation, appear in the drama and which category the 
drama’s protagonist belongs to. It also includes the social values of those specific categories 
conveyed in the drama, such as gender roles, relations and expectations, power and resistance, 
reform and convention, etc. In other words, the micro-narrative could be considered what Barthes 
calls the denotative level of a TV drama and the macro narrative fits Barthes’s definition of the 
connotative level. The meta-narrative is closer to the denotative level in this sense because the 
TV drama’s main subject-matter is usually clearly indicated, typically promoted by its sub-text, 
such as its synopsis. In ideological criticism, the macro-narrative is the key analytical level 
(O’Donnell, 1999, p.23). The ideological meaning of a telenovela appears in its macro-narrative 
where questions are raised, such as: does it show only upper class or only working class or does 
it combine more than two classes? What does it say about the viewpoint, world view and value 
system in its presentation of gender, national and class aspects, from specific ideological 
viewpoints and discourses?  
I have explained how a TV drama synopsis can be analysed via a structuralist ideological 
analysis. Methods that focus on synopsis and characters, such as O’Donnell’s structuralist 
account, fit well with my case study on idol drama because the idol drama too has fixed episodes, 
beginning, middle, and end, and consequently, ideological closure. Idol drama also entails the 
repetition of the popular formulae that interest Propp.  
Instead of focusing on one particular drama, I have chosen seven dramas that were 
produced in different years and different contexts, as my whole thesis aims at gaining a 
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comprehensive picture of the inter-Asian articulations in idol dramas over the last few dynamic 
years. The dramas include Silence, Fathers’ War, Alice in Wonder City, Gangster’s Bakery, You 
Light up My Star, Scent of Love and Fondant Garden. They have non-Taiwanese characters and 
settings. Of importance is that each of them has a bilateral or trilateral inter-Asian linkage (one 
Taiwanese-PRC, two Taiwanese-South Korean, one Taiwanese-PRC-South Korean, and three 
Taiwanese-Japanese co-operations) in which foreign characters are featured, and Taiwanese 
interactions with non-Taiwanese East Asians are clearly manifested on screen. They were jointly 
contributed to by Taiwanese and non-Taiwanese individuals and companies. Their signifying 
processes were mainly carried out by Taiwanese packagers, who did not necessarily have 
funding from companies within the countries that were their target markets. Despite not having 
funding from the countries, their cross-cultural narratives necessarily articulated the ideologies of 
the countries since their aim was to attract local audiences and to export to the countries. 
Certainly, there are a great many TV dramas that have cross-cultural representations, in particular 
the category of Taiwanese-PRC co-productions, but the seven dramas I have chosen contain 
more ideological implications than other dramas and so may produce rewarding insights for 
researchers working on Taiwanese inter-Asian packaging.  
Table 3-3 List of analysed dramas 
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I personally viewed these TV dramas and transcribed them into written synopses that 
centred on the interactions and relationships of characters having different national, class and 
gender identities. I also noted a number of their scenes that clearly visualised the key ideological 
meanings in their macro-narratives. I watched Scent of Love and Silence when they were aired 
in 2003 and 2006 and watched them again during my research. I watched Alice in Wonder City, 
Fondant Garden when they were aired and Fathers’ War, Gangster’s Bakery, and You Light up 
My Star for the first time in the course of my analysis. I produced a written form of their synopses 
that will appear in chapter 6. 
My ideological analysis took on board the cultural politics of nation, gender and class set 
against a globalised geo-political backdrop. These ethno-national, gender and class politics often 
intersect, and dramatic narratives concerning them tend to appear in not only nation-gender but 
also gender-class patterns, as I found out through my review of the studies of inter-Asian film 
narratives (Fore, 1993; Shih, 1995; 1998; Ma, 1999; Hitchcock, 2002; Yeh and Davis, 2002; Kim, 
2004; K.-C. Lo, 2005, 2014; Teo, 2008; S. C. Wang, 2009; Chang, 2010; Yeh, 2010a; Wee, 2012; 
F.-c. I. Yang, 2012; 2013; Dasgupta, 2013). National relations are dramatised through 
relationships between characters, which also convey ideas about gender. The ideological views 
lie in the connotation level and the macro-narrative in these seven idol dramas. I modified 
O’Donnell’s model with reference to the insights of the inter-Asian film researches 
aforementioned. I briefly discussed the protagonist relationships in the dramas and their topics 
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before I explored their specific macro-narratives: first, their allegories of national relations; and, 
second, the social, cultural and gender values conveyed in them.  
My discussion has three main sections centring on the representations of Taiwan in relation 
to the PRC, Japan and South Korea in the seven dramas. To gain a comprehensive picture of 
Taiwanese inter-Asian articulations in them, I summarised their similarities and also highlighted 
their differences. I compared and contrasted the macro-narratives of the idol dramas that have 
the same co-operating foreign industries, so as to examine what narratives they share. For 
instance, I focused on the similarities and differences in the Taiwanese-PRC works in terms of 
three narratives over a period of time. I also did similar to the Taiwanese-Japanese and 
Taiwanese-South Korean TV dramas. In the conclusion, I provided an overall comparison of the 
three sections. 
 
3.2.2 National Representations 
When I analysed the inter-Asian TV dramas, it was important for me to examine if any dramatic 
tropes of cross-cultural relationships appearing in previous film and other media are reiterated in 
the dramas, and if so how they are conveyed contextually. From the aforementioned East Asian 
film analyses, I summarised three common geo-cultural political settings of East Asian film and 
TV drama: 1. an (ex-) imperial/colonial setting between a former imperial dominator and the 
dominated (S. C. Wang, 2009; Chang, 2010; Yeh, 2010a); 2. a post-Cold-War setting between a 
communist and a capitalist subject (Shih, 1995; 1998; Ma, 1999); 3. an inter-Asian setting 
between subjects that have more neutral, parallel historical bilateral relations (Yeh and Davis, 
2002). In terms of narrative conventions, these contemporary or historical relations are either 
explicitly or implicitly drawn on and played out in the macro-narratives of the film and TV drama, 
with romance and competition as common dramatic tropes (metaphorical expressions) for the 
relations (Kim, 2004 cited in Lo, 2005, p.138). The inter-Asian geo-political issues and national 
political-economic relations are usually reduced to male-male or male-female protagonist 
relations in a dramatic world, as argued by Kwai-Cheung Lo (2005, p.138). Competing or 
hierarchical relationships between same-sex characters, usually male characters having different 
socio-economic and cultural status, tend to bear connotatively the national and political 
connections of their countries, or serve as allegories with regard to the countries’ power and 
strength (Kim, 2004 cited in Lo, 2005, p.138). The characters as signs symbolise specific aspects 
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of the countries to which they are connected in the dramas via their connotation, and audiences 
treat them as allegorical national symbols. For example, post-Cold-War interactions between the 
PRC, Hong Kong and Taiwan were perceived as the physically and materially hierarchical 
relationships of characters from Hong Kong/Taiwan or the PRC when the former’s economic 
power was stronger than the PRC (Shih, 1995, 1998; Ma, 1999). Or, the heterosexual romantic 
engagement of a man and woman manifests a clichéd ideological discourse aspiring to utopian 
hopes for peace, friendship, co-operation or reconciliation between their countries in the dramas 
(Hitchcock, 2002; Dasgupta, 2013). The endings of the dramas could be happy, friendly, 
antagonistic, or oppositional between confronting subjects in these political situations. The 
characters are stereotypes. They bear recognisable characteristics of particular countries. They 
invoke benign or hostile geo-political discourses written from the ideological viewpoints of the 
countries, address specific cultural exigency of the countries, and thus embody specific 
ideological concerns (Hitchcock, 2002).  
When I applied these previous findings concerning the dramatisation of various cross-
cultural relations to inter-Asian idol dramas, I was sensitive to the different political economic and 
cultural contexts in which the dramas were created, of Taiwanese societies in relation to those of 
other countries. I followed Shih (1995; 1998) in particular for my analyses of Silence and Fathers’ 
War, two Taiwanese-PRC co-productions with the contexts across Taiwan Strait in 2005-2006 
and 2010-2011. Regarding the representations of South Korean, Hong Kong and Japanese 
individuals living in Taiwan, in Silence, Alice in Wonder City, and Gangster’s Bakery, in particular, 
I referenced the arguments of Chang (2010) and Sharon Chialan Wang (2009) about the filmic 
staging of foreigners settling down in Taiwan as an expression of a Taiwanese multicultural (and 
by extension, cosmopolitan) society in the making. The representation of an advanced Japanese 
subjectivity and an inferior Taiwanese subjectivity in terms of their capitalistic development, in 
Gangster’s Bakery, Alice in Wonder City and You Light up My Star, owed much to the insights of 
Emilie Yueh-yu Yeh (2010a) and Kwai-Cheung Lo (2005; 2014) who critiqued the stereotypical 
representation of Japanese economic differences with non-Japanese countries in Japan’s inter-
Asian movies. Regarding the allegory of national relations in Scent of Love and Fondant Garden, 
I referred to Lo (2005), who analysed inter-Asian films where two male protagonists compete for 
power, and I saw the two dramas as invoking the economic relations of Taiwan and South Korea.  
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I identified the nationalities of these characters by observing their backgrounds. Many of 
them have clear national identities. Yet a few of them are “mixed-blood” or “bi-national”. The 
mixed-blood backgrounds sometimes have historical implications. For instance, the half-
Japanese half Taiwanese female protagonist in Alice in Wonder City indicates the legacy of the 
long-term influence of Japan on Taiwan. At times, the bi-nationality is arbitrary, such as the South 
Korean protagonist of Fondant Garden, whose Taiwanese background only gives him proficiency 
in Mandarin. I analysed him as South Korean. For characters in the latter type, I defined their 
national identities by the nationalities they thematically connote. 
 
3.2.3 Gender and Class Representations 
Chapter 2.3.2.2 says that “women’s melodrama” is different from “women’s film”, the former being 
ideological fantasy coming from an East Asian patriarchal value system, whilst the latter reveals 
the real-life dilemmas confronted by contemporary East Asian women. To identify which type 
these dramas are, I closely followed the analytical methods of Fang-chih Irene Yang (2012) and 
Steve Fore (1993) on East Asian female film and TV drama, and mixed and matched their findings 
with my case study dramas. I observed the class differences between male and female 
protagonists and noted in what way any socio-economic conflict is resolved by the ends of the 
dramas.  
My summaries revolved around these protagonists’ class identities (social economic 
backgrounds), the transformations of their characteristics, and their endings. I identified their class 
identities by mainly looking at their family backgrounds and professions. Here, observing the 
material conditions of the protagonists (such as house setting, clothing, appearance and any 
accessories they use) helped me do so. I did not find any working class background in the male 
protagonists in my case study dramas. In Silence and Fondant Garden, the male protagonists 
were analysed as upper class because their families own transnational companies which they are 
about to inherit. In Scent of Love, the male protagonist was analysed as an upper class because 
his mother owns a company and his lifestyle is quite well-to-do. In Fathers’ War, Alice in Wonder 
City, and You Light up My Star, the male protagonists have very successful careers and enjoy an 
above-average lifestyle. They were not born into rich families but their specific capabilities and 
talents enable them to climb the social ladder to become newly rich people. They were analysed 
as members of the newly rich urban class that is closer to upper class. The female protagonists 
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in the dramas, on the other hand, work as cooks, tour guides, actresses, bakers, documentary 
directors, etc. – are in fact contemporary urban working women, who, it is apparent, are working- 
or middle-class. Importantly, they generally remain economically inferior to the male protagonists, 
except the female protagonists in Fathers’ War and Gangster’s Bakery who are daughters born 
into rich families. The university student heroine in the Gangster’s Bakery has not embarked on 
her career as yet.  
I observed whether these dramas have rich patriarchal figures and whether these 
authoritative figures remain powerful or not. They are usually the protagonists’ fathers or mothers 
and embody capitalist patriarchal discourses and sometimes Confucian values. They face 
situations in which their authority is challenged by a younger generation. In an essay on Meteor 
Garden, Yang (2012) argued that its hero is under the disciplinary control of his mother, a 
matriarchal capitalist figure. The hero, nonetheless, is a figure from a new generation – the rich 
class in the making. In doing so, Yang (2012) claimed that the story produces an ideological 
fantasy from a capitalist patriarchal discursive position by imagining that class conflict would be 
resolved when a young woman with good employment prospects marries a young future capitalist 
figure who under her influence becomes a more compassionate character. Yang influenced my 
examination of Silence, which illustrates a similar patriarchal control of its young protagonists. In 
a similar way, I identified two patriarchal figures who are presented in Fathers’ War and analysed 
how their relationships with their children reach happy resolutions.  
I observed whether or not any utopian gender-class fantasy or myth is present in the ways 
these dramas end. Not all of the dramas include gender-class discussion in their central storylines. 
The three Taiwanese-Japanese dramas do not have romance between classes as their subject-
matter. Alice in Wonder City, Gangster’s Bakery and You Light up My Stars have dual topics 
whereby their protagonists struggle with career and life difficulties as well as romantic love. Yet 
the Taiwanese TV dramas, co-operating with South Korean and PRC actors and companies, for 
example Silence, Fathers’ War, Scent of Love and Fondant Garden, explicitly revolve around 
heterosexual romantic encounters between the rich and the middle/working class who derive from 
different East Asian societies. Silence and Fondant Garden, two dramas packaged by Angie Chai, 
have several character settings similar to Chai’s successful TV drama Meteor Garden. There is 
obvious economic difference between the heroes and heroines in both Silence and Fondant 
Garden. In the Fondant Garden, the rich man is South Korean whereas the Taiwanese female 
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protagonist is working/middle class. Yang’s (2012) insights helped when I analysed the two 
dramas, e.g. in terms of the relationship of the male protagonists and their parents and the 
romantic happy ending as a fantastic resolution of class conflict. I examined the ideological 
implications at their conclusions, and also paid particular attention to the choices of the female 
protagonists for their romantic lovers.  
I attended to forms of idealised femininities – the female behaviours, life goals and values 
that are represented via the end results of these female protagonists becoming the perfect 
standards or models – moulded jointly by East Asian Confucian and capitalistic patriarchal values. 
In these dramas, I analysed which idealised femininities that have appeared in other popular 
female TV dramas and films, such as Meteor Garden and Dae Jang Geum, have been iterated. I 
also analysed the virtues that have been assigned to the heroines by observing their behaviours, 
life goals, end results, etc. In which value system are the virtues rooted? Then I analysed whether 
the dramas belong to “women’s melodramas” that are complicit with the patriarchal values, or 
express the dilemma of the values as “women’s films”. I looked to see if the patriarchal values are 
explicitly conveyed. I noted that the ideological discourses of the patriarchal values concerning 
idealised femininity are particularly apparent in Fathers’ War, but Scent of Love shows 
contradictions in the idealised femininity. When I analysed the Scent of Love that thematises the 
tragedy of a reincarnated woman, Fore’s (1993) analysis of a Hong Kong “women’s film” that 
shares the theme helped.   
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Chapter 4 Inter-Asian Packaging of Idol Drama 
This chapter shifts attention to the idol drama productions conditioned more directly by Taiwanese 
and regional markets in the 2000s. Situated in a deregulated environment characterised by a free 
flow of popular Japanese and other foreign dramas to female audiences in the country, new 
Taiwanese drama makers came up with a contingent and opportunistic form of inter-Asian 
“package” of idol drama. They adapted manga and explored inter-Asian funding, presale and co-
production to attract not only domestic but also regional markets. This chapter examines the 
development of idol drama, its markets and its characteristics. It explains how the Taiwanese TV 
drama industry discovered its competitive edge in the regional market. Then it focuses on the 
competition between Taiwanese idol drama makers and other East Asian drama industries in 
Taiwanese and overseas markets, especially three major overseas market blocks in South East 
Asia, the PRC and Japan, and several co-operation patterns of Taiwanese idol drama industry 
with non-Taiwanese media cultures and industries. 
The first section analyses practices in the production of the pioneering work Meteor Garden, 
its target audiences and its regionalised employment of the means of production. In the early 
2000s, when the major domestic TV stations were mainly speaking to their conventional market 
segments (older married women) with localist dramas and Sino-centric historical dramas, 
audiences in their teens and twenties were tempted by foreign imports, mainly on new cable and 
satellite TV channels. Observing this, new Taiwan-based drama makers (previously variety-show 
producers) who were sensitive to youngsters’ tastes, broke into drama production and succeeded 
in winning particular sets of the domestic audience – female audiences in their teens and twenties. 
The debut of this home-grown youth-centred urban TV drama, which was then coined “Taiwanese 
idol drama”, marked the generational shift in Taiwanese TV drama making. 
Firstly, idol drama production was conditioned by Taiwanese media’s post-colonial 
hybridisation of Japanese media culture and its pan-Chinese marketing business model, which 
were outcomes of Taiwanese post-colonial engagement with Japan, the existence of the trade 
route of ethnic Chinese media products in regional market and the selection of Mandarin as the 
official language in Taiwan during the KMT rule. Secondly, this drama harvested a surprising 
regional success by emulating a Japanese TV drama format and adapting a Japanese story. This 
Taiwanese product was in fact an alternative to the Japanese youth-centred dramas in East Asian 
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markets. It spoke to the gender and class issues of young Taiwanese women, who tended to be 
much concerned about their own life troubles. It also unintentionally addressed the similar 
anxieties of young East Asian female audiences by adapting a female fantasy originally from 
Japan. With their initial success, the drama producers were able to operate with and take 
advantage of the regional commercial TV drama distribution and link with other media industries, 
together constituting a heterogeneous East Asian drama production assemblage.  
The chapter then charts idol drama’s further inter-Asian packaging. It follows the footprints 
of the idol dramas that raised funding and employed elements from other East Asian media 
systems. The producers were driven by financial reasons – deteriorating domestic funding 
conditions and the existence of affluent neighbouring markets. The domestic condition included 
the loss of younger audiences and advertisement income to the Internet media, a lack of new 
funding from the private sector (e.g. sponsorship) and ownership transition of TV stations. In the 
meantime, the PRC media market was becoming affluent and demanding idol dramas; the 
Japanese had been importing them, and the much richer Japanese financiers had an interest in 
investing in this type of drama. Taiwanese idol drama’s further packaging included the use of 
popular South Korean media culture, the incorporation of funding markets’ elements, and the 
employment of Japanese actors and settings. 
 
4.1 Initial Packaging of Meteor Garden 
As Chapter 1 introduced, TV drama making in Taiwan had been occupied by Sino-centric dramas 
from the Old Three and localist dramas that resonated with the Taiwanese nation-building 
movement during the 1990s. Both types of dramas mainly targeted family and older married 
female audiences. Younger audiences were mainly attracted to foreign imports from Japan and 
the West, on satellite and cable TV as well as underground video circulation. Domestic 
productions had given up targeting them until 2001 when the new drama makers entered this 
terrain. The new drama makers, especially leading producers, were mainly the producers of the 
Old Three’s variety shows. During the KMT era, these low-brow variety shows had been the most 
important windows for mediating foreign entertainment and popular culture. The variety-show 
producers, who were in charge of the completion of programming, were seen as the most 
knowledgeable media professionals in foreign popular cultural trends, either because they were 
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faithful fans of the foreign media or just understood the products for work (Feng, 2005). They had 
been making variety shows for domestic youngsters and been sensitive to these youngsters’ 
tastes. They had been conveniently imitating Japanese variety shows as a workable programming 
format without paying for copyright of the shows’ format to the Japanese media (S3, personal 
communication, Jan 25, 2013, p.2).24 They were also familiar with popular culture business in 
Taiwan because their shows were the main platform for domestic pop singing idols and other 
singers. 
Whether these variety-show producers broke into a drama career intentionally or 
unexpectedly, they finally had the chance in the year 2001. According to Angie Chai – one of the 
two producers of Meteor Garden, it was an “accident” when CTS (one of the Old Three) scouted 
for new content for its Thursday 9pm time slot to replace the then stagnant variety show on the 
time slot, Love Textbook (Lin, 2002). CTS asked the production company, Fulong Production Co., 
which had long been contracted to provide content for the time slot, to either give up the time slot 
or bring in a new commercially successful programme. Fulong’s top producer plus Chief Executive 
Officer, Chai, who had been in charge of a highly commercially successful variety show, Super 
Sunday, aired at 8-10pm Sundays on CTS in the late 1990s, negotiated and was asked to take 
charge of the Thursday time slot. Later, Chai started to generate ideas for the time slot and 
decided to jointly found a new company, “Comic Ritz”, with her colleague, Jerry Feng, who was 
in charge of the Love Textbook (Lin, 2002; M.-J. Lin, 2006b; Shan, 2009). 
To start their drama career, they targeted the young domestic female audiences who were 
teenage or in their early twenties. The demographics were potentially faithful drama consumers, 
who would love to imagine drama heroes as their ideal lovers and search for ideal heroines for 
role models. Growing up in the 1990s, the target audience had no strong political stance and had 
formed their world view through consumption of foreign media. Before Chai and Feng, one or two 
teen dramas were aired on the Old Three, but had little commercial success (Jasun39, 2007). 
Even though Chai and Feng may have been the most successful variety-show producers in 
Taiwan at the time, making drama was still a huge career challenge. Luckily the CTS did not 
intervene and allowed them to choose their approach (Feng, 2006 cited in M.-J. Lin, 2006b, p.40). 
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 Copying Japanese TV programmes was one convenient and low-cost innovation for the variety shows of the Old Three 
to increase popularity. This act of copying could be maintained because the Japanese media did not care much about its 
potential overseas profit (Iwabuchi, 2002, pp.86-88). 
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By 2000, the most popular foreign TV dramas in Taiwan were targeting these demographics; they 
were Japanese urban youth-centred dramas that packaged pop music and stylistic idol talents 
with beautiful love stories. The two drama makers assessed that the Taiwanese teen idol market 
was saturated with Hong Kong and Japanese idols, who also won fans as film and TV drama 
male leads because there was a lack of home-grown idols. Sensing this shortage of home-grown 
teen idols and dramas for Taiwan’s urban female youngsters, they decided to fill the gap and 
establish their own talent pool rather than banking on young stars from elsewhere (e.g. Hong 
Kong), or younger actors whose personas were connected to Sino-centric and localist dramas. 
Casting their own contracted talents as lead actors in their own dramas would allow Chai and 
Feng to combine several commercially successful products into one project. Once the synergy 
worked, their actors would become idols overnight, and their company would become the centre 
of the next Taiwanese idol economy (Lin, 2002, p.90; Ma, 2005, p.156; Mao, 2011).  
 
4.1.1 Post-Colonial Hybridisation and Standardised Chinese-Speaking Setting 
Chai and Feng’s talents might have been home-grown, but their format was Japanese. Being 
manga readers and unfamiliar with the existing circle of drama production, Feng and Chai decided 
to adapt Japanese manga artist Kamio Yoko’s Boys Over Flowers, a best-selling Japanese 
manga that was serialised in Japanese comic magazine Margaret in 1992 and was imported to 
Taiwan with a Chinese title Meteor Garden (Chao, 2001; Feng, 2005; Deppman, 2009, p.96; 
iSUN@Taipei, 2011; Mao, 2011). It is a light romantic comedy about a poor but strong-willed girl 
and her romantic encounter with “F4” – four rich handsome teenage boys dominating their high 
school. The original manga was released in Taiwan a few years before the TV adaptation.25 It 
became popular in the Taiwanese manga consumption market in which Japanese imports 
dominated domestic consumers’ tastes (Ku, 1998; Wang, 2001). Its Japanese animation 
adaptation also had a high TV viewership in Taiwan (Mao, 2011; Chen, 2013). The manga (and 
its Japanese anime version) had had two market tests in Taiwan, so it would have a great chance 
of garnering another commercial success on TV. Feng even foresaw that the Japanese media 
would be interested in their new drama (M.-J. Lin, 2006b, p.42).  
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 After extensive search, I was unable to trace the exact year in which the manga Boys Over Flowers was officially 
imported into Taiwan. However, Taiwanese media started reporting on its popularity in Taiwan since January 1997 (Pai, 
1997). Thus, the manga seemed to have circulated in Taiwan during 1996 or even earlier. 
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Although the storyline had been circulating in East Asia, this type of TV drama was “new” in 
domestic drama making in terms of content and target audience (Arpon, 2010). Director Tsai 
Yueh-Hsun was also new in serial drama directing.26 Barbie Hsu, a girl-idol-singer-turned-variety-
show-host was cast as the heroine. Chai and Feng then cast four new young male talents as male 
leads (Jerry Yan, Ken Chu, Vanness Wu and Vic Chou), who were either fashion models, singing 
talents, or ordinary individuals who did not have formal acting training. They were chosen mainly 
because they looked physically similar to the manga characters “F4”. The two producers 
prioritised physical similarity between actor and character over acting ability: young talents can 
still touch audiences if they are guided properly by directors (Lin, 2002, p.94; Our Talk Show, 
2012; Chai, 2015 cited in Golden Bell Awards, 2015a).27 Once audiences accept them, these 
young talents might have a chance to grow into professional performers (Our Talk Show, 2012). 
To deal with the new leads’ lack of acting performance, the production team gave them a few 
hours of urgent acting training for the pending shoots, and employed veteran actors for supporting 
roles to help them on set (Li, 2004; Hsu, 2006 cited in Latsyrc, 2006). 
The textual dimension of Meteor Garden is hybrid on many levels. This hybridisation is a 
consequence of the Taiwanese consumption of Japanese media culture and Western media 
influence. In terms of TV drama format, the crew emulated Japanese TV drama’s visual 
presentation and aesthetic styles (Kao, 2004, p.194). They also used Western pop songs for 
background music. 28  In terms of the drama world view constituted through language and 
background, Meteor Garden presents a hybridisation of Mandarin and Japanese. Its protagonists’ 
names are in Japanese but are pronounced in Mandarin, which is how Taiwanese viewers of its 
original manga would read the names. According to Tsung-yi Michelle Huang (2006, p.485), the 
contemporary Taiwanese public have adopted many Japanese terms and phrases in the 
language, since there is a high degree of similarity between written Japanese characters (Kanji) 
                                                     
26
 Tsai Yueh-Hsun, who was 32 years old, was scouted to direct the drama and guide the new talents to act in front of 
camera alongside some theatre-turned-TV workers responsible for the performing training. Tsai started his career as a 
screen actor and off-screen worker in the late 1980s and began his directing career in the late 1990s. He had mostly 
worked for one-episode TV dramas featuring Mandarin pop music and singers and had only directed a 40-episode 
Buddhist Da-Ai TV drama before sitting on the director’s seat of Meteor Garden (Tung, 2007; Our Talk Show, 2012). 
27
 Tsai recalled that as he had worked with many new talents, he had been very good at interacting with them, very 
patient, and was able to encourage them to show their emotions and feelings in their acting (Our Talk Show, 2012). 
28
 Meteor Garden was also an unprecedented case in Taiwanese TV drama making as it considerably used Western pop 
songs by Coldplay, Martine McCutcheon, etc. for background music to signify the emotions of the characters so as to 
appeal to a young audience. It was agreed the songs would appear in the drama free of charge because the producers, 
who were veterans of variety-show production, were well connected with major music labels. In sum, its cinematography 
and music was fresh and unprecedented at the time of its broadcasting (Ma, 2005). 
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and written Chinese characters. Japanese names can be pronounced in Mandarin. Consequently, 
the producers did not intend to completely change the Japanese names. Instead, they seemingly 
wanted the TV adaptation to offer an atmosphere when viewed very similar to how Taiwanese 
youth read Japanese manga (Lin, 2002, p.90; Kao, 2004, pp.163-164; Mao, 2010). According to 
Sharon Mao, the scriptwriter for Meteor Garden, the drama’s production staff wanted it to be 
identical with the manga in terms of protagonists’ names in production. They did not think to 
rename the protagonists with Chinese names because they thought that the manga’s fans in 
Taiwan would criticise them if they changed these names. They cared very much about the 
feedback of the Taiwanese audiences who are familiar with Japanese language and media culture 
(Mao, 2010). 
According to Chi-Hsiang Kao (2004, pp.58-69) and Hsiu-Chuang Deppman (2009), 
Japanese original Boys Over Flowers is set in specific Japanese post-bubble economic recession 
but Meteor Garden only has a non-specific temporal spatial setting, showing ambiguous national 
boundary and selective presentation of local traces, issues and history. This was because Meteor 
Garden’s producers were part of the Chinese-speaking media industries that took advantage of 
the pan-Chinese market in East Asia that have used Mandarin as lingua franca whilst Boys Over 
Flowers adhered to the domestic orientation of Japanese media industries and mainly addressed 
Japanese domestic issues (Deppman, 2009). 
Meteor Garden’s characters mainly communicate in Mandarin. This characteristic has been 
commonly shared by other idol dramas. Mandarin is the primary language of Meteor Garden (and 
by extension, idol drama) for domestic and foreign reasons. 29  Concerning the domestic 
environment of idol drama, I argue that Mandarin is the main language in idol drama due to the 
request of domestic commercial channels that have aired idol dramas (the Old Three) and the 
general linguistic cultural environment in Taiwan.30 At the time when idol drama was to emerge 
from the Old Three at the end of the 1990s, Mandarin still enjoyed a relative privilege status in 
media (Kloter, 2006, p.219). As chapter 1.3.2 introduced, there was fierce competition between 
Mandarin and Hokkien over the 8-9pm drama time slot in the Taiwanese TV market in the 1990s 
                                                     
29
 Since I started watching idol dramas, I found out that almost all idol dramas I have watched adopt Mandarin as their 
primary language. 
30
 Virginia Liu had a similar account of idol drama’s prioritisation of Mandarin. In our interview, she explained that main 
characters in Scent of Love (her production that was aired in 2003 and featured South Korean characters and cultural 
elements), even its South Korean characters, spoke Mandarin in most of their scenes due to the preference of the 
Taiwanese TV industry and the habits of the Taiwanese viewers (personal communication, Mar 26, 2013, p.17).  
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(Ko, 1999; F.-c. I. Yang, 2008c, pp.283-285; 2015). Yet although the Hokkien-speaking dramas 
were gaining ground at the 8-9pm time slot, the 9-11pm drama time slot targeting married women 
and the prime-time variety shows targeting youngsters on Saturday and Sunday at the Old Three, 
such as Super Sunday for which Angie Chai was the main producer, maintained largely the 
Mandarin language, for instance. In terms of dissemination, Mandarin was used by more 
Taiwanese people than Hokkien. Mandarin remained the official language in Taiwan, even though 
Taiwanese society had been distancing itself from the KMT’s Sino-centrism and resisting PRC’s 
political agenda (Kloter, 2006, p.219). Urban North Taiwan predominantly used Mandarin (Curtin, 
2007, p.168). It may be argued that female teenagers and women in their early twenties in urban 
Taiwan were Mandarin-speakers, in addition to their own ethnic languages. 
The prioritisation of Mandarin also relates to the foreign marketing of idol drama. S7 
explained that an actor who usually speaks Hokkien on stage had to speak Mandarin in 98% of 
his scenes in idol drama Gangster’s Bakery (2014) for its pan-Asian marketing (personal 
communication, Mar 15, 2013, p.4). In the view of Fang-chih Irene Yang (2015, pp.173-174), idol 
drama mainly uses Mandarin for the consideration of East Asian markets, in particular, the market 
of PRC where Mandarin is the official language, whilst Hokkien-speaking dramas have been 
regarded as having no immediate foreign trade market (Yang, 2008c, p.283; 2015, pp.174-175). 
For the consideration of overseas marketing, idol drama controls the presence of Hokkien 
and other ethnic languages. This does not mean that Hokkien and other ethnic languages are 
totally absent in idol drama. I found out that Hokkien has appeared occasionally in idol dramas, 
yet it has been arranged at a secondary position. It is usually used by senior characters who have 
Hoklo backgrounds. Young protagonists originating from Hoklo families would speak Mandarin 
when talking to their colleagues or peers in the workplace or school and speak both Hokkien and 
Mandarin when talking to their parents. In our interview, the head of GTV drama programming 
mentioned to me a similar approach to the language issue in its idol dramas, in which protagonists 
may mainly speak Mandarin and communicate to characters from the countryside with Hokkien 
(B2, personal communication, Feb 26, 2013, p.9). This approach seemed to reflect her common-
sensical perception of how urban Taiwanese youngsters communicate today. Fang-chih Irene 
Yang (2013, pp.1083-1086) obtained a similar observation. Moreover, Yang criticises some 
stereotypical representations of vulgar, naïve and lower-class Hoklo characters in idol dramas in 
contrast to elegant waishengren characters that reproduced the waishengren-centred ethnic 
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hierarchy.31 In a nutshell, the aforementioned domestic and foreign reasons have driven idol 
drama to present a generally standardised Chinese-speaking setting (a Mandarin world), in which 
Taiwanese ethnic stereotypes would be presented. 
In terms of drama consumptions of female teenagers and women in their early twenties in 
urban Taiwan, they tended to watch romantic dramas which concentrated on the small personal 
and emotional world of women (F.-M. Lin, 2006; Yang, 2008a; b; c; 2012; Huang, 2008). The 
reason might be two-fold. Their lives had been directed to domestic domain, such as marriage 
and rearing children in the patriarchal Taiwanese society, so that they had not been as engaging 
to national politics as male nationalists themselves. With the wish to have a happy marriage in 
their lives, they had hoped for ideal romantic love relationship that would lead to such a marriage, 
and thus they had been supplied with romantic love dramas from commercial cultural and media 
industries (F.-M. Lin, 2006; Berlant, 2008; Yang, 2012, pp.420-421). Gradually they internalised 
the apoliticalness and would not demand TV dramas that have strong link to particular Taiwanese 
socio-historical background (Yang, 2012, pp.420-421). 
Even though these women had multiple options of foreign imports, they had chosen 
Japanese manga, especially the genre coined in Japanese as “shojo (teenage girl) manga” 
targeting teenage Japanese girls. Boys Over Flowers belongs to the genre of shojo manga. It 
may be argued that the most important factor contributing to Meteor Garden’s narrow focus on 
the small, emotional and private world of individuals and its detachment from Taiwanese political 
agendas, had less to do with it being an adaptation of manga than its target audience, who were 
keener to resolve their emotional and female desires, rather than become actively engaged with 
the political and cultural movements in Taiwan. The story, concerning teenagers’ life on campus, 
and their family life, created a very personal world which could detach itself from macro political, 
social and historical events. 
 
4.1.2 Inter-Asian Remediation of Young Female Fantasy 
Meteor Garden soon had a high viewership when it was aired on Thursday 12 April 2001 in Taiwan 
(Huang, 2001; Nien, 2001a; b). It attracted young Taiwanese female audiences and became a 
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 For criticism of the prioritisation of Mandarin and suppression of Hokkien in commercial Taiwanese TV dramas, refer 
to Yu-Fen Ko (1999) and Fang-chih Irene Yang (2008c; 2013; 2015). 
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phenomenal success over the next two to three years in South East Asia (Singapore, Indonesia, 
Vietnam and Malaysia), mainland China and then Japan and South Korea (Kao, 2004; Liu, 2006; 
Y.-Y. Li, 2007; Chen, 2008, p.178; Chi 2008; Hsu and Weng, 2008; Ida, 2008; Zhu, 2008, p.90; 
Deppman, 2009; Heryanto, 2010; Kawamura, 2011; Chou, 2012, pp.67-74). Teenager and young 
women in Taiwan and many parts of East Asia started taking an interest in Taiwan’s new 
generational TV dramas and idol talents. There were two different reasons for its East Asian 
popularity. It was initially popular among relatively developing countries, including Taiwan, Hong 
Kong, South East Asia and mainland China (Chen, 2008, p.178; Ida, 2008; Zhu, 2008, p.90; 
Deppman, 2009; Heryanto, 2010). It did not enter Japan until 2003 and its popularity there was 
connected to the Japanese post-colonial cultural relationship with non-Japanese East Asia.32 I 
will discuss this in detail later in the current chapter. The  Japanese female audience consumed 
many non-Japanese East Asian TV dramas for the pristine, soft and friendly East Asian 
masculinity of the idol talents (Chou, 2012, pp.67-74) and it can be argued that their pleasure was 
embedded in the Japanese collective nostalgia of an optimistic phase of modernisation (Iwabuchi, 
2002, p.159). 
Indonesian audiences, in two case studies, were more interested in the gender-class 
relations and values of the modern individuals in Meteor Garden (Ida, 2008; Heryanto, 2010). In 
the studies, its main attraction comes from the depiction of masculinity and femininity in an 
urbanised society with a strong Confucian trait. According to Indonesian research (Ida, 2008; 
Heryanto, 2010), the Meteor Garden and the four handsome ethnic Chinese idols from Taiwan 
caused wide discussion among the female Muslim audience who lived in a local community that 
witnessed tension between indigenous Indonesians and ethnic Chinese immigrants. Also, the 
young female audience contrasted this East Asian heterosexual romance to love scenes in 
Western media and felt that the former had more conservative depictions of love and character 
appearances (no smoking and tattoos). Lovers in the drama kiss but do not have premarital sex. 
The male protagonist demonstrates non-smoking, clean, pretty and young masculinity with a 
macho quality in some contexts. The modern Cinderella is brave and self-sufficient, faces daily 
troubles and has the ability to transform the male protagonist to the positive side of humanity. 
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 Meteor Garden was aired in South Korea (Hsu and Weng, 2008). However, there have been no researches, even 
industrial reports, about the reception of Taiwanese idol dramas in South Korea. 
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Meteor Garden was aired in the PRC for a few episodes in March 2002 but soon was banned by 
the PRC government which judged that the depictions of teenagers’ school life in the drama 
encouraged materialism and school bullying and that the drama would negatively influence youth 
(Chen, 2008, p.178). Despite this, the drama was hugely popular in the PRC through piracy. 
Hsiu-Chuang Deppman (2009, p.94) notes that its regional sensation was related to 
regionally shared female aspirations in contemporary East Asian societies. It seems that, 
although Chai and Feng were mainly thinking about the desire of young local Taiwanese women, 
this female desire was similar to that of other young East Asian women, especially in South East 
Asia and mainland China. Critics noted that young East Asian urban women were feeling more 
pressure about their life within the environment of neo-liberal economic development and the 
widening class gap in the post-colonial patriarchal countries (Barlow, 2007; Yang, 2012, pp.425-
430). These countries were mostly undergoing drastic economic transitions triggered by the Asian 
financial crisis in 1997, and female audiences in these countries were negotiating between 
economic security via conforming to patriarchal rules, and gender autonomy under East Asian 
patriarchal nationalist regimes. Heterosexual romance/marriage to a rich young man – a future 
capitalist – might have been viewed as the quickest way to resolve the problem. The urban 
romantic fantasy provided escape as an imaginary resolution to deal with female class anxiety 
and desire for a consumerist lifestyle. This was why young teenage female audiences were keen 
to consume idol drama, yet the fantastic stories provided to them were complicit with patriarchal 
capitalist ideas. The newness of the Meteor Garden as utopian heterosexual romance is that the 
heroine has a decent job even though she is surrounded by rich men. Yet such plot innovation is 
also noted as being complicit with capitalist values which desire women to enter the workforce 
(Fore, 1993; Lin and Tong, 2008, pp.111-114; Deppman, 2009, pp.105-106). 
The Taiwanese adaptation tried to be identical to the manga by casting four Taiwanese men 
who resembled the original manga figures and by depicting the teenagers’ world, such as on-
campus bullying, friendship, girls’ self-sufficiency and male transition to manhood (Lin, 2002). The 
four young handsome heroes are an imagined ideal of an East Asian patriarchal figure in the 
contemporary world. In terms of their character, they are still shaping their personality and are 
able to transform into human-centred individuals under class intersection with and influence from 
a working-class heroine (Yang, 2012, p.427). In terms of their appearance, the ideal urban young 
men are tall (more than 180 cm), fit and beautiful; they have no rebellious tattoos and do not go 
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in for premarital sex (Ida, 2008; Heryanto, 2010). Meteor Garden is also a drama about 
generational politics, which is conveyed through several patterns of protagonist-parent relations 
(Yang, 2012, p.428). The parent-children relationship is constantly split or troublesome, the youth 
looking for a better and more utopian world. 
There was a key difference between the Japanese and the rest of the East Asian societies. 
Whilst many East Asian societies were embracing strong economic growth, Japan had already 
stepped into a post-bubble economic recession at the beginning of the 1990s – a decade labelled 
Japan’s “lost decade” due to its economic underperformance (Powell, 2009). Confronted with the 
social crises in the 1990s (Woronoff, 1996), Japanese media industries responded with diverse 
media products (Ito, 2004, p.25). In the Japanese manga industry, the shojo manga, Boys Over 
Flowers as an example, is simply a specific girl-oriented genre among a variety of genres, such 
as adult manga (Kinsella, 2000; Toku, 2007; Choo, 2008, pp.277-279). Similar to many previous 
successful media products targeting young female audiences (Ito, 2004, p.32), the Boys Over 
Flowers offered ambivalent messages to its target audiences. It thematised gradual positive 
relationship between a poor girl and rich, handsome boys, thereby involving escapist Cinderella 
fantasy. Yet, as a post-bubble-economic Japanese cultural product, it nevertheless shared a spirit 
with other Japanese media products to establish its readership with a trace of progressive “post-
fairy-tale socialism”, conveyed in its portrayal of the heroine’s consistent resistance to capitalist 
social order, according to Deppman (2009, pp.106-107). Hence, it may be argued that Boys Over 
Flowers belonged to that section of Japanese media that delivered the most traditional gender 
and class resolutions whereas the majority of Japanese media products were more concerned 
with addressing the problem of how to survive in a post-bubble economy, and tackling 
complicated urban human relationships. 
At the same time, non-Japanese East Asian countries had not encountered economic crisis 
yet until the late 1990s. The majority of individuals in non-Japanese East Asian societies, had 
more traditional (Confucian) attitudes and lifestyles that had mingled with capitalistic development 
model (Choi, 2010, pp.128-129). In societies ruled by relatively more traditional patriarchal 
dominations, the majority of Meteor Garden’s East Asian audience tended to seek fairy tales 
involving heterosexual marriage rather than seeking more progressive media templates. The 
resolutions of Boys Over Flowers, which are ambivalently progressive yet in general 
conservative, met these demands embedded in the non-Japanese value systems in East Asia.  
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This can be proved by the difference between Meteor Garden and Boys Over Flowers noted 
by Deppman (2009, pp.104-108), who argues that, in their endings, the Meteor Garden is more 
“pragmatist”, giving a conservative message in which capitalistic social order absorbs dissension, 
which was initially embodied by the heroine, and maintains its dominance, whilst the Boys Over 
Flowers is “socialist”, with the heroine maintaining a distance from patriarchal capitalism. In the 
ending of the original manga, the protagonists do not end up entering marriage. They are just 
about to develop their relationship. The first instalment of the TV adaptation conveys a similar 
message about the heroine’s future: it has an open ending concerning female autonomy and 
submission to patriarchy. But in the sequel to the TV adaptation, the heroine submits to a marriage 
with the patriarchal symbol (the hero). I argue that this narrative closure can be seen as a 
negotiated outcome between her class mobility and female independence. This drama seemingly 
provided the most accepted resolution for this gender issue to its regional audience and became 
the most inter-Asian phenomenon of Taiwanese TV. It seems that the targeted East Asian female 
audiences were inclined to more traditional values and resolutions and had not yet entered a 
phase of looking for more modern and individualist options. The disparity between Japan and 
non-Japan East Asia was later proved by the popularity of South Korean media in the latter’s 
market. 
 
4.1.3 Contributions towards Taiwanese Soft Power (in Female-Centred Economy) 
The success of Meteor Garden made the new home-grown dramatic idol talents famous 
overnight, igniting overseas interest in purchasing similar Taiwanese products, especially dramas 
starring the four talents-turned-stars actors and Barbie Hsu. The four actors even assembled an 
idol group called F4 (after the manga characters “F4”), which had concert tours in the 2000s. TV 
drama was now a part of the Taiwanese “idol economy”, and a more integral part of the pop idol 
vehicle.33 Idol drama producers began incubating their own contracted talent pool which was 
                                                     
33
 For example, F4 were collaboratively incubated by the team of Feng, Chai, and Tsai. Feng incubated other idol talents, 
such as Fahrenheit, which also provided a stable cast for his dramas throughout the decade (Sina Entertainment, 2015). 
These producers’ works are driven by and centre on talents/stars. They scout for and make talented performers into rising 
stars, rely on the talents’ fame and create new personas of the rising stars to guarantee their East Asian marketing (S3, 
personal communication, Jan 25, 2013, p.2). The idol talents would be remediated by pop music and other celebrity-
related media. Pop music talents would be featured in drama to gain fame before releasing an album; acting talents would 
feed the pop music industry’s demand for new faces, usually singing for dramas (Lin, 2002, p.94). The overall revenue 
came from drama sales, the sales of drama-derivative products and particularly the derivative profits of idols’ stage 
performances, concert tours, and product endorsement in East Asian markets (Yang, 2005). This integrated business 
model scouted talents from fashion model agencies and pop singing agencies (Mao, 2011).  
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nonetheless smaller than those of Japanese or South Korean talent agencies (Lin, 2002). The 
local industry seemingly was able to compete with foreign imports for the young female audiences 
of the region, to a certain degree. Chai and Feng, as well as their staff and crew, were able to 
build up their track record with this new home-grown media business orienting towards regional 
audiences.34 Chai and Feng were coined as idol drama’s birth mother and father (Feng, 2001; 
M.-J. Lin, 2006b, p.39). Importantly, their success created opportunities for other Taiwanese TV 
drama makers who also wanted to make idol dramas.35 It is no surprise that their commercial 
business model was soon quickly exploited (Liu and Chen, 2004, pp.69-70). The domestic TV 
channels produced similar dramas in the following two years (Wu and Jiang, 2010a, pp.12-13). 
Most of these dramas were produced quickly and thus lacked quality (Chen, 2004). This 
oversupply jeopardised the general production condition of the business as the domestic 
audience were soon fed up with them and became very selective, according to Jerry Feng (2006 
cited in M.-J. Lin, 2006b, pp.40-41). However, eventually, Sundays 10-11.30 pm became the 
flagship time slot for idol dramas since early 2003 when the Old Three aired three idol dramas 
head-to-head. The time slot provided a stable platform in the cultivation of the domestic-audience 
base of the idol drama (Wu and Jiang, 2010a, pp.13-15).36 
It is fair to say that, during the 2000s, several independent production companies, especially 
Comic Ritz (run by Angie Chai), Comic International (run by Jerry Feng), Prajna Works (run by 
Tsai Yueh-Hsun) and Power Generation Entertainment (run by Virginia Liu) and two Taiwan-
based satellite TV channels Gala TV Station (GTV) and Sanlih Entertainment Television 
Company (SET), formed the major power houses of idol dramas. The production companies run 
by Angie Chai, Jerry Feng and Virginia Liu released idol dramas since 2001 and 2002 at a fairly 
consistent pace and usually screened them on the important idol drama time slot on Sunday. 
They also had produced above-average idol dramas in terms of expense, establishing with clear 
                                                     
34
 The two producers did not recoup all their expenditure for the drama solely from the drama’s financial returns, but they 
gained cultural prestige and symbolic capital, and particularly fame and professional credits (Nien, 2001c; Lin, 2002, p.92). 
Chai (2002 cited in Lin, 2002, p.92) explained that in the beginning she still adopted the financial logic of variety shows in 
which a producer spends the biggest amount of money in the first pilot week to attract audiences and then reduces the 
amount in later weeks to the minimum. She found out that drama making is different: more money needs pouring in at the 
later stages of production. 
35
 Virginia Liu admitted that Meteor Garden’s success provided a chance for her to produce dramas and provided them 
to market (P1, personal communication, Mar 26, 2013, pp.1-2). 
36
 There was a minor adjustment to its starting time from 9.30pm to 9.40pm and eventually 10pm. Another secondary 
time slot for idol dramas is on Saturdays 9-11pm on terrestrial and satellite TV channels. PTS has a time slot on Saturdays 
9-11pm. Since 2008, idol drama has had a new time slot on Fridays 10-12pm on terrestrial and satellite TV channels (Wu 
and Jiang, 2010a, pp.13-15). 
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brand image as independent companies. Tsai Yueh-Hsun did not produce idol drama annually 
but he attracted audiences by producing the most expensive quality idol dramas. S3 (personal 
communication, Jan 25, 2013, p.2) commented that Angie Chai, Jerry Feng, Tsai Yueh-Hsun and 
Virginia Liu were very important pioneers of idol drama business before SET and GTV’s entry of 
the business. An article by Yi-Kuo Wu and Yi-Hui Jiang (2010a, p.5) has similar account. They 
argue that GTV and SET produced idol dramas at network level and list six companies that 
produced idol dramas and provided them to networks as independent brands, including Angie 
Chai’s Comic Ritz, Jerry Feng’s Comic International, Virginia Liu’s Power Generation 
Entertainment and Tsai Yueh-Hsun’s Prajna Works. Wu and Jiang also include Peggy Ko’s 
Domani Production and Doze Niu’s Honto Production. I have not included the two companies 
because Peggy Ko usually worked for GTV as a subcontractor company and her work is seen as 
GTV productions in my thesis. Niu has not produced idol dramas annually in my own observation. 
During 2001 and 2010, he only produced two idol dramas, Say Yes Enterprise (2004) and 
Wayward Kenting (2007). 
Idol drama’s effects have now in general been understood as “soft power”. “Soft power” was 
initially an American concept coined in 1990 by Joseph Nye that encouraged the US government 
to maintain its international domination over foreign countries through the export of education, 
ideology and (media) culture. This power form is practised through “persuasion” rather than 
“military coercion” (Chua, 2012a, p.65). It operates in the cultural terrain and is involved in 
competition between different ideological and value systems. What we call “soft power” today 
used to be regarded as media imperialism during the time when Hollywood media operated as 
an instrument for the US, to disseminate its individualistic, liberal and capitalistic value system, 
thereby jeopardising local media industries. With the ascendance of multiple centres in several 
regional blocs, the world now seems less in the Cold-War framework and is in a new entangled 
form of global competition and mutual penetration. The new competing countries emulate the US 
success for at least gaining economic benefit from, firstly, media export and, secondly, foreign 
tourism and further international influence and visibility. For many East Asian countries, especially 
small countries that do not have “hard power”, they can influence foreign attitudes and perceptions 
towards them through cultural exports as a means of “soft power” seeking a reaction in a positive 
way, hence creating more material and non-material benefits (Chua, 2012b, p.17). 
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The soft power of idol dramas was later identified by the idol drama industry, the public and 
the government in Taiwan. Meteor Garden caused a craze for visiting the shooting location (Chu, 
2003). For the target audience, it was not right to say that Meteor Garden was in a “complete 
social vacuum” because it half-heartedly indicated that it was set in a city in Taiwan. Like many 
commercial films and TV, the idol drama had the power of what Jean Baudrillard (1994) coined 
“simulacra”, creating an imagined world using the modernised landscape of Taiwan as a big studio 
lot. The Meteor Garden ambivalently delivered a “modern Taiwanese cultural scent” through the 
fitful use of contemporary Taiwanese urban landmarks and consumer spaces as well as popular 
idioms, slang and new urban phrases. Production crews searched for “beautiful” or even 
“astonishing” scenes to meet production demands (Tsai, 2009 cited in Lan, 2009). The non-
specific urban backdrop setting also enabled the drama makers to shoot in newly furbished 
modern spaces from different cities across Taiwan (Tsai, 2009 cited in Lan, 2009). The mediated 
“Taiwan” that audiences received was enhanced, modern and pretty. The audience might 
recognise and associate the Taiwanese shooting location with the fictional worlds. Even though 
the female audience knew that the female-oriented narrative was just fantastic, they visited the 
actual shooting locations to experience the fictional space symbolising romantic love. Pretty soon, 
idol dramas were considered a powerful promotion tool for Taiwanese tourism, and the fictional 
characters were the best model consumers, introducing audiences to various Taiwanese resorts, 
restaurants, beaches, shops, bookshops, cultural spots and anywhere that provided consumer 
goods. These consumer spaces used as backgrounds were detailed in the media. For instance, 
newspapers detailed the shooting locations of Meteor Garden in Taiwan and framed them as one 
thematic tour of Taiwan (Liu, 2007). Gradually, the idol drama became an effective promotion tool 
of the modern face of Taiwan to the world, mainly Japan and South Korea (A.-C. Li, 2007; Y.-Y. 
Li, 2007; Sung, 2015, p.46). In 2007, the Taiwanese government employed the four actors who 
played F4 in Meteor Garden to promote Taiwan to Japanese and South Korean tourism (Huang, 
2007; Apple Daily, 2008). 37  Shooting locations of idol dramas have been highlighted by 
Taiwanese government to help tourism business.38 Many municipal governments also started 
                                                     
37
 News about the employment can also be found on the website of Taiwanese Bureau of Tourism that is available at: 
http://theme.taiwan.net.tw/epaper/chi/20070316.htm [Accessed 31 March 2016].  
38
 For instance, National Chung Chen University in mid-south Taiwan has become a tourist spot for being the shooting 
location of the fictional college in Meteor Garden (Chu, 2003).  Similar account is also available at: 
http://travel.culture.tw/template/StrokePage.aspx?Sid=189 [Accessed 31 March 2016]. 
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supporting idol dramas via funding or production support in exchange for placing their local spots 
in idol dramas in 2004 (Huang, 2016, p.20). 
Tourism has occupied the centre of idol dramas’ soft power. Its power to glamorise tourist 
spots and to bring tourists to them has become the most central driving force for the Taiwanese 
economy to recognise its significance. The idols, with their influence on the target audience, have 
been perfect partners for consumer goods. The commodity endorsement of these talents would 
bring economic benefit to the talent agency department of the production company, which would 
indirectly cover its drama production expenditure. In 2006, the Bureau of Tourism of the ROC 
government contracted the idol group F4 as the presenter of Taiwan to Japanese and South 
Korean tourists; in the following years, more idol celebrities endorsed domestic tourism (Huang, 
2007; Apple Daily, 2008; Sung, 2015). Taking advantage of public acknowledgment, the idol 
drama industry has become active in framing itself as an important showcase of Taiwanese 
modernity and local tourism (Yang, 2009a; F.-C. Chu, 2011; Pan, 2012; Huang, 2016). Idol drama 
has thus been nationalised by soft power. The soft power of Meteor Garden and the following idol 
dramas has offered the export-oriented drama industry one way to show its national loyalty to 
Taiwan. Although the dramas are fictional, the locations are in Taiwan. I argue that this place-
based loyalty is the key for Taiwanese society to identify with the idol drama industry. Discoursing 
its economic benefit to Taiwan, the industry became eligible to ask for state support. 
In summary, based on the marginal Taiwan and targeting the East Asian market, successful 
idol dramas balanced between regional and local/domestic concerns, demonstrated the modern 
faces of Taiwanese society and at the same time addressed shared cultural interests among the 
domestic and the regional areas. To do so, the export-oriented dramas had to selectively present 
domestic culture and overlook some domestically specific issues and history. Although the inter-
Asian mobility of idol drama has been recognised as an important asset to the Taiwanese 
economy, public identification with idol drama has been conditional. The bottom line has been to 
make a “Taiwan-based” drama and this “Taiwan-based” criterion can have many forms. Minimally, 
Taiwan should be the main location of shooting. I will discuss the criteria of public acceptance, 




4.2 More Patterns of Inter-Asian Packaging 
Two main factors have been driving the idol drama production companies, especially the 
independent production companies led by producers like Chai and Feng, to be more inter-Asian 
in finance and the production process throughout the 2000s. The first factor was the lack of 
domestic funding and the second, the existence of more affluent markets in East Asia.  
Despite the initial success of the inter-Asian packaging, the industry has not had a good 
domestic industrial environment. Angie Chai and Jerry Feng spent NT$1,000,000 (£20,000) per 
episode on average for the Meteor Garden but the CTS only allotted around NT$700,000 
(£14,000) per 70-min episode to it (Chao, 2001; Liu, 2001; Nien, 2001c; Lin, 2002, p.92). Angie 
Chai tried to recoup the extra cost by selling the drama’s foreign distribution rights (Liu, 2001; 
iSUN@Taipei, 2011). Furthermore, the average budget for drama production in the Old Three 
had been shrinking in recent years (Chao, 2012; S.-H. Lo, 2014; Hsu, 2015 cited in Golden Bell 
Awards, 2015b).39 Shunning the risk and responsibility of drama production, the Old Three would 
only consider purchasing programme broadcast rights for domestic producers’ works, even for 
prime-time slots (Chao, 2012; P2, personal communication, Feb 20, 2013, p.1; Chiu, Chiu and 
Hsu, 2015, p.108). The vertical disintegration of TV programming led to the programme market 
being between the programme provider (independent production companies) and broadcasters. 
The former has produced dramas and sold to the latter and overseas markets (Chiu, 2009; 2012; 
Lan, 2009; Chao, 2012; Chai, 2015 cited in Golden Bell Awards, 2015a). In this mode, an idol 
drama project could enjoy a higher production budget at NT$1.8 million (£36,000) per 70-minute 
episode on average (Government Information Office, 2011, p.16). Among this, around 
NT$700,000 (£14,000) would likely come from the domestic terrestrial TV broadcasting. The extra 
expense must be recouped mainly from overseas sales (Chao, 2012; P2, personal 
communication, Feb 20, 2013, p.3). Chi-Hsiang Kao had a similar finding. In Kao’s study, an idol 
drama was likely to raise NT$600,000 to 700,000 (£12,000 to 14,000) per 70-minute episode in 
total from a domestic terrestrial TV channel and a satellite TV channel that aired it in 2004. It then 
                                                     
39
 The terrestrial TV channels’ production fee for a Monday-Friday one-hour Hokkien-speaking serial drama in the 8-9pm 
time slot was NT$1,400,000 (£28,000) per episode in 2001 but it allotted the same amout per episode to a Monday-Friday 
two-hour serial drama in the 8-10pm time slot in 2008 (Hsu, 2015 cited in Golden Bell Awards, 2015b). In other words, 
the production fee for the latter was reduced by half. The terrestrial TV channels’ funding for idol drama has also been 
reduced over the years. Angie Chai (2012 cited in Chao, 2012) revealed that the production budget from Taiwanese TV 
stations only accounted for one fourth of her production expenses by the end of 2012.  
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raised more money by selling distribution rights for overseas markets. The overseas revenue 
ranged from US$8,000 to 20,000 (£6,100 to 15,227) per episode (Kao, 2004, p.94, p.168).40 
In the beginning years, the drama production companies enjoyed a stronger bargaining 
power in the domestic programming market. The Old Three were willing to bid for domestic 
dramas as the audience had a craze for home-grown dramas, mainly due to the success of 
Meteor Garden and many other dramas featuring rising idol stars (Li, 2003). At this time TV, the 
traditional medium, was not seriously affected by the Internet, in terms of advertising revenue. 
There were only a few good options for home-grown idol dramas, and TV broadcasters were more 
willing to bid for a well-produced idol drama’s broadcasting right with a higher-than-average price 
(Li, 2003).  
Gradually the financial condition worsened. During the 2000s until 2012 when product 
placement was approved by the government, the Taiwanese TV stations faced more crises, jointly 
caused by the already fragmented market, the loss of younger audiences to the Internet, and the 
lack of alternative advertisement income. Commercial TV advertisement in general had not grown 
much because of the overall slowdown of the Taiwanese economy (Feng, 2008).41 Also, these 
terrestrial and satellite TV were losing young audiences to the Internet and consequently 
advertisements that were targeted at young people (Yang, Tu and Chen, 2013; Lee, 2014). 
Moreover, the TV stations experienced a digital shift so they had been under great financial 
pressure (Chang, 2014a; b). This circumstance led the TV networks to hope to attract older and 
larger female audience groups to sustain themselves in the short term and thus they tended to 
air TV dramas that covered broader female demographics, ranging from teenager to audiences 
between 25 and 44 (the main target of commercial advertisers) (Kao, 2004, p.164, p.185; Wu and 
Jiang, 2010a, p.9; Wang, 2016). They were not doing clear targeting but instead wished to cover 
wider female audience groups. The TV networks and, consequently, drama makers also tended 
to stick to financially safe templates and were not taking risks to experiment in diversifying genres 
and targeting markets (Maple, 2015a; b). 
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 The figures in US dollar are converted to British Pounds at the exchange rate of 1 US dollar to 0.76 British Pounds, as 
in August 2016. 
41
 Taiwanese economy has not gone well since the late 1990s after the Asian economic crisis and thus the advertising 
segment in Taiwanese media has not increased much. According to research of Chien-san Feng (2008, p.220), the Old 
Three have been in deficit since 2002. 
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What was worse was the ownership transition of the Old Three during the 2000s. After the 
power shift in 2000, the Old Three were either privatised or transferred into public TV in the mid-
2000s.42 TTV and CTV were privatised. Since 2007, TTV has been mainly owned by Taiwan-
based businessmen Huang Song and a pro-independence businessman Lin Jung-San, who 
already runs a pro-independence newspaper Liberty Times (the China Post, 2007; Apple Daily, 
2007). After a few rounds of mergers and acquisitions during 2006 and 2008, CTV has, since 
2008, been owned by the PRC-based Taiwanese businessman Tsai Eng-Meng (Pi, 2008). Tsai’s 
ownership of the CTV and the station’s pro-Chinese tendency in news production have caused 
the “anti-media-monopoly movement” in Taiwan (Rawnsley and Feng, 2014). The homology of 
politics and media was visible in the form of competition for media by the nationalist groups. The 
competition for media in the 1990s was about the foundation of new TV channels to counter the 
KMT’s Old Three. In the 2000s, the Old Three’s ownership was the major warfare. After this round 
of contest, TTV took a pro-independence stance, CTV has maintained a pro-Sino-centric and pro-
unification stance, and CTS was integrated into public broadcasting group. In 2006 the CTS was 
included in the PTS group which was rebranded as the TBS (Taiwan Broadcasting System), but 
the CTS as the second station of the TBS receives no state funding and relies on advertisement 
(Lin, 2009, p.208). In the meantime, the TV regulation authority was transferred in 2006 from the 
Governmental Information Office (GIO) to the National Communications Commission (NCC) 
founded in early 2006.43 The GIO was now in charge of public subsidy for TV and later was 
incorporated into the newly-founded Ministry of Culture in 2012.44 Theoretically, when the old 
commercial media are losing direct income from selling advertisement, they would start to seek 
indirect advertisement, such as sponsorship and product placement. But this practice was not 
approved by the NCC in the 2000s decade, which perceived TV more as a public education and 
was opposed to the intervention of advertisement into TV programming.45 Consequently the TV 
                                                     
42
 On 9 December 2003, the Taiwanese government passed the amendments to the Radio and Television Act, the Cable 
Radio and Television Act and the Satellite Broadcasting Act. The amendments banned the government and political 
parties from involvement (investing) in private radio and TV stations. Within two years of the new rules taking effect, 
shares of the government and political parties must be sold (Lu, 2003). 
43
 Available at: http://old.npf.org.tw/PUBLICATION/EC/093/EC-R-093-007.htm [Accessed 31 March 2016]. 
44
 Available at: http://mol.mcu.edu.tw/data/1337232081.pdf [Accessed 31 March 2016]. 
45
 The NCC lifted the ban in the October of 2012 because the industry kept complaining about the lack of domestic 
funding. Since then, commercial sponsors have started to test the economic value of direct programme sponsorship in 
Taiwanese TV (Hsu, 2012; C.-T. Lin, 2012; National Communications Commission, 2012; Peng, 2012). This regulation is 
available on NCC’s website at: 
http://www.ncc.gov.tw/chinese/print.aspx?table_name=law&site_content_sn=257&sn_f=1964 [Accessed 31 March 2016]. 
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stations took more low-cost strategy by further outsourcing to external companies and relying on 
foreign imports (S.-H. Lo, 2014). 
The above-mentioned political economic contexts of the idol drama industry imply that TV 
drama was confronted with a tug of war between political, economic and social forces in the 
2000s. Increasingly technological factors became important: many national TV companies were 
switching to high definition broadcasting and the Taiwanese export-oriented drama productions 
had also to upgrade to high definition format for its overseas circulation (Chu, 2012).46 This meant 
that the production costs were also increasing. To give short-term financial support, in 2003 the 
GIO began to partially subsidise TV dramas, which was contested by and did not go to every 
application, only a few being granted money; a number of idol dramas started receiving subsidies 
(Lin, 2003; Tinallll, 2011). The amount of the subsidy could only occupy up to 50% of the 
production budget.47 It meant that the government still hoped that the TV dramas would be 
market-oriented and exportable. 
 
4.2.1 Responding to the Korean Wave 
The overseas market of Taiwan’s idol dramas is composed broadly of two sets of sub-regional 
markets: South East Asian and North East Asian markets (Chiu, 2009; 2012; S3, personal 
communication, Jan 25, 2013, p.2). The foreign funding bodies are from the distributors of three 
specific places: South East Asia (including Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, etc., 
where there are ethnic Chinese communities and other East Asian cultures influenced by ethnic 
Chinese culture), Japan, and PRC, which respectively bear changing economic significance for 
idol drama in a different time period (S3, personal communication, Jan 25, 2013, p.2; B1, personal 
communication, Jan 31, 2013, pp.5-6). Certainly, the funders mainly took note of companies that 
had gained success. The receiving countries’ buyers started to be interested in the idol dramas 
from Taiwan (Chu, 2007a; Mao, 2010; C.-W. Wu, 2012). Since 2001, the idol drama companies 
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 During a public forum, director Chu Yu-Ning (2012) commented that his idol dramas had been produced in high 
definition format for foreign marketing. 
47
 According to the regulations during 2008 and 2015, which I collected from the websites of GIO and Ministry of Culture, 
applicants for the subsidy must be terrestrial TV stations, satellite TV stations and TV drama production companies 
registered in Taiwan. Public-funded TV stations (the TBS entities) are not allowed to apply. The subsidised TV dramas 
should present Taiwanese culture and society creatively. They also should address audience tastes, employ new talents, 
have the capability of integrating with other media platforms and have overseas marketability. The subsidy should not 
exceed 49% of the reported production cost for every subsidised drama. Previous call for applications in the year of 2015 
is available at http://www.moc.gov.tw/information_250_34208.html [Accessed 4 August 2016].  
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could raise overseas funds for their next projects. The overseas market is important especially for 
production projects which do not want to be tied by the scale of domestic budgets (Chiu, 2009; 
2012; Lan, 2009).48  But the Taiwanese idol drama companies are still in the middle of the 
popularity hierarchy in the region. When they pursue foreign funding, they are usually requested 
by their funders to incorporate “winning” elements and usually keep remediating regionally 
popular themes/elements (Mao, 2010; S1 and S2, personal communication, Feb 4, 2013, p.6).49 
Therefore, there are two main forms of their inter-Asian production relationships: first, 
referencing/remediating and, second, incorporating elements from funding countries. In the past, 
they only borrowed (paid or unpaid) from the “superior”– to emulate the more advanced media 
elements from Japan and South Korea. But now they not only reference the “superior” but also 
incorporate elements of the “inferior” – the funding market’s elements from South East Asia and 
the PRC – and integrate the two into one unity of difference, or one hierarchical structure (Chu, 
2010a; 2011b; Huang, 2010; Hung, 2010a; 2016; Mao, 2010; S3, personal communication, Jan 
25, 2013, p.24). In short, the idol dramas were having more inter-Asian fusions. 
While the Taiwanese TV industry is getting into deeper crises, the South Korean TV drama 
industry has been enjoying a remarkable export success in the region and the success has been 
called the “Korean Wave” (Lee, 2008, pp.189-190). Since the mid-2000s, South Korean TV drama 
has replaced Japanese TV drama to become the trendsetter, in terms of social values, femininity 
and masculinity as well as aesthetics, among working-class and middle-class female audiences, 
and the most in-demand products in the regional market (Yang, 2008b). South Korea has 
overtaken Japanese influence even on teenagers since the mid-2000s and has become a new 
phenomenal cultural trendsetter in East Asia (Kim, 2013).  
The dividing line between Japanese and South Korean domination was in 2005, according 
to Nissim Otmazgin (2014).50 It took a few years for South Korean drama to become highly in 
                                                     
48
 For instance, seventy percent of the export-oriented satellite network GTV’s profit comes from sales of dramas in 
overseas markets (B3, personal communication, Feb 26, 2013, p.14). The foreign market might be even more financially 
important than the domestic market, accounting for a larger proportion of total sales. 
49
 During a public forum on the work of contemporary Taiwanese idol drama scriptwriting, Taiwanese scriptwriter Sharon 
Mao (2010) discussed a project for a TV drama, funded by a PRC production company, where the lead producer asked 
her to emulate Tokyo Love Story (1991), a successful Japanese TV drama in the early 1990s (for details of the Japanese 
TV drama, see Iwabuchi, 2004a). In chapter 5, I will discuss how scriptwriters S1 and S2 were requested, by producer 
Angie Chai, to emulate a South Korean TV drama when writing a piece for a Taiwanese-PRC co-produced TV drama (S1 
and S2, personal communication, Feb 4, 2013, p.6).  
50
 Japanese media had the most popularity and influence during the period between the 1990s and 2005 in East Asian 
markets (including Taiwan) (Otmazgin, 2014, p.323). The success of Taiwanese TV adaptations was also a part of 
Japanese success. But its foreign influence was in general fading at the end of the 2000s and early 2010s. Since the 
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demand. South Korean drama exporters have used several marketing strategies, especially 
“product bundling”. Initially they sold TV dramas cheaply on the regional market and, when the 
dramas became popular, they bundled one popular drama with several commercially mediocre 
ones into one combined product for sale to increase sales and income (S1, personal 
communication, Feb 4, 2013, pp.17-18). This strategy depended on the capability of the South 
Korean TV industry to keep making successful TV dramas in the region. Ying Zhu (2008, p.91) 
argues that South Korean TV dramas are hugely successful in mainland China because their 
Confucian characteristic matches the contemporary political and cultural context of the PRC. The 
existing research shows that East Asian female audiences identify themselves with the more 
Confucian characteristics in South Korean TV dramas than Japanese TV dramas (Lin and Tong, 
2008, p.103). JungBong Choi (2010) suggests that this tendency towards a more conservative 
template of modernisation is the reason that South Korean media and TV dramas replaced the 
Japanese contemporaries to become the most important reference for the majority of female 
audiences in the region.  
South Korean TV dramas and Taiwanese idol dramas have competed in many East Asian 
markets, such as the PRC, since the 2000s (Zhu, 2008, pp.90-91). The Korean Wave first came 
to the PRC in the late 1990s before spreading elsewhere. The South Korean actors were soon 
invited to act in the PRC TV dramas since the late 1990s. Their South Korean cultural background 
has usually had no significance in their characterisations as the PRC TV industry has only utilised 
their personae constructed in the South Korean dramas and cast them to play ethnically Chinese 
characters. Although Taiwanese TV drama making has treated South Korean TV as the primary 
competitor in the same genre and target market, it could not rival its South Korean counterpart. 
Thus, the Taiwanese drama makers have tried to take advantage of the South Korean drama’s 
popularity by emulating its subject-matter, story formulas and popular elements in order to attract 
those markets whose tastes have been shaped much by the South Korean products. 
Taiwanese TV industry has had little production interaction with South Korean TV stations – 
the core of South Korean TV production system – except purchase. The South Korean TV system 
has four free-to-view national TV networks, Educational Broadcasting System (EBS), Korean 
                                                     
middle of the 2000s decade, the dominant position of the Japanese media in Taiwanese (and broadly East Asian) 
consumption has been offset by other rising media industries, especially the South Korean industries.  
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Broadcasting System (KBS), Munhwa Broadcasting Corporation (MBC) and Seoul Broadcasting 
System (SBS). Power Generation Entertainment run by Virginia Liu produced the TV drama Scent 
of Love in 2003 as one of its Asian trilogy and tried to interest KBS in co-productions and other 
forms of collaboration, albeit with little success. Meanwhile, South Korean companies have had 
more interest in co-producing with the PRC, as proved in the example of Beijing My Love (2004), 
a KBS co-production with the PRC’s China Central TV station (CCTV).51 MBC co-produced with 
CCTV A Modern Family (2002) (Song, 2015). The regional popularity of South Korean TV dramas 
seemingly is driving South Korean independent production companies to raise foreign money for 
funding (Lee, 2008, p.193). GTV (Gala Television Station), a satellite TV channel that has 
imported many South Korean TV dramas, pre-purchased/invested in the South Korean TV drama 
Full House (2004) (Wu, 2004).  
South Korean talent agencies have been actively cashing in on the Korean Wave impact by 
sending their talents to perform in the media of non-Korean markets. The South Korean talent 
export to the Taiwanese media has been one dimension of its expansion in the Chinese-speaking 
market composed mainly of the PRC, Hong Kong and Taiwan.52 Taiwanese producers have 
employed South Korean actors roughly since 2003. Many of them assigned the South Korean 
actors ethnically Chinese characters.53 A number of the idol dramas have emphasised the South 
Korean background of the actors (I will analyse them in chapter 6.3). For instance, Silence (2006), 
produced by Angie Chai, cast actress Park Eun-Hye to play a Korean-Taiwanese heroine (Chen, 
2005b). Also, several young South Korean actors, such as Park Shin Hye, Choi Si Won, and Gu 
Hye Seon, lead the cast in the live-action TV adaptations of Japanese mangas of Jerry Feng and 
GTV, My Combat Butler (2011), Extravagant Challenge (2011) and My Perfect Boyfriend (2012) 
respectively (P.-C. Chu, 2011a). 
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 Available at: http://twkor.com/hanju/885.html [Accessed 21 May 2016]. 
52
 The South Korean talent agencies have encouraged South Korean talents to work overseas by charging less from the 
overseas revenue of the talents. The overseas performance fee is much higher than that of their South Korean domestic 
performances. The ratio difference was revealed in the news about South Korean pop artist Park Jung-Min’s contract with 
CNR Media. The news indicated that the artist-agency proportion was 2:8 for South Korean profit and 5:5 for overseas 
profit (Available at: http://www.diodeo.com/news/view/83228 [Accessed 8 September 2015]). 
53




4.2.2 Incorporating Elements from Funding Markets 
The second practice of idol drama is to input the funding markets’ elements from South East Asia 
and the PRC. The South East Asian markets, formed from Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia and 
other South East Asian markets, have been an established market for Chinese-language media, 
including Taiwanese products, for a long time since the Hong Kong film industry cultivated market 
tastes in the markets. The Chinese-language products have spread widely in the South East Asia 
but their market revenue mainly comes from several other countries: Singapore, Malaysia and 
Thailand as well as Hong Kong, in which Chinese-language programmes are regularly aired on 
dedicated TV channels.54 Meanwhile, the Indonesian market has been reported by Taiwanese 
newspapers as the most difficult national market for the Chinese-language TV programmes 
without in-depth investigation (Chu, 2007a). 
In the initial four years, idol dramas enjoyed a certain degree of interest from the East Asian 
markets mainly because of the halo effect of Meteor Garden.55 South East Asia has remained an 
important market for idol dramas to cater for. Taiwanese drama makers have pre-sold idol dramas 
to the market.56 For instance, GTV has been pre-selling TV dramas since the mid-2000s decade 
(B2, personal communication, Feb 26, 2013, p.4). My Combat Butler (2011) by GTV and Jerry 
Feng mentioned previously is partially pre-funded by Hong Kong distributor Medialink 
Entertainment Ltd (B2, personal communication, Feb 26, 2013, p.10). The funding relations 
between the market and idol drama generated a number of works that cast South East Asian 
actresses. For example, the Meteor Garden generated a sequel which received funding from 
Taiwan, Singapore and many Southeast Asian distributors. Singapore-based actress, Michelle 
Saram, AKA Zheng Xue-Er, played a leading role alongside the Taiwan-based actors in the 
sequel (EP2, personal communication, Feb 23, 2013, p.4). Later, Meteor Garden director Tsai 
Yueh-Hsun’s White Tower (2006) also cast an Indonesia-based actress, Agnes Monica, to play a 
small role (S3, personal communication, Jan 25, 2013, p.24). South East Asia, such as Singapore 
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 Malaysian Astro TV and Singaporean Media Corp have been stable purchasers of these non-domestic East Asian 
dramas. For information, see their websites at http://zhongwen.astro.com.my/Channels/SHX.aspx and 
http://www.channel8news.sg/ or http://tv.toggle.sg/en/channelu. 
55
 Virginia Liu told me that “the environment was not bad in the beginning three and four years. But gradually since 2009 
the whole production environment has completely changed. Besides, the Taiwanese TV drama industry has not created 
another benchmark success [in East Asia]” (P1, personal communication, March 26, 2013, p.9). 
56
 Pre-selling is a common media business practice because it helps reduce a project’s financial risk and includes a larger 
market base. The incoming payment can go directly into the production project to ease the financial burden. International 
pre-selling has been commonly used by project-based film and TV producers who do not have enough in-house capital 
and market, and rely on overseas markets, for instance the Hong Kong film industry (Lii, 1998). 
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and Thailand, has encouraged Taiwanese media to use its tourist spots as drama locations for 
promotion of its local tourist business via the regionally circulating media content (S1, personal 
communication, Feb 4, 2013, p.15). For instance, idol drama Letter 1949 (2009) and In Time with 
You (2011) shot a few scenes in Thailand (Phuket Island) and Singapore respectively. 
South East Asian money has been gradually decreasing for Taiwanese idol dramas. By 
contrast, PRC and Japanese markets are much more affluent and quickly rising. The trend is 
shown in the change of GTV drama’s overseas market show fee per episode between the early 
2000s and early 2010s (see Table 4-1). Thus the idol drama industry has put more effort into 
expanding into the more affluent and high-growth PRC and Japanese markets. 
Table 4-1 GTV dramas’ overseas market show fee per episode (in US dollar) 
 Early 2000s Early 2010s 
South East Asia Up to US$25,000 (£19,034) US$10,000-15,000  
(£7,600-11,420) 
The PRC US$10,000 (£7,600) US$20,000-30,000  
(£15,228-22,841) 
Japan NA Up to US$50,000-60,000 
(£38,069-45,683) 
Source: B1 (personal communication, Jan 31, 2013, pp.5-6) 
Idol dramas have been traded in US dollar in the regional market. Thus the amount is represented in US 
dollar to capture the industrial convention.57 
 
PRC TV is a new and important funding source because of its rising domestic advertisement 
market and hence TV production budget. The PRC with the population of more than one billion 
people opened itself to non-PRC capital and business in the early 1980s (Hung, 2009). In the 
twenty-first century, it has topped the Japanese economy to become the second largest national 
economy in the world, following the US economy, and its urban areas have accumulated much 
fortune on average (Monahan, 2010). The PRC not only keeps functioning as an important export-
oriented manufacturing base for the world, but also has a booming domestic consumer market 
(Canton, 2015). Advertising has become an important business tool in the PRC’s market 
economy. Alongside this general trend, the PRC media market has been increasing at a surprising 
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 The figures in US dollar are converted to British Pounds at the exchange rate of 1 US dollar to 0.76 British Pounds, as 
in August 2016. 
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rate. Market researches indicate that Chinese TV advertisement revenue has increased by more 
than 10% annually from 2012 to 2013 (Szalai, 2012) and, according to a US report, by 2020 the 
Chinese film market will replace the US market to become the largest in the world (Ernst & Young, 
2012 cited in Tsui, 2012). The drastically rising TV and media advertising revenue has helped the 
TV stations to increase their programming budget. According to Deloitte China Research and 
Insight Centre (2013, pp.10-20), PRC film and TV drama entertainment markets are steadily rising 
as opposed to fragmented Taiwanese film and TV drama entertainment markets. The sales of TV 
dramas overall rose from 5.2billion Yuan (around £0.52 billion at the exchange rate of one 
Chinese Yuan to 0.1 British Pounds) in 2008 to 9.8billion Yuan (around £0.98 billion) in 2012; 
consequently, TV drama’s production expense increased when the revenue increased (Ibid, 
pp.11-12). Online video platforms, such as Youku, Tudou, iQIYI and LeTV, are also the main 
platforms for TV dramas in PRC. Their purchase for the online show rights of TV dramas 
increased from only thousand Yuan to 600,000 Yuan per episode (Ibid, p.12). Gradually they also 
produce online dramas themselves. By contrast, Taiwanese TV production companies suffer from 
the lack of funding due to the over fragmentation. These Taiwanese TV workers are drawn to the 
PRC TV companies and even film making that target PRC markets (Ibid, p.17). 
The PRC TV system since the 2000s is mainly formed of a central national TV network – 
China Central TV – and more than twenty provincial networks. All these networks have their 
nation-wide satellite channels, such as Hunan Satellite TV channel, Dragon Satellite TV channel, 
Anhui Satellite TV channel, etc. (S.-H. Lo, 2014). These networks are the central broadcasting 
platforms for TV dramas in the 2000s decade. The PRC TV is tightly controlled by its government, 
which sees TV as an important ideological tool (Ng, 2015). Nonetheless, to increase its own 
competitive edge, co-production has been an important way for the PRC TV to upgrade itself. 
Since the 1980s, the PRC state has planned to improve its domestic programming by selective 
imports and co-productions (Lai, 2008; 2011; S.-C. Cheng, 2010).58 In co-productions, non-PRC 
partners receive the PRC production funding whilst the PRC side learns foreign know-how (Meng, 
2007; Pan, 2008; S.-C. Cheng, 2010; Huang, 2010; Liang, 2010; Lai, 2011; Keane and Liu, 2013; 
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 TV dramas are regulated in three categories in the PRC: imports, co-productions and domestic productions. Import 
refers to the TV drama produced by a foreign enterprise. Co-production refers to the TV drama that is made by at least 
one foreign enterprise and one PRC company. In terms of elements (actors, shooting scenes, behind-the-scene staff), it 
should have a minimal third or half of PRC elements – the proportion changes from time to time. Domestic production is 
made by PRC enterprise. It can only have up to 5 external actors and non-acting workers. The regulations are to protect 
local business and professionals (Lai, 2008, pp.1-5, p.58). 
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Hsiao, 2014; Li, 2014, p.6). Since then, the market-driven PRC TV production system has been 
learning a great deal from foreign TV industries, including the Taiwanese TV industry. 
Although Japanese TV dramas ignited some sparks in the 1990s in the PRC, South Korean 
TV dramas made the first nation-wide consumption in the PRC in the late 1990s. Around that 
time, the foreign urban youth-centred dramas set against a materially wealthy backdrop met the 
demands of the middle-class women in urban PRC. Taiwanese idol dramas have been popular 
in the PRC TV market but in general, South Korean dramas are more heavily consumed by 
Chinese audiences (Zhu, 2008, pp.90-91). F4 was one of the most popular idol stars in PRC for 
a few years after Meteor Garden was circulated underground in 2002.  
Although the underground circulation has been a quick way to fame and popularity, an 
industrial producer needs official circulation for an immediate financial cash return. The 
Taiwanese idol drama industry has sought to take advantage of the PRC’s affluent market in 
many ways. Numerous Taiwanese TV companies have co-produced with the PRC since the late 
1980s (Lai, 2011). In the idol drama era, Angie Chai was the first staff member from Meteor 
Garden to launch co-productions with the PRC (W.-J. Yeh, 2007). Commonly framed as the “birth 
mother” of Taiwanese idol drama, or a “sorceress” who has the magic to create popular TV serial 
dramas, Chai became a star producer and attracted co-operating invitations from the PRC and 
Hong Kong (W.-J. Yeh, 2007; Pan, 2008; Huang, 2010; Liang, 2010). Compared to Chai, Jerry 
Feng and Tsai Yueh-Hsun’s interactions with the PRC have been fewer and later and I will discuss 
this in chapter 5. Chai’s first PRC-funded TV drama, City of Sky, was produced in 2004 under the 
funding from the China Central TV, starring Taiwanese and PRC actors. In 2005, Chai packaged 
an inter-Asian cast in her TV drama Silence (2006), starring Taiwanese, Hong Kong, South 
Korean and PRC actors. Corner with Love (2007) produced and scripted by her, was her third co-
production with a PRC TV company. Sweet Relationship (2007) and Calling for Love (2009) were 
also co-productions at different levels between her company and PRC companies (EP2, personal 
communication, Feb 23, 2013, pp.5-8). 
As Taiwanese domestic market revenue has been sliding and the PRC market has risen 
with a consistent annual growth rate, more Taiwanese media talents and professionals have 
flowed to the PRC TV system instead of staying in Taiwan (Chu, 2006; Huang, 2010; Chang, 
2011, pp.50-52; Kung and Hsu, 2012; Ma, 2016). According to Taiwanese news coverage, in 
2014 a PRC-funded TV drama could have on average a budget of NT$5 million (£100,000) per 
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70-min episode (Hsiao, 2014), much higher than the average Taiwanese funding. Many PRC TV 
stations started employing Taiwanese idol drama workers for their own idol dramas (Pan, 2008; 
Huang, 2010; Liang, 2010; Mao, 2010; Chien, 2011; China News, 2012; Kung and Hsu, 2012; 
Shenzhen Business News, 2012; Chai, 2015 cited in Golden Bell Awards, 2015a). For instance, 
in 2009, the PRC’s Hunan Broadcasting System and its affiliated production company produced 
and aired its own TV adaptation of the Japanese manga Boys Over Flowers. The TV adaptation’s 
director Shen Yi comes from Taiwan (Z. Wang, 2009). The PRC’s Anhui Broadcasting System 
employed a Taiwanese team and cast to release its idol drama Happy & Love Forever (2010) and 
Sunny Happiness (2011), which were penned by one of the scriptwriters I interviewed. 
Other Taiwan-based TV drama producers also have sought PRC funding in the 2010s (Wu 
and Jiang, 2010b; Chien, 2011). Fathers’ War (2011) was a co-production between the PRC’s 
Shenzhen Broadcasting System and the Taiwanese independent company Chun Long 
International Entertainment Co (Sina Entertainment, 2011; Y.-L. Wang, 2011a; Citizen Weekly, 
2012). GTV co-produced one TV drama, When Love Walked In (2012), tailored for PRC TV, that 
employed PRC-born Korean Wave idols (Zhou Mi from Super Junior M and Song Qian from F(x) 
who are represented by South Korea’s SM talent agency) and Taiwanese idol star Calvin Chen 
of Fahrenheit in 2012 (Chen, 2012; Tu, 2014). Jerry Feng’s Comic International also co-produced 
Sunny Girl (2011), which was a remake of the popular South Korean TV drama Bright Girl’s 
Success (2002) with a PRC-based Shanghai Yiaoxingying Media Company in 2010 (P.-C. Chu, 
2011b). The PRC-Taiwanese co-productions have usually employed South Korean elements 
alongside less attractive Taiwanese elements because these projects have wished to capitalise 
on the surplus value of the Korean Wave (P.-C. Chu, 2011b; Chen, 2012). These “co-productions” 
have been more like the outsourcing of PRC TV for programmes from Taiwan-based production 
companies. 
 
4.2.3 Entering Japan and More Remediation 
Idol drama’s third pattern of inter-Asian packaging is to further remediate Japanese elements. 
The Japanese media market, in a country of more than 100 million nationals, is abundantly 
profitable and stable, for it has not had the problem of serious piracy and has been oligopolised 
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by six Japanese media conglomerates called “major six”.59 Besides, post-war Japan has been 
known for its closed cultural boundary between itself and foreigners, particularly East Asians. 
Japan has not had quota control of foreign imports but its TV has been self-sufficient since the 
1970s (Iwabuchi, 2002, p.212). In terms of sources of import, Japan has mainly accepted Western 
media and imported fewer East Asian content (Iwabuchi, 2002, p.212). 
The major six networks have their own associated broadcasting satellite (BS) channels and 
local sub-stations (local channels). Since the 2000s, the local TV stations and nation-wide BS 
channels have been expanding and have demanded alternative materials. Previously re-airing 
the domestic programmes produced from the major TV networks, they began to air non-Japanese 
East Asian TV dramas in the 2000s. Also, Japanese public TV, NHK, is responsible for airing 
“quality foreign content” for international cultural exchange (Kawamura, 2011). They chose South 
Korean TV drama and have witnessed its phenomenal impact on Japanese TV since 2003.60 
South Korean TV dramas constructed the market segmentation for “Asian drama”. Seeking 
alternatives outside South Korean TV dramas, Japanese TV drama traders found the Taiwanese 
idol dramas, particularly Taiwanese adaptations of Japanese manga (Liu, 2006; Y.-Y. Li, 2007; 
Kawamura, 2011). At the end of 2003, Meteor Garden was introduced to the Japanese BS and 
DVD markets. Since then, the Taiwanese idol dramas have attempted to expand in Japan.61  
The most successful idol dramas in Japan have come from companies that began their 
careers by adapting Japanese manga, especially Meteor Garden. Although many idol dramas 
have been sold cheaply to Japan, only three production groups have had more visible success 
there: Angie Chai, Jerry Feng (who has teamed up with GTV since 2005) and Tsai Yueh-Hsun 
from the Meteor Garden crew. TV adaptations of Japanese manga have guaranteed at least 
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 The six Japanese nation-wide TV networks are Japan Broadcasting Corporation, aka Nippon Hoso Kyokai (NHK), 
Nippon Television Network System (NNS), Japan News Network (JNN), Fuji Television System (FTS), All-Nippon News 
Network (ANN) and TV Tokyo Network (TXN). 
60
 There have been many academic researches on the Japanese success of South Korean TV dramas (Honda, 2006; 
Chua and Iwabuchi, 2008). In short, the poignant and tragic South Korean TV love stories, mainly providing fantastic 
escapes, are very different from the highly realistic and socially engaging Japanese TV dramas developed since the 
1990s. Thus older Japanese women treat the handsome, tall and strong South Korean actors, who manifest a very 
different masculinity from many Japanese male actors, as ideal lovers. The first and most phenomenal South Korean TV 
drama was Winter Sonata, which was aired from April to September 2003 on the NHKBS2 channel and then released on 
DVD. It was a phenomenal success among Japanese women. After that, the six major networks started to occasionally 
air South Korean dramas on their main channels in 2004. Some even exceptionally created a special time slot for South 
Korean dramas. Although the local channels and satellite channels have been the major broadcasters of non-Japanese 
contents, DVDs have been a really important way of circulation in Japan for foreign dramas as the target audience can 
buy DVDs and watch them any time including at home (Kawanura, 2011). 
61
 Japanese press has coined the dramas centred on Meteor Garden, F4 and other idol dramas from Taiwan as “Tai-
phoon”, “Taiwanese Wave” or “Chinese-language Wave”. These labels hint at South Korean media culture forerunning 
Taiwanese media culture in the Japanese market (Liu, 2006; Y.-Y. Li, 2007, p.3; Chi 2008; Kawamura, 2011; Chou, 2012). 
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certain visibility in the Japanese market. Chai and Feng have kept producing and promoting 
adaptations of mangas, starring F4 and other Taiwanese idols such as Fahrenheit, to expand into 
the Japanese market (Sina Entertainment, 2015). For Tsai, entering the Japanese market was a 
benchmark for higher economic return. As a much established system, Japanese TV 
broadcasting has had high standards of narration, technological and production quality and has 
been setting the technological benchmark for East Asian media business, in particular Taiwanese 
TV. In the 2000s, Tsai was benchmarking his production capability against Japanese criteria 
(Tung, 2007; Lan, 2009). To enter Japan and receive pre-purchase funding, Tsai cast members 
of F4 and chose elements familiar to Japanese market dealers and consumers. For example, 
after Meteor Garden, Tsai produced a Taiwanese version of the Japanese best-selling TV drama, 
White Tower – which also received a level of recognition in Japan.62 White Tower was a great 
success in Japan by Taiwanese standards (Chu, 2007c; Y.-H. Yeh, 2007; P1, personal 
communication, March 26, 2013, p.22).63 By the same logic, Tsai also took advantage of the 
Japanese market when he produced his police action genre Black and White (2009), which cast 
F4 member Vic Chou and sold its distribution rights in Japan (Lan, 2009). 
The Japanese consumption of idol dramas has also seen adaptations of manga, romantic 
comedies and idol stars, especially F4. Women in their thirties, younger than the audience groups 
for South Korean dramas, have been the main consumers (Kawamura, 2011). They have been 
attracted to the TV adaptations because they are familiar with the original manga. Also, the TV 
adaptations are teen-centred romantic comedies, attracting the audiences who are tired of serious 
Japanese dramas. There have been a few Taiwanese idol stars who have garnered a certain 
amount of fandom in Japan, particularly F4 and Fahrenheit. But the Taiwanese stars were never 
as prominent as A-list South Korean stars in the Japanese market (Y.-Y. Li, 2007, p.7; Kawamura, 
2011). The 30-year-old Japanese fans have been attracted to the less complicated, less modern, 
pristine, softer, tender and gentle personalities of the Taiwanese stars. The pleasure of TV drama 
consumption has been embedded in the cultural hierarchy between Japan and Taiwan (Chou, 
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 Tsai’s White Tower (2006) claimed it received the highest distribution fee ever from a Japanese dealer at US$33,000 
per episode in 2007. Although it was not an adaptation of manga, it had many elements that the Japanese dealer preferred, 
including the star casting of Jerry Yan (F4) and its inter-textual allusion to the Japanese same-name hit drama White 
Tower (2003) (Y.-H. Yeh, 2007). 
63
 The success of the White Tower in Japan is defined in terms of its profit. Its distribution fee for the Japanese market 
was US$33,000 per episode (Chu, 2007c; Y.-H. Yeh, 2007; P1, personal communication, March 26, 2013, p.22). Virginia 
Liu believed that this figure is the highest among Taiwanese idol dramas ever sold to the market (P1, personal 
communication, March 26, 2013, p.22).  
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2012, pp.67-74). In summary, in both demographics and dramatic genres, in a narrow sense, the 
light comedy of idol dramas differs significantly from the tragic genres of South Korean dramas.  
The Taiwanese heyday in Japan took place between 2005 and 2007. According to the study 
of Yi-Yun Li (2007, p.5), idol drama from Taiwan almost formed a large phenomenon in 2005 and 
2006. Kawamura (2011) believes that 2006 was the best year of Taiwanese idol drama in Japan. 
In October 2007, Tsai Yueh-Hsun’s White Tower was aired on NHK’s BS channel, reaching the 
Japanese climax of idol drama (Chu, 2007c). After that, even F4’s bankability quickly decreased. 
But although their popularity decreased, the Japanese tourist business became interested in co-
operating with idol dramas.64 The idol drama industry began to shoot in Japanese cities, such as 
Honey and Clover (2008), Alice in Wonder City (2012) (Chi, 2011; CTS, 2012; S3, personal 
communication, Jan 25, 2013, pp.20-21).65 
The interaction mainly involved trading programmes and intellectual property between 
Taiwanese and Japanese media in the 1990s and 2000s. The trades have been asymmetric with 
Japanese export to Taiwan more than the other way round. The Taiwanese consumptions of 
Japanese media culture (even including multiple ways of adaptation) were mainly one-
dimensional. Production interaction between Japanese and Taiwanese TV hardly existed. Idol 
drama Mars (2004), co-produced by Chai and Tsai, employed Japanese production technicians 
and shot some scenes in Japan (EP2, personal communication, Feb 23, 2013, p.3). This was one 
of the rare technical interactions during the 2000s decade.  
Japan did not change its attitude towards Taiwan when its media culture was actively 
embraced by the new Taiwanese generation in the 1990s and even 2000s. In the 1990s, some 
Japanese media companies tried to expand the overseas market when they were aware of their 
popularity, but the Japanese collective perception towards East Asia influenced its East Asian 
strategy. Koichi Iwabuchi (2002, p.11) argues that the Japanese media business in general had 
a “condescending” attitude towards Taiwan and many East Asian areas. After a few setbacks in 
co-operation (Ibid, p.109), its major foreign business returned to exports. Japanese entertainment 
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 A local TV station in Ehime Prefecture reported the Japanese filming of Alice in Wonder City. This news indicates that 
the Japanese local society was interested in taking advantage of the influence of Taiwanese idol drama in East Asia for 
the promotion of tourist spots in the prefecture. The news clip is available at 
http://v.youku.com/v_show/id_XMzk4ODkxMTY4.html [Accessed 19 August 2016]. 
65
 A number of scenes in Honey and Clover and Alice in Wonder City were filmed in Japan’s Kagawa Prefecture and 




programmes also had a number of satellite channels by the late 1990s on Taiwanese cable TV. 
In the late 1990s and early 2000s, Japanese TV made a profit from the Taiwanese market by 
providing TV programmes to TV channels that specialised in broadcasting programmes relating 
to aspects of Japanese culture: Videoland Japan Channel, Bo-Shin Japan Channel, Gold-Sun TV 
Channel and JET (Ibid, pp.139-141). JET (Japanese Entertainment Television) was founded by 
Sumitomo Trading Co., Ltd. in partnership with TBS (Tokyo Broadcasting System), the key nation-
wide TV station of JNN, in 1997 (Ibid, p.123). It was headquartered in Singapore and covered 
Taiwan, Hong Kong, Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines (Ibid).  
This relationship slightly changed in the 2010s. In the 2010s, this export mode via regional 
satellite TV no longer worked well. JET ended airing Japanese TV programmes in 2010, which 
reportedly was due to its Japanese TV programmes being less popular than South Korean TV 
dramas and Taiwanese domestic dramas (M.-T. Cheng, 2010). Its end might also be because the 
Internet had replaced satellite TV to become the most important medium for young audiences, 
especially urban youngsters and university students – the most faithful overseas audience of 
Japanese TV dramas. They have mainly watched unauthorised fan translations of Japanese TV 
dramas on the Internet (Hu, 2005; 2012; 2014). 
The Japanese media turned to Taiwan again also because of its uncertain political relations 
with the PRC during the 2000s decade (B2, personal communication, Feb 26, 2013, p.5; P1, 
personal communication, March 26, 2013, p.8; Shang, 2014a). 66  Between 2005 and 2010, 
Japanese political relations with the PRC worsened due to the escalation of the long-standing 
territorial dispute. Large-scale anti-Japanese protests, demonstrations and boycotts happened in 
the PRC in 2005, 2010 and 2012 (Cody, 2005; Ramzy, 2010; Johnson and Shanker, 2012). 
Compared to South Korean success in the PRC, Japanese media could not operate well in the 
PRC and turned to Taiwan (Shang, 2014a). Although the Taiwanese government also has had 
disputes among the islands with Japan, it has pragmatically encouraged economic and cultural 
interactions between Taiwan and Japan. Thus Taiwanese economic relation with Japan has been 
steady (Sahashi, 2014). 
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 Virginia Liu commented that the relationship between PRC and Japan has been bad so that Taiwanese TV drama 
companies interest Japanese companies which would seek co-operations with Taiwanese companies in the East Asian 
market expansion of the Japanese companies (P1, personal communication, March 26, 2013, p.8). 
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Japanese media sensed the fading of its foreign influence at the end of the 2000s and early 
2010s, since when it has taken action in Taiwan actively. Japanese once again treated “Taiwan” 
as “a springboard to the PRC market” to increase Japanese competitive edge (Shang, 2014a). 
According to B2, Japanese companies have softened their attitudes towards Taiwan and been 
active in encouraging co-operations and even investing in idol drama (personal communication, 
Feb 26, 2013, p.3).  
A few Japanese TV companies have established Taiwanese branches. Nippon Television 
Network Corporation (NTV), the key nation-wide TV station of NNS, co-founded CNplus 
Production Co., a Taiwan-based drama production company, with Taiwan-based Chung Tian 
Satellite TV Station (CTI). NTV’s affiliated production company AX-ON and CNplus agreed to 
exchange production experience and co-produce TV programmes (Li, 2011). SPO Entertainment 
Co., a Japanese dealer of East Asian (mainly South Korean, Taiwanese and the PRC) TV 
dramas, co-founded with Taiwan-based Azio TV the Dafang Entertainment Production Co.67 
Dafang co-produced the idol drama Fabulous Boy in 2013 with Jerry Feng’s Comic International.68 
At the programming level, Taiwanese GTV and Japanese Epoch Entertainment co-funded 
Extravagant Challenge in 2011, which was previously mentioned for its casting of South Korean 
idol stars (B1, personal communication, Jan 31, 2013, p.2). NHK co-produced a TV music show 
with Taiwan-based TVBS, featuring the Japanese pop singer Fukuyama Masaharu and 
Taiwanese pop singing band Mayday in 2014. The TVBS stated clearly that it tried to learn from 
Japan (Yu, 2014). Another nation-wide network, Fuji TV, alongside its sub-station Kansai TV, shot 
a four-episode TV drama GTO Taiwan with Comic International being its local producer and GTV 
being its Taiwanese broadcaster in early 2014.69 Adaptation business continues. Jerry Feng 
produced Gangster’s Bakery (2014) and Tsai Yueh-Hsun is adapting Japanese manga Midnight 
Restaurant for TV drama (P2, personal communication, Feb 20, 2013, pp.11-12; B2, personal 
communication, Feb 26, 2013, p.2; Hung, 2016). 
Major Japanese talent agencies co-founded a talent agency, Creative Artist Japan (CAJ), 
which is headquartered in Japan and has two branches in Taiwan and the US. Its aim is to 
represent and promote Japanese artists, talents, actors, scriptwriters and directors, and art works 
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 Available at: http://www.spoinc.jp/company/taiwan-rerease20121206.pdf [Accessed 19 February 2013]. 
68
 Available at: http://www.spoinc.jp/company/taiwan-rerease20121206.pdf [Accessed 19 February 2013]. 
69
 Available at: http://www.gtv.com.tw/News/20140312001/ [Accessed 1 April 2016]. 
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to gain a place in the East Asian market.70 Its most important act was to link Comic International 
and GTV’s idol drama Gangster’s Bakery (2014) with Japanese actress Nagasawa Masami so 
far.71 Amuse Soft, a Japanese entertainment conglomerate with a talent management agency 
and a mass media content distribution business, is possibly one of the most active Japanese 
media companies expanding into overseas markets. Over the last few years, it has opened 
branches in South Korea, the PRC, Taiwan, etc. The Amuse Soft established the Amuse Taiwan 
in Taipei in May 2011.72 Its activities in Taiwan have been highly visible, receiving media attention. 
The company says its rationale is to “enter the Chinese-speaking countries via Taiwan” and it has 
a vision of Taiwan as a bridge for Japan and the Chinese-speaking East Asia on its official 
website.73 But its Taiwan Branch claims to not only promote Japanese artists in Taiwan, but also 
introduce Taiwanese mass media content back to Japan. Amuse Taiwan invested in the idol 
drama You Light up My Star (2014), which is analysed in chapter 6.3. It also introduced 
Taiwanese pop music band Mayday and TV drama writer and novelist Mag Hsu, to the Japanese 
market (Yang and Tu, 2013; Mei, 2015). 
These talent agencies have changed the scene of Taiwanese-Japanese talent exchange. 
Taiwanese media has had a few Japanese performers who are not famous in Japan but want to 
seek an opportunity to perform in the Chinese-language media industry, for instance, Fujioka 
Dean and Tanaka Chie (Yeh, 2006; Yang, 2009c; Mei, 2016). They usually play Japanese 
characters in Taiwanese media products which highlight Taiwan’s Japanese interaction.74 Since 
the foundation of CAJ and the Amuse Taiwan branch, well-known Japanese actors have 
participated in Taiwanese idol dramas either as cameo or leading performers, including 
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 Available at: http://www.caj-asia.com/ [Accessed 8 November 2014]. 
71
 Available at: http://www.caj-asia.com/work/ [Accessed 1 April 2016]. 
72
 Hatanaka Tatsuro, the president of Amuse Soft Entertainment, stated officially in June 2012 that it will be expanding 
into East Asia via the Taiwanese office. Available at: http://ir.amuse.co.jp/english/company/message.html [Accessed 14 
March 2013]. 
73
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 Fujioka Dean was a talent represented by Angie Chai and consequently appeared in Chai’s idol drama works, such as 
Corner with Love (2007), Miss No Good (2008). Tanaka Chie was most known for her performance in film Cape No. 7 
(2008). She also played the female lead in Virginia Liu’s idol drama work Because of You (2010). Their characters in the 
idol dramas have Japanese backgrounds (Yeh, 2006; Yang, 2009c; Mei, 2016). 
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Fukuyama Masaharu, Nagasawa Masami and Hiraoka Yuta respectively in You Light up My Star 
(2014), Gangster’s Bakery (2014) and Once Upon a Time in Beitou (2014) (NTDTV, 2013; Li, 
2014, p.6; Shang, 2014a). These dramas’ production budgets could reach NT$4-5 million 
(£80,000-100,000) per 70-min episode (Hsiao, 2014, p.30; Li, 2014, p.6). 
4.3 Conclusion 
This chapter has traced the inter-Asian packaging of the new Taiwanese TV drama makers since 
2001 until the present day. The development of idol drama and its practices are applicable to the 
theory of Raymond Williams (1982) reviewed in chapter 2. Symbolic creators are confined by the 
political economy (Taiwanese politics and regional geo-politics) and dominant conventions of their 
production environment (the domination of Japanese and South Korean TV dramas in the market 
and the ethnic Chinese cultural business route in the region) alongside their embedded 
consciousness (post-colonial engagement with Japan and production of media culture in 
standardised Chinese setting, etc.). 
Those inter-Asian packagers have operated within a dynamical hierarchy of pop culture 
popularity in the regional market which has very much determined their practices. In general, the 
dynamic pecking order is constituted by media industries based in different East Asian countries 
and refers to their popular appeal in the female market of dramas. In the 1990s, the most popular 
TV dramas among women in their teens and twenties were from Japan. But later, since 2005, the 
South Korean media culture has topped the market demographics of many countries, attracting 
both young and middle-aged women in many East Asian countries. The Taiwan-based idol drama 
has been at the middle level of the pecking order. This post-Sino-centric Taiwanese industry of 
female TV dramas has occurred in a laissez-faire home market (in terms of free import) and has 
opportunistically taken advantage of East Asian regionalised taste for its survival. It has faced the 
domination of Japanese and South Korean media in its target market but has created its own 
market share. 
The making of Meteor Garden was a perfect example of the pecking order dominated by the 
Japanese media. To attract domestic audiences, Meteor Garden adapted Japanese manga and 
emulated Japanese TV drama formats and the aesthetics of romantic genre and young good-
looking idol talents, a formula that proved workable in the market. The production and 
consumption of idol drama have been highly connected to the liberalisation and globalised media 
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flow in East Asia. Meteor Garden and its descendants can be seen as an outcome of the 
Taiwanese post-KMT, deregulated and fragmented media market and increasingly regionalised 
media consumption. It targeted young Taiwanese women and teenage girls in globalised, post-
Sino-centric and post-colonial Taiwan. As the Taiwanese media market was deregulated, 
domestic TV production took an export-oriented business model, relying on both domestic and 
foreign markets. The domestic and regional success of the idol drama signalled a competitive 
edge over the Taiwan TV industry. 
In terms of subject-matter, Meteor Garden spoke to many East Asian young women by 
mediating a set of more conservative gender and class values that were slightly different from its 
Japanese original. The idol drama harvested its initial regional success from a regional market 
that in return became interested in the post-colonial “Japanised” and Mandarin modernity, 
masculinity and femininity of post-KMT Taiwan. In terms of its imaginary world view, Taiwanese 
drama makers constructed and displayed a post-colonial and post-Sino-centric Mandarin-
speaking setting of urban Taiwan. Targeting young women, such hybridisation may be seen as 
an ambiguous response of female-focused media products towards Taiwanese nationalist 
politics. This is so, although idol drama showed no serious engagement with the hegemonic 
contestation between the political narratives of the KMT, the anti-KMT and even the CCP-PRC 
forces concerning Taiwan’s political future. 
This new celebrity-centred media genre has gradually been considered one of the best 
showcases for home-grown talents, consumer goods and tourist spots. It also became a new 
celebrity vehicle for Taiwanese media businesses. But the Taiwanese general public’s recognition 
of this industry seems to be conditional, in my own observation of the media and governments’ 
response to the idol drama. It seems that the industry must be helpful to domestic economy and 
function as a showcase for modern Taiwan. Nevertheless, in a similar way to the deregulated, 
globalised and regionalised post- (Sino-centric) national female consumption, this female-
oriented drama industry has also experienced a similar laissez-faire process. The inter-Asian 
packaging of the new Taiwanese TV dramas can be seen as a chain reaction to the liberalisation 
of the market and consumer’s choice. The industry has been free from state regulation, 
consequentially receiving little state protection (especially the control of foreign imports), apart 
from some opportunities, after 2003, to apply to win partial state subsidy. It can only survive by 
targeting the regionally shaped tastes of the female audiences of the regional market, including 
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Taiwan. It has walked onto a road that leads to opportunistic and more aggressive decentralised 
inter-Asian packaging and linkage with production materials and elements that will attract these 
audiences and benefit the industry. 
The idol drama industry developed in highly competitive markets, situated in a turbulent 
Taiwanese society fraught with political contestations (and homologous media ownership 
transition and contestation), lacking domestic funding and industrial production experiences, and 
incubating only a small pool of talents. Hence a few Taiwanese independent TV production 
companies have resorted to overseas market funding and employed popular foreign elements 
and talents, and other production means, in this production system which is characterised by 
flexibility and low-cost innovation. As Taiwanese TV production conditions worsened, the 
companies relied on overseas funding, the domestic commercial market and limited state subsidy 
to target Taiwanese and overseas markets. Again, in the middle of the pecking order, the 
companies have kept remediating regionally popular themes/elements from Japan and South 
Korea and have started incorporating elements of funding markets from South East Asia and the 
PRC. These activities seem very sporadic and non-systematic, quickly reacting to regional 
dynamism, and lacking in critical reflection and long-term strategy, echoing the argument about 
the Taiwanese response to globalisation as having “little luxury to ponder” and little chance to 
“take time inventing strategies” and thus accompanying “jitters, shocks, excitements and after-
effects” (Shih, 2003, p.147). The idol drama industry seems preoccupied with making a living and 
adapting to the changing domestic and regional market dynamics. 
In the introduction chapter and this chapter, the homologous relation of politics and media 
in terms of the transition from one Sino-centrism to dual nationalist competition appeared visibly 
at the level of TV in the 1990s and 2000s. The competition for TV (the foundation of cable TV 
and the contest for the Old Three’s ownership) between two Taiwanese nationalist groups was 
made under the conscious acts of politicians and media businessmen from both the KMT and 
DPP groups. But we only saw the ambiguous response of female-oriented idol drama which at 
first took forms such as post-colonial engagement with Japan in a standardised generic Chinese-
speaking setting, and, then, co-operations with media enterprises from particular countries. Idol 
drama is certainly not identical with politics but it is still tied by the political economy of Taiwan. 
Its inter-Asian connections with South East Asia, the PRC and Japan, did not go beyond 
conventional Taiwanese political relations and economic trade routes. In the framework of critical 
148 
 
approach to the relation of mass media and its society introduced in chapter 2, mass media 
conforms to and articulates dominant forces, maintaining the hegemony of dominant value 
systems and neglecting subordinated and marginal ones in terms of nation, class and gender. 
In the age of globalisation in East Asia, the mass media market is in an integration process which 
would more influentially be shaped by the value systems and media aesthetics of stronger and 
larger countries. This homogenisation not only takes place in consumption, but also 
subsequently in production. As a result, the media consumption and production of Taiwan that 
operates in a laissez-faire market is strongly influenced by larger external forces. The idol drama 
industry, which has never had a dominating status in the regional market, has had to submit to 
the funding markets’ wishes and demands. Some productions have become, again, 
conventional, and have sought safe dramas.  
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Chapter 5 Strategies, Constraints and Politics 
Chapter 4 argues that the inter-Asian packaging of idol drama is a new business model for the 
new generation of Taiwanese TV drama makers to build careers in the domestic and regional 
commercial female-oriented TV drama market dominated mainly by other East Asian (South 
Korean and Japanese) and also Hollywood media culture. This chapter examines the strategies 
of the TV drama producers in their inter-Asian packaging with an attention on the contestations 
and negotiations surrounding their work and how they strive for legitimacy in their industry. 
A question should be asked here: what is the main purpose of the idol drama industry? 
People in the industry would tell us that it ideally wants both commercial success and critical 
acclaim. Admittedly, professional reputation, prestige, production know-how and other skills 
(cultural capital and symbolic capital) are crucial, but these accumulations can never be done 
without the long-term accumulation and investment of economic capital. Apparently, the 
commercial success matters more than critical recognition and the packagers in the industry 
achieve this goal with their own strategies.  
In the Taiwanese TV market characterised by market liberalisation, fragmentation and 
recession, one of the safest ways to make money has been low-cost “commercial localism” – 
satisfying the domestic market with low-cost production. In the idol drama sector, this production 
strategy has been most successfully practised by Sanlih Entertainment Television Company 
(SET). Briefly mentioned in chapter 1.3.2, the SET is a domestic TV station that owns four satellite 
TV channels (SET-Taiwan, SET-Metro, SET-News, SET-International) and it is owned by a pro-
independence Taiwanese businessman Lin Kung-Hai who has a clear political stance (Chen, Yi 
and Kao, 2012). Since the end of 2001, when its first idol drama Lavender (2001) was aired on 
TTV, SET-Metro has produced idol dramas and sold them to the Old Three. As a TV station, it 
allots budgets to its productions with its advertisement income. It hence focuses on the domestic 
TV audience and is ruled by domestic TV ratings (Yu, 2012a, pp.28-30). 
Its idol drama is both apolitical and political. It is “apolitical” in the sense that SET also 
follows commercial rules to produce romantic love stories that do not have clear historical and 
social backgrounds and involve political issues (Yu, 2012a, pp.28-30; Maple, 2015a; b). Yet the 
SET’s romantic TV drama is “political” by way of its dominant use of domestic workers and the 
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indirect interpellation of an audience’s patriotism as SET does not co-produce TV dramas with 
the PRC or uses overseas performers (Hsiao, 2012; Tu, 2012a). 
Certainly, it is simplistic to argue that commercial localism is not concerned about foreign 
markets at all. Indeed, for SET, overseas revenue has been more of an extra luxury than 
necessity, whereas other idol drama production companies consider the overseas market as 
crucial (P2, personal communication, Feb 20, 2013, p.3; EP2, personal communication, Feb 23, 
2013, pp.2-4; P1, personal communication, March 26, 2013, pp.1-2; Chai, 2015 cited in Golden 
Bell Awards, 2015a). Yet, SET also tries to maximise profit by exporting dramas, though in general 
it is less urgent to do so. As Taiwanese TV continues to shrink, it also needs to export (Chen, Yi 
and Kao, 2012; Yu, 2012b; Hung, 2014a). 
Dictated to strongly by domestic TV ratings and scarce advertisement revenue, SET has 
been restrictive in resource allocation with a clear cost-profit margin. The budget control is so tight 
that SET avoids commercially risky dramas such as high-cost, challenging and non-profitable 
dramas. It tends to reproduce the most commercially proven formula – urban romantic comedy 
(Yu, 2012a, p.30). SET also copies Japanese and South Korean TV dramas that are successful 
in the Taiwanese market (F.-c. I. Yang, 2013). It has done this in the most economical manner, 
e.g. plagiarism – reworking successful drama plots instead of purchasing adaptation rights from 
their holders (Mao, 2010).  
The main language of SET’s idol drama is still Mandarin. Yet it has a high percentage of 
Hokkien – the language used by the Hoklo Taiwanese ethnicity, compared to the idol dramas 
produced by independent companies that operate at regional scale. It helps mediate the local 
identity by fitful use of language uttered by comedic supporting roles. SET’s idol drama usually 
has “sweet-grass figures” (comic sidekick) – characters that are meant for humour which relies 
on ethnicity-based common sense and are usually ethnically benshengren (F.-c. I. Yang, 2013, 
p.1085). In general, SET’s principles are a domestic cast, elements and funding, and a 
standardised formula.  
According to scriptwriter S5 (personal communication, Feb 12, 2013, p.24) that has worked 
for SET, SET is a big company so that it has been conservative and mainly produced safe dramas. 
S5 argues that running media companies and a TV station demands seniority and economic 
capital, and Taiwanese TV managers and production company bosses tend to be senior men. 
The senior male managers judge market demand with statistic reports and tend to adopt 
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previously successful value-laden plots (Yu, 2012a, pp.28-30). In the mind-set of SET, idol 
dramas should be romantic and in pursuit of individual happiness in a private world. They should 
not touch subject-matter such as the greater common good and grand political narrative (Yu, 
2012a, p.30; b, pp.26-28; Wu, 2013). Stories dealing with the negative aspects of capitalist society 
are not welcome in SET, which requests its producers and writers to avoid marginal social 
identities, hard topics and social agendas. 
Moreover, the male managers in SET also tend to reproduce stereotypical gender ideas 
and values, instead of observing and addressing new female demands (Yu, 2012a; b). Writers in 
SET have been struggling with its stereotypical gender values. According to S5 (personal 
communication, Feb 12, 2013, pp.9-10), a male senior TV manager of SET, whom she worked 
with, seemingly holds a simplistic and stereotypical perception towards women. He once asked a 
scriptwriter (S5’s colleague) to follow his idea in a plot in which the male protagonist succeeds in 
winning the female protagonist’s heart by “reserving a whole restaurant”. He believes that women 
are materialistic and a man can win their hearts quite simply by showing his wealth and buying 
them material possessions and physical comfort. The writer found it difficult to follow his idea 
rooted in simplistic and outdated perception about women because she thought that the plotting 
would not persuade the female audiences of idol drama. S5 and her colleague believe that their 
idol drama audience would appreciate spiritual values more than material comfort and much more 
buy into a story in which man and woman form a relationship naturally and spontaneously in 
interaction. S5 and her colleague often experience similar situations. But it is very difficult for them 
to persuade their male boss. In general, the manager decides. They can choose to either leave 
or stay in the project. S5 usually stays and tries to play games with his ideas: 
I usually choose to listen to him (the manager) but I can also be a little rebellious. For instance, 
if he (the manager) wants a restaurant scene, I will give him a restaurant scene. However, the 
things that happen within it will definitely not be expected by the manager… I always want to 
overcome (his orders and ways of thinking). If I get caught by him and he insists that I follow his 
directions, I would give up and think: “Okay! (You can do whatever you like.) This female 
character can fall in love with this guy in the restaurant!” I usually take the restaurant scene as 
what the male character would like to do for the female character. However, I believe that the 
female character will not react the way the male would like her to in this setting. I always struggle 
with this process… I try to divert away from his (the manager) direction... This seems like he (the 
manager) is giving a puzzle to solve and I’m taking it on as a challenge. (S5, personal 
communication, Feb 12, 2013, p.10) 
 
The commercial localism represented by SET, as introduced, leads to low-cost production, 
content standardisation and the reproduction of local patriarchal values and stereotypical ideas 
towards women. The commercial localism has been domestically successful (Hung, 2014a). SET 
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reached its peak time when its idol drama Fated to Love You (2008) obtained the highest TV 
ratings in the history of idol drama (Alexandri, 2008; Cheng, 2011). In the long run, SET will have 
a monopoly in the domestic market of idol drama, defeating the drama workers who do not agree 
with SET’s strategy. By that time SET will control and determine the production of idol dramas in 
Taiwan, setting conditions for the inter-Asian packaging I am going to analyse. The production 
companies that have their own production orientations have tried to survive in their own ways. 
They have not preferred a low-cost approach and they have attempted to develop the know-how 
of diverse genres and build up expertise. Other producers have prioritised their own personal 
expression. The producers that do not side with SET need to take advantage of overseas revenue 
and compete with each other for TV ratings, short-term profits, long-term development, 
acknowledgement and reputation in Taiwanese market. 
This chapter analyses four inter-Asian packaging strategies that are opposed to the 
commercial localism represented by SET. They are represented by four idol drama production 
companies and their head producers: Virginia Liu of Power Generation Entertainment; Tsai Yueh-
Hsun of Prajna Works; Jerry Feng (Comic International) in affiliation with GTV; and Angie Chai 
(Comic Ritz). They have owned their personal production companies which have provided 
dramas to Taiwanese TV stations. This chapter examines their creative strategies’ advantages 
and constraints as well as the criticisms surrounding them. In short, they actively seek resources 
and alliances in the region. They interact with foreign buyers during story construction. Doing so, 
they are relatively free from the domestic TV station’s budgetary constraint, but they cannot 
compete with commercial localism which attracts audiences with local elements in the domestic 
market. Although their strategies have contributed to the heterogeneity and diversification of idol 
dramas, there have been controversies surrounding them concerning the economic feasibility and 
cultural validity of the strategies. 
 
5.1 Narrative Inter-Asian Drama 
Inter-Asian packaging does not necessarily mean inter-Asian depiction on screen; a Chinese-
language TV drama may cast South Korean actors for ethnic Chinese roles. My term of “narrative 
inter-Asian dramas” refers to the TV dramas that engage two or more East Asian cultures, in 
particular those consciously making cross-cultural dialogues. They not only use foreign casts but 
153 
 
also have inter-Asian depictions. Such works are usually called “cross-cultural film” in East Asian 
film studies for their depictions of cross-cultural relations (Hitchcock, 2002; Hyland, 2002; K.-C. 
Lo, 2005; 2014; Yeh, 2010a; Dasgupta, 2013). The narrative inter-Asian dramas are usually less 
commercially profitable for difficulties in shooting and scripting as well as lower interests from 
mainstream audience so that Taiwanese idol drama industry has had only a small number of such 
dramas, as I have mentioned in the beginning of the thesis, citing Peter Ho-sun Chan. It may be 
argued that, so far, these productions have commonly occurred when production companies 
intended to obtain a professional reputation in the industry. With the accumulation of reputation 
(symbolic capital), a production company can earn calls and work opportunities from TV stations 
for long-term business and economic capital. For instance, a narrative inter-Asian drama Letter 
1949 penned by scriptwriter S3 developed from the purpose of its production company – Eastern 
Shine Production Co. – to pursue international reputation. 
Letter 1949 is a TV drama that Eastern Shine made for recognition. They (Eastern Shine) let me 
know that they, at the beginning, knew that the drama would not have very high commercial profit. 
They will produce other dramas to balance their commercial imperative. Their aim in Letter 1949 
was to produce a quality product. They intended to build the company’s quality of production 
skills or capability of producing quality drama in this project. Eastern Shine’s capability was 
recognised in an overseas market – the PRC – because of the drama. (S3, personal 
communication, Jan 25, 2013, p.19) 
 
Similarly, Virginia Liu developed Asian Trilogy to establish a brand name at the beginning of her 
drama career. According to EP1 (personal communication, July 24, 2013, p.2), the Asian Trilogy 
was a promoting strategy – a name-making practice when Liu’s company just began. Because 
the strategy prioritises critical acclaim over short-term profit, commercial production companies 
have seldom adopted it as a main strategy – but they do so occasionally. I observed that Liu’s 
company has produced more narrative inter-Asian dramas than any other production companies. 
In this section I will use her as a case study to illustrate the strategy and its constraints. 
Virginia Liu probably was the first producer who self-labelled with “Asia”.75 On Liu’s company 
introduction, she identifies her company as a Taiwan-based show business brand based in 
Taiwan, “aiming at all entertainment-related business in Asia, to ultimately worldwide”.76 Liu thinks 
that an idol drama producer tends to be and must be more borderless (compared to other labour 
divisions in a production team): 
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 Although Meteor Garden packaged Taiwanese and Japanese elements and its sequel cast a Singapore-based actress, 
its two producers Angie Chai and Jerry Feng did not hold clear regional plans. 
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 Available at: http://www.pgestar.com/about.php [Accessed 6 October 2015]. 
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“Producer” is more borderless…I have had many contacts with (business in) many countries for 
the performer talents I represent. The main reason is that I am running an independent company 
so that most of the times I must stand at the front line to make contacts. (P1, personal 
communication, March 26, 2013, p.5) 
 
This strategy is related to her personal background and work experience. Liu comes from a 
waishengren family and has been educated in a westernised environment: 
(Choosing inter-Asian packaging) is related to my family background. My parents were both very 
well-educated in their generation. My father studied in the US. He was familiar with Western 
culture which I have contacted since young. To be honest, I do not know much about local 
culture77…I studied in Christian college for secondary school. My education was very Western. 
My personal growth was not very local. (P1, personal communication, March 26, 2013, pp.4-5) 
 
Her career began in the 1980s when the Old Three dominated Taiwanese TV. She worked 
for a Taiwan-based media tycoon Ge Fu-Hong who has had very good regional connections. Ge 
has been active in the Taiwanese entertainment business since the 1980s. She started as a TV 
producer at the Old Three and has gradually owned several important Taiwanese entertainment 
companies, such as Fulong Production Co. and Azio Satellite TV Station, etc. (He, 2012). Her 
regional career covers talent agency and TV business. She has represented many Taiwanese 
actors who usually work at regional scale, in particular Kaneshiro Takeshi, Lin Chi-Ling, and F4 
(He, 2012). She has good regional connections with, in particular, Hong Kong and Japanese 
business (Tsai, 2005, p.102). She once represented the South Korean idol group Super Junior in 
the Mandarin-speaking media market (Yeh, 2011). Ge encouraged Liu to forge links with foreign 
media industries.  
My ex-employer Ge Fu-Hong commonly requested us to stay in contact with foreign 
businesses…Long time ago she had arranged us to visit Fuji TV (Japan), hoping that we did not 
fall behind in terms of production skills. (P1, personal communication, March 26, 2013, p.5) 
Later, working in the Mandarin pop music industry as a talent agent, Liu has had many interactions 
with Japanese and Hong Kong TV, film and pop music since the 1980s. As a pop music idol band 
producer, she introduced American-born ethnic Chinese hip hop band LA Boys to debut in Taiwan 
in the early 1990s. When she started her drama career, she still preferred inter-Asian operation 
(P1, personal communication, March 26, 2013, pp.2-3). 
As a commercial media producer, for reference and appropriation Liu has usually interacted 
with the advanced media industries in Hong Kong, Japan and South Korea whose media products 
attract her own target audience (P1, personal communication, March 26, 2013, pp.2-3). For Liu, 
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 The term “local culture” that Liu used here mainly refers to the ethnic culture of the benshengren (Hoklo) Taiwanese – 
opposite to the waishengren’s culture. 
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inter-Asian drama packaging is to enhance the TV industry in Taiwan. She developed Asian 
Trilogy to improve her drama-making skill by co-operating with advanced industries. Witnessing 
that idol drama was able to go to the regional markets, she pondered that maybe through such 
productions she could make better links with the outer world (P1, personal communication, March 
26, 2013, p.2). Conducting inter-Asian packaging, she hoped that technological interactions 
could, on the one hand, take the dramas to the regional world and, on the other, bring in the 
production know-how of those advanced media centres to her TV industry (P1, personal 
communication, March 26, 2013, p.2).  
Liu received positive support from Hong Kong, Japan and South Korea. Her Asian Trilogy 
interested Warner Music Hong Kong Branch. “This project was not very Taiwanese so it (Warner 
Music HK) supported” (P1, personal communication, March 26, 2013, pp.3-4). Her first inter-Asian 
idol drama Tomorrow (2002) adapted Japanese manga Asunaro White Paper (1992-1993) by 
Saimon Fumi. Liu added more border-crossing elements in the adaptation by constructing a 
protagonist who was born to a Taiwanese mother and Japanese father, grew up in Hong Kong 
and Taiwan and later studied in Japan. To promote the drama, Liu also invited the Japanese 
original manga creator to visit Taiwan (Liu, 2002).  
Tomorrow was a commercial success and as a result Liu obtained more space and financial 
resources to further her plan (Liu, 2003a; Wu, 2003a). She wanted to co-produce with the South 
Korean TV industry and received positive feedback from Media Banker, a South Korean company 
(P1, personal communication, March 26, 2013, p.3). The company was led by Kim Seong Nyeol, 
a South Korean media entrepreneur who worked in Hong Kong as a senior representative of 
Korean Broadcasting System (KBS) International. The South Korean producer “also had been 
contacting Hong Kong (media industry) and also thought that the concept of pan-Asia was very 
good” (P1, personal communication, March 26, 2013, p.3). With his mediation, Liu tried to interest 
KBS in co-producing her second work Scent of Love (2003), and with that aim she incorporated 
more cultural features to attract the South Korean funder, staff and cast. Liu also put in many 
South Korean elements, such as an old folk melody (“Five Hundred Years of Regret”), and drew 
on the history of East Asian filmic and artistic interactions (P1, personal communication, March 
26, 2013, pp.12-13).  
However, KBS turned her down as it was in an administrative transition due to the year’s 
presidential election outcome. Hence, Liu’s team completed the shooting by raising extra funds 
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from the South East Asian market (Liu, 2003a; b). The Asian Trilogy was planned to have three 
serial dramas. Liu planned that the third TV drama would be based on Turn Right Turn Left, a 
picture book created by Taiwanese writer Ji Mi, but she was forced to give up as the adaptation 
right was purchased by a third party (P1, personal communication, March 26, 2013, p.2). After 
the suspension of Asian Trilogy, even though Liu did not label her more recent idol dramas with 
“Asia”, most of the dramas had Japanese elements. Honey and Clover (2008) was an adaptation 
of the Japanese manga of the same title and was shot partly in Kagawa, Japan (Chi, 2011). 
Adapting the manga was a safer way to take the Japanese market but Liu also liked it very much 
for its adult reflection on youth (P1, personal communication, March 26, 2013, p.6). Because of 
You (2010) cast Tanaka Chie, a Japanese actress working in Taiwanese film and TV, as the 
female lead (Yang, 2009c). Her latest idol drama Home (2012) staged a Taiwanese medical 
soldier’s trajectory between three political forces in Taiwan and mainland China during 1945-1949 
(the ending moment of WWII and the Chinese Civil War). She decided to narrate from the 
viewpoint of a benshengren (Hoklo) Taiwanese protagonist who interacts with KMT soldiers and 
CCP soldiers and maintains distance from the nationalists (P1, personal communication, March 
26, 2013, p.6). 
Among the four inter-Asian packagers introduced in this chapter, Liu is closest to the pole 
of personal expression, in my observation. She is a hyphenated worker – both producer and head 
writer in her TV dramas. 
I treat every TV drama a work of mine…In commercial cultural production, this is not practical. 
Yet…spending so much time and efforts on these works, I still hope to input my ideas in them. 
(P1, personal communication, March 26, 2013, pp.7-8) 
 
Although Liu works in a commercial system, she does not give formulaic stories. She likes to 
dramatise various cross-cultural interactions. Her dramas have had many elements, talents and 
settings, including Hong Kong, Japan, the PRC and South Korea. She does not have a particular 
nationalist standpoint and address the mainstream sentiments and tastes of local audiences in 
Taiwan that have been cultivated by commercial localism. Her TV dramas, consequently, failed 
commercially because they are much more personal, unique and complex. She can only attract 
a niche audience group that likes complex dramas (P1, personal communication, March 26, 2013, 
pp.7-8; EP1, personal communication, July 24, 2013, p.2). 
Apart from time-consuming negotiation, another difficulty of narrative inter-Asian dramas 
was technological. Foreign casting usually brings technical troubles in the presentation. Poor 
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presentation of the actors would cause cognitive dissonance in the audiences and discourage 
them. Take Scent of Love, for instance. Arranging South Korean actors and actresses who do not 
speak Mandarin fluently in a Taiwanese idol drama is very troublesome (P1, personal 
communication, March 26, 2013, pp.16-17; Chai, 2015 cited in Golden Bell Awards, 2015a). At 
that time when Scent of Love was produced, South Korean TV dramas were dubbed into 
Mandarin on local TV (Kim, 2005, p.195). Local Taiwanese audiences were not familiar with 
Korean language, so including a large proportion of South Korean language in Scent of Love 
might discourage them. Liu decided to assign all South Korean characters some Mandarin-
speaking background. But because of the commercial pressure to increase sales, she chose 
South Korean actors who had better market value. However, as they did not speak Mandarin, she 
dubbed them in Scent of Love and left only a minimum percentage of Korean-speaking scenes 
(P1, personal communication, March 26, 2013, pp.16-17). This decision might draw her drama 
closer to Taiwanese local mass audiences, yet, in general the narrative that constantly shifts 
between two countries is quite difficult for a mass audience. Liu’s executive producer reflected on 
his work experience and said that mainstream Taiwanese audiences felt distance towards her 
works. 
Based on my experiences over the last few years, the mainstream Taiwanese audience holds a 
strong feeling of detachment towards the domestic dramas casting foreign (Japanese, South 
Korean or Hong Kong) actors. Taiwanese TV audience like to sense a “buddy, buddy” feeling in 
the dramas...another problem is dubbing…Humans still rely on ear and voice when they are 
emotionally touched… (EP1, personal communication, July 24, 2013, p.3) 
 
 
Respecting Counterpart’s Sentiments 
An inter-Asian TV drama packaging is an ensemble formed of different national participants. The 
participants need to negotiate over many issues, in particular historiography, political facts and 
world views. Writing or talking on the history of East Asia is itself a “political practice” for the 
region’s historical entanglement and contemporary conflicts (Sun, 2000a; b). This would also 
discourage mass audiences. Not all people – including TV workers – are familiar with and 
interested in inter-Asian interaction in the drama. Moreover, this type of depiction could be 
controversial, conflicting, time-consuming and very challenging even if it is well-rounded. It could 
enflame a real national political issue (Ota, 2004, pp.85-86). 
Liu conducted her “political practice” in the making of Scent of Love. As the drama links 
together the traditional East Asian concept of reincarnated destiny and the historical and 
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contemporary ties of Taiwan and South Korea, she had to address the South Korean people’s 
dominant attitude towards Japan. The main issue of Scent of Love was that Liu came up with a 
plot that could be considered unthinkable in South Korea. The drama revolves around the love 
between a Taiwanese man and a South Korean woman, whose previous reincarnations are a 
Japanese imperial soldier and an engaged Korean woman during WWII. The two societies’ 
different historiographies and attitudes towards Japanese colonialism have been argued by 
Soyoung Kim (2008, p.196) as a consequence of the pre-colonial and post-colonial histories in 
South Korea and Taiwan. After Japanese colonial rule, South Korean society continued to view 
Japan as its national foe and the South Korean government administered an anti-Japan policy, 
prohibiting cultural imports from Japan. The romance between a Korean woman and a Japanese 
imperial soldier was still unthinkable in contemporary South Korean media products. But Taiwan 
entered another highly suppressive political power structure of the KMT from mainland China. 
Consequently, it changed its attitude and even felt nostalgia towards the Japanese rule (Kim, 
2008). The relative distance from KMT’s Sino-centrism and Chinese nationalism has made the 
Taiwanese depart from “unitary national narrative” to micro history and the myriad history of 
individuals, including those of wartime Japan (Chang, 2010, p.111). They do not necessarily see 
every Japanese individual as absolutely evil. The Taiwanese media makers of the 2000s treated 
the Japanese element as a handy and cliché plotting resource in their narration of the Taiwanese 
future, argued by Sharon Chialan Wang (2009, p.247). 
Liu’s South Korean adviser, Lee Hee Woo, a senior South Korean scriptwriter, suggested to 
her that in order to go more easily in South Korea, the drama ought to end tragically in the present-
day and historical storyline (P1, personal communication, March 26, 2013, pp.13-14). Liu agreed 
with the suggestion and also thought that the arrangement made sense. Liu was aware of the 
South Koreans’ anti-Japanese sentiment. But the WWII story for her was imaginable. She thought 
that a sad ending could appease the South Korean sentiment. 
The Koreans objected such thing to happen: the (Japanese-Korean) romance was forbidden at 
that time (in Korea). Thus we presented a tragic wartime romance: this was a love relationship 
unaccepted by the society and family. (This was the main reason for the tragedy in the present-
day storyline). They told me that (this would make the drama to be released and be accepted in 





Dramatic consideration encouraged her to agree with him, too. She thought that tragic feelings 
stayed in people’s minds much longer than happy ending (P1, personal communication, March 
26, 2013, p.20). 
However, Liu had a few market dilemmas. She appeased South Korean anti-Japan 
sentiment but the plotting suppressed the Taiwanese female audience’s inclination to see happy 
endings. She tried to appeal to the inclination through the subject-matter of reincarnation; the 
heroine leaves the Taiwanese hero in this life for her destiny, but she promises the hero that she 
will reunite with him in their next life. This life ends sadly but their next life will have a happy ending 
(He, 2004). 
To understand the Taiwanese domestic response, I collected four newspaper posts from 
Taiwanese audiences expressing their fondness for the drama while asking their questions about 
it (Chi, 2003; Denlison, 2004; Huan, 2004; Lin, 2004). All of these Taiwanese audiences praised 
the beautiful production of Scent of Love. Yet they seemed to treat it as an ordinary melodrama 
and wondered why the protagonists could not have a happy ending. These Taiwanese audiences 
seemed to understand the subject-matter of reincarnated destiny, but they complained about the 
protagonists’ lack of agency to fight against destiny. One audience wondered why the Taiwanese 
hero’s ending was so fateful and why he must bear the predestined burden. 
I think that the male protagonist was a bit pitiful. How can the heroine forget their promise but he 
must carry his vow? This was a bit unfair. The hero sacrificed his previous life during the war but 
also has to pay for his previous life’s promise in the current (reincarnated) life… (Chi, 2003) 
 
Another audience member spoke from a critic’s viewpoint and commented on his/her blog 
that the drama carries so many messages that it is complicated and confusing (pip, 2004). He/she 
also wondered why it has a tragic ending and thought that the death of the heroine did not make 
sense (pip, 2004). None of these Taiwanese feedbacks associated the tragic end as being caused 
by South Korean influence. As chapter 2 indicated, different imagined worlds formed by official 
patriarchal nationalist discourses might contradict each other. Scent of Love seemingly 
experienced a “negotiated or resistant reading” in the Taiwanese market in Stuart Hall’s term. In 
his influential theoretical model of encoding/decoding, Hall (1980, pp.168-169) notes that media 
as a meaningful discourse presumes a match between encoding and decoding sides. The 
decoder-audience shall be in an ideal reading position preferred by the encoder-producer so as 
to understand and enjoy a media product. Resistant reading (e.g. misunderstanding) would take 
place if an individual, whose ethno-cultural-social structural position is very different and distant 
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from the preferred position, misinterprets the media product. The lack of equivalence between the 
two sides is the main reason for the misunderstanding. Scent of Love’s primary decoder was 
presumably a South Korean; the Taiwanese were not designed as primary decoders. Thus it is 
also difficult for a Taiwanese audience to understand the narrative in Scent of Love. Moreover, 
they generated negotiating or even resistant reading. 
Scent of Love was not appealing to Taiwanese people because of its complicated 
signification and ideological articulation of Taiwanese and South Korean mainstream sentiments. 
A question should be raised here. Why did the Taiwanese audience want a happy ending in the 
story? The first factor was their resistance against fatalism, against the East Asian traditional way 
of thinking and instead wishing to see an agency that could break the predestined curse. This 
was related to the fact that the audiences of idol dramas had been living in a more westernised 
social cultural environment that encouraged individual agency. The second reason was probably 
also connected to the Taiwanese post-colonial attitude towards Japan, characterised by a lack of 
anti-Japan sentiment. They might not treat the drama as a political text when watching it. In other 
words, this drama is a site where post-colonial Taiwanese people (both producers and consumers) 
encountered post-colonial South Korean nationalism. I argue that there are two types of audience 
that might understand better why the drama has a sad ending: those who are familiar with the 
theme of reincarnated fatalism and those who understand the South Korean attitude towards 
Japan. This explains why Scent of Love was a commercial failure in the Taiwanese market due 
to its narrow audience base. Those who liked this drama tended to be more elderly and thoughtful 
thinkers. 
Liu admits that her personal orientation is very different from most audiences in Taiwan (EP1, 
personal communication, March 26, 2013, pp.14-17). Reflecting her previous dramas, including 
Scent of Love, Liu concludes that her dramas are more her own expressions than carefully 
calculated market-driven works. Liu admits that many idol drama audiences probably do not 
appreciate her dramas. These dramas can attract mostly audiences who are similar to her. 
I think that my company’s dramas are not for teenagers. They probably cannot understand these 
dramas…Scent of Love is a drama for adults. I met some people who like the drama. One of my 
friends told me that she talked about Scent of Love when going to Sotheby’s (in Hong Kong). An 
auctioneer at Sotheby’s loves that drama very much. I responded by saying “that’s bad! It means 





The sarcastic reflection seemed to prove that the Asian Trilogy, which was related to a Hong Kong 
transnational company, indeed had attracted at least a cultural elite in Hong Kong. This exactly 
indicates the purpose of Liu’s inter-Asian packaging. Liu’s executive producer EP1 echoes her 
reflection and comments about her uniqueness:  
Power Generation Entertainment’s central spirit is that our dramas do not appeal to the 
mainstream taste that has been fed with sensationalism; we don’t make ordinary things. Over 
these years, we have made dramas that brought some challenges…with quite pioneering 
approaches. Although they have not had good ratings but they have received good 
acclaims…Our cast have not been just Taiwanese actors. We have transnational cast...We hope 
to bring new things…Our company has established a brand image of making thought-provoking 
and complex TV dramas...In summary, the outcomes of a production company really depend on 




5.2 Global Culture Production 
Generally, Virginia Liu has not gained in terms of Taiwanese TV ratings that are addressed and 
cultivated by commercial localism from SET. Nor has she formed a strong competition to SET. 
Yet, she has pursued realisation of her own vision in the field of idol drama. Witnessing the non-
feasibility of inter-Asian narrative of Liu’s dramas in the commercial market, the producers who 
are more concerned about practicality, such as Tsai Yueh-Hsun, have avoided adopting this 
strategy in their idol drama making. The Meteor Garden director, born in 1968, became a director-
producer in four idol dramas and two films (Tung, 2007). Previously working as an actor and off-
screen film-maker since late 1980s, Tsai witnessed the crisis of Taiwanese film industry and is 
very eager to break technical ground in Taiwanese TV drama industry to produce genres that are 
beyond the limits of the Taiwanese local TV market.  
I feel that I am in a race, trying to catch up very hard. The Western TV dramas…I cannot even 
see them in my horizon. (Tsai, 2006 cited in Eslite Reader, 2006, p.56) 
 
He is keen on accumulating skills and know-how of different types of commercial productions. To 
his mind, the commercial and artistic sectors of drama making feed each other. Commercial 
productions are in the outer concentric circles that would financially support the artistic creations 
in the inner circles (Tsai, 2012). Seeing the production conditions of Taiwanese commercial TV 
industry deteriorating, he identifies himself strategically as a commercial worker and pays close 
attention to audience demand in order to rebuild a good commercial system (Chiu, 2009; 2012). 
I am not an auteur director. I consider market and audience. (Tsai, 2012) 
 
You cannot merely think that “I want to do it in this way”. You must consider the audience…their 
capability to understand, their feeling and the reasons for which they would accept your works or 




But unlike the commercially conservative SET, Tsai’s target audience is beyond the conventional 
female fans of romantic idol dramas and he has successfully attracted them with medical and 
action dramas.  
The most different thing between me and the rest of the industry has been that I do not use 
number and money to assess what I do and its effect. If you judge what I have done over the last 
few years in term of money, they could not have been done or hardly been done as they have 
been risky. (P2, personal communication, Feb 20, 2013, p.13) 
 
These dramas have been the specialty of Hollywood and other more advanced media industries 
in the world because they demand more money and advanced narrative skills. Making them is 
particularly challenging for the Taiwanese TV drama industry. For the funding issues, he has 
taken advantage of the regional market for these more expensive drama projects. 
The Taiwanese TV drama industry has confined its productions to young adult romance or urban 
love stories. It has not dared to produce police action genre because the genre is very expensive 
to produce. In such vicious circle, our skill to produce police action genre has disappeared. We 
did not dare to think about it… Taiwanese TV drama industry must go beyond Taiwan and enter 
Asia so as to have more funding and variety in its subject-matters. (Tsai, 2009 cited in Lan, 2009) 
 
Tsai has had the idea of taking advantage of East Asian market before the success of Meteor 
Garden. It was not until Meteor Garden that Tsai realised his dream and found the key to the 
regional market. 
When I was young, 20 years old…I already told people: “we (Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong, 
PRC, and Taiwan) could co-operate to make TV dramas! Let’s choose a project that interests 
everyone…Let’s make Three Kingdoms!”...At that time, I’ve already had the idea of locating the 
great Asia Pacific region as a market. Yet, it was in Meteor Garden that I started to try to export 
Taiwanese TV drama overseas. (P2, personal communication, Feb 20, 2013, pp.3-4) 
 
Observing the Meteor Garden’s success, he believed that in the regional mainstream markets, 
Taiwanese TV dramas and modernity were not as craved for and desired as Japanese media 
culture and modernity. Thus he told stories centring on elemental themes: 
The most important thing for a TV drama that targets international markets is its inclusivity. The 
TV drama should not have too many elements that can only be understood locally. There are 
many barriers between national cultures so that you cannot communicate to the markets with 
what they are not interested in…Of course, once our country’s charisma is extremely strong, we 
may be able to talk to them about the local culture in Taiwan. Before that, we have to 
communicate to them with elements which they can understand immediately. (Tsai, 2009 cited 
in 101 Summit, 2009) 
 
The Taiwanese particularity in his images for regional audiences lies on Taiwanese know-how 
and sensibility in producing modernity (Tsai, 2009 cited in 101 Summit, 2009). Taiwanese acting 
talents that embodied the Taiwanese know-how, sensibility and modernity are important when 
Tsai presented the generic themes:  
Being based in Taiwan, I should establish my own features so that people would recognise me…I 
have been able to make TV dramas over the last few years because I have continuously 
produced stars...Casting stars (F4) that have a big (East Asian) market, I can raise funds to 
realise my dream. The foreigners who have watched so many big-budget quality productions 
would like to watch Taiwanese dramas mainly because of the stars. As long as I produce good 
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dramas with the stars, my market will grow…The actors would benefit from all my input to dramas. 
If the dramas are attractive, the audience will be moved, like the characters, and appreciate their 
performance. (Tsai, 2009 cited in Lan, 2009) 
 
He also made the best use of Taiwanese geographical elements for his generic images to create 
the charisma within his works (Tsai, 2009 cited in Lan, 2009). As he gained success, he received 
the Taiwanese governmental support for shooting and has welcomed the support in return. His 
acceptance of Taiwanese governmental support is most obvious in the making of Black and White, 
which received shooting support from Kaohsiung, Taiwan’s second largest city: 
Without the help of the Kaohsiung Municipal government and the local people, I could not have 
made Black and White…Their help was invaluable…I planned to shoot 40% in Kaohsiung. In the 
end, 90% was shot there. I fully felt that the Kaohsiung government was determined to support 
the film and TV industry. I would highlight Kaohsiung in my overseas press tour and invite fans 
to visit Kaohsiung and the shooting locations, so as to maximise the effect of Black and White as 
a part of Kaohsiung’s city branding. (Tsai, 2009 cited in Lan, 2009) 
 
With regard to selling TV dramas to regional market, Tsai accomplished his objects step by 
step, in the observation of scriptwriter S3 who worked for him (personal communication, Jan 25, 
2013, p.2). He tried first of all to emulate Japanese TV drama in a way more akin to Taiwanese 
ethnic reality after the success of Meteor Garden. His first own project Friends (2003) was an 
original work and only followed the narrative and aesthetics of Japanese trendy drama. It revolved 
around seven countryside youngsters, two of whom were indigenous people, struggling in urban 
Taipei. Tsai (2004 cited in Kao, 2004, p.198; Tung, 2007) labelled it a genuine “trendy drama” 
that reflected the lives of contemporary Taiwanese youngsters, which most “idols dramas” in 
Meteor Garden’s Cinderella fantasy had not achieved. Nevertheless, Friends got low TV ratings 
due to many factors including the lack of star casting, which made it less marketable. Nor was it 
particularly well received in the overseas market, despite receiving warm feedback from local 
Internet-generation youngsters (Tsai, 2006 cited in Eslite Reader, 2006, p.55). 
After this commercial setback, Tsai returned to adaptations of existing works that clearly 
alluded to Japanese works. He directed and co-produced another TV adaptation of Japanese 
same-name manga Mars (2004) together with Angie Chai. This drama set the record for the 
highest budget in Taiwanese idol drama history in 2004 (Nien, 2004) and had good feedback from 
online TV critics, TV ratings, and overseas sales (Yeh, 2004; Chen, 2005a; Liu, 2005). When the 
Japanese TV drama White Tower (2003) became a huge success in Japan and Taiwan in 2003 
and 2004, Tsai successfully caught the regional interest in medical workers’ power politics by 
producing White Tower (2006) (Liew, 2011). This high-budget medical drama received both 
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commercial and critical acclaim in 2006 and 2007 (Y.-H. Yeh, 2007).78 However, the two dramas 
were so expensive by Taiwanese standards that Tsai also began relying heavily on star power to 
ensure overseas marketing. Vic Chou and Jerry Yan, two members of idol group F4 from the 
Meteor Garden, provided a very bankable cast, and in return Tsai refashioned their on-screen 
personas in the displays of their male qualities (Tsai, 2009 cited in Lan, 2009). 
Indifferent to national politics in Taiwan, instead, these works addressed the personal 
concerns of urban subjects, and supplied hopeful endings to them. One common motif among 
them was the yearnings of youth, whose patriarch-/matriarch-child relationship was constantly 
split or in trouble, for a better, more hopeful future in post-Confucian East Asian urban society. 
Meteor Garden gives a complex view of patriarchal social relationship (Deppman, 2009, p.103). 
White Tower depicted hospital politics in a Confucian hierarchical structure, in which senior male 
teachers resemble father figures to students, and brought more criticism (Liew, 2011, p.261). 
In terms of overseas marketing, Tsai has flexibly responded the demands and regulations 
of these East Asian markets to recover his production cost. When idol dramas he produced have 
many elements that could not pass the censorship of the PRC’s state-owned TV system, his star 
cast were the main driving force for mainland Chinese buyer to purchase them. Mars has two 
traumatic teenage protagonists, teenage killing and domestic violence which could not easily pass 
PRC censorship. White Tower unpacks the power politics and corruption of medical 
organisations. Black and White (2009) involves a transnational arms dealer and its crime. 
Because of the star cast in the dramas, they were still purchased by mainland Chinese buyers 
and their special versions were broadcast by China Entertainment Satellite TV and Shanghai 
Dragon Satellite TV (Yang, 2004; Sohu Entertainment, 2005; 2009; Feng, 2006; Chu, 2007b). 
Black and White did not pass Chinese censorship and it was only broadcast by China 
Entertainment Satellite TV, a southern Chinese satellite service (P2, personal communication, 
Feb 20, 2013, p.11).  
He also attracted the Japanese market with the star cast. At the time of the three dramas, 
Japanese market was more affluent than PRC market (P2, personal communication, Feb 20, 
2013, p.3). Tsai’s idol dramas starred member of Meteor Garden’s actors and were mostly 
                                                     
78
 White Tower gave Tsai an award for best director in TV serial drama in the Golden Bell Awards – the most important 
annual award for the Taiwanese TV industry. It received the highest broadcasting fee from Japan among Taiwanese TV 
serial dramas and was aired by NHK’s satellite channel (Y.-H. Yeh, 2007). 
165 
 
highlighted in Japan. White Tower was even broadcast by NHK in Japan (Y.-H. Yeh, 2007). Tsai 
largely recouped his production expense for White Tower from its Japanese sale: 
At that time, Japan was a very important market. Entering the Japanese market was very 
special…A Taiwanese idol drama that was able to enter the Japanese market was most 
highlighted by the media…It (the Japanese market) was very crucial to me because, at that time, 
mainland China (market) was not that big. Its (mainland China) value for our cost recovery was 
not very high. Among the Asia Pacific region, the Japanese market had the highest value…White 
Tower was sold to Japan at a very good price, which covered most of my production cost. (P2, 
personal communication, Feb 20, 2013, p.3)  
 
Tsai’s strategy to make use of the overseas markets flexibly for progress in commercial 
storytelling has offered valuable opportunities for a few TV workers who are interested in exploring 
the dark side of society and humanity using a variety of commercial genres, such as writer S3 – 
a theatre director who is very concerned about social issues and entered TV drama writing for a 
living. S3 worked with Tsai in White Tower and Black and White. They had a good co-working 
experience in the White Tower that centres on problems in contemporary medical institution that 
was very concerned by S3 (personal communication, Jan 25, 2013, p.13). Yet in the development 
of synopsis for Black and White, there was tension between them. S3 initially wanted an even 
darker story whose pace is as fast as American action TV dramas in Black and White, but Tsai 
decided to make an action comedy and commented that the pace is too fast for his target audience 
(personal communication, Jan 25, 2013, pp.9-13). Nonetheless, Tsai accepted a few of the darker 
settings added by S3 which drew on political and military incidents in Taiwanese history – arms 
purchase and governmental corruption – in Black and White.  
We wanted to tell you about the existence of a transnational munitions industry behind all the 
incidents – the very dark force that hands into the political sphere via trading to control every 
country. Things like police corruption and drug dealing on the surface are in fact chained to and 
manipulated by the dark force from the top. (S3, personal communication, Jan 25, 2013, p.9) 
 
Tsai’s TV dramas have not been strongly tied to the Taiwanese society, particularity in order 
to enter the regional market and maximise the revenue. The dramatic worlds in his teenage 
dramas (Meteor Garden and Mars) are small, personal and look generic. They were also divorced 
from their Japanese contexts and modified for a non-Japanese East Asian mass market. Even 
adult-oriented White Tower also had a non-specific story setting. It is a same-name TV adaptation 
of Taiwanese novelist Hou Wen-yong’s best-selling novel. Hou collected material from his work 
experience in the National Taiwan University Hospital – one of the oldest and most prestigious 
hospitals in Taiwan – but set the novel in a non-existent Taiwanese university hospital (Y.-F. 
Huang, 2006; M.-J. Lin, 2006a, p. 24). Tsai produced different versions of the TV adaptation for 
its marketing in Japan and PRC because the original novel mentioned Taiwanese president 
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(Feng, 2006). White Tower provided a good model for Tsai to adopt in Black and White in handling 
political subtext in a nationally non-specific setting (Chu, 2009). The Black and White that 
mentions international arms trade and crimes might have offended a few East Asian governments, 
so Tsai and S3 decided to make up a “Harbour City” in the drama to protect their creative security. 
Many elements we talked about in the drama actually emerged from contemporary Taiwanese 
reality…so a al city helped us not to be constrained when we developed the story. (S3, personal 
communication, Jan 25, 2013, p.9) 
 
Fictionalisation provides a way for creators to go through state censorship safely in a media 
environment that does not permit freedom of expression. Later, its prequel movie even makes up 
a fictional country as the base for the munitions company so as to minimise political troubles. 
I fictionalised it (the story) so it did not refer to any place. I took out borders appearing in the story. 
That means I took out state, ideology, politics and everything. The trouble no longer exists… (P2, 
personal communication, Feb 20, 2013, p.18) 
 
Nonetheless, the fictional Harbour City rendered Tsai a chance to construct a hyper-modern 
Chinese-speaking/East Asian city, using Taiwanese landscape. He emulated recognisable 
symbols from Hollywood action dramas so that Harbour City visually resembled many seaport 
cities in Hollywood films, such as Miami or Los Angeles. Harbour city, in my opinion, is a televisual 
visualisation of Taiwan’s collective desire for Western (American) and globalised East Asian 
modernity, and Tsai is the best “makeup artist” for Taiwanese cities. Paradoxically, although this 
TV drama constructs a more complicated and darker story and characters, it reproduces a 
Western world view as it designates a number of controversial villains who are connected to the 
transnational munitions organisation as North Koreans (S3, personal communication, Jan 25, 
2013, p.11).  
The importance of the Japanese market was relative and conditional for Tsai. When PRC 
has exceeded Japan to become the largest market of film and TV entertainment in East Asia, 
Tsai started considering how to appeal to both markets in his productions: 
At that time, Japanese market was very valuable to enter. Yet the Mainland Chinese market has 
become bigger and bigger. There is another big market in the Asian market. It is No.1 now. We 
are able to recoup cost from it…so long as I can connect the three places well (mainland China, 
Japan, and Taiwan)…I could have more capital. More options are possible in my productions. I 
could cast more actors. I could do projects on amazing subjects. I could introduce newer filming 
technologies and purchase good equipment. I can make more things possible. These activities 
would become the driving force for the growth of my markets. The triangle between mainland 
China, Japan, and Taiwan is the key to whether I can either enter South Korea, which is hard to 
enter, or regain the market in South East Asia…Therefore, currently it is the most important task 
to stabilise the triangle. (P2, personal communication, Feb 20, 2013, p.3) 
 
As Tsai’s career becomes more regionally successful and his dramas more expensive, he has 
gradually declined to produce dramas that “speak from a particular social historical position” (P2, 
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personal communication, Feb 20, 2013, p.9). To be accepted by more people, Tsai’s creations 
are becoming more “inclusive”. His dramas are taking out local particularities and avoiding political 
troubles. Also, he opts for making highly generic dramas. He suggests that if creators could 
expand their viewpoints and empathy, they would naturally have broader and more inclusive 
creations (P2, personal communication, Feb 20, 2013, pp.8-9). 
Tsai is now moving into a new stage. He announced in 2012 that his new project of “New 
Asian projects of Chinese-language film and television” would be composed of four TV dramas 
and films. The project’s name seems to say that Tsai has associated himself with a pan-Chinese 
culture and Tsai admits that he wants to unite Chinese-speaking media companies so as to enter 
non-Chinese speaking markets for the project:  
I am targeting Asian markets as a Chinese-language subject…The Chinese-language dramas 
form a collective subject. When I broaden my market base so widely and widen my horizon of 
creation so widely, what is really important for me is unity. I should enable the Chinese-speaking 
people in Hong Kong, Taiwan and mainland China to unite with each other. Because of the 
political reason, we have been separated. However, if we can unite, that is the best power for us 
to make the strongest film and TV industry in East Asia. Thus, coining the term is to broaden my 
creation horizon and also to call for unity…If I say “(A new project of) Asian market”, I do not 
produce the sense of unity. Taiwanese creators say that we are expanding in the Asian market 
as Taiwanese creators. Mainland Chinese creators say that we want to go to the Asian market 
from mainland Chinese angle. But if I say the Asian market of Chinese-language works, I mean 
to unite all Chinese-speaking people together to go to the Asian market…Adding the two 
characters (“Hua yu” – Chinese-language) conveys the message of the unity between us. We do 
not just make Taiwanese movies, mainland Chinese movies or Hong Kong movies. We unite to 
make a Chinese-language movie that all Asian people can appreciate….The key to succeed is 
that the boundary in the three places should disappear. (P2, personal communication, Feb 20, 
2013, pp.4-5) 
 
The project is supported by PRC’s Beijing Hualubaina Film & TV Company and Japanese Amuse 
Soft (P2, personal communication, Feb 20, 2013, pp.8-11). The project includes the second 
prequel to Black and White, a TV adaptation of Japanese manga Midnight Restaurant, and two 
TV dramas – In Love With Aisin Gioro and Super Power, the latter featuring computer-generated 
special effects (Wang, 2012; C.-W. Wu, 2012). His works are becoming “non-national” in their 
backgrounds. I propose that these non-national and non-specific films and TV dramas can be 
seen as “global cultural products” made by Tsai, who is increasingly prioritising international 
distribution by shedding off, effacing and disembedding from local history and social pulses. Here 
the “global culture” refers to a cultural product created in a disembedding process described 
Anthony Giddens (1990, p.21), in which production relation is lifted out of local contexts and 
restructured across indefinite spans of time-space.  
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Tsai is not the first global cultural producer of East Asia. Drawing on Giddens, critics called 
the Hong Kong action genres in the 1990s “global culture”, not only for their globalised market 
and production locations affected by the market transformation, but also for their mind-set that 
emulated Hollywood (Fore, 2001, p.117; Lo, 2001, p.266). It may be argued that Tsai’s work is to 
some degree similar to the Hong Kong action genres. Although Tsai has not started multinational 
location shooting, he is doing it in an equally delocalised way – creating a fictional city – to bring 
better global movement for his works. He is also accepting inter-Asian funding and becoming de-
localised in terms of finance and crew employment. More importantly, he has drawn his idea of 
generic temporal-spatial background from Hollywood films such as the Batman franchise that has 
a fictional city as its background. Tsai explained, in the forum of the 2012 National Taiwan 
University Film Festival, that his decision to fictionalise the setting of Black and White was 
developed from Meteor Garden’s non-specific setting and referred to the Batman franchise (Tsai, 
2012). He is like many Hong Kong film-makers who have aimed for East Asian success by 
imitating Hollywood and simulating its productions. According to Laikwan Pang (2005, p.160), 
many East Asian films want to enter global circulation and ascend to “global cinema”, whether 
they have large or small-scale budgets. Tsai’s works have also aspired to become globally 
distributed, thus he can also be considered a producer of global culture in his own right in the 
post-2000 Taiwanese idol drama industry. 
Although Tsai’s TV dramas are constantly set in generic urban worlds, they were all shot in 
Taiwan with Taiwanese talents playing lead roles. Moreover, his works show landscapes and the 
most modern aspects of Taiwan, and so bring in overseas tourists. Thus Taiwanese people so 
far have seldom questioned Tsai’s contribution. Moreover, Tsai’s clear production strategy and 
vision of the future also have persuaded Taiwanese media and audiences to accept him as an 
important industrial leader (Lan, 2009; Li, 2012; S3, personal communication, Jan 25, 2013, p.2). 
Taiwanese film critic Tsu-Wei Lan (2009) acclaimed Tsai’s Black and White a well-made police 
action TV drama. Another film critic Chang-An Wang (2009) advocates Tsai’s regional marketing 
approach. Li Hang, film critic and the runner of film magazine Cue, respects Tsai as a brave 
pioneer in the film and TV industry of Taiwan (Li, 2012). Yu-Ping Michelle Yeh, one of the 
producers of Taiwanese film Formula 17 (2004) believes that Tsai’s Black and White franchise 
was important for the industry – the domestic film professionals could learn know-how of making 
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action film (Yeh, 2012).79 Tsai was also complimented by SET on “the highly completeness in his 
productions that have all details they should have” (Chen, 2009, p.125). Even S3, who has also 
been learning to master commercial production in Taiwan, recognised that Tsai has changed the 
meaning of idol drama by making important progress in the business (personal communication, 
Jan 25, 2013, p.2). As mentioned above, S3’s personal imagination was suppressed to a certain 
degree in Black and White. S3 admitted with a complex feeling that Tsai made a good decision 
with regard to the market demand for the action genre, and the making of the action genre, and 
in the end achieved both a good commercial success and industrial acclaim (personal 
communication, Jan 25, 2013, pp.17-19). The drama marks the starting point of S3’s exploration 
of social issues in her TV writing career. Her opportunities to write more complicated characters 
has increased.  
Before Black and White, I actually had no chance to write about any dark characters, the world’s 
dark side and dark forces. Since the drama, such chances are getting more and more. I have 
been able to explore these issues in many of my new dramas. (S3, personal communication, Jan 
25, 2013, p.19)  
 
It may be argued that, in the Taiwanese commercial TV industry that strives for regional visibility, 
profit, acknowledgement and influence, Tsai’s inter-Asian strategy has been successful and 
obtained legitimacy. He has accumulated all kinds of capital from the markets in the region, 
including fortune, know-how and reputation.  
 
5.3 Adapting Manga for TV 
The third inter-Asian packager is Jerry Feng, who left his co-founded Comic Ritz and founded 
Comic International (Comic International, 2003, p.194; Feng, 2005). During 2002 and 2004, Feng 
produced dramas Come to My Family (2002), The Rose (2003), and Michael’s Dance (2004) for 
the Old Three independently. Since 2005’s It Started with a Kiss (2005), he has formed an 
association with GTV in the Taiwanese TV drama market.80 GTV has aired Feng’s idol dramas 
and is often responsible for overseas sales. Feng also plans to make use of international market 
to overcome the disadvantage of the fragmented domestic market:  
Many Taiwanese TV dramas just target the domestic market, want to appeal to the existing 
audiences, and are satisfied with the safe options. This conservativeness in following routines 
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without thinking about improvement would curb the innovation of our drama industry and worsen 
our production environment…In addition to the domestic market, we should also pay attention to 
the international market. If we have the international market, we can obtain more resources and 
produce better dramas, and make Taiwanese dramas achieve international status…Via Meteor 
Garden, we have obtained the entry ticket to the train that carry many of our competitors from 
other countries. But we are just a new player…How could we overcome difficulties and improve 
skills? That is a question that we need to contemplate. (Feng, 2003 cited in Comic International, 
2003, pp.196-198)  
 
 
5.3.1 Post-Modern Sub-Culture 
Two elements define Feng’s international strategy: the sub-culture of the teenage girl and 
Japanese manga adaptation. Feng likes teenage manga very much as an audience (Feng, 2005). 
He is mainly interested in producing teen dramas that feature young male idol talents and are 
tailored for early-secondary-school female students, in the views of other idol drama workers (B2, 
personal communication, Feb 26, 2013, p.1; P1, personal communication, March 26, 2013, p.6). 
Feng knows that his own idol dramas cannot attract those Taiwanese media consumers who have 
been watching foreign dramas from Japan and even from the West. Thus he intends to target the 
teenage audience, who are exposed to media idols from early adolescence. 
We are very clear that the discrepancy (between our idol dramas and the audiences who are 
used to watching foreign dramas) is not amendable...Thus, I keep producing idol dramas in the 
hope that the new young audience can identify and grow up together with the young talents, new 
directors and new scriptwriters. (Feng, 2006 cited in M.-J. Lin, 2006b, p.41) 
 
Feng continually produces idol dramas that feature Taiwanese idols. His successful idol groups 
include F4 who debuted in 2001, Fahrenheit in 2005 and recently Spexial in 2012 (Sina 
Entertainment, 2015). 
Adaptation is advantageous when the original script is not considered profitable for 
commercial productions. In Feng’s trajectory, adapting Japanese manga, which has enjoyed 
regional popularity, is an economic practice whose effects may be felt beyond the Taiwanese 
market.  
When I was making Meteor Garden, I foresaw that we could sell it back to Japan. At that time 
everybody felt this idea was impossible and I had to take it as an ideal and an ambition. But it did 
come true! (Feng, 2006 cited in M.-J. Lin, 2006b, p.42) 
 
Adapting a popular work that has gone through several market tests guarantees minimal quality 
and attention. A senior manager of GTV comments that Feng’s TV adaptations of manga enjoy 
much better sales in overseas markets, particularly Japan, since the Japanese manga has had a 
certain commercial reputation. By contrast, GTV finds it more difficult to sell original Taiwanese 
works in the overseas market. 
Overseas marketing demands a shared understanding of this, either book or manga…maybe 
everyone has read the work and it would have certain degree of market base and familiarity. This 
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manga might have been introduced to Asia and many countries…we can imagine what it would 
be like on screen so that everyone wants to adapt it. If today I want to sell a drama to Japan and 
South Korea, an original work does not have advantage because it (the market) does not know 
this work. It would even wonder: is this a story about local Taiwanese people? Is the story very 
bounded to Taiwanese local sentiment? So it would have low interest and confidence. On the 
contrary, although an adaptation of manga is limited in terms of the Taiwanese rating for its target 
audience being too young, it is advantageous in overseas market. (B2, personal communication, 
Feb 26, 2013, pp.1-2) 
 
In terms of subject-matter, the teenage-girl manga that Fang has adapted into TV dramas are 
fantasy stories, similar to Meteor Garden, addressing teenage-girl market with utopian endings. 
As I examined previously in chapter 4.1, these adaptations of manga tend to construct a 
standardised Mandarin setting and be shot in Taiwanese urban space that can communicate with 
the East Asian audience.  
It may be argued that Feng’s strategy has had two phases. In the beginning (early 2000s), 
TV adaptations of manga obtained domestic success easily as the domestic market was less 
competitive, and regional success too because of the regional spread of Japanese popular 
culture. In the second phase (in late 2000s until now), Feng’s strategy has received smaller 
domestic success in the Taiwanese TV market as it has had more competitors. Since the SET 
and other companies have joined the idol drama market, ratings of the TV adaptations of manga 
that mainly target teenage girls have been lower. The idol drama produced by Feng is regarded 
as less culturally close to Taiwanese mass audience than that made by SET (B2, personal 
communication, Feb 26, 2013, p.10). Besides, South Korean TV dramas have created 
competition (Zhu, 2008, p.91) while the regional influence of Japanese media culture has declined 
(Otmazgin, 2014). Feng thus has demanded foreign profit which then requires the equipment of 
regional stardom (see chapter 4.2). 
Since 2010, Feng and his Taiwanese broadcaster GTV – an importer of South Korean pop 
culture and TV drama – started casting more regionally popular South Korean rising stars in their 
adaptations of manga My Combat Butler (2011), Extravagant Challenge (2011) and My Perfect 
Boyfriend (2012). The dramas set the South Korean stars in hyper urban spaces alongside 
Taiwanese idol talents. The synergy of three dramas was beyond their expectation. Initially GTV 
only promoted them as multinational co-operations, with an export orientation, that targeted 
regional youngsters (B3, personal communication, Feb 26, 2013, p.10), but they received great 
attention in the Taiwanese press and were framed as “Taiwanese-Korean Trilogy” by the press 
(P.-C. Chu, 2011a). Among the three dramas listed above, Extravagant Challenge in particular 
obtained an ideal commercial success (B1, personal communication, Jan 31, 2013, pp.5-6). Feng 
172 
 
and GTV have decided to invite more foreign stars in the future (Hung, 2010b). It suffices to say 
that Feng’s inter-Asian packaging has led him to be more regionally oriented, incorporating more 
regionally popular cultural elements.  
 
5.3.2 Striving for Legitimacy 
Feng’s adaptation of Japanese manga was once questioned by a number of old Taiwanese TV 
producers as a backlash towards younger generational Taiwanese consumption of Japanese 
media in the 1990s, according to him. Feng (2006 cited in M.-J. Lin, 2006b, p.43) responded to 
the criticism by arguing that “it is too heavy to relate his act with national hatred and antagonism 
when he was just looking for a good story”. Feng further argued that he has “found a way, 
discovering a new market in which youngsters are willing to tell stories and audiences would 
watch the dramas happily”. Therefore, it is irresponsible to give him a label of “betraying Taiwan” 
(Feng, 2006 cited in M.-J. Lin, 2006b, p.43). The dispute disappeared when the old generational 
TV producers went to mainland China and no longer had voice in Taiwanese TV drama industry. 
Feng’s main competitor in the long term has been SET. Feng has competed with commercial 
localist projects for time slots, TV ratings and show fee in the Taiwanese idol drama market and 
beyond. The Feng-GTV coalition and SET have even been considered “rivals” in the idol drama 
business (Tu, 2015). When Extravagant Challenge was aired, Chen I-Chun, senior producer of 
SET, criticised GTV and Feng as “traitors” because they cast South Korean stars (Choi Si Won 
and Lee Dong Hae from the South Korean pop idol group Super Junior) as lead actors (Hsiao, 
2012). 
Paying South Korean idols to play roles in Taiwanese drama and to be worshiped by  Taiwanese 
audience…instead of nurturing your own artists…sacrifices Taiwanese creativity…and lets South 
Korean invade the Taiwanese market when the local industry is slightly recovering its 
strength…Aren’t you ashamed of being traitors? (Chen, 2012 cited in Hsiao, 2012) 
 
Whilst SET highlighted its protection of domestic workers, the GTV defended it by noting the 
marketing advantage of regional casting. The GTV spokesperson said in defence that its 
production crew members were Taiwanese. GTV (and Jerry Feng) have been operating regionally 
and have made dramas for both Taiwanese and overseas markets. GTV further noted that 
Taiwanese people should be happy that Taiwanese dramas attract foreign actors to participate 
and that GTV is bringing a spotlight to the Taiwanese TV industry. Via South Korean stardom, 
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Taiwanese idol dramas can go to more overseas markets, and Taiwanese actors can be 
introduced to these markets (Hsiao, 2012). 
Although we cast Super Junior’s (Choi) Si Won and (Lee) Dong Hae to play the male lead 
characters, the whole production crew is Taiwanese…In the era of the global village, we operate 
at the pan-Asian market scale. “We do not produce dramas solely for Taiwanese audience but 
also for overseas world”…People should be happy that Taiwan can attract foreign actors who 
are willing to come. We do this to promote Taiwan rather than abasing ourselves. (Hsiao, 2012)  
 
Yet taking advantage of the market value of South Korean stars, but assigning them characters 
that do not show their cultural background, is also a consequence of regional commercial 
operation that is not agreed on by another voice in idol drama. A few original writers who I 
contacted also expressed their criticism (S3, personal communication, Jan 25, 2013, p.24; S1, 
personal communication, Feb 4, 2013, p.20). S3 once worked with Comic International but her 
contract with the company ended miserably (personal communication, Jan 25, 2013, p.15). As an 
original creator, S3 does not appreciate Comic International’s TV adaptations of manga:  
It (Comic International) always adapts manga into TV dramas because it has purchased the 
rights of so many mangas to be adapted to TV dramas. I believe that it did not read the mangas 
carefully. It purchased the rights after browsing the mangas quickly…Since it has bought the 
rights of so many mangas…it would adapt some of them into TV dramas anyway, even knowing 
that the market’s taste has changed or foreseeing difficulties in the adaptation…because its 
adaptation rights are expiring soon. It definitely would tell you sounding rhetoric, such as 
transnational co-operation…If it is able to complete the productions, it would have products to 
sell in the market, disregarding the quality of the productions. At least it would be better than 
giving up the rights and not being able to purchase manga rights in the future. (S3, personal 
communication, Jan 25, 2013, pp.15-16)  
 
S3 further contends that casting the South Korean stars that do not speak Mandarin and need 
voice actors in the adaptations of manga is a commercial decision, disregard artistic exploration:  
Let’s say that Park Shin Hye (a South Korean actress) is cast in a Taiwanese idol drama. 
Everyone says that she would look weird and her voice dub would sound weird, too, but the 
production company still insists on the cast. There must be a reason. Usually, it is that investors 
of the drama want her. …In many situations, actors are cast not because they really fit their 
characters. (S3, personal communication, Jan 25, 2013, p.24) 
 
S1 echoes S3’s argument by commenting that the foreign and trans-media casting does not add 
points to the aesthetical aspect of the productions: 
We would like (Choi) Si Won and (Lee) Dong Hae (the South Korean pop singers) as singers but 
we would not necessarily like that when they play in a Taiwanese TV drama, which looks weird, 
as you would not know whether to perceive them as actors or the South Korean artists. It is a 
dissonance like a square peg in a round hole. (S1, personal communication, Feb 4, 2013, p.20) 
 
Confronting the question, the head of drama production at GTV defended the decision: 
Many people have questioned us why we are adapting existing (manga) contents, but Japanese 
stars and South Korean stars would only participate in the adaptations…If you ask the South 
Korean stars to play an original story, they would say no. They don’t have any knowledge about 
this story and can’t assess it. If we give them TV adaptations of manga, they are willing…because 
this work is already transnational. Maybe they watched the manga when they were young and 
have a sense of confidence. For them it is a guarantee of quality. (B2, personal communication, 




GTV defended their strategy by emphasising its economic benefit – the TV adaptations and South 
Korean cast could help more Taiwanese original works have a better chance of being properly 
introduced to overseas markets as the adaptations obtain export success (Tu, 2012a). This 
suffices to say that the Taiwanese commercial TV station must prioritise economic capital over 
artistic value and local cultural expression. 
Answering my question in the interview as to why the production company did not change 
the cultural background of characters for the foreign actors, the head of drama production at GTV 
defended the decision, saying that it was a dilemma for commercial production. Every drama has 
its own characteristics which determine its development. They wanted to reflect the cultural 
identities of the South Korean actors in the characterisation but Feng’s TV dramas are non-
specific in their settings so that Koreanising the roles is not a proper arrangement for commercial 
TV drama making (B2, personal communication, Feb 26, 2013, p.7). The group of Jerry Feng and 
GTV was aware of the technical issue of foreign casting. In 2014, Feng released his latest inter-
Asian drama Gangster’s Bakery, in which Japanese actress Nagasawa Masami leads the cast. 
This drama was co-funded by GTV and the PRC-based Hua-Ce Media Company (Li, 2014). It 
was distributed in the form of DVD by SPO in Japan.81 This was Feng’s first time to actually work 
with a well-known Japanese actress (S7, personal communication, March 15, 2013, p.6). The 
lingual issue of foreign casting was addressed as the Japanese actress played a Japanese 
character and delivered the lines herself. It received good Taiwanese TV ratings and good 
regional sales in 2014 (Li, 2014; Maple, 2014). Speaking about its vision of the future development 
of Feng’s adaptations of manga, the spokesperson of GTV stated it would act as an open 
container to house different regional popular elements. 
You may say that we want to be a co-operator. We are unlikely to be a leader. To be a leader, 
Japan has very fruitful resources and experiences and South Korea also has very strong capacity 
of cultural integration…our geo-cultural political location is very unique. For instance, Japan is 
anti-Korean, South Korea is anti-Japanese and mainland China is anti-Japanese and South 
Korean. Taiwan happens to occupy a good location in between…Our TV drama has a lot of 
mixing…Our dramas do not show many national traces…We can be mutual…We can be an 
open container that houses many things. We are like a beautiful entity that accepts everybody. 
We can combine everybody’s resources to make a yummy dish and present it…Everybody 
benefits. (B3, personal communication, Feb 26, 2013, p.3) 
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The statement indicates that GTV, as well as Feng, is developing an inter-Asian packaging style 
and mastering the skills of making non-national symbolic products that can travel to more 
countries. 
  
5.4 Co-Production with the PRC TV Industry 
Apart from the above three packaging strategies that have reached Japanese and South Korean 
co-operators, many idol drama producers can mainly operate between Taiwan and the PRC, such 
as producer P3 and the production company for which scriptwriter S6 worked. Among the 
producers that co-produced idol dramas with the PRC TV companies, Angie Chai is one of the 
first and regular idol drama producers who co-produced with PRC (W.-J. Yeh, 2007), entering the 
PRC industry earlier than the other inter-Asian packagers analysed above. Chai (2011 cited in 
Lin, 2011) has aspired to “to create another success in Meteor Garden” that has mesmerised her. 
To achieve it, her strategy is financial co-production at regional scale: 
The success of Meteor Garden has created a network with Asian businesses. We are willing to 
maintain the network…we manage it on our own, integrating Asian markets and selling dramas 
to the dealers or TV stations. We maintain good connections with them. (Chai, 2004 cited in 
Liang, 2004, p.208) 
 
Chai has tried to expand into many overseas markets, such as Japan and PRC, while 
maintaining her Taiwanese status, as chapter 4.2.2 and 4.2.3 analysed. Yet, her inter-Asian 
career has much more frequently and gradually been geared towards co-production with PRC TV 
companies. She co-operated with PRC TV companies for at least eight idol dramas during 2004 
and 2012, including City of Sky (2004) and Chrysanthemum’s Spring (2012). The co-operation 
between her and PRC TV industry has continued until 2016 (Xinhua Net, 2016).  
Chai’s co-operation with the PRC TV industry was driven by the market because the PRC’s 
market size and revenue have been rising rapidly during the development of the idol drama 
industry in Taiwan, according to EP2, Chai’s executive producer (personal communication, Feb 
23, 2013, p.4). Chai was probably the most famous idol drama producer from Taiwan in the PRC 
TV industry during the 2000s (Liang, 2010). She received the fame as “birthmother of idol drama” 
as the producer of Meteor Garden, was regarded as successful producer of idol drama, and 
attracted most co-operation wishes from PRC (S5, personal communication, Feb 12, 2013, p.36).  
Just like most Taiwanese-PRC co-productions, Chai’s interactions with the PRC TV industry 
between 2004 and 2012 can also be divided into two types, as chapter 4.2.2 mentioned. The first 
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type “Taiwanese-PRC co-production” prioritised Taiwanese market feedback yet started to appeal 
to PRC market feedback. It mainly appeared between 2005 and 2010 in Chai’s career. She 
controlled production processes, maintained a high proportion of Taiwanese elements and met 
PRC’s minimal requests on drama content and elements. Chai’s City of Sky, a 2004 work funded 
by a subsidiary company of PRC’s CCTV, was totally filmed in the PRC (EP2, personal 
communication, Feb 23, 2013, p.5). We shall see it as an “experiment” in her interactions with the 
PRC TV. Chai managed to air it in Taiwan in July 2006, more than one year after it was filmed in 
the PRC (Apple Daily, 2006; Yang, 2006). That means the drama had difficulty to find Taiwanese 
TV stations that were willing to buy it. After the drama, Chai changed her creative strategy. Major 
settings of her dramas are in Taiwan, instead of PRC. These dramas now have Taiwanese 
characters who go to the PRC and interact with local characters. This applied to her five PRC-
Taiwanese idol dramas: Silence (2006), Corner with Love (2007), Sweet Relationship (2007), 
Calling for Love (2009), and Hi My Sweetheart (2010). During this time, Chai had creative control 
although her power varied according to counterparts. In the making of the dramas, Chai’s 
company was in a very controlling position. The funding companies from Hong Kong and PRC 
were smaller TV drama distributors purchasing TV drama show rights (EP2, personal 
communication, Feb 23, 2013, p.8). One exception was Calling for Love, which she co-produced 
with PRC’s Hunan Broadcasting System’s Satellite TV Channel, one of PRC’s nation-wide TV 
conglomerates and her creative power was affected. She planned to air it in Taiwan in 2009, 
earlier than PRC broadcaster received the broadcasting permit from PRC government. The PRC 
side did not agree to this so that the drama’s Taiwanese broadcast was affected by its PRC 
broadcast (Yang, 2009b; Media News, 2010). In general, during 2005 and 2010, Chai seemingly 
had higher financial, cultural and symbolic capital overall and was able to narrate from her own 
point of view. 
 
5.4.1 Patriarchal Values and Tastes 
The co-productions must go through PRC’s censorship and accept the PRC’s official values and 
ideologies. PRC government has at least two censoring points in the media-making process: 
production and distribution licences are issued to each project from the media regulation and 
control authority in Chinese government, the State Administration of Press, Publication, Radio, 
Film and Television (SARFT), which is under the supervision of the Department of Publicity, the 
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propaganda division in charge of ideology-related work and media censorship/control in the CCP. 
Every licence means a censoring gate. In this way, the state makes sure the production and 
distribution of TV content are all state-approved (Samuels, 2012; Ng, 2015). It may be argued 
that there is a strong continuum between the state censorship and market censorship. The market 
censorship of the PRC media distributors internalises the principles of the state censorship, as I 
will show later in Chai’s case. The distributors and their production companies tend to censor their 
own TV programme projects before the contents are actually sent to governmental censoring 
bodies.  
The PRC media censorship has been frequent, vagarious, unpredictable and it has been 
tightening (Samuels, 2012; Ng, 2015). PRC officialdom has prevented the state-controlled mass 
media, media imports and any forms of co-operations from spreading Western values centred on 
individualism and its derivative cultural and social forms (Keane and Liu, 2013, p.237). The first 
decade of the 2000s, in which the PRC TV had very active importation of idol dramas, was 
considered by PRC scholars as an age of “Confucian Revivalism” in the PRC – a period of rapid 
transformation of the PRC’s socio-economic structure (Zhu, 2008, p.95). Confucian Revivalism 
refers to the cultural policy during the administration of Hu Jintao (2002-2013). The government 
tried to cultivate its nationals with morally and ethically upright behaviours and more conservative 
gender codes. In the TV culture, the PRC launched “Clean up the Screen” that included a series 
of reactive regulations to curb and remove “inappropriate” contents from TV screens (Bai, 2015). 
The campaign promoted strong patriarchal value. It banned certain subject-matter that was 
considered harmful to social and moral order, such as materialism, homosexuality, incest, divorce, 
murder, revenge, love affair, premarital love/sexual relationship and teenage bullying (Bai, 2015; 
Ng, 2015).  
Angie Chai is a prime example for us to enrich our understanding of the complex gender 
politics in the production side of Taiwanese-PRC co-production beyond the naïve idea of female 
solidarity as well as the Taiwan-PRC dichotomy. As a female TV producer, Chai did not 
necessarily resist patriarchal paternalism that centres the PRC state censorship. She said that 
“TV producers like me convey messages – I always try to create happy moods and right 
(mainstream) messages” (Chai, 2005 cited in Ma, 2005, p.157). According to writer S5, who has 
written for Chai, Chai preferred to make fairy-tale stories, especially romantic comedy, and was 
strongly against showing premarital sex scenes and socio-gender realism. S5 believes that this 
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has resulted both from Chai’s marketing experiences and personal preference. S5 commented 
that Chai, who was born in 1962, “is a girl forever” – living like a girl and making dramas that are 
naïve. S5 thinks that a number of elder female idol drama producers, including Chai,  
are more conservative because their experience and background have cultivated them this 
way…They seem to believe that women should be “spotless, clean and pure”, better remain as 
virgins before marriage…Most of the experienced individuals who are bosses today all think in 
this way. They are all much more conservative. Their ideas and value systems stay in the last 
century. (S5, personal communication, Feb 12, 2013, p.18) 
 
Chai is a good romantic comedy producer. Chai’s executive producer EP2 commented romantic 
comedy as Chai’s speciality:  
She is very good…in making comedy…she thinks that life is very painful…she would feel very 
sad when she watches a tragedy. She does not like such genre. Besides, she turned to drama 
making from variety show. She has a comedic personality. (EP2, personal communication, Feb 
23, 2013, p.17) 
 
This is evident in her selection of Meteor Garden and its following success. Romantic comedy 
has become an important strategy in Chai’s inter-Asian trajectory.  
The creative workers working with Chai have to negotiate with and usually conform to her 
more conservative and escapist principles. The suppression of realism was illustrated in the 
pairing between Chai and S1 and S2, who worked with Chai from 2002 to 2006. S1 and S2 had 
to create romantic love stories, preferred by Chai, who believes that most audiences do not like 
to see miserable scenes and social issues on TV: 
When I worked with Chai, she actually gave me many frames...The frames referred to some plots 
that Chai particularly preferred very much and some plots that she did not like at all. She very 
much liked romantic and more naïve plots. With regard to realistic plots, she thought that the 
audience did not like to watch that. This is her personal preference. (S1, personal communication, 
Feb 4, 2013, pp.21-22)  
  
An interesting question is where Chai and PRC TV market’s social cultural value boundaries 
were? We can answer the question by going back to S1 and S2. Knowing the primary orientation 
of Chai’s company, S1 and S2, who preferred more observational realistic stories, tried to satisfy 
the producer while at the same time obeying their own creative orientation in their negotiation for 
more personal inputs (S2, personal communication, Feb 4, 2013, p.4). They tried to create more 
realistic characters in light-atmosphere stories so as not to discourage Chai. In 2005, several 
months before Silence started shooting, Chai came to S1 and S2 for a story tailored for three star 
actors Chai contracted. I will have more discussion about the cast in chapter 6.1. Chai asked S1 
and S2 to copy the regionally successful South Korean romantic comedy Full House but the 
writers were more inspired by another less popular South Korean drama I Am Sorry I Love You 
that involves murder, revenge and other dark sides of humanity (S1 and S2, personal 
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communication, Feb 4, 2013, p.6).82 S1 and S2 developed the initial version of Silence that had a 
heroine taking revenge on a dysfunctional rich family whose patriarch murders her father. They 
constructed a young heir and his manic-depressive mother in the rich family due to their interest 
in the vulnerability of the rich. Chai objected to the design of the mother, claiming that their 
audiences do not want to watch a manic-depressive. But S1 and S2 insisted on keeping the 
depressive mother in the story. Surprisingly, they won in the negotiation mainly because the 
project was in a crazy rush. If Chai kept saying no, S1 and S2 would have left and Chai would 
have failed the whole project. Chai was forced to agree to this part in their story, accepting both 
the dysfunctional family and the vengeful heroine (S1 and S2, personal communication, Feb 4, 
2013, p.22). 
Although S1 and S2 luckily passed Chai’s own censor, they were caught by the internal 
censors from a PRC co-financier who faced official censorship. Their vengeful heroine was not 
allowed on PRC TV. Chai did not defend for them and instead asked S1 and S2 to resolve the 
problem on their own. They compromised and softened the story by turning the would-be thriller 
into a “healthier” love story, because the whole production team could not afford any delays and 
vetoes (S1 and S2, personal communication, Feb 4, 2013, pp.6-7).  
The inter-Asian contestation in the linkage built by Chai appeared vertically between the 
PRC funder that suppressed alternative ideas about women’s behaviour at that time and the 
Taiwanese writers that wanted darker characters, as chapter 2 indicates. The key point that I want 
to make here is that the negotiation did not directly take place along the national difference 
between the people. It was actually happening between the Taiwanese personnel. Chai as a more 
senior woman seemingly had internalised and reproduced the dominant patriarchal ideas in the 
mass media. She did not advocate more aggressive ideas about women. Moreover, as the 
interface, Chai did not naturally resist the request from the PRC side. She did not stand with the 
writers simply because she is Taiwanese. Instead, she tilted to and administered the request from 
the PRC funder. The Taiwanese writers negotiated with the commands from foreign funders via 
Chai.  
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 In 2004 and 2005, the most phenomenal urban modern TV drama in Chinese-speaking countries was possibly the 
South Korean TV drama Full House (2004) that many Taiwanese idol dramas wanted to copy. The romantic comedy was 
very successful in Taiwan, the PRC and beyond. It revolves around the romantic engagement between a fictional South 




5.4.2 Avoid Offending PRC’s Political Discourse  
The PRC regulates the world view, political facts and historiography of TV dramas. It bans its 
newspapers and TV from reporting on or mentioning the ROC based in Taiwan, or its activities, 
be it the KMT or the DPP, and suppresses the Taiwanese independent movement (Tsai, 2007, 
pp.138-139). The PRC also bans any performing activities of “pro-independence Taiwanese 
performers and media workers” who do not follow its ideologies and regulations and even 
challenge them.83 Any representations of film and TV that operate within the PRC media system 
have to follow the PRC’s official discourse of Taiwan being a province of the PRC and consequent 
rules for naming. On the Internet, a document that was allegedly issued from official news agency 
of PRC illustrates how to script and write for PRC media (Scripting Community, 2014). According 
to the document, firstly, it is forbidden to say that people from Taiwan travel to “China”. It may be 
said that they go to the “mainland” or “inland”. Secondly, it is not allowed to call Taiwan and China 
as “liang an (meaning ‘two places across the Taiwan Strait’)”, which suggests equal political status 
of the two places. Thirdly, it is forbidden to refer to Taiwan in equal place with “China”, such as 
“China-Taiwan” relations. It may be used in ways such as “mainland-Taiwan” or “Fujian 
(Province)-Taiwan”. Fourthly, “Taiwan” is a concept opposite to “(zuguo) da lu [(ancestral national) 
mainland]”. All of these political terms indicate that “Taiwan” is not an equivalent country to 
“China”. The fifth is that any reference to the ROC government’s activities should be in quotation 
marks. On the other side, Taiwanese government does not accept the PRC discourse and 
naming. To oppose PRC’s official naming, KMT and DPP have used several terms for the PRC 
since 1990s, such as “da lu”, which has usually been translated as “mainland” in English, and 
“zhong guo [China]” (Chang and Holt, 2015). Their naming has largely determined how ordinary 
Taiwanese name the PRC. Thus, Taiwanese media that has any terms following PRC’s naming 
would be disliked in Taiwan by particular groups. The most visible example is that some 
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 The PRC government allegedly has a list of pro-independence performers, the existence of which the government 
never officially admits, but information about its existence has circulated on the Internet (Tsai, 2007, pp.138-139). 
Taiwanese pop singer Chang Hui Mei, aka A-Mei, was banned from performing in China for the following few years 
because of her performance at the presidential inauguration of DPP-affiliated Chen Shui-Bian of the government of the 
ROC. The self-surveillance of people has caused a chilling effect in Taiwanese show business. Since the A-Mei incident, 
Taiwanese artists or media workers rarely declare their political stance (Tsai, 2005, p.101; 2007). 
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Taiwanese individuals as well as politicians publicly protested against the use of “nei di [inland]” 
in Taiwanese media (Shih and Chen, 2010).84  
Nevertheless, Taiwanese people and media business working outside Taiwan, especially 
in the PRC, are subordinate to the PRC discourse rather than those of the KMT and DPP. To 
cope with the political controversy, the idol drama industry has been mainly avoiding political 
discussion and insinuation, too. The industry has articulated the powers in a way that is similar to 
the “choric mode of articulation” coined by Horace M. Newcomb and Robert S. Alley (1983, p.31). 
Choric mode refers to a text that “sings in resonance with mainstream heterogeneous ideologies” 
whilst lyric mode “stands out from, and negotiates with the mainstream in a personal voice” (Ma, 
1999, p.120). A choric articulation is esoteric with the mainstream preferences on its surface, but 
it can still generate polysemic interpretations and meanings, possibly on the audience side. Choric 
mode contrasts with lyric mode to form a continuum on which commercial TV and non-commercial 
TV are located. Lyric mode of voice does not compromise. It publicly opposes mainstream ideas. 
Commercial TV can have lyric elements whilst non-commercial TV might have choric texts. The 
general thrust of commercial TV nevertheless is choric and that of public TV lyric. The Taiwanese 
industry responds ambiguously to the political hegemony of the PRC and does not clearly resist 
it. Taiwanese idol drama workers have produced polysemic texts whose meanings cannot solely 
be defined by or submit to one particular nationalist or nation-state. Such tactics can be called 
“polysemic articulation” – the production of polysemic words and texts that allow the existence of 
multiple interpretations. Chai’s productions have used a city instead of a country to identify its 
characters in the lines to produce polysemic texts. Only the names of the two backdrop cities, 
such as Taipei and Beijing, would be noted in dramas. Doing so leaves interpretations open to all 
audiences in the two ideologically contradictory societies and beyond. Those who accept the PRC 
discourse and those accepting Taiwanese DPP or KMT discourse may interpret the meaning of 
a particular text on their own. 
Polysemic interpretation also appears during the interaction between the PRC funders and 
Taiwanese creators. Writer S3 told me that her PRC funder interpreted, from the PRC nationalist 
discursive position, a scene of her TV drama aired in 2009 when the Taiwanese protagonist drank 
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 The explanation of the difference of these terms are available at: http://www.ettoday.net/news/20130902/264884.htm 
[Accessed 4 April 2016] and at: http://smvv0206.pixnet.net/blog/post/5581866 [Accessed 4 April 2016]. 
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Starbucks coffee in Shanghai: “When the PRC funders were reviewing the script to decide if they 
would invest in it, the funders’ viewpoint was that ‘see! Taiwan has Starbucks! Shanghai has 
Starbucks! We are a family! We live in the similar way!’”. These managers did not know that S3 
was intending to talk about the globalisation of Western culture in Taiwan and the PRC. The 
managers mainly interpreted the script from a PRC nationalist’s viewpoint. S3 did not refute the 
managers because she knew that this interpretation was from their own ideological standpoint 
which saw S3’s script as a text conveying the message that “the two places are family” as their 
new generations drank the same coffee from Starbucks (S3, personal communication, Jan 25, 
2013, p.5).  
 
5.4.3 Domestication, Prioritising the PRC and the Loss of Legitimacy  
Nonetheless, PRC TV companies have had strong motivations to “domesticate” projects from 
Chai as well as other Taiwanese producers, completely buy them out and then replace the 
Taiwanese elements and world view with PRC ones.  
The PRC side can either reject TV dramas that involve cross-Strait (Taiwan Strait) historical 
representations and pursue PRC funding and shooting co-operation, if it disagrees with the 
historiography of the dramas, or purchase them to change the stories, if it thinks the dramas can 
be profitable in the PRC with some modifications. Taiwanese producer-director Tsao Jui-Yuan, 
who had pursued PRC funding for his historical drama A Touch of Green (2015), which was 
adapted from Pai Hsien-Yung’s same-name novel and set in the historical moment of mainland 
China and Taiwan before and after the Civil War, commented on PRC funders being able to fund 
them 100% yet requesting script change to meet the PRC ideology (Tsao, 2015 cited in Fanily, 
2015).  
An urban romantic love story that does not contradict with PRC historiography and world 
view, which is Chai’s specialty, still can cause commercial conflicts over revenue. The PRC and 
Taiwanese sides do not share revenues from all markets – Instead, the PRC gets only PRC 
market rights whilst Taiwan gets overseas market rights including Taiwanese rights (P.-C. Chu, 
2011b; B1, personal communication, Jan 31, 2013, p.8; Hung, 2014b; Tsao, 2015 cited in Fanily, 
2015). This is a convention of financing for Taiwanese-PRC TV drama co-production – the PRC 
funder is in charge of PRC market whilst the Taiwanese funder in charge of non-PRC area, in 
order to save the time spent for making decision jointly and avoid extra cost in distributing profits 
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from all markets (B1, personal communication, Jan 31, 2013, p.8). Taiwanese-PRC co-production 
that Chai adopts sounds ideal for the Taiwanese idol drama producers. Its key problem also lies 
in the uneven distribution of profit between the partners as one partner’s acts to maximise profit 
could jeopardise the profit of another and cause conflicts between the two.  
The first conflict is about broadcasting time. Both sides would want to maximise their 
interests and profit in their own markets by finding the best broadcasting time slot for their co-
produced dramas. Nonetheless, the two TV systems have different ecologies, in which Taiwanese 
TV have aired idol drama one episode for per week while PRC TV on a daily basis so that to air 
an idol drama at the same time on both sides has been difficult. When a Taiwanese TV station 
airs first, PRC’s revenue would be jeopardised by piracy and vice versa, due to the circulation of 
these dramas on the Internet (Chen and Chen, 2011). 
Also, in PRC, pure domestic productions have better broadcasting privilege than co-
produced dramas. To maximise interests, PRC co-producing companies would want to 
domesticate the projects if they can afford them:  
It (PRC) protects its domestic industries so that prime-time slot at 8pm only broadcasts domestic 
productions. Co-produced TV dramas can only be broadcast in specific time slots…with a 
number of restrictions. Thus they (PRC funders) would try to get what they want …the PRC 
funders definitely want the drama projects to become “domestic productions” so that the channels 
and broadcasting time that these projects could get are better (than when they are categorised 
as “co-produced TV dramas”). But Taiwanese issue is that I would have received Taiwanese 
government’s subsidy for high definition dramas…which requests PRC funding not exceeding 
51%. Would the two sides fight? The outcome of the fight would be that PRC funders would say 
that…You give up the subsidy and I cover the whole production expense. You give the whole 
project to me! Let’s make it a “PRC domestic production”. (S3, personal communication, Jan 25, 
2013, pp.16-17) 
 
The third issue that must be taken into account is cultural resonance. Both sides aim to 
maximise popular and local elements in the dramas to appeal to their own targeted markets. The 
PRC co-financiers would ask the dramas to change the location from Taipei to Chinese cities as 
well as adding more domestic actors in order to win a better broadcasting time slot in PRC TV 
channels. One drama being taken over for this reason was Love at Aegean Sea (2004), a TV 
drama project carried out by a Taiwanese company and written by a Taiwanese TV writer, S6, in 
2002. It was equally invested in by both Taiwanese and the PRC companies and was aired in 
Taiwan on CTS in 2004 (S6, personal communication, Jan 23, 2013, pp.2-3). The drama is about 
an urban love triangle that features the scenery of the Aegean Sea and beautiful actors. The 
major production difficulty was the lack of funding for shooting in Greece. To cover the production 
budget and make a name in the TV market, the project asked for PRC funding. However, the 
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PRC co-financiers asked the team to change the location from Taipei to Shanghai. The production 
company agreed. S6 was asked to not only change location but also avoid mentioning any 
particular local features in Shanghai in order to attract a Taiwanese audience by keeping it 
temporally and spatially generic (S6, personal communication, Jan 23, 2013, p.6). Recalling her 
writing experience for the drama in my interview, S6 responded with unhappiness and complaint:  
When I was informed that the project became a co-production…the Shanghai part had much 
difficulty. If it were just a Taipei story, the dialogue would have been like this: “let’s meet up on 
Chung Hsiao East Road”.85 But when we had Chinese funding, we must consider the resonance 
of mainland China and Taiwan. This was a problem…Some TV critics (of Taiwan) mentioned 
about the problem of the locality. We did not appeal to both sides well. The CTS felt that it was 
set in Shanghai. The mainland partner simply considered it a Shanghai story. Actually we did not 
particularly emphasise which background it was in. We were sort of shunning the issue of locality 
but these issues are unavoidable. We did not want to mention the geo-regional aspect…The 
company thought that since we shot in the mainland (China), we should not highlight the Chinese 
shooting…We did not highlight any places in Shanghai. The company worried that the Taiwanese 
regarded it as a foreign drama in the Taiwanese release. But in fact it was no use. Taiwanese 
considered it an “import buy” but we were an initiated-by-Taiwan project. (S6, personal 
communication, Jan 23, 2013, p.6) 
 
For those Taiwanese producers who input great effort into their projects and care about the 
outcomes, their control power over the projects depends on their ownership and whether they 
can raise money from the market that would favour them – usually their home market or any other 
non-PRC market – so as to balance the power from the PRC funder. The Taiwanese side must 
fund more than 50% of the production budget to take control as a 50-50 structure would not secure 
control power. A 50-50 or 33-33-33 joint venture would put the co-funding parties in a tug of war 
that delays production (EP1, personal communication, July 24, 2013, p.5). If Taiwanese 
producers can no longer cover more than half of the production budget and ownership, they lose 
creative control to PRC TV companies. Yet, most of the Taiwanese TV productions seek PRC 
funding exactly because they cannot raise the full amount of money required for them from 
Taiwan. Even Chai admits that “the production budget from Taiwanese TV stations only accounts 
for one fourth of production expense, the rest of which must be recouped from overseas revenue” 
(Chai, 2012 cited in Chao, 2012). Consequently, the PRC TV companies take over the projects 
with the result that Chai and other Taiwanese TV producers become just commissioned executive 
producers (Huang, 2010).  
Facing the funding and creative taking over, Chai and other Taiwanese TV drama workers 
responded differently according to their input in terms of effort and ego, with regard to the loss of 
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 Chung Hsiao East Road is an avenue full of shopping spaces for clothes, cosmetics, etc. in Taipei. It is a Taipei 
equivalence of the Oxford Street of London, UK. 
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creative control. Those who have devoted themselves to and care very much about their own 
visions of the projects would be more upset. For example, a serious deprivation of authorship – 
an extreme alienation between artist and artwork – took place and the story developer’s right to 
the story was abridged. S1 developed a 30-episode story about Republican China (the period 
when the ROC government owned the sovereignty in mainland China during 1912 and 1949) 
around 2007 and proposed this project to Chai’s production company. Chai agreed to take it and 
started looking for co-producing PRC companies that would be co-financiers, local line producers 
and local distributors. When S1 finished the script, the PRC funding body asked her to revise the 
whole script. The drama project proceeded but S1 gave up her ownership of the script rights (EP2, 
personal communication, Feb 23, 2013, pp.6-7). Describing the experience as “miserable” and 
“painful”, S1 (personal communication, Feb 4, 2013, p.22) has gradually realised the creative 
difference between her and Chai and has not co-worked with Chai since.  
The controversial co-production with PRC that Chai and other Taiwanese TV producers 
adopted triggered cultural opposition from other people inside the industry. The criticism was 
centred by difficulties in production and failures in markets. Behind these commercial problems 
were various differences between Taiwan and PRC that are highly irreconcilable. S3 criticises 
that a Taiwanese-PRC co-production that tries to satisfy both Taiwanese and PRC demands will 
only create something that is “neither fish nor fowl” (S3, personal communication, Jan 25, 2013, 
pp.16-17). That means that the product has neither a PRC nor Taiwanese viewpoint. It is 
inconsistent and conflicting in its message and is difficult for audience. Now as head of her own 
production company, S1 objects to the strategy. Echoing S3, S1 points out the difficulty to 
articulate the requests from both Taiwan and PRC for Taiwanese idol drama and the lack of clear 
message in the content: 
Based on my participation experience of these co-produced dramas, I deeply feel that when a 
drama wants to sell in both Taiwan and mainland China, it is doomed. It will never work…When 
I think that I want to attract cross-Strait or transnational audiences, it is easy to “aim too high but 
accomplish little because of little talent”. You cannot handle a lot of issues! You just want to 
include every element! You would lack clear central spirit. (S1, personal communication, Feb 4, 
2013, p.18) 
 
Such a strategy largely leads to market failures in Taiwan. The co-production projects initiated by 
Taiwanese TV companies have usually been commercial failures in the Taiwanese market, due 
mainly to their prioritisation of mainland Chinese demand and world view (Want Daily, 2012). This 
explains why the number of co-produced dramas dwindled from eight in 2009 to three in 2011 
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(Want Daily, 2012). Chai stated that she had no positive views on the prospect of these 
Taiwanese-Chinese co-funding productions overall (Huang, 2010; Want Daily, 2012). Since the 
Taiwanese-PRC co-funded and co-produced dramas targeting both markets bear little fruit in the 
Taiwanese TV market, recently Chai and other Taiwanese TV producers prioritised the PRC 
market over the Taiwanese market (Huang, 2010). Chai’s 2012 work Chrysanthemum’s Spring 
was funded by Shenzhen Broadcasting System and it targeted the PRC market and was set 
mainly in Shenzhen, PRC (China News, 2012; Shenzhen Business News, 2012). This can be 
called “PRC domestic production”: Chai would assemble Taiwanese writers and directors to 
produce dramas that are made for PRC TV stations and companies and completely give up on 
broadcasting them in Taiwan (Huang, 2010). Chai is not the only producer who is doing this. Many 
Taiwanese TV drama producers have been like Chai, making TV dramas for PRC TV companies 
as a subcontractor (Huang, 2010).  
 
5.4.4 Changing Work Schema towards PRC Co-production 
According to S2 (personal communication, Feb 4, 2013, p.28), the TV dramas he wrote purely for 
the PRC have seldom obtained good TV ratings in Taiwan. But he does not resist the strategy 
personally. The key is that he has a different work schema with it – he considers these PRC 
projects something he does mainly for a living, for the financial imperative.  
Simply speaking, I am making money from the PRC projects...The PRC market can offer me 
better income. (S2, personal communication, Feb 4, 2013, p.28) 
 
To achieve commercial success, S2 usually follows a formula in the creation process, 
because he as a Taiwanese writer could not produce stories that capture PRC social pulses. S2 
could not input too much ego into the PRC projects, either. 
The stories that I write for it (PRC market) would be safer. I might not be able to write stories 
rooted in the PRC’s domestic sentiments so I reproduce dramas thematising family conflicts. I 
cannot make them very emotionally touching. (S2, personal communication, Feb 4, 2013, p.28) 
 
These commercial productions could deliver fairly standardised urban stories that do not 
point to any particular locality or delve into the complex historical and cultural connections 
between the PRC and Taiwan. The narratives disembedded themselves not in a displacement 
fashion, such as Taiwanese working and travelling to the PRC – instead, they are stories that do 
not root in either particular PRC or Taiwanese social-historical realities (Mao, 2012 cited in Y. Lin, 
2012). They also could remake existing successful dramas. Chai’s Chrysanthemum’s Spring was 
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adapted from a regionally successful South Korean TV drama Pure in My Heart (2006) (China 
News, 2012). The PRC TV drama projects that tend to be more formulaic and commercially safer 
are the main source of income for Taiwanese TV workers.  
It may be argued that S2 has different schema and thus does not reject the strategy. In the 
new strategy in his wish, Taiwanese local productions that mainly target Taiwanese market are 
the important part where he realises his creativity. S2 could realise creativity better in Taiwanese 
projects than in PRC projects:  
I write stories that touch me deeply for Taiwanese projects because I grew up here. (S2, personal 
communication, Feb 4, 2013, p.28) 
 
S2 hoped to contribute Taiwanese productions with his own visions as he grew up in Taiwan. The 
answer shows the separation of the works for Taiwan from those works mainly for PRC has 
emerged as a new work schema for Taiwanese TV creators in their negotiation with PRC co-
production.  
S1 also does not give up on writing stories with a Taiwanese world view. S1 further argues 
that dramas prioritising Taiwanese market feedback and depicting Taiwanese characters could 
be economically feasible: 
I tell a good story that only revolves around this place – the story has just a man and a woman 
living in Taipei. It can also be popular in mainland China because humans can empathise with 
each other. (S1, personal communication, Feb 4, 2013, p.18) 
 
Previously hurt from the direct and indirect suppression of PRC funders and Chai, S1 also needs 
to work for PRC domestic productions. She has a very different schema as she views it as a 
money making exercise, more specifically to supplement her fee in producing Taiwanese TV 
drama, in case the Taiwanese drama could not return cost immediately: 
Producing (good) dramas in Taiwanese TV (will require more money than the domestic platform 
can cover)... We will be in debt. Thus we have to work for PRC TV to make money. (S1, personal 
communication, Feb 4, 2013, p.28) 
 
Such separation is also taken by S3. S3 also maintains that a project initiated by a Taiwanese 
producer must decide on one primary market in their inter-Asian packaging: either Taiwan or the 
PRC; she believes that a project made by a Taiwanese company should prioritise Taiwanese 
market demand and it should stop self-censoring for PRC’s values and preference (S3, personal 
communication, Jan 25, 2013, pp.16-17). If she needs to compromise the PRC’s regulation, she 
could have worked for projects that target the PRC and give her four times the pay that a 
Taiwanese project could give. She does not want to work for a Taiwanese project that not only 
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gives her low payment but also self-censors for the PRC market (S3, personal communication, 
Jan 25, 2013, p.17). 
Overall, the PRC-Taiwanese co-productions represented by Chai have aimed for 
commercial purpose. Cultural negotiation and contestation takes place inside Taiwanese team, 
rather than between Taiwanese and PRC sides. The gender value of Chai was more similar with 
that of PRC. They together suppressed more progressive ideas suggested by junior Taiwanese 
TV workers. It also has been articulating political stances ambiguously in the background.  
We have witnessed a transition of market priority in the development of the strategy. In the 
beginning, Taiwanese TV producers prioritised the Taiwanese market and passively incorporated 
PRC elements. But when the Taiwanese TV industry started encountering funding difficulty in 
Taiwan, they were not able to maintain their creative control in the administration of production. 
Eventually, the PRC took over control. Making one idol drama for both the PRC and Taiwanese 
markets is becoming less feasible for these Taiwanese TV stations and production companies. 
The PRC productions have fulfilled the commercial imperatives of Taiwanese TV workers but not 
the cultural imperatives of these workers, audiences and society in Taiwan. The new model of 
business demanded by a bottom-up and junior industrial voice is a product targeting a specific 
national market. However, the Taiwanese TV drama industry is crossing over to the PRC for 
financial reasons, making a living or covering the expense of a Taiwanese project that is made 
for personal expression and maybe a Taiwanese audience. 
 
5.5 Conclusion 
Money-making – the accumulation of economic capital – is the primary interest of the commercial 
TV drama industry. Yet the producers in the commercial system are on a continuum that poles 
between short-term and long-term commercialism. Long-term commercialism would be aware of 
the significance of accumulating cultural, symbolic and social capital – crafting skills, mastering 
different commercial genres, winning recognition and making production connections. This is the 
reason that a few Taiwanese producers opened their own personal companies and took 
advantage of regional markets. In the declining Taiwanese TV market, the easiest commercial 
model is commercial localism relying on low-cost and standardised productions and targeting a 
smaller local TV market. It prioritises short-term and constant accumulation of economic capital 
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over creative advance. Those who are more concerned about personal expression, professional 
reputation and prestige (symbolic capital), and production know-how and skills (cultural capital), 
have taken advantage of overseas markets and foreign resources. They have worked on their 
own to get away with budgetary constraints to make significant progress. 
This chapter examines the strategies of four Taiwanese inter-Asian packagings in idol 
drama industry. Different production companies have different orientations, styles and schemata, 
and their leaders have developed production strategies and made inter-Asian connections 
actively and voluntarily based on their own personalities, creative styles, work history, 
connections, their future vision concerning idol dramas, and imaginations about audience. The 
diversification of their trajectories marks the particularity of the Taiwanese idol drama industry’s 
inter-Asian experiences. These inter-Asian packagers have contributed to the diversification and 
heterogeneity of Taiwanese TV drama. Taiwanese idol drama industry has been capable of 
producing more dramas than by itself due to resources and fundings from other countries. 
Compared to the production of commercial localist dramas that prioritises guarding the 
domestic market, inter-Asian packaging can be really risky because of the uncertain, dynamic 
and competitive regional and domestic markets. Not all of the packagers have succeeded in 
making a profit or continued to accumulate money. The common situation is that they would gain 
money for one drama and lose what they earned in the next project. Thus they must continuously 
seek investment. 
Virginia Liu seized the chance to conduct inter-Asian connections and obtain the knowledge 
of inter-Asian co-operation and critical acclaim. Prioritising personal expression and challenging 
socio-cultural issues can be risky and lead to financial loss. Liu’s TV dramas that commit to her 
own personal expression have obtained little commercial success. Tsai Yueh-Hsun has mastered 
his production skills and succeeded in obtaining money, recognition, reputation and knowledge 
of making diverse types of commercial genres. Standing apart from more expressive producers, 
Tsai has balanced well between commercial profit and professional recognition in his dramas. 
The two packagers’ TV dramas have been recognised as quality dramas since the 2000s and 
recognition is evident in that the TBS aired Liu and Tsai’s Home (2012) and Black and White 
(2009). 
The four strategies have all expanded their inter-Asian connections. Angie Chai has secured 
connections and economic investment in the PRC market. Jerry Feng is expanding into the 
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Japanese market. Feng keeps making teen dramas adapted from Japanese manga, is gradually 
receiving Japanese attention and deepening his connection with Japanese media. Inter-Asian 
packaging can also be as standardised and formulaic as commercial localism, especially the PRC 
co-productions. Chai, who believes that audiences only like to watch funny romantic comedy for 
escape, continues to brush up her signature style in her co-operations with PRC TV. 
Their strategies have marked their advantages and disadvantages in market. These inter-
Asian dramas do not appeal to local Taiwanese audiences with local sentiments and values. 
Instead they compete more in the Taiwanese market and regional markets with regionally-shared 
elements. Their productions require money more than their home market can cover. Moreover, 
as the idol drama packagers not only target the Taiwanese market but also aspire for overseas 
exports, they need to deal with more diverse political and economic powers in the region, implying 
that their dramas are subject to political and ideological pressures coming from different areas in 
the region. The tendency is that they accept rules in their target markets. All commercial 
productions do not challenge the political discourse of the PRC and other East Asian national 
sentiments. Some inter-Asian packagers, such as Virginia Liu, have tried to reconcile cultural and 
national differences in their narratives and have obtained complex textual outcomes. Some would 
just avoid touching national and cultural issues, such as Jerry Feng and Tsai Yueh-Hsun, for 
different motives. 
The first inter-Asian contestations occur indirectly and horizontally as competitions between 
the production companies and individuals, especially between inter-Asian packagers and SET’s 
commercial localism. Although they also compete for viewership overall, they are similar in term 
of regional operation. The four inter-Asian packagers do not treat each other as primary 
competitors. Competing with the SET, the inter-Asian commercial operation modes have strived 
for economic and cultural legitimation and called for identification in Taiwan. Virginia Liu’s TV 
dramas have hardly earned high viewership in Taiwan and been commercial failures. Both PRC 
co-productions and TV adaptations of manga have been involved in such types of politics for 
cultural legitimation. GTV and Jerry Feng have been attacked by SET for their casting of foreign 
actors for lead roles. The GTV-Feng group has chosen to defend itself by discoursing its 
contribution and loyalty to Taiwanese TV industry. As covered in chapter 4, idol drama business 
associates itself with Taiwan for its place-based production, whereas TV adaptations of manga 
with moderate foreign casts might obtain legitimation more easily than the PRC co-productions 
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that are not filmed in Taiwan. The production strategy of Tsai Yueh-Hsun also obtains legitimation 
for its economic contribution (casting Taiwanese talents, shooting in Taiwan and presenting 
Taiwan’s modern aspects) and thematic resonance to Taiwanese social reality. 
The creative differences between packaging team members, packagers and foreign co-
operators formed vertical and hierarchical inter-Asian contestations. Angie Chai’s scriptwriters 
were often constrained by her supervision which was influenced by her own taste and marketing 
decisions. Yet Virginia Liu experienced and negotiated the cultural difference mainly by herself. 
Since the Taiwanese market recession has continued, more affluent PRC TV companies have 
taken control of the inter-Asian projects jointly funded by Taiwanese and PRC TV stations and 
companies, deprived Taiwanese producers of control, and harmed the Taiwanese market 
feedback. More recently, making TV dramas for the PRC has become an efficient way to accrue 
economic capital. The PRC-Taiwanese works are geared to the PRC market. The type of 
packaging that raises funds from and appeals to Taiwanese and PRC markets are no longer 
workable. The dramas shot in the PRC have no emotional and spatial connection to Taiwanese 
society and are not welcomed by Taiwanese audiences. Commercial Taiwanese TV workers go 
to the PRC market for a living. Some of the producers earn money from the PRC, which may be 
used to cover the expenses of the realisation of their own visions. 
This chapter suggests the co-existence of multiple packaging strategies of Taiwanese idol 
drama making. The heterogeneity of Taiwanese idol drama is formed of and maintained by the 
packagers who connect to regional allies. In comparison, the non-Taiwanese countries seem to 
have relatively homogeneous national characteristics and behaviours when they interact with 
Taiwanese inter-Asian packagers. The heterogeneity of production strategies in the field of idol 
drama is roughly homologous with larger Taiwanese political culture: localist cultural movement, 
pan-Chinese universalism and cross-cultural inter-Asianism, the heterogeneity of which is also 
characterised by the connection of Taiwanese factions with particular foreign forces. But the idol 
drama culture has relative autonomy from politics. PRC co-production, narrative inter-Asian 
drama, global culture making and TV adaptation of manga alongside commercial localism, are 
five production strategies. The strategies are connected to producers’ own personalities, work 
history, connections, future vision and imaginations about audiences, which may be influenced 
by the social categories (ethnicity, gender, generation and class) in Taiwanese society. Their 
polemic contestations concern legitimacy between strategies advocating localism vs inter-Asian 
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regionalism, low-cost standardisation vs technological advance, and finally, personal expression 
vs market demands. 
It is crucial to note that the heterogeneity of Taiwanese inter-Asian packaging is also related 
to and largely determined by the Taiwanese connections with particular foreign forces. Therefore, 
the next chapter will be dedicated to analysing how foreign markets and forces influence the text 
of Taiwanese inter-Asian packaged idol drama. It will focus on the various representations of 





Chapter 6 Inter-Asian Imaginations 
This chapter shifts attention to the contents in idol dramas. It analyses the imaginations in the idol 
dramas that struggled to enter markets in the PRC, Japan and South Korea. It explores the ways 
that these inter-Asian TV dramas have presented the Taiwanese in relation to people from these 
three countries and manifested the intentions of the inter-Asian packagers in the idol dramas. 
Chapter 2 states that there are two forms of articulation that connect two elements together: one 
from a powerful position and one from a subordinate position (Laclau, 1977; Laclau and Mouffe, 
1985; 2014; Hall, 1986a; Chen, 1998; 2010). The chapter will show that as the above three 
markets are economically important to idol dramas, the imaginations in idol dramas articulate 
elements of the three countries and Taiwan, from a weaker position (since Taiwanese media and 
the Taiwanese are less powerful than the other three countries). Whilst the articulation of the 
powerful position would be a “structure in dominance”, articulation coming from the weak, e.g. the 
(ex-) colonised, might also be complicit to and identify with the dominant structure, thus reinforcing 
the structure in dominance. As “little subjectivity”, Taiwanese contemporary cultural formation is 
full of identifications with the dominant value systems of “larger civilisations”, capitalism and 
heterosexual patriarchy, rather than critical identification with various minor identities (e.g. women, 
homosexuals, the working class, former colonies) (Chen, 1998; 2010).  
This chapter will analyse to what degree idol dramas are critical of or conform to dominant 
forces in East Asia. At media production level, critical scholars have identified that art-house films 
have resisted the hegemonic forces of patriarchal nationalist and capitalist and its value systems, 
whilst mainstream commercial media tend to be articulated and complicit with the forces (Hall, 
1982; 1986a; Shih, 2007, p.35). Still, the commercial media field is full of heterogeneous works. 
As I am interested in the development of criticality in idol drama and how the diverse ways of 
inter-Asian packaging could bring a critical edge, I will analyse different articulations in the chosen 
idol dramas that link to different countries. Comparing these imaginations helps to pinpoint the 
different, heterogeneous and even contradictory cultural imaginations of Taiwan (and being 
Taiwanese) that are structurally similar to the political and cultural fragmentation of the country. 
Before I explore imaginations in idol dramas that have elements from the PRC, Japan and 
South Korea, noting how “global Taiwan” in East Asia and beyond has been generally envisioned 
in idol dramas would serve as a useful ground for us to understand more clearly the particularity 
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of the imaginations analysed in the chapter. Such effort will demonstrate how certain East Asian 
countries have become (more) significant in Taiwanese envisioning. To begin with, the idol 
dramas that do not have particular marketing considerations towards other East Asian markets 
would primarily address the dominant ideology and value system of post-Sino-centric Taiwanese 
society. To recap chapter 1, post-Sino-centric Taiwan has encouraged “transnational civil 
consciousness” whilst marginalising Sino-centrism (Tu, 1996; Shih, 2003, p.146; Chang, 2010, 
pp.110-111). Yet it has developed a hierarchical world view that is composed, first, of those who 
have dominated Taiwan (West Europe, North America and the economically superior East Asian 
countries) and second, those that the Taiwanese have dominated, including marginalised 
indigenous people in Taiwan, South East Asian migrant workers and female marital immigrants 
from the PRC, South East Asia/Vietnam, etc. (Lei, 2009, pp.422-425; Chen, 2010, p.35; F.-c. I. 
Yang, 2013, pp.1083-1086). The Taiwanese have an occidental myth that the West is more 
advanced in general (Lei, 2009). Also, cultural products and commodities from “white” East Asian 
countries like Japan and South Korea are desired by contemporary Taiwanese urban dwellers 
(Ko, 2004; Huang, 2011, pp.7-8).  
The hierarchy is indirectly displayed in idol dramas. Western elements appear along with 
the upward movements of the dramas’ protagonists, travelling, studying and sojourning in the 
West. Although Taiwanese media may hope to shoot in the West, most of them cannot afford the 
expenses of shooting in distant Western countries (S6, personal communication, Jan 23, 2013, 
p.3). Only a few idol dramas, most of which were Taiwanese-PRC co-productions, have been 
shot in Western cities, mainly London and Paris. These cases include Meteor Garden’s sequel 
(2002), Amor de Tarapaca (2004), Love at Aegean Sea (2004), Emerald on the Roof (2006), 
Dreams Link (2007), Material Queen (2011) and Queen of SOP (2012).86  
Globalised tourist spaces in more geographically proximate South East and East Asia have 
also appeared in the idol dramas, for instance, the PRC (Tianjin, Qingdao and Shanghai), 
Singapore, Vietnam (Ha Long Bay), Philippines (Boracay Island), Thailand (Phuket Island), South 
Korea (Seoul) and Japan (Hokkaido, Kagawa and Ehime). The idol dramas have presented South 
                                                     
86For my interest in Taiwanese TV industry, I usually watch the first few episodes of idol dramas so as to have a basic 
understanding of them. I watched the idol dramas mentioned here and found out that they filmed scenes in these foreign 
places. Amor de Tarapaca’s producer P3 told me that she planned to film foreign scenes of the drama in the US but she 
finally filmed them in Chile (personal communication, Feb 13, 2013, p.2).  
195 
 
East Asia as a space filled with resorts and natural scenery that may be considered unspoiled, 
and a place for relaxation by ordinary Taiwanese people. Dramas such as Letter 1949 (2009), In 
Time with You (2011) and Love Now (2012), present Taiwanese characters who visit tourist spots 
in Thailand, Singapore and Philippines respectively, seeking relief from the stress of work and 
their daily lives.87 
The desired cultures are framed positively whilst non-favourable cultures previously 
mentioned are either absent, neutral or negative. The PRC’s image has been controversial and 
contradictory, as I will discuss in more detail later. Apart from the PRC, other (ex-) socialist 
countries, especially Russia and North Korea, are symbols of unknown mysteries and sources of 
threat in a police action drama Black and White (2009). Rooted in a pro-American and anti-
Communist society, the Taiwanese TV drama involves villains from the mysterious North Korea 
and Russia, following Hollywood action thrillers that usually designate them as major enemies. In 
this police action drama, these characters are less negative and threatening than in Hollywood 
since they are not major military or political threats to Taiwan in my observation. 
The characters mentioned above may not have direct and immediate significance in 
mainstream Taiwanese imaginations. Examining who are playing the love interests and important 
characters of Taiwanese protagonists would indicate which East Asian countries are being 
perceived as “significant others” for the idol dramas. We are witnessing the existence of a number 
of cross-cultural relationships in the idol dramas. Some of the idol dramas hired foreign actors 
from the PRC, Japan and South Korea, who acted as either the love interests or important friends 
of the Taiwanese protagonists in the dramas. In the age of globalisation, cross-cultural 
interactions and marriages are both rising in reality (H. z. Wang, 2007; Friedman, 2010; Chiu, Fell 
and Lin, 2014), but this rise does not form a strong motive for commercial media to draw on them. 
It may be argued that the East Asian cross-cultural romance has become an emergent plotting 
resource in the idol drama because, firstly, more idol dramas are targeting female and teenage 
audiences who have consumed TV dramas from Taiwan, South Korea and Japan and are 
devoted fans of popular stars in these TV dramas. Commercial media is now drawing on the stars’ 
cultural backgrounds. Secondly, having protagonists played by foreign actors is to enter their 
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 I watched the idol dramas and noticed that they filmed scenes in these places. 
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markets. The idol dramas serve their specific economic imperatives to articulate each two entities 
together. 
Thus, this chapter delineates idol dramas’ inter-Asian articulations with three particular 
countries – PRC, Japan and South Korea. Each section begins with a brief summary of the 
production conditions of the bilateral linkages to explain the economic imperatives of the 
envisioning. Then, I will analyse their ideological articulations that unify Taiwan with each of these 
countries, and then their cultural imperatives for Taiwan. Their articulations of the dominant value 
systems in terms of political, cultural and gender aspects are the focus. To understand the 
recurring principles and themes in the cross-cultural dialogues and social, cultural and gender 
values communicated in the drama, I will focus on the idol dramas that stage cross-cultural 
relations. The imaginations are embodied in various Taiwanese protagonists interacting with 
characters of other East Asian countries on-screen. They form three levels of narrative: allegories 
of past or current relations between the countries; social (cultural, class and gender) values 
conveyed in the dramas; and the protagonists’ relationships such as kinship and romantic 
relations. The narratives on social values intertwine with the allegorical articulations of the 
historical or contemporary relations of the countries. These articulations are conveyed by the 
different personal relationships of the on-screen characters played by the Taiwanese and East 
Asian idol stars, such as love, friendship and kinship. The dramas are confined by the production 
conditions examined in previous chapters and hence they are likely to articulate the dominant 
social (gender) value systems from the countries of their co-operators.  
 
6.1 Interactions with the PRC 
Taiwanese idol dramas can choose many ways to present Taiwanese interactions with the PRC, 
heavily shaped by their close but controversial relationship. Taiwanese TV companies started to 
co-produce with the PRC TV in the late 1980s (S.-C. Cheng, 2010; Lai, 2011). The cross-cultural 
depictions in such co-productions have changed quickly according to socio-economic transitions. 
In the beginning of the twenty-first century, the economic and social interactions between Taiwan 
and the PRC have become a fait accompli (Chow, 2013; Chiu, Fell and Lin, 2014; Tseng, 2014). 
Apart from the manufacturing sector of Taiwanese economy that has marched into the PRC since 
the 1990s, Taiwanese cultural and TV workers are also going to work with PRC local businesses 
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(Tseng, 2014; 2015). This trend is relaying to the idol drama industry as I analysed in chapter 
4.2.2. In this new political economic context, interaction, reconciliation and harmony with the 
Chinese in social, economic and daily life settings are also recurring, common themes in the idol 
dramas that have PRC funding in the new century. Among countless idol dramas that were co-
operated between Taiwanese and PRC companies, at least twelve dramas were set clearly 
against cross-cultural backdrops staging the cross-border movements of Taiwanese and Chinese 
people; a number of these were produced by Angie Chai (see the discussion in chapter 5.4). They 
are Silence (2006), Just Give Me a Call (2007), Corner with Love (2007), Sweet Relationship 
(2007), Love or Bread (2008), Calling for Love (2009), Letter 1949 (2009), Starlit (2009), Knock 
Knock Loving You (2009), Down with Love (2010), Hi My Sweetheart (2010), Fathers’ War (2011), 
Queen of SOP (2012).88 These commercial works can be divided into two stages characterised 
by different financial and creative imperatives, in particular the changing power relationship 
between Taiwan and the PRC, as chapter 4.2.2 explained. In the first stage (early 2000s until 
2010), Taiwanese idol drama enjoyed an advantage in the PRC market, prioritising the Taiwanese 
market and passively incorporating the PRC’s elements. In these dramas, Taiwanese characters 
are usually economically more powerful. Most of the dramas have Taiwanese male and female 
protagonists. The PRC as a dramatic setting mainly functions as the venue of their love stories 
(Chu, 2010a). A limited number of dramas in this period stage Taiwanese men who work in the 
PRC and fall in love with local women. In the second stage (after 2010), the PRC TV industry has 
had more power and called for more idol drama makers from Taiwan, who very much relied on 
the PRC market for profit. Many dramas were domesticated by the PRC media and had only PRC 
characters. In the dramas set against a cross-cultural backdrop, the PRC characters might be 
socio-economically equal, or rising and even more affluent than Taiwanese characters: a young 
(and ideally rich) man from the PRC meets and marries a young Taiwanese woman. 
In these Taiwanese-PRC dramas, two types of urban Taiwanese characters have 
commonly appeared as protagonists: first, a more compassionate, human-centred Taiwanese 
businessman who reduces the exploitation of capitalism and reaches socio-economic 
reconciliation with the Chinese; and, second, a Taiwanese person who shares the cultural values 
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 I watched these dramas and found out that they filmed scenes in Taiwan and PRC and staged the cross-border 
movements of Taiwanese and Chinese people. 
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of the PRC patriarchal nation-state officialdom. To understand the changing rules of cross-cultural 
dialogues and social (gender) values in the idol dramas’ envisioning, I chose a representative 
drama from each stage: Silence (2006) and Fathers’ War (2011).  
Silence is a 20-episode drama co-funded by Angie Chai’s Comic Ritz and Hong-Kong-
turned-PRC Yi-Yuan Production House, the latter being responsible for the drama’s distribution 
in the PRC market (EP2, personal communication, Feb 23, 2013, p.6). It is a representative 
attempt of Angie Chai to incorporate PRC funding and elements. It has all the typical elements of 
the first stage. The drama has actors from Taiwan, Hong Kong and South Korea for leading roles 
and casts PRC actors for supporting roles, shooting in Taiwan and the PRC in 2005. The drama 
was produced and released at a moment of political tension between Taiwan and PRC. On 14th 
of March in 2005, the PRC government ratified the Anti-Secession Law which formalised PRC 
governmental policy to use non-peaceful or military means against the Taiwanese political 
independence movement (Li, 2005; Rickards, 2005). The legislation aroused a huge outcry in the 
Taiwanese public sphere and worsened political relations between the DPP and PRC 
governments (Li, 2005; Rickards, 2005). But this political incident seemed to have no direct impact 
on the making of Silence and other co-production practices of the idol drama industry, especially 
when Angie Chai’s PRC business was about to kick off. My informants did not recall any direct 
impacts of the political incident to their work (S1 and S2, personal communication, Feb 4, 2013, 
p.6; EP2, personal communication, Feb 23, 2013, p.13). It aired firstly in Taiwan in the summer 
of 2006.  
Fathers’ War (hereafter FW) was jointly produced by the PRC’s Shenzhen Broadcasting 
System and Taiwanese Chun Long International Entertainment Co (Sina Entertainment, 2011; 
Y.-L. Wang, 2011a; Citizen Weekly, 2012). It only focuses on the relationship between the 
Taiwanese and the Chinese. It is a representative case in the second stage. Chinese characters 
are mainly male and stronger, yet it still has a Taiwanese patriarch. Moreover, its mediation of the 
cross-cultural interactions between Taiwanese and PRC patriarchs is an excellent example for us 
to understand how the two patriarchal nationalist value systems were articulated in imagination 
in the 2010s. 
Comparing the two dramas produced in different years helps to illuminate the changing 
power relations between Taiwan and the PRC in dramatic imaginations in the current century. 
The eventual harmony between the two sides is jointly shared by Silence and FW. Both 
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communicate the theme of “reconciliation” to the markets, yet they do so with different social and 
cultural values: the first via the philanthropy of the rich that is under crisis, and the second via 
kinship support and shared Confucian familial values (respect for ancestors).  
 
6.1.1 Making Reconciliations with the PRC 
Angie Chai’s drama usually follows a common dramatic formula shared by many TV dramas 
popular in Taiwan and East Asia. The formula in Silence is romantic love between two people 
from two classes and the protagonist’s death at the end. Death of the protagonist is a common 
melodramatic strategy for its capacity to trigger the sympathy of the spectators (Mao, 2010; E. 
Tsai, 2010). In the first few years of the 2000s, South Korean TV drama had crossed a cultural 
border and was successful largely because of its successful utilisation of the two dramatic 
narrative techniques (class romance and protagonist’s death) to an unprecedented extent (E. Tsai, 
2010). This is set against a backdrop of Taiwanese and PRC economic integration in the Taiwan-
PRC TV drama. The subject-matter of reconciliation is presented via the transformation of the 
hero, Chi Wei-Yi, played by the Taiwanese star, Vic Chou. London-educated Wei-Yi is heir to his 
family-owned company that operates in both the PRC and Taiwan. He goes to Qingdao of the 
PRC for a new shopping centre project that will be constructed on the site of an old building called 
Four Happiness House (hereafter House), currently inhabited by a group of poor local residents. 
In the House, he also meets his love interest Chao Shen-Shen, a young woman born to a South 
Korean father and a Taiwanese mother played by the actress Park Eun-Hye from the South 
Korean TV drama Dae Jang Geum (2003). During this time, he discovers that he has liver cancer 
and starts to change his values, cherishing the innocence of the House and caring about the 
situation of the residents. According to the story creators (S1 and S2, personal communication, 
Feb 4, 2013, p.7), it was a “happy accident” that worked to their benefit to construct a young 
Taiwanese man, who seemingly has everything (a rich family and an arranged life) but is going 
to die, as their protagonist. Through the portrayal of the unhappiness of rich people, their aim was 
to show that happiness comes from contribution and not wealth. Hence Silence’s key value is 
social contribution, and in particular the benevolence of the rich, which is told in the process of 
Wei-Yi’s transformation.  
The Wei-Yi that we constructed was not happy in his life. He grew up in a confined environment… 
He hated his father who tortured his depressed mother. He had seen much of the violence 
beneath fortune and power…as well as hypocrisy…he had a heart of rebellion inside himself 
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against his father. When he met the heroine (and the House), he felt that this group of people 
were very adorable. But just when he would like to change his attitude, it was too late that he 
was dying, so if we had any themes to express in the drama, it would be the importance of doing 
good deeds before it is too late. (S1 and S2, personal communication, Feb 4, 2013, p.7) 
 
The resolution of the class conflict between Wei-Yi’s company and the House is the 
background of his change and also his journey to love and happiness. The House symbolises the 
suffering innocent who need salvation that eventually comes from Wei-Yi. Silence could therefore 
be interpreted as an articulation in which the Chinese and Taiwanese reach harmony with Taiwan 
taking the role of the benefactor. In Wei-Yi’s storyline, “China” means an innocent group of 
individuals threatened by his Taiwanese business – a pre-capitalist China. Only when he 
becomes a considerate loving person does he earn the reciprocal love of the House. 
The central value of compassionate and human-centred capitalism is the key to 
reconciliation in Silence. In FW, the key becomes kinship support and shared Confucian and 
traditional values. FW articulates the two markets via Confucian values that are promoted by 
PRC’s government and rooted in Taiwanese society. Such articulation is performed by the young 
Taiwanese actress Joanne Tseng, young Chinese actor Ling Xiao-Su, and veteran actors Gao 
Min (from the PRC) and Ma Ru-Lon (from Taiwan), who play the fathers. Tseng has developed a 
persona of “the girl next door” in her idol drama career (Citizen Weekly, 2012). Ma became well-
known in the Taiwanese film market for his father role in the Taiwanese hit film Cape No. 7 (2008), 
a movie conveying the male Southern Taiwanese grass-roots imagination (S. C. Wang, 2009, 
p.249; Chang, 2010, p.86; Citizen Weekly, 2012). 
FW adopts a few narrative conventions of family drama: both parents and children are the 
main protagonists, having strong agency in the story. It revolves around the romantic encounter 
and subsequent path to marriage between Chen Li-Chun, the daughter of a Southern Taiwanese 
businessman, Mr Chen Cheng-Kung from Tainan City, and Fang Lei, the son of a Northern 
Chinese university professor called Fang Jianjun living in Tianjin City. Li-Chun’s name seems to 
allude to the famous Taiwanese singer Teresa Li-Chun Teng, who occupied a very important role 
in cross-Strait pop cultural interaction and consumption. When the Chinese and Taiwanese 
governments banned cultural interaction, Teng’s music flowed from Taiwan to the PRC and 
mesmerised Chinese youngsters in the 1980s (Liew, 2014, p.504). The conflicts between the two 
fathers contribute to the main obstacle in the way of marriage for the children, who also overcome 
cultural conflicts. The first conflict concerns differences in ways of living and personality. The two 
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patriarchs do not like each other. The Taiwanese characters are framed as occultists. Mr Chen 
and Li-Chun rely on their faith in supernatural forces and power to guide their actions and make 
choices. The daughter asks the Tarot – a pack of playing cards originating in Europe and now 
used by mystics and occultists as a guidance to life – whilst Mr Chen asks his traditional 
Taiwanese gods. Ma’s on-screen persona as a Southern and Hoklo Taiwanese patriarch was 
obviously alluded to in FW. 89 Mr Chen lights up fireworks to scare away any wandering spirits 
surrounding his new residence opposite the Fangs, who abide by the Chinese regulations 
regarding fireworks. Prof Fang criticises Mr Chen for believing in feudal superstition. Prof Fang is 
educated, artistic and decent whilst Mr Chen tends to yell out loudly in the neighbourhood at 
midnight when he returns home drunk from social events.  
The second conflict is also related to real estate. Mr Chen invests in a real estate project 
that plans to knock down Prof Fang’s old house. The house is represented as the symbol of family 
for the Fangs. It becomes the major barrier when the two families have overcome their cultural 
difference mentioned earlier. Respect for ancestors symbolised by old buildings, which might 
presumably be the shared value between Taiwan and the PRC, is the key to the reconciliation. 
When Mr Chen takes Prof Fang to the Chen’s familial shrine in Tainan and explains that the 
familial shrine is a symbol of the family’s roots and must be preserved and memorialised, Prof 
Fang tells Mr Chen that the latter’s investment in Tianjin would destroy his old house, which is his 
own symbol of family. Mr Chen decides to sacrifice his own interests in order to respect Prof 
Fang’s wish to preserve the old house. Mr Chen’s decision is opposed by other stake holders in 
the business project and is ambushed by them. Seeing Mr Chen’s trouble, Prof Fang decides to 
help Mr Chen. He says goodbye to his old house and gives the house to Mr Chen. Both families 
sacrifice something, help each other reciprocally, and develop mutual respect for each other. I 
argue that mutuality (mutual support and respect) is an important value mediated in FW, 
interpreting the message against the cross-Strait backdrop. The drama emphasises the value as 
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 Ma’s public subjectivity has mainly been established in the 2008 movie Cape No. 7, in which his character is an authority 
figure representing the local council in a Taiwanese southern town. Disappointed at the fact that the local community has 
been losing its young population, who go to Taipei to earn a living, and upset that investment from outside is changing 
the local area, he has determined to gain self-autonomy. The character is argued as a representation of a typical 
Taiwanese local elderly patriarch in the countryside in Southern Taiwan, who is morally decent but ill-tempered and tends 
to vulgarly express his ideas. He is more fluent in Hokkien than Mandarin. His famous line that he shouts out provocatively 
is that “his interests are to quarrel, fight, kill and cause a fire” to frighten the capitalists from outside (Cape No. 7, 2008; 
Huang, 2014). In FW, Ma is still portrayed as a Southern Taiwanese patriarch, recalling his signature character. But in the 




a response to the troublesome political climate and serious antagonism between Taiwan and the 
PRC. Capitalism is not denounced. Instead a benevolent capitalist is imagined as a good force. 
Also FW provides an imagination that articulates Taiwanese and PRC sides with the Confucian 
value system, which is the centre of PRC’s cultural policy in the 2000s and has been deeply 
ingrained in Taiwanese patriarchal values. 
 
6.1.2 Changing Allegories of Political Economic Relations 
Taiwanese mainstream media tended to perceive Taiwan as agent of modernisation to the 
mainland Chinese in the 1990s, following the pro-American anti-Communist cultural imagination 
of the KMT, when Taiwanese businesses in general started exploiting the market and cheap 
labour of the PRC (Shih, 1995, p.164). In terms of culture, Taiwan perceives itself as more modern 
and advanced on account of its continuous capitalistic economic development and hence urban 
culture (Shih, 1995; 1998). According to Shih (1998, p.286), this envisioning was very vulnerable 
because the developmental gap was relatively small and by the end of the twentieth century, 
Taiwanese confidence was replaced by hesitation and anxiety. 
The idol drama industry in Taiwan has relative autonomy from the larger political economy. 
First of all, it enjoyed a relative advantage in relation to the PRC’s counterpart until 2009 (P1, 
personal communication, March 26, 2013, p.9), as chapter 4 and 5 indicated; the anxiety was 
less obvious in the early 2000s. Idol drama mainly thematises romantic encounters set against 
cultural and class differences alongside sub-themes such as friendship and inter-generation gaps. 
Since it emphasises socio-economic, personal and generational conflicts and reconciliation rather 
than any political expression, the idea of the nation-state or nationalist discourses seldom plays 
a direct role in the narratives.  
The interactions of Wei-Yi and the Chinese characters are central in Silence’s Taiwan-PRC 
articulation, which arguably repeats the Taiwanese envisioning of the 1990s. Their relationship is 
opposite to the political and military relationship between the two countries. Wei-Yi resolves the 
class conflict with the House, which becomes his object of contribution. Wei-Yi becomes a friend 
to A-Ling and A-Han, two younger residents in the House, and teaches A-Han to swim. He gives 
A-Han a dictionary to do some basic self-learning when he is informed that A-Han does not read 
or write. A-Han is also a source of happiness and reflections that he can learn from. It may be 
argued that his benefactor/teacher role is an envisioning of Taiwanese mainstream ideology: a 
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nurturing figure in the cultivation process of Chinese youth. Here, the reconciliation comes to 
Taiwan and the PRC in a situation where the Taiwanese idol drama industry enjoys a more 
advantageous position when facing the PRC. 
The power relation is envisioned much more equally in FW, showing the changing power 
relations between two societies. Since the 2010s, especially after the 2008 Beijing Olympic 
Games, the transition in the economic power relationship between Taiwan and the PRC has been 
even more visible (Guo and Teng, 2011). The textual imaginations have had a parallel change, 
as more co-produced idol dramas have conformed to the PRC market’s social and cultural values 
which are highly controlled by the PRC government. FW has stronger Chinese roles. Whilst 
Silence mainly features South Korean, Hong Kong and Taiwanese actors, FW has only a 
Taiwanese woman and a PRC man who are getting married. The fathers possess different types 
of capitals: the Taiwanese father is rich yet vulgar; the Chinese father is a cultural elite. They are 
not inferior to each other in any particular area. 
On the one hand, the difference marks the gradual adaptation of the idol dramas to the socio-
cultural context of the PRC market. The PRC market context has determined the production of 
these co-produced idol dramas and consequently their dramatic presentations of Taiwanese and 
Chinese subjects. Yet, on the other, their different negotiation strategies are geo-cultural. The 
Tainan elements of FW address the more traditional sentiments of Southern Taiwan. Silence is 
probably a Taipei-centred, Northern Taiwanese envisioning of its relation with the contemporary 
PRC.  
The political atmospheres of the two dramas are different, which was probably a deeply 
rooted ideological factor. The cross-Strait relations worsened in DPP’s administration during 2000 
and 2008 (Wang, 2008). The PRC ratified the Anti-Secession Law in 2005 to prevent Taiwan from 
moving towards independence (Li, 2005; Rickards, 2005). In 2008, the KMT government returned 
to power and encouraged more interaction between Taiwan and the PRC (He, 2010, p.46; Muyard, 
2010, p.7). Given these contexts, Silence was produced in a politically tense atmosphere, thus it 
was more apolitical. FW was produced in an environment in which the official government 
encouraged interaction, so it dared to allude to politics.  
The two dramas do not mention Taiwanese political status or any activities related to the 
Taiwanese independence movement as political discussion is simply not the term of reference of 
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the two TV dramas targeting young women. Writer S1, who wrote for Silence, commented that 
Silence did not have cultural intentions and its initiative was purely commercial: 
The meaning of the work did not lie on cultural interaction for the production companies. They 
(the companies) just wanted to make a drama which has good feedback and is emotionally 
touching and popular among the audience. (S1, personal communication, Feb 4, 2013, p.17) 
 
The writers of Silence say that they “only wanted to tell a beautiful story to touch and comfort the 
audience” (S1 and S2, personal communication, Feb 4, 2013, p.18), with their knowledge of the 
social economic reality in Taiwan in relation to the other countries in which the drama was set: 
We constructed the story with all our perceptions…The plot hinged reasonably on the reality of 
the time…we only wanted to tell a good story for the audiences. So we told it nicely and fluently! 
We did not make it sound awkward! The materials that we had were a South Korean actress who 
must not speak, a Hong Kong actor playing Hong Kong man, and a Taiwanese idol star …The 
characters needed to go to a foreign city…because the co-produced TV drama must have 
mainland Chinese elements and scenes for a few episodes. Therefore, we were limited by it. We 
had to arrange them (the three actors mentioned above) to go to mainland China reasonably. 
(S1 and S2, personal communication, Feb 4, 2013, pp.10-15) 
 
I do not think that Silence consciously reduced political issues to private and economic 
engagements – a meaning which, if it exists, is more of a contextual interpretation of viewers. My 
analysis supports the idea that Silence’s articulation was ideologically structured and the 
packaging team members were contextually determined by multiple factors, that is, the ideologies 
expressed through the unaware packagers.  
In FW, the history of Tainan as a political centre in a Dutch colony and the late Ming Dynasty 
era, is selected. When Li-Chun, who works as a tour guide, presents local scenic spots to tourists, 
she introduces Dutch-period Fort Provintia and Tainan Confucius Temple. But Tainan’s Japanese 
legacies do not appear, such as Tainan’s Butokuden, a historical building where Japanese people 
taught and learned martial arts in the Japanese colonial period.90 In terms of subject-matter, the 
lack of political matters in the two dramas is not as serious as a “structuring absence” – something 
that the subject-matter requires but the work avoids (Dyer, 2002, p.83) – in the two dramas. Yet 
the absence that can create multiple interpretations is important in the production aspect. Without 
the absence, any co-production dramas between Taiwan and the PRC cannot proceed. The two 
dramas do not state clearly the political identities of the characters. As chapter 5.4 indicated, such 
textual tactics however polysemically articulate different political discourses. The on-screen 
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 Tainan’s Butokuden’s introduction is available at: http://www.tnwcdo.gov.tw/culture01a.asp?ID=%7B41410BCC-E046-
435A-A25D-133F17CDAC90%7D [Accessed 16 April 2016]. 
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characters who come from Taipei and Tainan can be interpreted as either citizens of the PRC or 
the ROC, etc. 
FW seems more of a political allegory than Silence. It was conscious about the co-existence 
of the conflicts and shared culture of Southern Taiwan and the PRC as it intended to articulate 
the conflicting societies. Yet it overtly alluded to politics between Taiwan and the PRC in only one 
scene. In the scene, the two families confront each other to discuss the relationship between Li-
Chun and Lei, and the characters themselves refer to the meeting as “a cross-(Taiwan) Strait 
summit” – a political term referring to the official meetings of the ROC and PRC governments. 
The point that I am making here is that these idol dramas targeting young women and teenagers 
had few political imperatives and the political allusion is generally scarce in FW. FW is still very 
apolitical in comparison with the overt political text found in the New Cinemas of Taiwan. A recent 
Taiwanese film It Takes Two to Tango (2014) made by Wan Ren – a film-maker from the school 
of Taiwan New Cinema – contains a large number of overt political allegories (Lan, 2014; Tsui, 
2015). It may be argued that FW only nods towards the tricky cross-Strait tensions with which the 
audience is very familiar, and does not delve any deeper into the matter. 
I argue that the most important factor that makes the character of a capitalist businessman 
popular in Taiwanese-PRC co-productions might be related to the narrative tradition of idol drama, 
especially its most popular urban romance genre. As it was discussed in chapter 4, the subject-
matter of idol dramas, especially within the romance genre, is a romantic fantasy that overcomes 
class difference – thus the presence of rich people, especially young rich men, is particularly 
important for the narrative to show class difference and upper-class lifestyles. However, how the 
male protagonist obtains love is different in every story. This pursuit of love can apparently be set 
against the backdrop of Taiwanese and PRC economic integration, with a sub-theme of cross-
cultural interaction. We can ask one important question here: why is reconciliation a recurring 
subject-matter in the co-produced commercial dramas? This might be where the idol dramas 
become political. They are not political by narrating politics and making political allegory 
themselves; most of the time, they interact with politics indirectly by comforting the audience under 
political contestations. As Laurent Berlant (2008, pp.3-4) argues, female-oriented cultures 
“bracket” political tensions temporarily to find a soothing space that locates only “juxta-politically” 
to politics. These reconciliation themes continuously speak to the female audience of idol dramas, 
who are aware of political conflicts in the background yet ask for ultimate peaceful resolution. 
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Though the central purpose of the idol dramas was mainly to appeal to the audience, the two 
dramas and the actors happened to contribute to the dialogues of Taiwan and the PRC at different 
historical moments with different production resources.  
 
6.1.3 Gradual Acceptance of Patriarchal Confucian Values 
The two dramas differ in their mediation of patriarchal values. Silence has a very negative 
patriarchal figure. Its destructive force is Wei-Yi’s domineering and profit-oriented father, Mr Chi. 
Throughout the story, the hierarchy of male figures is manifest through Mr Chi. When Wei-Yi 
insists on resolving the land conflict through financially helping the House, his action can be seen 
as his defiance of the patriarchal control. It may be argued that Wei-Yi bears the burden of bringing 
social justice to the deepening socio-economic inequality present in the integrated Taiwan-PRC 
economy. In his personal transformation he liberates himself from his domineering father. At the 
end of the drama, he dies in peace. 
Silence chose Park Eun-Hye, the South Korean actress from Dae Jang Geum, as mentioned 
earlier, in response to the popularity of South Korean TV dramas – and Dae Jang Geum in 
particular (Chen, 2005b; EP2, personal communication, Feb 23, 2013, p.11). The drama swept 
over East Asia, including Taiwan, Hong Kong and the PRC, in 2004 and 2005 (Kim, 2009; 
Rawnsley, 2014). It may be argued that Park’s participation was a result of the Taiwanese idol 
drama industry’s capitalisation on the South Korean media culture. The reproduction of Dae Jang 
Geum’s femininity in Silence was in fact more of the intervention of Chinese official policy (see 
discussion in chapter 5.4.1). To recap, in the initial script of Silence, the heroine was vengeful, 
approaching Wei-Yi and his family. But this script was self-censored by the PRC market distributor 
as the plots might not pass the TV censorship of the PRC (S1 and S2, personal communication, 
Feb 4, 2013, p.9). The creators softened the story that went back to the Dae Jang Geum template, 
that of mediating and shaping Chinese femininity in the new century that was governed by the Hu 
Jintao administration’s cultural policy during 2002 and 2012. Her character Shen-Shen had a 
“puppy love” with Wei-Yi in the past. Her positive, tender, decent, upright and strong-willed 
character is just like the protagonist in Dae Jang Geum. She makes a living by running a Korean 
food truck business in Taiwan, after her parents passed away. She is a lovely daughter and sister 
to her adoptive father and brother (played by Andy Hui) from Hong Kong. Arriving in the PRC to 
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seek a traditional medicine91 remedy for her muteness92, she stands with the House against Wei-
Yi. As Taiwanese idol dramas have created many Cinderella heroines that demand the rescue of 
heroes, it brings a critical edge to departure from the representation of the previous Cinderella 
forms of femininity (Wu, 2008, pp.27-74). One way to do so might be to combine the Cinderella 
femininity with that of “Gaia”, a “motherly” type of femininity that is full of strength that can give 
birth to positive energies. In terms of socio-economic status, Shen-Shen as a working-class 
woman is inferior to Wei-Yi. Yet she owns a small business and lives on her own and she does 
not end up marrying Wei-Yi. In terms of vitality, she is much livelier than the dying hero. The 
drama instils much energy and agency into her. In two scenes, she dives into water to rescue the 
aching hero losing consciousness in the water. In other words, the heroine is more of a Gaia than 
Cinderella.  
In contrast, FW has positive patriarchal figures, and children who follow their fathers’ wishes. 
The Confucian paternalist values are also present in the reconciliation of inter-generational 
conflicts in FW, too. The patriarchs play central roles in the futures of their children, who achieve 
harmony with them in the end. Their traditional values concerning gender roles and division are 
positively portrayed as their children, who live in a global age, eventually accept their values. In 
the beginning, Lei works for a high-end restaurant as a cuisine designer, but his father belittles 
his occupation as merely a cook. Li-Chun runs away to Tianjin because she is fed up with Mr 
Chen’s control. When Mr Chen is ill and goes to hospital, she becomes conscious of her father’s 
love and voluntarily complies with his wishes. When they are preparing for the wedding, Li-Chun 
is advised by Prof Fang to follow the traditional Confucian teachings on marriage and femininity. 
Lei is advised by Mr Chen to be more economically responsible, so he decides to launch his own 
restaurant. As a character that represents a new generation, Lei’s new business targets middle-
class consumers with healthy and ordinary food rather than high-end and fancy dishes. This 
transformation is related to his trip to Tainan, which is famous for food for ordinary people (CNN, 
2015). In other words, “Tainan” changes him. This is a clear message about mutual change in 
interaction.  
                                                     
91
 “China” means a root of traditional Chinese medicine in the storyline of Shen-Shen. 
92
 Giving her a mute character was a narrative design to resolve the actress’s difficulty in delivering lines in Mandarin on 
her own (S1 and S2, personal communication, Feb 4, 2013, p.5). 
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The serious contestation among gendered generational values in FW concerns the 
characterisation of Lei’s younger sister Fang Ying, who studies journalism. In the beginning of the 
drama, the young woman, who has dreamed of working as a war correspondent, informs Prof 
Fang of her plan. He strongly objects to her idea mainly because of security concerns. Yet the 
work plan is interrupted by external factors from her work institution, so the drama does not go 
any further into generational politics. She quickly turns her attention to cross-Strait cultural 
interaction. In the crisis, Prof Fang is paternal yet reasonable and sensible. Ying later helps Li-
Chun’s older brother, who has been in a fraught relationship with Mr Chen, to figure out and 
resolve his tension and conflict with Mr Chen. In summary, FW offers a happy ending, with 
reconciliations and harmonies between Taiwanese and PRC sides, and between the young and 
older generations. In the end, the difficulties are resolved and the fathers are happy. 
 
6.2 Interactions with Japanese 
In chapter 4.2.3, I argued that two factors have shaped the general production conditions of recent 
Japanese-Taiwanese TV co-operations: firstly, the Japanese promote their media culture and 
tourist attractions in East Asian and Chinese-speaking markets and, secondly, the Taiwanese 
wish to market Taiwanese idol stars and dramas in Japan. Adapting popular texts from Japan, 
such as manga, has been a major and conventional choice for Taiwanese idol dramas that seek 
Japanese money (P1, personal communication, March 26, 2013, p.6). Taiwanese idols debuted 
in Taiwanese TV adaptations of manga. Yet, they need to constantly change their persona to 
interest the audience, especially to appeal to the Japanese market. Japanese marketing of idol 
dramas has asked for “novelty of the Taiwanese male stars” that may come from the transition of 
the stars’ persona (S3, personal communication, Jan 25, 2013, p.22). The transition stays in a 
range so as to guarantee commercial safety.93 Gradually, original narratives starring Taiwanese 
idols also interested Japanese buyers. Combining Japanese elements and Taiwanese idol stars 
                                                     
93
 Scriptwriter S3 told me about the logic of stardom innovation in the Japanese market. This novelty must be confined 
within a certain range. Their characters’ professions may change but their persona must have some consistency in the 
romantic part. “For the Japanese (market), the new element of the star’s persona should be different from the established 
ones…but the novelty must also have some level of commercial safety! …For instance, Jerry Yan always plays the role 
of a dedicated lover. Then he plays a gangster who turns to good deeds – a novelty for them (Japanese)! ...He has been 
playing a loafer, so his new role as a doctor means novelty. Successful projects in Japan always have a new, different 
element for the Japanese”. (S3, personal communication, Jan 25, 2013, p.22) 
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thus becomes a key strategy for Japanese-Taiwanese joint operations (see the discussion in 
chapter 4.2.3). 
Idol dramas have made use of Japanese settings, e.g. Meteor Garden (2001), Starry Starry 
Night (2002), Tomorrow (2002), Mars (2004), Honey and Clover (2008), Die Sterntaler (2012), 
Alice in Wonder City (2012), IUUI (2013), You Light up My Star (2014), etc.94 In these dramas 
Japan is the Taiwanese protagonists’ destination for education, travel or work. Seven dramas 
have created Japanese characters for key roles. They are Corner with Love (2007), Miss No Good 
(2008), Because of You (2010), Alice in Wonder City, Spring Love (2013), Gangster’s Bakery 
(2014) and You Light up My Star. Young female Japanese come to or live with Taiwanese kin in 
Taiwan in Because of you, Alice in Wonder City, Gangster’s Bakery. Spring Love also has a 
Japanese man settling into his Taiwanese father’s family. Most of the Japanese characters have 
been played by Taiwanese actors or Japanese actors who debuted in Taiwan (Yeh, 2006; Yang, 
2009c; Mei, 2016). Only three recent dramas – Gangster’s Bakery (2014), You Light up My Star 
(2014) and Once Upon a Time in Beitou (2014) – cast established Japanese actors based in 
Japan’s media industry after Japanese media enterprises started interactions with idol drama 
companies (NTDTV, 2013; Li, 2014, p.6; Shang, 2014a).  
Two themes recur in idol dramas that have major Japanese characters: first, Japanese 
individuals settling in Taiwan and, second, the interactions and connections between Japanese 
and Taiwanese (pop) culture. The articulations draw on the present or historical Japanese-
Taiwanese relation. Together, the dramatic themes manifest three ideological desires of Taiwan: 
(1) cosmopolitanism or multiculturalism of Taiwan, (2) hierarchical cultural interaction (in classical 
music and pop culture) and (3) progress in the modernisation. Naturally, there are also romantic 
relations that take place between the Taiwanese and Japanese protagonists, depending on the 
dramas’ specific conditions. Among all these dramas there are three that manifest the above three 
themes the most: Alice in Wonder City, Gangster’s Bakery and You Light up My Star. The first 
one is a Taiwanese production that capitalises on a Japanese setting and characters and 
manifests the three desires. The latter two are co-funded by both Japanese and Taiwanese sides 
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and partially reiterate the first one in their ways. The three are all backed by GTV, who purchased 
their Taiwanese show right. 
 
6.2.1 A Japanese Girl Settling in Cosmopolitan Taiwan 
The dramatisation of the above mentioned desires is very visible in Alice in Wonder City (hereafter 
AWC) that thematises several intersecting relations between Taiwan and Japan. Initiated by story 
writer S3, the drama echoed the event of the Taipei International Flora Exposition that took place 
in 2010 and 2011, by narrating the relationship between the local population, music and flowers 
in Taipei (personal communication, Jan 25, 2013, p.20). Taipei’s historical relation with Japan 
was hinted. AWC was partially shot in Matsuyama city (Japan) since its local government had 
active interactions with Taipei City government in the same period (S3, personal communication, 
Jan 25, 2013, pp.20-21). The key depiction of Japanese-Taiwanese relations revolves around 
two Taiwanese protagonists: violinist He Ting-Yu and his motherly friend, Lisa King. Its first 
Taiwan-Japan relation is between Lisa and her daughter, Ito Seiko (aka Alice); the second 
between Ting-Yu and a Japanese connoisseur who gives him a precious violin.  
In the first relation, Lisa worked in night clubs in Kabukicho of Shinjuku, Tokyo, when she 
was young. She married one of her customers, botanist Dr Ito. The elder generation of the Itos 
did not approve of their marriage. When Mr Ito lost his life on an expedition, Lisa was forced to 
leave Japan. Seiko has been brought up by the Itos since then. Lisa opened an Alice café in 
Taipei. In the beginning of the drama, Seiko approaches Lisa, who accepts her with surprise. 
Seiko symbolises the post-war political economic relationship of Taiwan and Japan. The post-war 
US-Japan economic bloc in East Asia tied Taiwanese economic activities strongly to those of 
Japan. When the Japanese economy was booming in the 1970s-1980s, a number of young 
Taiwanese women worked in the nightclubs of Tokyo (Mao, 2002, p.47; Chiou, 2005, pp.125-
127). According to Shwu-Wen Chiou (2005, pp.125-127), the influx of non-Japanese East Asian 
female workers into the Japanese sex industry was related to the economic gap between Japan 
and other East Asian countries, the Japanese government giving visas to foreign entertainment 
performance workers, and thus for the prostitute culture of Japanese men. Hence the idea of a 
woman who worked in Tokyo at a young age and had children coming from Japan to Taiwan to 
find her mother, made sense to S3: 
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The idea of a Taiwanese woman who sang or worked in night clubs in Kabukicho at her young 
age is very familiar to me. She left a child in Japan…The daughter comes back to find her mother 
but in the meantime she also has some desire for revenge or intends to discover the truth... (S3, 
personal communication, Jan 25, 2013, p.4) 
 
The parent-child relationship draws on the historical reality of the post-war movements of 
Taiwanese women. It counter-acts the nationally perceived parent-child relationship between 
Japan and Taiwan that Japanese colonial history may have inflicted upon the Taiwanese 
collective psyche, but the presentation of a deserted half-Taiwanese, half-Japanese child is also 
influenced by the Taiwanese post-colonial psyche. In the interview, S3 talked about her 
perception of the colonial history. 
I feel that Taiwan is to some degree like a thing that the Japanese left behind after WWII. Let’s 
put it this way: Taiwan was adopted by Japan. But was it a true kinship, or was Japan simply an 
adoptive/foster parent for the Taiwanese? I feel that this question is interesting. Many of my 
dramas are more or less related to Japan – in fact, I am too. For example, my grandparents on 
my mother’s side speak Japanese…Japanese culture has had a strong influence on me. (S3, 
personal communication, Jan 25, 2013, p.4) 
 
It may be argued that Lisa and Seiko can also allegorise the ex-colonial relation between Japan 
and Taiwan. Lisa functions as “the colonial Japan as mother” the other way around, whilst Seiko 
symbolises the “colonised Taiwan as child”, contrary to their actual national positions. Seiko’s 
unity with Lisa symbolises Taiwan’s harmony with Japan. Here AWC once again speaks to the 
post-colonial Taiwan’s nostalgia towards Japanese colonial rule. 
Seiko approaches Lisa for two reasons, which eventually lead to her settling down in Taipei. 
The first reason is connected to her father’s death. Dr Ito worked for a Japan-based company that 
wants to find a plant – also called Alice – for commercial use. After his death, the company then 
controls Seiko and asks her to find out if Lisa holds any information about the Alice plant. Once 
she accomplishes the mission, she may be free from its control. This is a more negative 
representation of the Japanese business world. Secondly, it is a discovery of maternal love for 
Seiko herself. Both searches for truth and love are an allegorical redemption on Seiko’s part. 
Gradually the mother and daughter establish true intimacy and a loving bond: Seiko understands 
that Lisa did not leave her on purpose and feels that she is loved. In the end, Lisa rescues Seiko 
from the company’s control but loses her life in the process. Seiko decides to continue Lisa’s café 
in Taiwan. The settling down of Seiko in Taiwan speaks of the Taiwanese desire to be 
cosmopolitan, that Taiwan can be the home of Japanese who identify with Taiwan. 
The cosmopolitanism theme conveyed via parent-child relationship is reiterated in another 
idol drama, Gangster’s Bakery (hereafter GB) that cast an established Japanese actress to play 
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a Japanese child to Taiwanese parents. The commercial success of the Taiwanese adaptation of 
manga encouraged GTV and Jerry Feng to make GB, a live-action version of the Japanese 
manga Chocolat drawn by Kubonouchi Eisaku and published by Shogakukan, Inc. in the 
magazine Big Comic Spirits during 1999 to 2003 (Hung, 2010b; Tu, 2012b). The drama stars well-
known Japanese actress Nagasawa Masami, whose participation was its biggest selling point (Tu, 
2012b). Nagasawa is popular as men’s ideal lover in Taiwan for her role in the best-selling 
Japanese romantic movie Crying out Love, in the Centre of the World (2004). Japanese comedy 
director Kitamura Toyoharu, who has worked in Taiwanese film and TV, was hired to direct the 
drama. It may be argued that this would help Jerry Feng to communicate with the Japanese 
actress more easily and also he could label the drama a Taiwanese-Japanese co-operation (S7, 
personal communication, March 15, 2013, p.4).  
The original seven-volume manga is a Japan-based story about the strange familial 
relationship between a girl and her ex-gangster stepfather, as well as his ex-gang members, when 
her biological father, who is a businessman, has financial difficulty – an allegory of post-bubble-
economy Japan.95 To accommodate her Japanese identity, the TV adaptation changed the story’s 
setting. Tatsumi Chie is a Japanese music student born to a Taiwanese mother and a Japanese 
father. She comes to Taiwan to seek shelter with her Taiwanese stepfather because of her 
father’s financial troubles. The Taiwanese world that Chie enters consists of two gangs, the head 
of one of which is her stepfather. However, the gang disbands when her mother dies. Her 
stepfather leaves the world of gangs to run a small bakery. The drama revolves around how Chie 
establishes a familial connection with the ex-gangsters and how these ex-gangsters finally get 
away from the complex world in which they lived. Chie does not settle in to her new environment 
through daily and historical connection, but through an adventure and un-ordinary process, 
following the original manga’s structure. The gangster action comedy situates her and her 
Japanese father in several crises that are resolved by the ex-gangsters. Chie witnesses how the 
rival gang forces her stepfather to return to the previous lifestyle he led as a gangster, how their 
previous enemies seek retaliation against these ex-gangsters and how she, in the end, genuinely 
treats them as family.  
                                                     
95
 Visit the wikipedia entry of the manga for more English information about it: 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chocolat_(manga) [Accessed 24 August 2016]. 
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Yet GB reproduces the Japan-Taiwan relationship and the Taiwanese cosmopolitanism with 
stereotypes commonly seen in previous Taiwanese and Japanese commercial media. The 
omnipresent representation of Japanese ambiance in many Taiwanese media has been noted as 
the main form of Taiwanese post-colonial engagement with Japan (Tsai, 2005, p.109). GB also 
demonstrates this. The bakery and home of the former gangsters is located in a traditional 
Japanese house. One of the former gangsters is fluent in Japanese and acts as Chie’s interpreter. 
The Japanese setting would articulate the mainstream Japanese perception of Taiwan as the 
place in East Asia that is closest to Japan, in terms of culture. 
The subject-matter of gangsters, which is forbidden in the PRC’s media system (Sek, 2013), 
is more acceptable in Japan-funded works. But the gangster genre is commented to be embedded 
in Japanese orientalism towards East Asia. This Japanese social and cultural discourse was 
based on the economic status of Japan during the old times before the 1990s in which the 
Japanese perception of East Asia was dominated by the “flying geese paradigm”. This theory, 
which was raised in the 1930s and gained prominence in the 1960s, can be seen as the most 
mainstream Japanese thinking with regard to East Asian economic development and the Japan-
Asia economic relationship. The 1960s’ version proposed by Japanese economist Kaname 
Akamatsu (1959 cited in Iwabuchi, 2002, p.10, p.213) sees Japan as a top economic power (the 
first goose) leading the other East Asian and South East Asian industrialising economic entities. 
Japanese orientalism towards East Asia has had many aspects. In the post-WWII Japanese 
discourse, “(East) Asia” as a separate discursively-constructed entity has tended to be backward 
as a result of the huge economic gap. On the one hand, legal and illegal immigration from 
Chinese-speaking countries was treated as a serious social issue in Japan (Lo, 2005, p.146). On 
the other, interacting with the East Asians also triggered the nostalgia of contemporary Japanese 
people for a more primitive and pristine past (Yeh, 2010a, pp.63-64). From this viewpoint, the 
gangster genre is embedded in the Japanese orientalism towards East Asia. 
The Japan-East Asia (Taiwan) relationship has been a theme in Japanese gangster films. 
The world of gangs has been noted by film scholars as a cultural symbol signifying the difference 
between Japan and its East Asian neighbours (Hyland, 2002; Lo, 2005; Yeh, 2010a). The late 
1990s’ Japanese gangster thrillers depict the underworld of Chinese-speaking gangs in Tokyo in 
Swallowtail (1996) and Sleepless Town (1998) (Hyland, 2002; Lo, 2005). Japanese film director 
Miike Takashi also shot his film Rainy Dog (1997) – a sequel to his gangster thriller Shinjuku Triad 
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Society (1995) – in Taiwan. The films envision Taiwan as a shelter where the Japanese would 
hide from their troubles (Yeh, 2010a). Post-war Japan tends to look down on Taiwan with 
condescension (Iwabuchi, 2002, p.11). Taiwan shows a “double otherness” for Japan: Taiwan is 
a Chinese-language society triggering Japan’s fear and loathing towards ethnic Chinese but it 
also makes Japanese tourists feel comfortable in Taiwan’s Japanised familiarity; Taiwan also 
triggers the highly-modernised Japan’s nostalgia for primitivity (Yeh, 2010a, pp.63-64). The East 
Asian gangster is a stereotypical filmic representation of an untidy, mysterious and complicated 
“(East) Asia” in comparison to an urban Japan. GB reiterates some of the themes appearing in 
these films in a feminine and family-oriented way.  
The Japanese oriental myth regarding “East Asia” might no longer be persuasive in the 
2010s, especially when South Korea and the PRC have asserted their modernity, and 
contemporary Taiwan is westernised. There is another modern and westernised world different 
from the gangster’s underworld in Taiwan in GB, which is the university. Chie continues her study 
as a transfer student in Taiwan and is taught by teachers educated in the US. 
The Japanese must learn Mandarin. The promotional video of GB shows how Nagasawa 
Masami managed to flawlessly deliver her lines in Mandarin, thus demonstrating her effort to 
appeal to Taiwanese audiences, who love to see the cultural closeness between themselves and 
the star.96 This also shows the perfectionism and dedication of the Japanese star, which I will 
highlight in the next section as key values communicated in the Taiwanese-Japanese co-
productions.  
 
6.2.2 Hierarchical Cultural Interactions 
In the chosen dramas, Taiwanese artists are in need of Japanese recognition/advice in their 
advance. In the second relation of AWC, Taiwan is modern yet in crisis. It is displayed by violinist 
He Ting-Yu and a Japanese connoisseur. Played by Aaron Yan from the Taiwanese idol group 
Fahrenheit, Ting-Yu is a well-known but psychologically scarred musician star. He has been 
marketed by his agent as a genius violinist, but in fact has seldom played the violin from his heart. 
His then mother, Ms He, who was a well-known pianist, had very high expectations of him. The 
family had no patriarch and the mother and son (whose surname follows his mother) had a tense 
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 The promotion video is available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XXDKQ7WPmBk [Accessed 14 January 2014]. 
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relationship. When Ms He died, he became an alcoholic, suffering from insomnia and looking for 
self-redemption. The opposite of Ting-Yu is another violinist, Chen Hai-Chieh, who comes from 
the countryside, symbolising uncorrupted new hope.  
Ting-Yu’s violin disappears because his agent secretly sells it for money – a moral problem 
he must resolve later. He goes to Japan (Matsuyama) to pursue a famous yet cursed violin named 
Siren. The idea of a world-class violin owned by Japanese built on the Taiwanese image of Japan 
– a country that ably integrates Western influence (Western classical music) with its traditional 
elements (Japanese traditional setting), as I will explained later. This image has been commented 
to appear in previous Taiwanese literary works (Lu, 2014, p.259). According to the scriptwriter of 
AWC, choosing Matsuyama was for its classical artistic atmosphere: 
Matsuyama is a very special place. It has very strong artistic atmosphere…Matsuyama alongside 
its old city delivers a very special aura. Thus we assessed which scenes in the drama could be 
set and shot in Matsuyama…Thus the violin (Siren) was there. (S3, personal communication, 
Jan 25, 2013, p.20) 
 
In the drama, Siren’s incumbent owner is set in an elegant Japanese traditional mansion. Yet his 
conversation with Ting-Yu is in both English and Japanese. The Japanese connoisseur is a stern 
assessor of Ting-Yu, echoing the long economic and cultural relationship between Japan and 
Taiwan. He turns down Ting-Yu at first because he senses Ting-Yu’s contradictions and instability 
inside and judges that Ting-Yu is not ready to play Siren. Yet the violin chooses Ting-Yu. That 
night, the owner dreams of Ting-Yu playing Siren and interprets his dream as a sign that Siren 
has chosen Ting-Yu as its new master by itself. So he hands Siren to Ting-Yu – a point which I 
will further examine later. 
This hierarchical relation between Taiwan in crisis and the forerunner Japan in terms of 
modernisation progress also appears in You Light up My Star (hereafter YLMS). YLMS is a meta-
drama about the operation of the luminous but complex Taiwanese capitalist media star system.97 
It stars Taiwanese stars Joseph Cheng and Nine Chang, who are known to the Japanese market 
for their previous roles in It Started with a Kiss (2005) and White Tower (2006). Both dramas have 
Japanese manga/fiction and TV drama versions. YLMS was partially financed by Japanese 
Amuse Soft’s Taiwanese branch as its ending credits show.98 Its main story developer, Chu Yu-
                                                     
97
 Meta-drama, according to the definition of Richard Hornby (1986, p.31), is a drama about drama. A meta-drama is self-
reflexive. It pays attention to drama itself, including its operation. 
98
 Its opening credit can be found at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=noKnnXJZBGo [Accessed 17 April 2016] where 
Ichige Rumiko, the president of Amuse Taiwan, appears alongside other funders. 
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Ning, made his name as a TV director by successfully adapting Japanese manga into Taiwanese 
live-action versions, including The Rose (2003), It Started with a Kiss (2005) and Sweet 
Relationship (2007) (Chu, 2012; Taipei Film Commission, 2012). Chu has been thinking about 
industrial creative breakthrough, especially genre diversity. He believes that as long as the idol 
drama industry improves its storytelling, it can have a longstanding East Asian market value: 
My TV dramas are usually sold to the Asian markets. If we can keep providing solid and unique 
stories, we definitely can create a good and promising Asian market (for our works). (Chu, 2012 
cited in Taipei Film Commission, 2012) 
 
Therefore, Chu produced the meta-drama. YLMS gives audiences a chance to see what goes on 
behind the scenes of their favourite idol dramas, but abandons the theme of romantic love by 
placing a couple in career and relationship crises at the narrative’s centre. Revolving around a 
fictional idol star Liu Cheng-Wei and his pairing actress Chang Man-Ling, it shows the difficulty of 
the stars fighting against the standardisation of commercial culture and also examines their 
complex relationship. 
The contemporary relations between the Taiwanese and Japanese media industries is 
allegorised by Cheng-Wei’s interaction with an established Japanese star played by Amuse Soft’s 
top artist Fukuyama Masaharu, with whom Cheng-Wei discusses the topic of this popular star’s 
work. In the past, Cheng-Wei arrogantly asked Fukuyama, whom he thought was a hotel waiter, 
to pass him a bottle of water. Fukuyama calmly did as Cheng-Wei asked. Afterwards, the troubled 
Cheng-Wei seeks opinion from Fukuyama with regards to his work as a popular idol star, asking 
how he can keep believing in himself in reaching perfection after producing works that adhered 
to a standardised formula he did not like. Cheng-Wei can be seen as an embodiment of the 
development, crisis and low point of the Taiwanese idol drama industry. He symbolises the 
creators in the industry whilst the Japanese artist is framed as an experienced forerunner. A 
similar message is conveyed in the 2008 Taiwanese film Cape No. 7, through a scene in which 
the talents of Taiwanese performers are recognised by a Japanese pop music star. YLMS cast 
the real star Fukuyama to play himself. This casting strategy was also used in Cape No. 7 in 
which Atari Kousuke played himself. Such a scene is perceived as evidence of the Taiwanese 
collective desire to join the global world (S. C. Wang, 2009, pp.254-255). The message in this 
scene of YLMS further suggests that Japanese media may be a teaching agent with regards to 





6.2.3 Urban Subjects’ Agency for Progress 
Apart from the blending of the contemporary and historical relations between Taiwan and Japan, 
the third Japan-Taiwan relation is the sexual attraction between Taiwanese men and Japanese 
women. The two violinists of AWC are both attracted to Seiko in different contexts. Seiko and 
Ting-Yu share a common element of personal history: the absence of biological parents. When 
Seiko dates Ting-Yu to understand Lisa, Ting-Yu responds more out of loneliness and their 
commonality. For the different reasons (loneliness and trust gaining), Ting-Yu and Seiko can have 
sex without true love. AWC displays a more liberal stance towards premarital sex than the 
standard of East Asian TV drama. The depiction of the loneliness of contemporary urban subjects 
is more complicated than those in many other Taiwanese idol dramas that abide by Chinese 
Confucian values. 
The previous section indicates that Siren is cursed, for many musicians who have played it 
are now either dead or in serious trouble. The Japanese owner cautions Ting-Yu not to play Siren 
before he is mentally and intellectually prepared, or Siren will lead him to death. But the cursed 
violin has mesmerised Ting-Yu; he ignores the advice and starts playing it. He has walked into 
Siren’s curse. His love affairs with Seiko and his assistant create a scandal (the first trouble). His 
other trouble lies in his music career as mentioned previously. To boost the sales, his agent even 
replaces his performance recording with Hai-Chieh’s music. Ting-Yu’s reputation collapses when 
he confronts the mistake by revealing it himself. Although the Japan represented by the Japanese 
connoisseur is culturally and economically superior, it does not play the hope role for Ting-Yu. It 
is the power of his self-agency that offers him salvation. Similar to Seiko, who is rescued by her 
mother, Ting-Yu also is empowered by Lisa and, more importantly, his own will power. His 
personal struggle is represented in a scene where he falls and floats in the water. In his life and 
death struggle, he eventually recalls Lisa’s advice. He comes to his senses, stands up on his 
own, and struggles to find a rehab centre. The recovered Ting-Yu stops playing music for 
commercialism. His individual agency frees him from Siren’s curse, reinstalling moral order into a 
commercial cultural production. 
The internal and personal struggle for career advancement is also shared by YLMS. The 
two on-screen thespians have played the role of lovers since the beginning of their careers, and 
gradually the love extends to reality. Cheng-Wei has functioned as a mentor to Man-Ling, guiding 
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her in her career. After seven years, Cheng-Wei is tired of these standardised love stories and 
his status quo. He also doubts if their love is authentic. Man-Ling tends to conform to the status 
quo. While Cheng-Wei is disrupting the operation of the star vehicle behind him, Man-Ling is 
standing on the opposite side. Their relationship is falling apart. Cheng-Wei is not a perfect 
problem resolver. Although he aspires to better works, he does not know how to achieve it in 
reality. The troubled star continues his work but his ill temper has ruined his work relationship with 
the industry. Cheng-Wei is diagnosed with depression.99 Similarly, Cheng-Wei does not rely 
solely on Japanese advice – he gains strength during his recovery through his interaction with a 
local girl, Yi-Fang. The star, who cannot be understood by most members of the industry, starts 
having illusions and schizophrenic syndromes. At his mental health clinic, a mysterious girl 
approaches him. She understands all his agonies, despair and wishes. Later he realises that the 
girl appears only in his fantasy. After the girl disappears, he meets Yi-Fang who looks similar to 
the girl in his fantasy. Through his interaction with Yi-Fang he recalls that his fantasy girl 
developed from his high-school days. In the past, he cravenly ran away when his female 
classmate was wounded in an accident. He never returned, and buried the memory deeply inside. 
Her image appears in his subconscious to signify his past, which he is scared to face. The 
demystification of the image frees some parts of him and he gradually feels the courage to 
confront all loss and troubles. He pays back all the money lost and re-starts his acting career. 
Although he is sometimes rejected by a few people who presume he is arrogant and selfish, he 
is back to a healthier condition. 
Japan is not the only reference of the Taiwanese artists in YLMS. Hong Kong obviously 
serves as another important mentorship for Man-Ling, who also finds the courage for reformation 
and transformation. She has been very dependent on other people’s protection and guidance. 
When Cheng-Wei can no longer be her guide with regards to life and her profession, Man-Ling 
feels disoriented. On the one hand, she realises that she must give Cheng-Wei some space for 
himself, so she keeps her distance from him. On the other, she must learn to be independent. 
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 In a scene of YLMS’s first episode where Cheng-Wei walks naked on the streets, his off-screen monologue presents 
the star’s nightmare: “I feel that every day is the end of the world. Have you had such horror? No one is on the street. You 
are afraid that no one can talk to you. No one knows whether you are happy or sad. No one can share with you. No one 
is here for you to hate or love. So you could only scream at yourself because you are scared that the silence suggests 
that you are deserted by people...as if you are stripped naked to walk on the street. You are very sure that many eyes are 
watching you but you see no one. All things that I used to be familiar with became strange. I want protection but I do not 
know what can protect me. I grab anything that might give me a little comfort in this end of the world so that I can be a 
little less discouraged. I am looking for something although in the end I do not know what I am looking for”. 
219 
 
She decides to go to Hong Kong alone, without her agent and assistant, for an advertisement 
shooting. In Hong Kong, the director of the advertisement notices her timid and reserved 
personality and asks her to do things that she would not have dared to do in the past. For instance, 
he asks her to go to several places in Central Hong Kong by herself and then invites her to sit on 
the street in public and interact with South East Asian migrant workers, who usually picnic in the 
public space of Central Hong Kong. 
By constructing two characters experiencing professional and personal crises, YLMS gives 
a much more adult-oriented definition of love that is beyond typical Cinderella stories. The star 
couple Cheng-Wei and Man-Ling spend most of their time probing and questioning their seven-
year intimate relationship. Most of their time together is filled with arguments and conflicts. They 
both also encounter someone who has the potential to become their new love interest. In the end, 
they reunite and realise that the true essence of love is to support another person in his or her life 
journey. 
 
6.3 Encountering South Koreans 
Since 2003, at least nine Taiwanese idol dramas have responded quickly to the popularity of 
South Korean media culture in the market by casting South Korean stars for leading roles. They 
are Scent of Love (2003), Hi My Dear (2003), Love at Aegean Sea (2004), Amor de Tarapaca 
(2004), Silence (2006), My Combat Butler (2011), Extravagant Challenge (2011), My Perfect 
Boyfriend (2012) and Fondant Garden (2012).100 Most of the dramas erased their Korean cultural 
backgrounds by giving them ethnic Chinese characters. Only Scent of Love (hereafter SL), 
Silence and Fondant Garden (hereafter FG) cast South Korean actors to play South Korean 
characters who are situated in urban, cosmopolitan Taiwan. The first one was made by Virginia 
Liu and the following two by Angie Chai. 
Briefly speaking, compared to the Taiwanese thematisations of reconciliation and reference 
in relation to the Chinese and Japanese, these interactions with South Korean media have 
displayed different themes. Similarly, the idol dramas draw on more or less historical and 
contemporary cultural relations between South Korea and Taiwan, including the existence of a 
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 I watched the dramas myself and noticed that they cast South Korean actors. 
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South Korean community in Taiwan and a Taiwanese community in South Korea. The people 
from South Korea are situated in urban Taiwan to manifest Taiwanese aspirations to be 
cosmopolitan and to be able to stand side by side with South Korea.  
Yet the envisionings differ in terms of creativity and realism and convey different sets of 
social and gender values. Chapter 5 indicates that the two packagers differ in terms of their 
packaging styles and commercial orientation and their motives for using South Korean actors. 
Virginia Liu showed more cultural and historical commitment than Angie Chai. I argue that Liu 
made SL at a time when co-operating with and shooting in South Korea was rare and risky for 
Taiwanese idol drama and when South Korean media culture was fairly new to Taiwanese 
society. She carried out the drama at a time when idol drama was in its beginning. As her plan to 
interest Korean Broadcasting System for investment did not succeed, none of the South Korean 
or Taiwanese performers were A-list actors in either South Korea or Taiwan. Kim So-Yeon, who 
gained fame through her work in the South Korean drama All about Eve (2000), was the first 
choice for the heroine, but eventually actress Chu Ja-Hyun, who was relatively unknown in both 
Taiwanese and East Asian TV, was cast to play the tragic heroine, co-starring with Taiwanese 
talent Eddie Peng, who played the hero (Wu, 2003a; b). SL has more complex articulation. It is 
deeper in terms of its exploration of relationships and its characterisation. To communicate to 
South Koreans, SL explored reincarnation – the East Asian idea of life – and constructed a tragic 
heroine struggling against patriarchy and fatalism. It forms a significant contrast to Chai’s TV 
dramas. I will explain later that Silence and FG took place when Taiwanese society was becoming 
familiar with South Korean media culture and made use of South Korean media talents without 
cultural commitment. Silence reproduced the gender roles of Dae Jang Geum, and FG 
reproduced that of Meteor Garden. With regards to class, the three idol dramas employing South 
Korean actors stage the romantic love stories across social classes. The heroes come from the 
upper class. The female protagonists are from the middle class, yet they have their jobs and 
business. 
 
6.3.1 Situating South Koreans in Cosmopolitan Taiwan 
SL purposefully displays a Taiwanese-Korean cultural and historical connection via an exploration 
on cultural (East) Asianness. The mediation is rarely seen in Taiwanese commercial media, 
whose cross-cultural narratives are usually either post-colonial or cross-Taiwan-Strait, and makes 
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this lesser-known drama worthy of academic attention. SL forges links between the traditional 
East Asian concept of reincarnation, Japanese colonial history and contemporary Taiwanese 
cultural interactions with South Korea. The drama revolves around a love triangle between the 
heroine Yin Hsiang-Chih, the hero Chin Cheng-Tian, and his competitor Pu Cheng-Chun, in their 
previous life in WWII and current, contemporary life. Contemporary South Korea and Taiwan are 
linked by ceramic art and film, represented by ceramic artists and film-makers from both societies. 
Living in Seoul (South Korea’s capital city) with his potter father, Taiwanese Cheng-Tian meets 
his reincarnated lover Hsiang-Chih, a Taiwanese-Korean female film-maker, and his contester 
Cheng-Chun, a promising South Korean film-maker, at university. They contribute to filmic 
interactions between Taiwan and South Korea – for instance, film co-productions and film festivals 
at the university. Cheng-Tian’s father Mr Chin symbolises the interaction of ceramic art between 
Taiwan and South Korea. In the drama, Mr Chin constantly travels in South Korea and Taiwan, 
teaching, researching and connecting.101 
Angie Chai’s production company is more market-driven, yet her personal resistance to 
dubbing means she gives actors characters which match the nationality and/or background of the 
stars, and sporadically draws on cultural reality (EP2, personal communication, Feb 23, 2013, 
p.9).102 In Silence, which I previously reviewed, the focus is on South Korean food. Park Eun-Hye 
plays a Taiwanese-Korean woman living in Taiwan, alongside Hong Kong actor Andy Hui, who 
plays a Hong Kong immigrant. They run a small Korean food business. 
For the consideration of the Taiwanese mass TV market, the South Korean and Hong Kong 
characters must communicate in Mandarin even though they present South Korean and Hong 
Kong identities. Thus the ethnic Chinese community in South Korea, the Korean community in 
Taiwan and Hong Kong people in Taiwan are utilised in SL and Silence. A number of Taiwanese 
individuals have had South Korean and Hong Kong backgrounds since the Cold-War period. 
Some waishengren people fled from mainland China via the Korean Peninsula to Taiwan, and 
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 SL draws on the interaction of ceramic art between the two places. For instance, Yingge Ceramics Museum of New 
Taipei City, Taiwan, held the Forum of East Asian Ceramics “Ambient Green Flow: The Emergence and Rise of East 
Asian Celadon” (10 October 2011 – 4 March 2012) and “East Asian Contemporary Ceramics Exhibition” (15 November 
2012 – 24 February 2013), displaying ceramic works from the PRC, South Korea, Japan and Taiwan (Yingge Ceramics 
Museum, 2011; 2012). 
102
 This logic of casting foreign actors to play characters with their own backgrounds was quickly replicated by many of 
the other inter-Asian dramas of Chai, such as Corner with Love (2007), Miss No Good (2008), Hi My Sweetheart (2009), 
Calling for Love (2010), Endless Love (2010), and Fondant Garden (2012) (EP2, personal communication, Feb 23, 2013, 
p.9). In these cross-cultural dramas, contemporary Taiwanese protagonists would encounter other protagonists from 
different East Asian cultural backgrounds in their romantic engagements. 
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these people developed a trade route between South Korea and Taiwan (Y. Hsiao, 2000; Cheong, 
2002). Individual contacts and movements between Hong Kong and Taiwan were also common 
during the period (Apple Daily, 2004). Yin Hsiang-Chih comes from an ethnic Chinese family living 
in South Korea. We can presume that the family is waishengren. Silence also draws on the ethnic 
diversity in urban Taiwan. With the perception of Hong Kong people living in Taiwan, writers of 
Silence designed Andy Hui’s character: 
We designed his character as a Hong Kong person moving to Taiwan from Hong Kong. When 
the British handed over Hong Kong (to PRC), many Hong Kong people moved to Taiwan and 
opened restaurants, etc. We were thinking about the character in the context…We knew that 
Andy Hui was to play in the drama. We did not like that if we have Andy Hui to play a Taiwanese. 
Thus we designed his character as a Hong Kong man coming to Taiwan with his father. He came 
here at his teenage but he was born and grew up in Hong Kong. This design matched the reality 
of the time: many Hong Kong people immigrated to Taiwan. (S1, personal communication, Feb 
4, 2013, p.12) 
 
The two foreign residents in Silence are nonetheless not noticeably different from other more 
“authentic” Taiwanese individuals. This was because the writers did not stress the difference of 
the two characters with Taiwanese people (S1, personal communication, Feb 4, 2013, p.11). The 
writers did not see their heroine as an outsider from South Korea when they created her character: 
We regarded her as Taiwanese. Her nationality might be South Korean but she loves Taiwan 
and has grown up here (in Taiwan). She is a person who loves the place…just like many 
Americans living in Taiwan, who would tell you in Hokkien that “I am Taiwanese”…Her South 
Korean background was not what we wanted to discuss in this drama. (S1, personal 
communication, Feb 4, 2013, pp.10-11) 
 
It may be argued that the foreignness of the two characters was acknowledged but the characters 
were treated as foreign people settling down in Taiwan. Just like dramas mentioned in above 
Japanese section, Silence’s construction of the two characters also strongly shows Taiwanese 
ideological desire for cosmopolitan community. 
FG that was made eight years later than SL in 2011, mediates the two countries via Western 
baking. Taiwan and South Korea are both portrayed as westernised and urban. Its heroine, a 
Taiwanese baker, goes to Seoul for a baking contest and there meets the South Korean hero. 
The plot connotes South Korea being more central than Taiwan in the global economy. It is a new 
East Asian centre in which Taiwanese talents will go on to make a name for themselves. 
 
6.3.2 Sporadically Drawing on National Relations 
All the packagers of these three dramas had no obvious intention to create political metaphors 
although they drew on parts of the reality (S1 and S2, personal communication, Feb 4, 2013, p.3; 
S5, personal communication, Feb 12, 2013, p.16; P1, personal communication, March 26, 2013, 
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p.14). They did not take any particular political stance regarding Taiwanese national politics. The 
characters move between Taiwanese (such as the declaration “I come from Taiwan”) and 
Chinese-speaking cultural identities (such as the declaration “I am Huaqiao [meaning ‘ethnic 
Chinese’]”). Yet the narratives draw on, echo and hint the political, economic and cultural realities 
of the countries in drama backgrounds for dramatic motivations. Thus they still allude to political 
and economic relationships. 
SL is narratively driven by the theme of reincarnated fate. The three protagonists all have 
two lives. Japanese colonial rule functions as the background of their first lives. In the first life, the 
previous reincarnations of Hsiang-Chih and Cheng-Tian fell in love in WWII Korea but their love 
was not accepted because Cheng-Tian’s previous analogue was a Japanese imperial soldier. 
Cheng-Chun’s previous analogue was the appointed fiancé to Hsiang-Chih. The forbidden love 
resulted in the death and curse of the fiancé, which contributed to the reincarnated destiny of the 
next life. SL glamorises the Japanese imperial soldier so that the heroine falls in love with him, 
thus increasing the dramatic conflict (for more details, see discussion in chapter 5.1). In present-
day life, Taiwanese Cheng-Tian competes with Cheng-Chun again. His Japanese analogue won 
in the previous life. In this life, Cheng-Tian is dominated by Cheng-Chun. The three protagonists 
meet each other at the Chinese Language and Cultural Society at the university in Seoul. Cheng-
Tian is much younger than Cheng-Chun (the elder founder of the society and a promising young 
film-maker adored by many young women) and Hsiang-Chih (the incumbent president of the 
society). Hsiang-Chih abides by the South Korean age system and respects Cheng-Chun very 
much. The younger, non-deferential Cheng-Tian is usually maltreated by Cheng-Chun, who rules 
the community by following South Korean ethical codes. An antagonistic relationship forms 
between Cheng-Tian and Cheng-Chun. The relationships of the male characters can be 
interpreted as allegories of the historical and contemporary competing relations between South 
Korea vs Japan, and South Korea vs Taiwan. Japan as a powerful colonial force over the 
colonised Korea forms the background of the first story. 
FG served as the promotional vehicle of South Korean idol talent Park Jung-Min, who Chai’s 
South Korea-based company (CNR Media) contracted (Chu, 2010b).103 Its narrative was driven 
by the production conditions. It constructed a South Korean rich young heir (played by Park) who 
                                                     
103
 CNR Media was co-invested by Angie Chai and the South Korea-based Roy Media (Chu, 2010b).  
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runs away from Seoul to Taipei for a vacation. In this fairly formulaic envisioning, the hero falls in 
love with Taiwanese urban culture, cuisine and people (to appeal to the market). Yet he is also in 
a personal and business conflict with his Taiwanese partner and kin – a crisis that he must resolve. 
Park’s character reconciles with his Taiwanese friends, relatives and businesses. His company 
will support the Taiwanese side, stop cut-throat competition and co-operate in the global 
economy.  
Male competition used by SL and FG is commonly seen in many idol dramas, as S5 
commented in our interview (personal communication, Feb 12, 2013, p.21), but the plotting 
coincidentally echoes recent Taiwanese-Korean economic relations. Historically, South Korea 
and Taiwan did not have either historical animosity or close interaction, although they were in 
parallel positions as Japanese colonies, the “liberalist” frontier in the Cold War, and both were 
part of the “Four Asian Tigers”. The 1950s’ Korean War that eventually divided the Korean 
Peninsula into two separate countries also resulted in American protection of the KMT-ruled 
Taiwan from the socialist expansion. During the Cold-War period, the governments in Taiwan and 
South Korea shared a similar priority of anti-Communism and had an official diplomatic 
relationship. There were cultural interactions too. The Hong Kong and Taiwanese Chinese-
language film-makers also had filmic interactions with South Korea. Hong Kong films were popular 
in South Korea during the 1970s and 1980s (Hyun, 1998). Chinese-language film-maker King Hu 
shot two feature films Legend of the Mountains (1979) and Raining in the Mountain (1979) in 
South Korea (Shih, 2009). Another Chinese-language film Love and Farewell starring Terry Hu, 
aka Hu Yin-Meng, was a Taiwanese-Korean co-production (Chiang, 2003).  
In 1992, the South Korean government established diplomatic relations with the PRC. The 
ROC government was shocked and failed to respond to the harsh diplomatic reality. Mainstream 
Taiwanese public resentment against South Korea was planted since this setback (Ko, 2009b; 
Liu, 2015). During the 1997 Asian financial crisis, the South Korean economy was gripped and 
wounded. However, in the 2000s, South Korea became a stronger competitor of Taiwanese 
business in the global economy and similarly a stronger media cultural performer and a role model 
in the East Asian cultural market (Peng, 2008). Regarding the competition from South Korea in 
manufacturing and media culture, an anti-Korean sentiment rose in the Taiwanese male-
dominated (cyber) public sphere and popular culture business in the 2000s (Yang, 2008a).   
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Fang-chih Irene Yang (2008a) has insightfully addressed two of Taiwan’s male-dominated 
public media backlashes towards South Korea. The first is economic nationalism, which sees 
South Korea as a strong economic competitor and urges Taiwan to join the global and regional 
economic integration more aggressively to compete with South Korea. In this discourse, South 
Korea is depicted by the Taiwanese business elite as a sibling rival to Taiwan, which has shared 
a similar political history as two ex-colonies of Japan (two siblings to a colonial mother) and 
adopted similar roles in the division of labour in the post-WWII world system of manufacturing 
sectors. The second discourse vulgarly expresses cultural nationalism towards South Korean 
media culture, but nevertheless wants to emulate the experience of commercial success enjoyed 
by South Korean media culture in turning Taiwanese culture into an economic asset. Observing 
how Taiwanese female audiences watched and discussed South Korean TV dramas, Yang 
argues that Taiwanese pro-Korean opinions only appear in fan spaces. The relations between 
Taiwan and South Korea became complex and entangled although mainland China and Japan 
have remained important neighbours for Taiwan. 
As for South Korea, the South Korean government stopped its diplomatic relations with the 
Taiwanese state in 1992 and established diplomatic relations with the PRC. Since then, it has 
treated Taiwan as well as Hong Kong as part of the pan-Chinese world. South Korean (cultural) 
business is concerned about how to continue the commercial success of South Korean (cultural) 
products in East Asia (including Taiwan) and even the world, while South Korean cultural 
nationalists have been articulating the commercial success of South Korean popular culture in 
East Asia (including Taiwan) as symbols of the excellence and competence of South Korean 
popular culture in expressing “Asian values” shared by a “Confucian East Asia” (Cho, 2011, 
pp.385-386). In other words, South Korea sees the shared characteristics between the pan-
Chinese world (including Taiwan) and South Korea, through the lens of the popularity of South 
Korean media culture in the pan-Chinese world. 
FG can be seen as a product targeting the fans of Park Jung-Min as well as Korean Wave. 
The drama articulates Park’s public persona with the Taiwanese attitude towards South Korea 
against the larger social economic background where Taiwan has been in competition in many 
aspects, such as the manufacturing sector and media culture business, with South Korea. A 
common idea in Taiwan is that “Taiwan can lose to Japan but cannot lose to South Korea” (Ko, 
2009b; Liu, 2015). For this part of Taiwan, Park’s character forms a threat. The ideological 
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articulation of Park’s character gives a clear message that he as a South Korean will co-operate 
with Taiwan, hoping to appeal to the Taiwanese part, and that Taiwan can survive in global 
competition, taking advantage of South Korean co-operation. 
In summary, the antagonistic relations embodied by male characters in SL and FG are 
products of dramatic formulae, which nonetheless draw on and manifest deeply rooted collective 
attitudes and emotions. SL and FG did not intend to make any political allegories, but such political 
messages would still present because the dramas and their packagers were socially and 
contextually structured, as Raymond Williams (1977; 1982) notes. 
 
6.3.3 Contesting Gender Roles 
As chapter 2 mentioned, E. Ann Kaplan (1993, p.13) distinguishes two types of women-centred 
films for female audiences: women’s melodrama is complicit in patriarchal ideology and emanates 
from a patriarchal position, and women’s films foreground the female desire to resist the 
patriarchal framing of females. Pam Cook (1983, pp.252-253) agrees with a distinction between 
two positions, yet she refines the theorisation. She argues that the line between masculine and 
feminine viewpoints is unlikely clear-cut in female-centred films because the sexual difference is 
softened and merged so that a pure female voice hardly exists (1983, pp.252-253). Their 
theorisation about the ambiguous distinction between “women’s melodrama” and “women’s film” 
applies very well to the three Taiwanese-Korean idol dramas. 
SL is a dramatisation of traditional East Asian ideas and values. The traditional concept of 
reincarnated destiny – that an individual’s difficulties in this life might be because of his or her 
deeds in their previous life – links all parts of the story in SL. Reincarnation was a popular theme 
in Chinese-language female films in the late 1980s and early 1990s (Fore, 1993). At least three 
Hong Kong commercial movies Dream Lover (1986), The Reincarnation of Golden Lotus (1989) 
and A Terracotta Warrior (1990) depicted the lives of reincarnated protagonists. According to 
Steve Fore (1993), many 1980s’ Hong Kong films wrestled with the dilemma of imported Western 
ideas mingling with traditional East Asian ideas in industrialised Hong Kong. Although East Asian 
society was importing Western ideas and new modes of socio-economic system, be it capitalism 
or socialism, traditional ways of thinking based on East Asian feudal/agrarian-based patriarchal 
values and norms remained strong. Moreover, the blending of Western capitalist-patriarchal 
notions with East Asian traditions had in some cases pushed East Asian women into a more 
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disadvantageous position as both systems have strengthened “the patriarchal status quo” and 
kept it from being questioned (Fore, 1993, pp.57-59). 
It may be argued that reincarnated destiny is an idea of life in fatalism, which is a traditional 
philosophical doctrine rooted in East Asian feudal/agrarian-based patriarchal values and norms 
(Fore, 1993, p.59). For fatalists, everything happening in life can be due to fate. Although fatalism 
has many contextual appearances, it advocates subjects to submit themselves to fate, or external 
forces, and stop resisting the current order: people have no power to influence the future or their 
own actions, and what has been predestined is inevitable. It may be argued that the wide spread 
of reincarnated destiny and fatalism indirectly helps stable the existing order in East Asian 
societies.  
As the East Asian existing order is made by the Confucian patriarchal value system, whether 
fatalism remains widespread or weakens is particularly relevant to women who lack power and 
might otherwise try and gain more autonomy. The Confucian patriarchal value system has 
remained strong in East Asian societies. East Asian patriarchal nation-states have defined 
Confucian patriarchal ideas, values and behaviour codes as a dimension of (East) Asianness and 
East Asian identity to explain the economic growth of the countries (Chua, 2004, pp.201-202). 
Yet some of the values (submission and collective respect) have been criticised as an ideological 
tool for the East Asian patriarchy to maintain social stability, noted by Eugkang Koh (2008, p.347). 
The traditional theory and its social system might become a source of repression for modern 
subjects and no longer interest women who identify themselves with modern and progressive 
values (Huang, 2008, p.199). Thus, the way romantic stories, films and TV dramas targeting 
women thematise fatalism/reincarnated destiny (whether they praise the idea or stimulate deep 
thoughts on it from audiences) is an issue for East Asian feminist media criticism (Fore, 1993; F.-
M. Lin, 2006, pp.67-68). 
To apply Kaplan’s categorisation, Hong Kong films involving reincarnation have used two 
approaches to the theme. The first and more commercially appealing, which is explicit in A 
Terracotta Warrior, mainly uses it as a plotting device for the romantic reunion of reincarnated 
lovers and has a happy ending. The East Asian belief is reinforced in this film – “women’s 
melodrama” in Kaplan’s definition. The second, which is displayed in Dream Lover and The 
Reincarnation of Golden Lotus, depicts the tragedy of reincarnated subjects who cannot 
overcome their fates. Using the case of The Reincarnation of Golden Lotus, Fore (1993, p.65) 
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argues that the female-focused film stages the melodramatic tragedy of a heroine, who is unable 
to transcend patriarchal normativity and conceive of a future alternative, so as to criticise East 
Asian patriarchal authority. The film – “women’s film” in Kaplan’s definition – criticises patriarchy, 
by showing reincarnation as source of female suffering and pinpointing the dilemma of the 
blending of Western and Confucian patriarchal value systems.  
Although Fore’s comment was referring to the late 1980s’ Hong Kong films, his insights 
can also be applied to SL and East Asia in the 2000s. East Asian women have been receiving 
Western values by watching Western TV dramas, such as Sex and the City; yet they are still tied 
by traditional East Asian Confucian ethics and gender codes so that they hold an ambivalent 
attitude towards the sexual freedom in these Western dramas (Huang, 2008, p.199). They also 
treat the affluent lifestyles in Beverly Hills 90210 more as a fantasy (Iwabuchi, 2002, p.148). These 
lead them to more adoptable and resonant TV dramas. Japanese and South Korean dramas 
became regionally popular because they provide the women with handy, adoptable templates in 
contemporary contexts – modern East Asian female models that manage an ideal compromise 
between traditional East Asian and imported Western values and gender codes, set in a modern 
East Asian city space (Iwabuchi, 2002, pp.144-151; Lin and Tong, 2008, pp.105-108; Zhu, 2008, 
p.95; Choi, 2010). In other words, refashioning and reaffirming East Asian values with a modern 
appearance – rather than abandoning them – is key for East Asian dramas to be popular among 
regional viewers. They are more of “women’s melodramas” in this perspective, speaking to the 
desire of the individuals situated in a neo-Confucian patriarchal context by offering utopian 
templates that are complicit with Confucian and capitalist value systems. 
SL thematised “reincarnation” because it wanted to build a bridge of understanding with 
South Korea.104 
I have always thought that reincarnation between previous and current lives is very interesting. I 
myself am very attracted to the subject-matter. When I wanted to co-operate with the South 
Koreans, I was thinking about what I should thematise in order to make a love between 
characters across diverse cultures strong and unbreakable. It seemed that the mysterious theme 
of reincarnation was an excellent idea…In South Korea there is a similar belief. I feel that 
basically all Asians have such a belief. Even Western psychology has taken up this idea. Drama 
should have some fantastic elements. It does not have to be just a romance in the current 
life…Human beings have always imagined all kinds of stories. (P1, personal communication, 
March 26, 2013, p.12) 
 
                                                     
104
 East Asian horror films also employ reincarnation in the plots. There have been other instances of East Asian screen 
makers using the theme of reincarnation when making an effort to seek inter-Asian cinematic cross-pollination, and to 
promote cultural ties between more geographically and politically distinct countries. In the omnibus horror film Three 
(2002), which was a “pan-Asian project” carried out by Thai, Hong Kong and South Korean film-makers, Thai director 
Nonzee Nimibutr also selected the concept as the main theme in his segment termed The Wheel (N. J. Y. Lee, 2011). 
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Yet SL did not appraise the East Asian value; instead it noted its suppression of the modern 
woman, combining the essence of Dream Lover and The Reincarnation of Golden Lotus. SL was 
a loose adaptation of Dream Lover and a South Korean popular novel called Scent of 
Chrysanthemum. The film gave SL the subject-matter of reincarnation, whilst the novel provided 
the structure of SL’s contemporary storyline (Nien, 2003; Power Generation Entertainment, 2004, 
p.153; P1, personal communication, March 26, 2013, p.10). This rarely-seen depiction shed light 
on the contradiction between modern/westernised East Asians (both Taiwanese and South 
Koreans) and the traditional way of thinking. SL’s centre is a sensible heroine Hsiang-Chih who 
is suppressed by East Asian patriarchal and capitalist value systems, struggles against them but 
fails to break the curse and the barriers they impose. This struggle concerning the individualities 
of East Asian women caught between progressive values, which advocate female independence, 
and traditional values (female submission and marriage), is encapsulated in the heroine. She 
undergoes a conscious transition from initially disagreeing with the old idea of life to finally 
surrendering to it. A few South Korean men who believe in this idea, e.g. an old fortune teller and 
an old traditional dance maestro, foresee her destiny and play important roles in guiding her to 
the doctrine. In the opening of SL, Hsiang-Chih is rushing to her society event when she collides 
with an old fortune teller who foresees her destiny. At that moment, she does not believe in the 
idea of reincarnated destiny and walks into her destiny, meeting Cheng-Tian and Cheng-Chun 
and starting their predestined cycle. The male characters are both driven by destiny. Cheng-Tian 
keeps dreaming about his previous life and is unconsciously driven by his fate. The fiancé cursed 
Hsiang-Chih and Cheng-Tian for the loss of his life. In this life, Cheng-Chun, driven by the curse, 
is trying to break Hsiang-Chih and Cheng-Tian. The central motif of predestined destiny in SL is 
emphasised again when, seven years later, an old South Korean traditional dance maestro 
foretells Hsiang-Chih’s fate. At the time, Hsiang-Chih is more attracted to yet still confused at the 
telling of her destiny. Eventually when Hsiang-Chih sees her previous life via hypnosis, she starts 
associating the current love triangle with her past life and believes that her destiny in this life is to 
return what she owes back to Cheng-Chun.  
In the meantime, Hsiang-Chih’s film-making career is unsuccessful. Her other trouble 
concerns the challenge of being an educated woman struggling for more autonomy in South 
Korean society and the male-dominated film industry. The difficulty faced by film-makers in a 
profit-driven commercial industry is also depicted when Hsiang-Chih’s boss puts commercial 
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pressure on her. She rejects working for a commercialistic South Korean film director of whom 
she does not regard highly. This plotting is for realistic motivation. Liu drew on her own 
observation on the gender division in South Korean show business and the wider society. 
In the South Korean society, women are in general inferior to men. So maybe it was an 
unconscious decision on my part to construct this heroine in this way. The gender inequality in 
South Korea has been worse than that in Taiwan. Comparatively speaking, Taiwanese society 
has a more equal gender relation. For instance, many Japanese friends have asked why there 
are so many female TV producers in Taiwan. There are fewer in South Korea and Japan. In 
South Korea many scriptwriters are women but there are few female directors…even fewer 
female producers. (P1, personal communication, March 26, 2013, p.15) 
 
Unfortunately, for melodramatic motivation and consideration of South Korean market (for more 
details, see chapter 5.1), SL gives no hope to Hsiang-Chih, who had violated South Korean taboo 
and been cursed in her previous life. She cannot break the destiny in this life.  
The South Korean gender relationship is quite traditional in SL. Cheng-Chun requests 
Hsiang-Chih to be his girlfriend without getting her approval in advance. He also pressurises her 
through her mother, who asks her to marry him and stop working as a bohemian documentary 
film-maker. Hsiang-Chih does not find much support and gives up on her besieged life out of 
despair. Facing all these difficulties, she indulges herself in alcohol and dies of cancer. In light of 
Fore (1993), I argue that, albeit SL’s melodramatic character, its construction of a tragic heroine 
encourages audiences to consider South Korea’s patriarchal value system critically, but at the 
same time leads them to think about questions such as whether the heroine is really guilty of her 
deed, and whether she needs to pay for her previous sin in this life. In this regard, SL can be seen 
as a complicated combination of Kaplan’s “women’s film” and cross-cultural drama. 
Whilst SL encourages its audience to think about the role of East Asian values in modern 
East Asia from multiple perspectives, Silence and FG reproduce the idealistic templates of the 
modern East Asian femininities in Dae Jang Geum and Meteor Garden. The sharp difference 
between Liu’s and Chai’s TV dramas that cast South Korean talents, indicates the gradual 
standardisation and market-driven inclination in the Taiwanese interactions with South Korean 
media culture. 
The heroines of Silence and FG are both new figures of Cinderella who end up dating rich 
men. I have discussed in 6.1.3 that Silence’s characterisation of the heroine is subordinated to 
the official values of the PRC. Park Euh-Hye’s character does not divert away from the Confucian 
gender codes in Dae Jang Geum that speaks to Chinese official values. Silence also presents 
the world of the rich, yet it holds an open stance regarding the heroine because she does not 
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marry to a rich person. FG is a romantic comedy. The heroine, played by Taiwanese actress Jian 
Man-Shu, is also a modern Cinderella, someone who is strong-willed and financially independent, 
on the one hand, and tender, considerate, faithful and willing to sacrifice, on the other. She is a 
talented cake baker, who goes to Seoul for a baking contest where she meets the South Korean 
protagonist. Like the heroines in many South Korean and Taiwanese romantic comedies, e.g. Full 
House or Meteor Garden, she lives happily with the young rich South Korean man in the end. 
Silence and FG provide utopian fantasies that speak to East Asian women’s desires in a 
neo-Confucian East Asian context, yet they do not pinpoint the problems of the new dilemma of 
East Asian femininity – the difficulty in balancing between patriarchal family values and personal 
career. Women joining the workforce in fact satisfice the demands of capitalism; yet women also 
need to meet the social expectation of entering into marriage (Fore, 1993; Lin and Tong, 2008, 
pp.111-114). Silence and FG reveal women’s desires, yet they are still “women’s melodramas” 
that are complicit with the patriarchal capitalist value system. Their ambiguous attitude towards 
patriarchal capitalist value applies to Pam Cook’s (1983) argument that the two types of women’s 
TV dramas towards patriarchal values are not clear-cut. Women’s melodrama and the patriarchal 
capitalist value system evolve to address and incorporate the new desires of women. 
 
6.4 Conclusion 
This chapter interprets the inter-Asian imaginations in Taiwanese idol dramas. It is aimed at 
understanding both the complicit and critical stances the dramas are taking towards the three 
dominant forces of East Asia (patriarchy, nationalism and capitalism/commercialism). I have 
chosen three groups of bilateral imaginations, each of which covers two to three works made at 
different historical moments. Briefly speaking, they are overall adherent to the dominant systems, 
yet they have different breakthroughs in different aspects. The dramas penetrated by the 
dominant pro-American, globalised, Taiwan-centric and anti-Communist ideology in 
contemporary Taiwan, have placed those inter-Asian subjects in a multicultural, post-colonial, 
post-Cold War, globalised and urban Taiwanese backdrop. The dialogues as a whole are diverse, 
seemingly open-ended and even contradictory, usually composed of several social, economic 
and cultural bilateral and sometimes multilateral inter-Asian encounters. The narratives form a 
multi-faceted system of images that together draw on and represent the Taiwanese economic, 
232 
 
political and cultural relations with other East Asian counterparts in the backgrounds. The 
mediated Taiwanese “East Asian relations” are by no means singular. They vary according to 
their contexts and are characterised by the temporally specific demands made of themselves and 
their counterparts and artists they utilise. Focusing on one singular bilateral expression, such as 
Taiwanese-Chinese or Taiwanese-Japanese, would not holistically display the multiple inter-
Asian networks that Taiwanese society is situated in. 
The Taiwanese perspective of East Asia should be understood as an entity composed of 
several blocs with various degrees of relevance, ranging from the politically and ideologically 
contradictory PRC, culturally influential Japan, parallel South Korea, not-very-relevant South East 
Asia, and mysterious (ex-) Communist bloc. 
Lila Abu-Lughod’s (2004) argument that women-oriented TV dramas are ambiguous 
“performative subjects” of a post-colonial patriarchal nationalist discourse, is applicable in this 
chapter. The chosen dramas do not turn to anarchism. They selectively absorb the KMT and 
DPP’s national discourses to articulate the cultural and national differences or tensions between 
the nations and therefore provide templates concerning values and identities that their target 
audiences in Taiwan and other East Asian countries can identify with and comprehend. As a 
commercial and mainstream media product, the idol dramas’ expressions are the negotiated 
versions of the dominant ideological and value systems in the PRC, Japan and South Korea. 
Economically, they serve the interests of both Taiwanese and non-Taiwanese media businesses. 
Their cultural and historical accounts appear sporadically in the dramas’ backgrounds but are 
constrained by commercial rules. The otherness of foreigners is controlled so that the dramas 
can focus on their main themes. They do not lead their audiences to face irresolvable regional 
differences and difficulties, such as foreign characters having extreme difficulties when settling in 
Taiwan. Instead, they address the economic and cultural imperatives of interactions and co-
operations. 
Among a large number of Taiwanese-Chinese idol dramas, including those that are 
completely funded by and tailored to the PRC market, only a few have cross-cultural envisionings. 
Socio-economic and cultural reconciliations with various PRC subjects have been common in the 
envisionings. Such reconciliations usually take place between local Chinese individuals and a 
Taiwanese capitalist figure that is expanding business in the PRC. The dramas avoid offending 
the globally hegemonic political discourse of contemporary Chinese officialdom with regards to 
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Taiwanese political identity. Resistant political expressions indicating potential political 
controversies, or any activities related to the Taiwanese independence movement, are absent in 
these dramas. 
The exhibitions of the Taiwanese who interact with the Japanese in Taiwanese-Japanese 
idol dramas, have served Japanese promotion to the East Asian markets of its various forms of 
soft power, such as tourist places and media culture. The Taiwanese idol drama industry, on the 
other hand, capitalises on Japanese elements to appeal to the domestic interest in Japanese 
modernity. Taiwanese-Japanese idol dramas draw on the overlapping post-colonial and 
globalised connections. Japan is envisioned as an expert to whom the Taiwanese reference. The 
Japanese who settle down in Taiwan in the dramas address the Taiwanese desire to be 
cosmopolitan. Female Japanese characters are framed as being more malleable in terms of their 
ethnic identification and tend to treat Taiwan as home. Male Japanese characters played by 
actors based in the Japanese media industry, act as authoritative figures towards the Taiwanese 
with regards to culture; their interactions have little relevance to ethnic hybridisation.  
The displays in Taiwanese-Korean co-operations of Taiwanese interactions with South 
Korean elements also build upon the consumption of South Korean media culture in globalised 
Taiwan that welcomes another form of East Asian modernity. These dramas exploit the surplus 
of the market value of South Korean media culture which has cashed in by sending its talents to 
perform in other East Asian media. Interacting with South Koreans is different from interacting 
with Taiwan’s ex-coloniser, Japan, its political adversary, PRC, or its not-so-relevant South-East 
Asian neighbours in the collective imaginations of Taiwanese society. The PRC and Japanese 
elements are usually related to reconciliation and reference but less familiar South Korean ones 
are bridged with a common East Asian root. South Korea as a similar, parallel but unfamiliar non-
ethnic-Chinese East Asia, has generated Taiwanese interest in exploring traditional East Asian 
value or (East) Asianness, which the Taiwanese would not think of when interacting with Chinese, 
Japanese or South-East Asians. The thematisation of reincarnated fate in SL suggests that South 
Korea provides a gateway to (East) Asianness in the imaginations of Taiwan. The Taiwanese also 
draws on its past and present relations with South Korea in the idol dramas. The South Koreans 
are situated in cosmopolitan Taiwan. The competing relation between Taiwan and South Korea 
is represented by male characters for dramatic motivation.  
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In terms of social values and individualities, idol dramas are more of the hegemonic 
articulations of capitalist values. Stuart Hall’s (1974; 1982; 1986a; 1989) critique to mass media 
applies in the idol dramas. Working-class men and their discourse hardly exist. Yet these social 
and gender expressions vary according to the target markets’ values. Some give mild critique to 
capitalism, e.g. the works mentioned above in the Japanese section.  
The representations of the vulnerable in Silence and FW emanate from capitalist hegemonic 
articulation. The value system of capitalism dominates in the articulations connecting the upper 
class with other social groups. A rich male or female protagonist has been very common in the 
idol dramas that are strongly attached to urban consumerism as a showcase for urban wealthy 
lifestyles. The rich protagonists would encounter other characters of lower socio-economic status 
in their regional travels, including heroines coming from the middle or working class. They address 
the socio-economic groups that are economically inferior to them. Cultural workers and 
performers, who make names in show business, have also been popular professional choices for 
main characters because they have quite transnational lifestyles and work experiences. They are 
also central in the new economy of the world.  
Capitalist values are less dominant in Taiwanese-Japanese idol dramas. The dilemma of 
the contemporary economic system is more evident in those dramas that probe the internal 
conflicts of urban characters. Co-productions with the Japanese have had more space to address 
the complicated intimate relationships of modern urban subjects. The Japanese market also 
offers space for genres concerning marginal figures such as gangsters. The troubles of the urban 
subjects do not come from socio-economic tension. Constructing internally conflicting urban 
characters struggling in crises, such as contemporary cultural workers and gangsters, 
complicates the process of the urban subjects’ road to salvation and appraises the significance 
of individual agency to fight against negative forces in a capitalist society. 
The Taiwanese-PRC co-productions usually express more conservative values towards 
gender roles since the PRC TV ethos is largely controlled by the state. Gender is also a big issue 
in the Taiwanese-Korean dramas. The dramas either speak to female desires with idealistic 
modern East Asian femininities that satisfy the traditional East Asian value system and capitalist 
value system, or reveal the contradiction in this social expectation towards the femininities. The 
mediated communication with the South Korean market in SL also negotiates with South Korean 
patriarchal nationalism. The Asianness (such as the idea of reincarnated destiny), which is rooted 
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in traditional values and organisational norms, is seemingly a source of repression for progressive 
East Asian women demanding more autonomy in SL. SL’s complex signification may serve as a 
perfect space for us to ponder the role of traditional East Asian values on contemporary East 
Asian women.  
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Chapter 7 Conclusion 
7.1 Scattered Hegemonies, Globalisation and Commercial Drive 
The main focus of my thesis is the inter-Asian packaging and mediated articulations of idol drama 
from Taiwan in the twenty-first century. I shall conclude this research by elaborating its three 
definitive characteristics: scattered hegemonies, globalisation and commercial drive. Briefly 
speaking, Taiwanese idol drama’s inter-Asian packaging has articulated several similar but 
different hegemonic forces located inside Taiwan and in East Asia in an age of globalisation in 
the logic of commercialism. Responding to the geo-politically and historically constituted forces, 
the mediated articulations, via the dramas, contradict yet overlap with each other. 
The thesis argues that “fragmentation”, or positively speaking, heterogeneity, has become a 
shared characteristic of Taiwanese politics, society, TV production and imagination. To begin 
with, Taiwan has been the target of various stronger countries that have tried to become leaders 
of East Asia over the last two centuries. Some of these were traditional opponents, and some 
were new East Asian patriarchal political regimes that experienced (Western, Sino or Japanese) 
imperialism in different ways. They were/are the Old Sino Empire, the Japanese Empire, the KMT 
and the CCP.  
After WWII, several patriarchal nationalist forces were scattered throughout the region. Their 
emergences and discourses are historically and geo-politically conditioned by Western 
imperialism, global capitalism and regional power relation. The patriarchal nationalist discourses 
are in continuous competition for resources. They are both similar and different on multiple levels, 
coded along specific sexual, geo-political and cultural axes, so that the dominance of their values 
needs to be analysed at multiple levels. They are also full of contradictions when interacting with 
each other.  
Firstly, the geo-politics before and during colonial and Cold-War periods affected and were 
internalised by Taiwanese subjectivity. The latter may have split into even smaller internal political 
factions that stood with specific larger neighbouring forces. The pattern of contestation between 
these domestic political factions structurally corresponds to that of larger geo-politics in the region. 
After WWII, a post-colonial patriarchal authoritarian government (KMT) ruled this small country 
for almost sixty years (1945-2000) and stood with the US, exchanging American protection with 
its own resources (militarily strategic position, labour, etc.) during the Cold War. It implanted the 
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two most determining ideologies into Taiwanese society: pro-Americanism and anti-Communism. 
After the 1970s, it gradually lost political legitimacy and could not suppress opposition forces as 
before. Its major oppositional force – the DPP and Taiwanese nation-building movement – 
emerged in the 1980s. The DPP challenged the KMT, leading to the latter’s relative decline. Since 
then Taiwan has been split into more than two political discourses. These two domestic patriarchal 
nationalist and capitalist political forces have competed to rule Taiwan since the late 1980s, the 
dawn of globalisation. Though the DPP contested against the Sino-centric KMT, it nevertheless 
internalised the KMT’s pro-Americanism and anti-Communism. In short, the KMT and the DPP 
are “small”, and under the influence of regional and global powers.  
Secondly, the KMT would be pressurised by both foreign and domestic forces for 
deregulation of the value-laden, commodity-form media that it once controlled. These forces 
included neo-liberalist Western media groups, bottom-up domestic political groups, and even the 
cultural groups who shared similar values but had different commercial interests. In the 
complicated network of relations, the contestation of larger politics would relay “down” to cultural 
fields. But the relaying effect did not produce absolutely corresponding patterns in the cultural 
fields, with the result that the cultural fields looked relatively autonomous.  
The homologous transition of TV was not much in evidence in the 1980s and unfolded starkly 
during the 1990s, partially reflecting the political contestation during the 1980s and early 1990s. 
Yet three other forces pressed the KMT to open up the TV market previously oligopolised by its 
three terrestrial TV stations (the Old Three). The Taiwanese media enterprises holding the anti-
KMT political stance founded their new TV stations. Another domestic commercial force came 
from Taiwanese media entrepreneurs who intended to expand into the overseas ethnic-Chinese 
media market, especially the PRC – these people were also planning to build their own 
international media businesses. The third force was transnational satellite TV that utilised popular 
foreign programmes to expand into the Taiwanese market. In this period of deregulation, other 
foreign imports also benefited. Non-profit TV, including the public TV system and religious TV 
stations, were founded at the time. These social bodies were much minor in the competition of 
discursive power in Taiwanese public; yet they managed to found their own TV channels in the 
late 1990s. 
Thirdly, various cultural production fields (e.g. TV as a field and TV drama as TV’s sub-field) 
had their own conditions and principles of operation. The access of new groups to a specific 
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cultural field depended on the field’s nature and operational principles. If art film and public TV 
programming were closer to resistant and critical mediated articulations in their respective fields, 
commercial film and idol drama adhering to commercial principles were more mainstream, 
complicit with the dominant discourses. Competing with each other according to specific 
principles, producers in the field of idol drama produced their TV dramas that were also in a range 
between mainstream and marginal, dominant and resistant, and complicit and critical expressions.  
Cut-throat competition in the TV industry caused the fragmentation of TV consumption in 
Taiwan in the 1990s. Female consumption of TV drama was divided into four main categories. 
Teenagers and women in their 20s were particularly interested in the Japanese star-centred 
dramas that gave them modern East Asian templates for their values and daily lives at the time. 
Married and older women were targeted by three main groups of TV dramas: Sino-centric 
historical dramas; localist multi-episode dramas with a Taiwanese background; and foreign TV 
dramas, especially those from South Korea. These three drama sources disseminated more 
traditional family values than the Japanese and US products. 
In the 2000s, domestic variety-show producers who worked in the Old Three, turned to 
drama production. The new drama producers worked together with new directors and scriptwriters 
in order to win back domestic female youngsters in their teens and early 20s by adapting a light 
romantic Japanese manga and copying Japanese TV drama’s aesthetics. The pioneering work 
Meteor Garden successfully addressed female desire and class anxiety in both Taiwan and other 
relatively developing countries in East Asia, by means of utopian heterosexual romantic fantasy. 
It also created regional interests for Taiwanese TV products as a supplement to Japanese and 
South Korean products.  
As its target audience very much overlapped with those of both Japanese and South Korean 
TV dramas, the latter succeeded in expanding its audience base to teenage female audiences 
around the mid-2000s. The increasingly competitive regional market and deteriorating domestic 
production conditions pushed the Taiwanese drama producers to, firstly, expand their target 
audience to women in their early 40s and, secondly, adopt more patterns of inter-Asian packaging 
that made flexible use of foreign production means. Thus my fourth finding is that, situating in a 
laissez-faire market, these Taiwanese media production agents started resorting to strategic 
international “co-operations” – an exchange of production means. They would establish many 
forms of bilateral or trilateral exchange relations between owners of capitals, talent and skills, etc. 
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The packagers chose to ally and connect themselves with particular foreign co-operators in 
specific ways, according to their strategies and the interests of the potential co-operators. This 
also implies that a packaging agent could find it hard to form an “ideal” alliance with some resource 
owners whose more valuable resources were also pursued by other idol drama packagers. So a 
packager had to keep making efforts to attract better foreign co-operators.  
These Taiwanese idol drama packagers have taken several directions of inter-Asian 
commercial exchanges at different moments. They have tactically made use of other East Asian 
media enterprises and also been used by the latter. South East Asia, the PRC and Japan, have 
been important funding sources for them over the last decade and early 2010s. The funding 
distributors exchanged their market bases for, firstly, the distribution rights of Taiwanese idol 
dramas and, secondly, the exposures of their own domestic talents to the region via debuts in the 
dramas. Japanese talent agencies, which used to be not interested in overseas performing, also 
started to let their own talents debut in Taiwanese idol drama. Overall, Taiwan’s idol drama’s 
advantage was its smaller regional popularity and visibility. Japanese and South Korean 
collaborators have traded with the packagers their production means: stories (manga), actors and 
settings which are sought after in Taiwanese and East Asian female markets. 
Fifth, most of the packagings oscillate on spectrums ranging between dominant and resistant, 
mainstream and marginal, conforming and critical articulations, significantly depending on the 
partners they exchange resources with and their articulation approaches. Commercial mediated 
articulations are formed in a choric manner while those with less commercial drive tend to express 
criticism. A unity of consensus forms a linkage between one foreign co-operator and one domestic 
packager (both of whom represent the interests of their own national and social cultural groups) 
on both the differences and similarities of their value systems (patriarchal, nationalist and 
capitalist spirits). Yet one linkage might contradict another, so the field is not without contestation: 
packaging groups must defend themselves for legitimacy, which mainly concerns their foreign co-
operators and packaging strategies.  
Chapter 5 examines four inter-Asian packaging strategies in idol drama that locate generally 
closer to the mainstream axis on the spectrum mentioned above. Their packagers’ personalities, 
preferences, vision and strategies locate at different positions on the spectrum. These packagings 
have two main forms of inter-Asian contestation: one horizontal and another vertical. Horizontal 
contestation refers mainly to the competition from the idol dramas made by drama producers that 
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adopt different strategies. Vertical contestation refers to negotiation between the managerial and 
creative sides. The negotiation forms an articulation of the dominant and the dominated, more 
precisely, two sets of vertical articulations (the first one between Taiwanese packager and non-
Taiwanese partner, and the second between the packager and members of packaging team). It 
happens when drama workers hold beliefs and creative ideas that are different from that of their 
leader and also different from their foreign co-operator. The drama workers would experience 
suppression from the leader because they do not share similar schema with each other. As the 
managerial packagers generally incline to compromise in favour of the dominant group, the drama 
workers holding non-mainstream ideas are tamed, in the inter-Asian packagings. If they do not 
leave the project, they can either contest or negotiate with the dominant. The situation is 
applicable with Hall’s theory that in mass media, the dominant discourse will negotiate with the 
non-mainstream voice but the latter remains in subordination (Hall, 1974; 1982; 1986a; b; 1989). 
Sixth, commercial productions are in general “conservative” – adopting melodramatic 
convention, conforming to patriarchal nationalist and capitalist values, and inclining to 
depoliticisation. However, they never completely obey all the dominant forces of the region. 
Rather, they have varying and contextual scales of criticality and conformity because the 
patriarchal nationalist discourses they have encountered were also temporally and spatially 
constitutive, dominant and dominated in different contexts. Also, these discourses can be 
contested by commercialism that wants to appeal to suppressed social groups, leaving the 
Taiwanese idol dramas in a grey area where they cannot really distance themselves from the 
East Asian scattered patriarchal nationalist capitalist value systems. They might provide a “petite 
mild critique”, showing “flexible conformity” to the regionally hegemonic forces – which is one of 
their ways to unconsciously participate in regional political discussion. 
Taiwanese women’s TV markets have not been keen to include politics into the background 
of dramas, probably because the two main domestic political parties (the KMT and DPP) and the 
PRC have not given enough opportunity for the women to talk about their ideas. The idol drama 
that addresses women and is sometimes made by women, has avoided national politics, and 
shows a tendency to denationalisation. The drama may well be set in a fictional background and 
only focuses on class and gender issues. This can be seen as its contextually escapist spirit. Yet 
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women would not automatically share nationalist discourses when they at times talked. 105 
Transnational backgrounds appear in some of the commercial TV dramas alongside the 
contingency of globalisation. Their articulations are juxta-political and in the background, with 
varying scales of emphasis. Still, these narrations do not strongly endorse a nationalist discourse. 
They emanate ambiguously from a political discourse instead, responding to and articulating 
another nationalist discourse. Some of the packaging of idol dramas shows interest in cross-
cultural interaction and a critical spirit. The absence of historical cultural backgrounds in Tsai 
Yueh-Hsun’s works does not absolutely mean a lack of criticality in any aspects. 
Chapter 6 analyses seven idol dramas that articulate in their mediations various bilateral or 
trilateral linkages between Taiwanese factions and their foreign co-operators, in different 
historically and spatially specific contexts. The seven dramas are different with each other in terms 
of their conformity to patriarchal, nationalist and capitalist values of Taiwan and the co-operating 
country, and their differences are exactly a demonstration of cultural contestation, as chapter 5 
indicates. Their manifestations of criticality vary on different levels with different scales. Whilst 
some of the cross-cultural narratives are very much in line with dominant values, such as Fondant 
Garden, most of them negotiate with the existing ideas, social values and political discourses of 
the similar yet different East Asian patriarchal nationalist capitalist regimes. One that is more 
cutting-edge in social and gender values may be subordinated to the funding market’s dominant 
discourse about national relationships (such as Scent of Love, Alice in Wonder City, You Light up 
My Star and Gangster’s Bakery). Scent of Love dares to explore cross-cultural debate, provoking 
thoughts and cross-cultural understanding. Targeting Japanese markets, Alice in Wonder City 
and You Light up My Star reveal the contradictions of the capitalist system. Silence shows a mild 
critique of domineering patriarchal capitalism, and depicts mildly progressive femininity (no longer 
Cinderella but a mix of Cinderella and Gaia). It addresses how the Taiwanese see themselves in 
relation to the PRC and the Taiwanese aspiration to become a multicultural and cosmopolitan 
society. Yet as the PRC’s state-approved TV system became more tightly monitored by its 
government with neo-Confucian policy, the patriarchal capitalist values, that are also shared by 
                                                     
105
 In fact, women are talking. In the study of Eva Tsai (2007, pp.143-144), ethno-nationalist contestation between the 
KMT, the DPP and the PRC is becoming considered by a number of Taiwanese and Chinese women as an “irrational 
source” of chaos and disaster in their opinion. 
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the patriarchal values of Taiwan, dominate the signification of the Taiwanese idol dramas that 
received PRC funding for this market, such as Fathers’ War. 
 
7.2 Self Critique and Future Research Directions 
The research is my attempt to make sense of Taiwanese TV dramas’ multiple bilateral linkages 
with non-Taiwanese East Asian societies and media in a globalisation age. The production of 
meaning on the audience’s side is beyond the current scope of the research. I focused on the 
production side, which is never the end of the production of meaning, which is realised by the 
receiving individuals. I had some discussions about the female-oriented dramas’ responses to 
patriarchal, nationalist and capitalist value systems when examining the dramas in the textual 
analysis. But they are only from my subjective interpretation, which is only one node (probably a 
more critical one aiming to disrupt mainstream interpretation of mass media) in the whole circuit 
of meanings, where audiences, who watch TV drama in a more ordinary setting, play key roles.  
The analysis of the packagers’ strategies and mediations mainly accounts for how idol 
drama’s inter-Asian packaging and mediated articulations have realised diverse economic and 
cultural imperatives from the perspective of Taiwanese economy, TV industry of female TV 
dramas, and commercial media workers, some of whom are also female. Inspired by Pierre 
Bourdieu (1993) and Stuart Hall (1974; 1982; 1986a; b), I have illustrated the horizontal 
competitions between idol drama production companies and vertical contestations between 
Taiwanese packaging members and their foreign co-operators. These competitions and 
contestations are also inter-Asian because they are related to the other East Asian societies and 
media cultures. 
Bourdieu’s study of symbolic production was designed to examine how social relations would 
be structurally and homologously relayed to cultural production (1977; 1984; 1993). Chapter 5 
noted the contesting relations between packagers and their different strategies (commercial 
localism, PRC co-production, adapting Japanese manga, global culture making and narrative 
inter-Asian drama). The research points out the significance of several parameters, such as 
gender, ethnicity, seniority and work history in the inter-Asian packagings. The packagers and 
packaging members come from the ethnicities of waishengren or benshengren; they are women 
and men who come from different generations and started their careers at different times. All of 
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the factors influenced their personalities, imaginations about the female audience, strategies and 
end products. Yet the research did not fully unpack the homologous relation between political and 
cultural fields: how the field of idol drama is homologously related to the political environment both 
domestic and regional. It is difficult to have an ultimately scientific answer since contemporary 
female-oriented dramas are very sophisticated works and are over-determined by many factors. 
The making of a drama is mainly decided by its producer, but at the same time it is still full of 
chaos, accidents, and emergencies. Besides, the people also change in themselves throughout 
their work history, adapting to the emergent social values in market competition.  
Nonetheless, this does not prevent us from delving into TV packagers’ personal details and 
foreign linkages in the field. Perhaps fuller answers to this research question could be obtained if 
the research could carefully, or even fully, de-anonymise information of the participants, including 
their personal backgrounds and experiences/trajectories, their views of the industry and their 
unique strategies. This further theorisation of the homology between female TV drama and male-
centred national politics would need careful arrangement of the information of participants. As 
many Taiwanese TV workers might use camouflage and thereby produce a polysemic articulation 
or interpretation at the time, in the thesis, I decided to anonymise most of my informants in order 
to protect them, although only some of them requested for partial anonymity. Alternatively, the 
question could probably be answered in a research that fully anonymises the information.  
 
7.3 The Future of Inter-Asian Commercial Packagings of Taiwan 
Living in an era in which crossing a border is a frequent and even daily experience for many East 
Asians, critical analysts need to keep an eye on inter-Asian images, discerning complicity, 
conformity and criticality in the works, as Shu-mei Shih (2007, p.191) calls for. “Narrative inter-
Asian drama” is likely to remain an emergent subject-matter in avant-garde art and art-house 
cinema in East Asia because such narrations depict the contemporary reality of the region. Yet, I 
am more curious about how commercial packaging would absorb this theme, as mass media’s 
evolution as “mass mediations of popular and emergent values and ideas” shows the general 
transformation of a society. Will the inter-Asian packaging of multinational elements remain a 
commercially profitable operation? Or is it more likely to be only a short-term phenomenon (in 
Taiwan) that will eventually be replaced by “the PRC co-productions”? And how should we 
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perceive the PRC co-productions? Analysing its future development or disappearance provides 
a way to see the transformation of a larger part of society, rather than only a small number of 
individuals. 
Cultural workers and their industries are tied to their environment through several levels of 
sociality: political economy, creative convention and the workers’ own personal consciousness. 
The future of Taiwan’s inter-Asian packaging may well be over-determined by multi-level factors 
coming from different geo-cultural locations. The first group of factors are the Taiwanese domestic 
conditions for cultural imaginations, including the political ideological atmosphere and market 
structure of TV. Over the past years, “vernacular” cosmopolitanism has been identified in 
Taiwanese avant-garde art that counters authorities such as the political ideologies, gender 
oppression and exploitation of third-world labour and their intersecting impacts upon Taiwanese 
gender and social minorities (Shih, 2007, p.175). Politically, not only Taiwanese politicians, but 
Taiwanese individuals too refuse to lose political autonomy under the arrangement of Beijing’s 
governance (Kaeding, 2014). Moreover, emergent social, gender, civil and student movements 
have sufficed to explain the lack of appeal of ethno-patriarchal nationalisation (from the existing 
discourses of either KMT or the DPP) for the younger Taiwanese generation (Sang, 1999; 
Kaeding, 2014, p.120; Rawnsley and Feng, 2014; Wu, 2015, p.293). These street movements 
will also influence new media workers. Yet, whether older political leaders will address the new 
urges is unknown. As Taiwan is expecting its next presidential election in January 2016, the new 
political leader, who is presumed to address and represent the Taiwanese collective will, will have 
administrative authority to influence the development of Taiwanese society and culture.   
The institutional factors of TV and the market, and the funding structure of idol drama are 
also determinate. This industry needs to maintain its capacity. Currently it relies on the 
international market (in particular the PRC), state subsidy and domestic TV advertisement 
(including product placement). Yet a larger overseas market whose mainstream values are 
becoming traditional, in conflicts with the emergent demands of a Taiwanese society that asks for 
further modernisation. The Taiwanese social and gender movements have been changing the 
collective mind-sets of society and its young generation to become more and more locally 
engaging and distanced from the neo-Confucian policy of the Sino-centric patriarchal nationalist 
authority in the PRC. Although the ownership fights for the Old Three came to an end, political 
contestation between the KMT and DPP is still at a high level in Taiwan. Conforming to any of the 
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two patriarchal nationalist forces is likely to direct the production system towards a different 
cultural imagination or nationalisation, serving the political economic interests of ethno-nationalist 
government and domestic business. Thus a healthy public broadcasting system that addresses 
local social and gender issues and minorities is strategically important. 
Secondly, the condition of other national media in the region will influence the existence and 
narrations of Taiwan’s inter-Asian packaging, which emerged contingently at the conjuncture of 
domestic deregulation and the regional and international trade market. Taiwan’s inter-Asian 
packaging took place largely when the PRC did not have domestic commercial productions 
targeting its female youngsters. In the changing and dynamic East Asian mass media market, 
success could come and go in only a few years. The competition from stronger media systems 
whose countries are also vying for soft power over the region is likely to extinguish Taiwanese 
hopes for survival. Developing strong national media systems and snuffing out the space of a 
small country and its media is an inevitable road for regional leadership for East Asian countries. 
The media industry in a small country in general is at a disadvantage in such free market 
competition.  
Taiwanese media might be too small to impact these stronger media. Its regional operation 
can only take advantage of the dynamism of big countries. Among the four types of inter-Asian 
activities of Taiwanese commercial TV workers presented in chapter 5, co-production with the 
PRC media is the most frequent, yet is controversial. How will the affluent PRC market influence 
Taiwan’s inter-Asian packaging in the future? The PRC entertainment market has been driving 
media workers from Hong Kong and Taiwan day by day (Yeh, 2010b; Chua, 2012b, p.19; Curtin, 
2013). This market, which is also competed for by the media business of other more developed 
countries, has become very dynamic and unpredictable. The PRC administers nationalistic 
protection of its own culture products that also vie for the same end result (export and influence) 
(Lee, 2010; 2012; Chua, 2012b, p.20; Hu and Ji, 2012; Keane and Liu, 2013). Will the Chinese 
patriarchal neo-Confucian policy and market force orient the commercial media of societies which 
are considered by it as “domestic parts” (such as Hong Kong and Taiwan), back towards a Sino-
centric standardisation (Shih, 2007, p.191) and suppress Taiwanese female desire for a more 
progressive way of life? 
Concerning this issue, film-makers from Hong Kong have been searching for possible ways 
to engage with the larger country. Previously, there were worrying and resistant statements, made 
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by Hong Kong film scholars, calling for attention to the “renationalisation” or “re-Sinicisation” of 
Hong Kong film industry. Seeing inter-Asian packager Peter Ho-Sun Chan choosing to relocate 
in the PRC and mainly address the country’s nationals after the late 2000s decade, Emilie Yueh-
yu Yeh (2010b) judges it as a deferral of commercial inter-Asian packaging of Hong Kong films. 
Michael Curtin (2013) notes it as the renationalisation of the Hong Kong film industry caused by 
the PRC film market force. Their controversial comments aim to raise more political concern about 
the cultural rights of Hong Kong under its gradual transition in the regional and global power 
structure. Yet so many factors are at work that, at the moment, cosmopolitan inter-Asian 
narrations in the recent inter-Asian packaging initiated by Hong Kong film-makers still exist, such 
as Shadows of Love (2012), 12 Chinese Zodiac (2012) and To the Fore (2015). Hong Kong’s 
commercial packaging may keep the identities of Hong Kong, but cannot attend to marginal social 
and gender issues, which are likely seen in the art-house films of Hong Kong (such as the works 
of Fruit Chan, Pang Ho-cheung, Tsang Tsui-Shan etc.) which, influenced by the economic rise of 
the PRC, struggle to critically articulate the region. 
My research findings indicate equally complicated interactions between the PRC and Taiwan. 
In the commercial economic network, Taiwanese TV producers inevitably get involved in the 
fundamental transformation of the region and the world for many reasons. One reason is that the 
PRC can make use of Taiwanese know-how and specialty, and another is that the South Korean 
and Japanese media are interested in getting the Chinese-speaking market via Taiwan. Culture 
(e.g. symbolic and intellectual activity) is argued to be one of the rare tools by which subjects from 
Taiwan can influence the region and the world (Shih, 2007, p.170). In the intellectual realm, Kuan-
Hsing Chen (2010) and Jieh-min Wu (2009, pp.151-152; 2012) call for critical forms of Taiwanese 
engagement with PRC society; Chen proposes intellectual activism and Wu calls for criticism of 
the collusion of cross-Strait political economic interest groups and attention to labour exploitation 
and gender oppression in the PRC.  
So what kinds of strategies have been emerging from the commercial cultural industry of 
Taiwan? Currently, the acceptable expectation towards the Taiwanese media workers’ westward 
movement to the PRC seems to be “dual tracks”: to co-operate with the PRC and thereby secure 
its own space (Shang, 2014b). This strategy of dual tracks, which can be understood as, for 
example, working for the PRC’s demands whilst finding space for producing discourses primarily 
for Taiwanese society, is seen in chapter 5. It hopes for a perfect “golden mean” between the 
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former and the latter – to “establish its (Taiwanese) own discursive authority” in the realm of 
culture (Shih, 2007, p.169). Whether working for the PRC or Taiwanese society, the idol drama 
packagers and other types of cultural producers are encouraged by critical intellectuals to keep 
their distance from dominant values and to commit to injecting criticality into mass media in 
Taiwan and the PRC. Post-colonial patriarchal nationalist regimes educate and constrain their 
people, yet they can be challenged, albeit slowly, by the people. The careers of Taiwanese TV 
workers, who spend more time in the Chinese production system, is consequently tied to Chinese 
media ecology.  
The PRC also faces complex internal variables extending to its more complex international 
exchanges with countries like South and North Koreas, Europe, South America, South and 
Central Asia, Africa and of course the US. For example, Chinese films and TV dramas have been 
actively co-operating with South Korea – see the discussions in Geng Song (2015, pp.108-113) 
and Ying Zhu (2008, pp.92-94). They are employing many Taiwanese idol drama producers and 
actors as representatives of the Chinese side, to co-work with South Korean media industries and 
stars. Chinese commercial media companies have their own approach to dealing with their 
authoritarian neo-Confucian regime. Chinese independent and critical film-makers have also 
learned to become more experienced in playing the game with the Chinese government. If 
Taiwanese workers are deeply attentive to the concerns of women in the PRC society, their career 
in the PRC is likely to be lengthened. If they do, they will be closer to the troupe of Chinese artists 
who counter against the authorities. Certainly, this would be time-consuming. The more familiar 
they are with PRC society, the more likely they will succeed in dealing with its dominant 
ideologies. The less familiar they are, the more likely they are to choose safer projects conforming 
to the mainstream. In an unfamiliar production system, Taiwanese symbolic workers are unlikely 
to seek narrative breakthrough.  
The crisis might be bigger for multiple marginalities in Taiwan because its TV industry, albeit 
a commercial one, is in crisis. The golden mean mentioned above presumes the existence of a 
stable Taiwanese symbolic production system, yet whether the mean is being established 
remains unknown. This golden mean cannot be maintained at all in the long term if Taiwanese 
society has no stable funding for its domestic TV industry, which then opportunistically makes use 
of other countries’ markets and production means and is forced to play a cat and mouse game 
with PRC media censorship. How can media workers balance their careers if one side no longer 
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exists? Maintaining balance is not easy for agents in a profit-driven environment as the PRC 
media industry would not primarily care about local issues in Taiwan. Banking simply on migrating 
workers whose careers are likely to tie in more closely with the PRC system is not practical. If 
Taiwan has a strong public TV system, this balance can be maintained more easily. 
If Taiwan’s domestic economic condition keeps worsening, media worker is forced to move 
to and stay in another place in the long term. Taiwanese people and media workers working with 
the PRC usually have to face patriotic pressure from Taiwan. The moral predicament of these 
mobile media workers is whether their shifting from a small Taiwanese stage to a more 
prosperous PRC stage is ethical. Are these workers abandoning their smaller home? How should 
they show loyalty to the home? Certainly, these mobile individuals are driven by commercial 
forces and economic interests. They seemingly are also “forced” to leave the home market in 
pursuit of better careers and business in a larger market (H.-l. Wang, 2009; Tseng, 2014; 2015). 
But, as cultural workers, they are unlike working class migrant workers and refugees because 
they might be more equipped to handle the conundrum and have more flexibility to construct their 
identities according to their own economic imperatives. Nonetheless the dilemma about 
“commitment and allegiance to home country and industry” will be hovering in the minds of these 
individuals, especially well-known media workers, celebrities and stars who get involved with the 
PRC (and any other new markets in larger countries). Their trouble is different from that of migrant 
workers and refugees. Their influence and fame will put them in the centre of the public sphere; 
they eventually must respond to the relay of national politics. 
This changing world has made symbolic work in Taiwan and the other parts of the world, a 
much more difficult task. The mediations of Taiwanese TV drama workers are conditioned by the 
above political and economic contexts. Either way, the dichotomous spectrum between complicity 
(or, women’s melodrama) and criticality (or, women’s film) in various levels of signification remains 
the guiding principle for cultural criticism. The commercial trade route usually produces works in 
line with existent discourses and rejects non-mainstream ideas. Most of the time, the latter then 
is forced, reluctantly, to stay in minor and marginal space. Idol drama is a relatively young medium 
without much convention established. More workers from art-house cultural productions are 
turning to the commercial system. One informant (S3) believes that although idol drama began 
as a copy, it is malleable. Her main concern is how much it can be changed and in what way (S3, 
personal communication, Jan 25, 2013, p.2). At a public talk held in July 2013, S1 said that she 
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has been injecting the artistic spirit of the theatre into her subsequent work to change the creative 
and production atmosphere in idol drama making. These people are competing to win the hearts 
of audiences with their thoughts. Cultural analysts should capture the negotiation between 
criticality and complicity to discover forms of (mild and) contextual critiques. 
Taiwan maintains the political system of an electoral-democratic country; thus it might not 
face the same situation as Hong Kong whose political future was determined by two external 
political powers. The current collective anxiety in Taiwan resulting from the lack of clear political 
vision is a bit like that in Hong Kong during the early 1980s when political decisions about its 
future were undecided. Ironically, this unsettling anxiety is a productive and even an enabling soil 
for critical minds and intellectuals, from a cultural or artistic viewpoint. The key issue about mass 
media is whether critical signification can slowly flow into mass media productions to change the 
greater social cultural milieu (consciously and unconsciously). Although Taiwanese political 
autonomy has institutionally secured the freedom of information and expression despite its 
vulnerability, how intelligently former variety-show runners and their packaging team members 
handle the aesthetic, social and political issues mentioned above remains a question. Producer-
director Tsai Yueh-Hsun honestly confessed that he and his colleagues were not sufficiently 
prepared in the early 2000s, in terms of their understanding about markets in the East Asian 
countries and their production experiences, and as a result their opportunities disappeared quickly 
over the next three years. He said:  
Jerry Feng, Virginia Liu, me…usually discussed this (producing for East Asian regional markets). But after 
Meteor Garden…the popularity (of idol drama) disappeared in three years. We self criticised and knew that 
we were not ready and prepared (in terms of our creative and production ability, including how we produce, 
how to communicate with audience, marketing, understanding the markets). The Taiwanese creators were 
not ready. Thus our first wave passed quickly. (P2, personal communication, Feb 20, 2013, p.2) 
 
In addition, how much new blood – especially newly joining symbolic workers from the non-
mainstream system (directors and writers from public TV system, art-house film-making and 
theatre) – can change the field of idol drama requires future inquiry. The end results are all 
connected to the time-consuming accumulation of experience and intelligence of workers in mass 
media. Continuous engagement with mass media culture in diverse ways is necessary for those 
hoping to spread ideas from themselves to those who do not belong in the intellectual circle, as 
Gramsci (1971, p.350) and Stuart Hall (1992, p.268) call for. Nonetheless, criticism is not an end 
because meanings are ultimately generated by numerous individuals, most of whom are 
presumably women keeping close or far distances with the identities of “nationals”, “citizens” and 
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“consumers” in dynamic East Asia (including Taiwan). Although the dramatic imaginations in 
mass media usually offer us conformist opinions and minimum progress, investigations must 
continue. This might be the true meaning when it is said that cultural studies’ research on the 




Appendix A. Glossary 
Glossary Original 
12 Chinese Zodiac 十二生肖 
a dissonance like a square peg in a round 
hole 
格格不入 
A Terracotta Warrior 秦俑 
A Touch of Green  一把青 
Aaron Yan  炎亞綸 
aim too high but accomplish little because 
of little talent 
眼高手低 
Alice in Wonder City 給愛麗絲的奇蹟 
All about Eve 이브의 모든 것 
Amor de Tarapaca 紫藤戀 
Andy Hui 許志安 
Angie Chai 柴智屏 
Anhui Broadcasting System 安徽廣播電視 
Anti-Secession Law 反分裂國家法 
Asian Trilogy 亞洲三部曲 
Asia-Pacific Regional Operations Centre 亞太營運中心計劃 
Asunaro White Paper あすなろ白書 
Atari Kousuke  中孝介 
Azio TV 東風衛星電視台 
Barbie Hsu 徐熙媛 
bases in Taiwan, aiming at all 
entertainment-related business in Asia, to 
ultimately worldwide 
立足台灣，放眼亞洲，進軍世界 
Because of You 星光下的童話 
Beijing Hualubaina Film & TV Company 
Ltd.  
北京華錄百納影視股份有限公司 
benshengren  本省人 
Black and White 痞子英雄 
Bo-Shin Japan Channel 博新日本台 
Boys Over Flowers 花より男子 
Bright Girl’s Success 명랑소녀 성공기 
Butokuden  武徳殿 
Cable Radio and Television Act 有線電視法 
Calling for Love 呼叫大明星 
Calvin Chen 辰亦儒 
Cape No. 7  海角七號 
Chang Man-Ling 章曼玲 
Chao Shen-Shen 趙深深 
Chen Cheng-Kung 陳成功 
Chen Hai-Chieh 陳海傑 
Chen I-Chun 陳一俊 
Chen Li-Chun 陳麗君 
Chen Shui-Bian 陳水扁 
Chi Wei-Yi 戚偉易 
Chin Cheng-Tian 金承天 
China Entertainment Satellite TV  华娱卫视 
China Television Company 中國電視公司 
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Chinese Communist Party 
中國共產黨 
Chinese Television System 中華電視公司 
Chinese-language Wave 華流 
Choi Si Won 최 시 원  
Chong Hui Huai Bao 重回懷抱 
Chrysanthemum’s Spring 小菊的春天 
Chu Ja-Hyun 추 자 현  
Chu Yen-Ping 朱延平 
Chu Yu-Ning  瞿友寧 
Chun Long International Entertainment 
Co. 
群龍國際影視娛樂有限公司 
Chung Tian Satellite TV Station 中天衛星電視公司 
City of Sky 天空之城 
CNplus Production Co.  黑劍電視節目製作股份有限公司 
Come to My Family 來我家吧 
Comic International Production Co. Ltd. 可米國際影視事業股份有限公司 
Comic Ritz Production Co. Ltd. 可米瑞智國際藝能有限公司  
connecting with the international  接軌國際 
Corner with Love  轉角遇到愛 
Crying out Love, in the Centre of the 
World 
世界の中心で、愛をさけぶ 
Da-Ai TV 大愛電視 
Dae Jang Geum 대 장 금  
Dafang Entertainment Production Co. 大方影像製作股份有限公司 
Democratic Progressive Party 民主進步黨 
Department of Publicity 
中國共產黨中央宣傳部 
Die Sterntaler 白色之戀 
doing good deeds before it is too late 及時行善 
Domani Production 多曼尼製作有限公司 
Down with Love 就想賴著妳 
Doze Niu  紐承澤 
Dream Lover 夢中人 
Dreams Link  又見一簾幽夢 
Eastern Shine Production Co. 東映製作公司 
Economic Co-operation Framework 
Agreement 
兩岸經濟合作架構協議 
Eddie Peng 彭于晏 
Emerald on the Roof  屋頂上的綠寶石 
Endless Love 愛無限 
Extravagant Challenge 華麗的挑戰 
Fabulous Boy 原來是美男 
Fahrenheit 飛輪海 
Fang Jianjun  方建軍 
Fang Lei 方磊 
Fang Ying 方瑩 
Fated to Love You  命中注定我愛你 
Fathers’ War 門當父不對 aka 老爸駕到 
Five Hundred Years of Regret 恨五百年 
Fondant Garden 翻糖花園 
Formosa Television Inc. 民間全民電視公司 
Formula 17 十七歲的天空 
Fort Provintia  赤崁樓 
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Four Happiness House 四喜院 
Fruit Chan 陳果 
Fuji TV フジテレビ 
Fujioka Dean 藤岡靛 
Fukuyama Masaharu  福山雅治 
Full House 풀 하 우 스  
Fulong Production Co. 福隆製作公司 
Gala TV Station 八大電視公司 
Gangster’s Bakery 流氓蛋糕店 
Gao Min 高明 
Ge Fu-Hong 葛福鴻 
Gold-Sun TV Channel 國興衛視 
Governmental Information Office 中華民國行政院新聞局 
Gu Hye Seon 구 혜 선  
Hakka 客家話/客家人 
Happy & Love Forever 幸福一定強 
Hatanaka Tatsuro 畠中達郎 
He Ting-Yu  賀霆宇 
Hi My Dear 嗨！親愛的 
Hi My Sweetheart 海派甜心 
Hiraoka Yuta  平岡祐太 
Hokkien 閩南語 
Hoklo 閩南人 
Home  回家 aka 彼岸 1945 
Honey and Clover 蜂蜜幸運草 
Honto Production 紅豆製作股份有限公司 
Hou Wen-yong 侯文詠 
Hu Jintao 胡錦濤 
Hua-Ce Media Company 華策影視 
Huang Song 黃崧 
Huaqiao 華僑 
Hunan Broadcasting System  湖南廣播電視 
I Am Sorry I love you 미 안 하 다  사 랑 한 다  
Ichige Rumiko 市毛琉美子 
In Time with You  我可能不會愛你 
Indigenous people 原住民 
It started with a Kiss  惡作劇之吻 
It Takes Two to Tango 車拚 
Ito Seiko 伊藤聖子 
IUUI 我愛你愛你愛我 
Jackie Chan 成龍 
Jerry Feng 馮家瑞 
Jerry Yan 言承旭 
Ji Mi  幾米 
Jian Man-Shu 簡嫚書 
Joanne Tseng 曾之喬 
Joseph Cheng  鄭元暢 
Just Give Me a Call 麻雀愛上鳳凰 
Kabukicho 歌舞伎町 
Kamio Yoko 神尾 葉子 
Kaneshiro Takeshi 金城武 
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Kansai TV 関西テレビ 
Ken Chu 朱孝天 
Kim Seong Nyeol  金成烈 
Kim So-Yeon 김 소 연  
King Hu 胡金銓 
Kitamura Toyoharu 北村豐晴 
Knock Knock Loving You 敲敲愛上你 
Kubonouchi Eisaku 窪之内英策 
Kuomintang, Chinese Nationalist Party 中國國民黨 
Lavender  薰衣草 
Lee Dong Hae 이 동 해  
Legend of the Mountains 山中傳奇 
Letter 1949 我在 1949 等你 
Li Chih-Chiang  李志薔 
Li Hsing 李行 
Lin Chi-Ling 林志玲 
Lin Jung-San 林榮三 
Lin Kung-Hai 林崑海 
Ling Xiao-Su 凌蕭肅 
Lisa King 金莉莎 
Liu Cheng-Wei  劉城偉 
Love and Farewell 愛情與離別 
Love at Aegean Sea 情定愛琴海 
Love Now  真愛趁現在 
Love or Bread 我的億萬麵包 
Love Textbook 戀愛講義 
Ma Ru-Lon 馬如龍 
Mag Hsu 徐譽庭 
Mars 戰神 
martial law 戒嚴法 
Material Queen 拜金女王 
Mayday 五月天 
Medialink Entertainment Ltd. 羚邦動畫（國際）有限公司 
Meteor Garden 流星花園 
Michael’s Dance 米迦勒之舞 
Michelle Saram/Zheng Xue-Er 鄭雪兒 
Midnight Restaurant 深夜食堂 
Miike Takashi 三池崇史 
Miss No Good  不良笑花 
My Combat Butler 旋風管家 
My Perfect Boyfriend 絕對達令 
Nagasawa Masami  長澤まさみ 
National Communications Commission  國家通訊傳播委員會 
neither fish nor fowl 四不像 
New Asian projects of Chinese-language 
film and television 
亞洲華語影視新計畫 
Nine Chang 張鈞甯 
Once Upon a Time in Beitou 熱海戀歌 
One Country, Two Systems 一國兩制 
operation at international or regional scale  國際經營 
ouxiangju 偶像劇 
Pai Hsien-Yung 白先勇 
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Pang Ho-cheung 彭浩翔 
Park Eun-Hye 박 은 혜  
Park Jung-Min 박 정 민  
Park Shin Hye 박 신 혜  
Peggy Ko  柯宜勤 
People’s Republic of China 中華人民共和國 
Peter Ho-Sun Chan 陳可辛 
Power Generation Entertainment Co. Ltd. 星勢力娛樂股份有限公司 
Prajna Works Entertainment Co. Ltd. 普拉嘉國際意像影藝股份有限公司 
Pu Cheng-Chun 朴成俊 
Public Television Service 公共電視台 
Pure in My Heart 열 아 홉  순 정  
Queen of SOP SOP 女王 aka 勝女的代價 
Radio and Television Act 廣播電視法 
Raining in the Mountain 空山靈雨 
Rainy Dog  極道黒社会 
reincarnation between previous and 
current lives 
前世今生 
Republic of China 中華民國 
Saimon Fumi 柴門ふみ  
Sanlih Entertainment Television Company 三立電視公司 
Satellite Broadcasting Act 衛星廣播電視法 
Say Yes Enterprise 求婚事務所 
Scent of Chrysanthemum 국 화 꽃  향 기  
Scent of Love 戀香 
Shadows of Love 影子愛人 
Shanghai Dragon Satellite TV 上海東方衛視 
Shanghai Yiaoxingying Media Company 上海曜新穎影視製作公司 
Sharon Mao 毛訓容 
Shen Yi 沈怡 
Shenzhen Broadcasting System  深圳廣播電視集團 
Shinjuku Triad Society  新宿黒社会 
Silence 深情密碼 
Sleepless Town  不夜城 
Song Qian 宋茜 
Spring Love  美人龍湯 
Starlit 心星的淚光 
Starry Starry Night 雪地裡的星星 
State Administration of Press, Publication, 
Radio, Film and Television 
中華人民共和國國家新聞出版廣播電影電視總局 
Stealing Heart 偷心 aka 天若有情 
Sumitomo Trading Co., Ltd 住友商事 
Sunny Girl 陽光天使 
Sunny Happiness 幸福最晴天 
Super Sunday 超級星期天 
Swallowtail  スワロウテイル 
Sweet Relationship  美味關係 
Tainan Confucius Temple 台南孔廟 
Taipei Film Commission  台北市電影委員會 
Taipei International Flora Exposition 台北國際花卉博覽會 
Tai-phoon 台風 
Taiwan Broadcasting System 台灣公共廣播集團 
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Taiwan New Cinema 台灣新電影 
Taiwan Original Filmmakers Union 電影創作聯盟 
Taiwan Television Company 台灣電視公司 
Taiwanese Wave 台流 
Taiwanese-Korean Trilogy 中韓三部曲 
Tanaka Chie 田中千絵 
Tatsumi Chie 辰巳千惠 
Television Broadcasts Satellite TV 無線衛星電視台 
Teresa Li-Chun Teng 鄧麗君 
Terry Hu (Hu Yin-Meng) 胡茵夢 
The Fourth Channel 第四台 
The Old Three 老三台 
The Reincarnation of Golden Lotus  潘金蓮的前世今生 
The Rose  薔薇之戀 
Three 三更 
To the Fore 破風 
Tomorrow  愛情白皮書 
traitor 漢奸 
Tsai Eng-Meng 蔡衍明 
Tsai Yueh-Hsun 蔡岳勳 
Tsang Tsui-Shan 曾翠珊 
Tsao Jui-Yuan  曹瑞原 
Turn Right Turn Left 向左走向右走 
Vanness Wu 吳建豪 
Vic Chou 周渝民 
Videoland Japan Channel 緯來日本台 
Virginia Liu 劉瑋慈 
waishengren/mainlanders 外省人 
Wan Ren 萬仁 
Wayward Kenting 我在墾丁天氣晴 
When Love Walked In 愛情闖進門 
White Tower 白色巨塔 
White Tower 白い巨塔 
Winter Sonata 겨 울 연 가  
Wu Lo-Ying 吳洛纓 
Yeh Yu-Ping Michelle 葉育萍 
Yin Hsiang-Chih 尹香之 
Yi-Yuan Production House 一元製作室 
You Light up My Star 你照亮我星球 
zhizuoren 製作人 
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